The small-form-factor Galileo OS (Open Service) or PRS (Public Regulated Service) sensors are designed to enhanced GNSS receivers and resilient multi-sensor navigation systems, ensuring safer and more reliable satellite-based navigation.
The Galileo PRS core module integrates a certified, single-chip, application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) security module that incorporates all the necessary Galileo PRS security and navigation functions. It provides dual-frequency (E1/E6) iono-free Galileo PRS positioning, velocity and timing services. It also provides pseudorange and delta pseudorange raw data, along with GPS C/A (coarse acquisition).
The low-SWaP (size, weight and power) digital solution has been designed to work with any European GNSS receiver manufacturer seeking a standardized, easy-to-integrate Galileo module with which to develop their own GNSS receivers.
Credit: Thales
The modules can meet the requirements of a wide range of applications for manned or unmanned vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, high-dynamic missiles, and the navy. Their small form factor also makes them suitable for platforms with size constraints, such as ground vehicles, small drones and guided munitions.
The modules feature standardized interfaces, enabling the Galileo PRS function to be easily integrated into the host system. Furthermore, the TopStar Galileo core module can be embedded with minimum impact by using the analog RF front end of the host receiver.
The Galileo OS core module version enables the early integration of Galileo functionalities into the host system, as well as export to countries not authorized to use PRS. The PRS core module version provides an easy upgrade to Public Regulated Service capability, offering greater resilience against jamming and crucial protection against spoofing.
How do/will/should North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces integrate GPS and Galileo for position, navigation and time?
Ellen Hall
“For improved resiliency, it would be a great move for NATO to integrate Galileo with GPS into their system. The ‘how’ will be difficult. Some of the challenges are that the EU consists of more than a single nation with which to negotiate complex security issues, such as whether NATO will be treated as a ‘third nation entity’ for the use of PRS. The initial Galileo development was difficult for all these reasons and the Europeans managed to sort it all out, so I’m confident that, if the desire is to do this, it can be done successfully.”
— Ellen Hall Imminent Federal
John Fischer
“In the interest of operational robustness and the criticality of the use case, NATO should integrate GPS and Galileo capability at the earliest. Both GPS’ M-code and Galileo’s PRS are encrypted, providing anti-spoof capability and extra frequency diversity, making jamming of our forces more difficult. Crypto key management for both systems may be an extra burden, but a single receiver capable of operating with either system individually or both simultaneously would be key for interoperability — always a driving factor for NATO. The capability is available, and NATO should take advantage of it.”
Galileo Control Centre in Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany. (Photo: ESA)
News from the European Space Agency (ESA)
Europe’s Galileo satellite navigation system continues to evolve. For the first time, end-to-end testing of the Galileo system demonstrated signal acquisition of an improved version of the Public Regulated Service (PRS), the most secure and robust class of Galileo services.
The system test extended from the Galileo Security Monitoring Centre in Spain and the Galileo Control Centre in Germany to a Galileo satellite at ESA’s ESTEC technical heart in the Netherlands, which then broadcast in turn to a user receiver.
Galileo’s PRS is an encrypted navigation and timing service for governmental authorized users and sensitive applications intended to remain available even in scenarios where other Galileo services might be degraded or jammed.
An initial version of the PRS signal has been broadcast by the satellites up to now, but as of next year the signals will evolve into an enhanced version known as Full Operational Capability Public Regulated Service (FOC PRS), which has been defined in close collaboration with the European Commission, the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) and the EU Member States.
The system’s FOC PRS capability is being enabled by an expansion of the Galileo ground mission segment — important upgrades of the Galileo Security Monitoring Centres (GSMCs) in St. Germain-en-Laye, France, and Madrid, Spain. These two sites oversee PRS provision and monitor its performance.
This coming version of the security monitoring centers, set for the following year, is being developed by an industrial consortium led by Thales Alenia Space in France.
Meanwhile the progressive deployment of remote system infrastructure is taking place over the course of this year, readying Galileo sensor stations to receive the upgraded PRS signals.
Upgrade of Galileo Sensor Station on Norway’s remote Jan Mayen Island in the Arctic Ocean. (Photo: ESA)
“To qualify, the FOC PRS Signal in Space required a major Galileo end-to-end test, demonstrating the compatibility of the space segment with the ground and user segments, called the System Compatibility Test Campaign (SCTC),” explained Federico Di Marco, ESA SCTC test director. “This test involved all Galileo key players spread across Europe, requiring close cooperation between the teams and months of preparation.”
The SCTC was led by an ESA engineering team from the agency’s ESTEC technical center in Noordwijk, the Netherlands supported by the System Engineering Technical Assistance industrial team led by Thales Alenia Space in Italy and in close collaboration with the operations team supervised by EUSPA.
“The testing involved three centers across Europe: the GSMC in Madrid, the Galileo Control Centre in Oberpfaffenhofen, and ESTEC hosting an actual Galileo satellite plus FOC PRS user receivers,” added Edward Breeuwer, who is in charge of Galileo system qualification at ESA.
FOC PRS test receiver developed by Antwerp Space under ESA contract. (Photo: ESA)
The FOC PRS signal was generated at the GSMC, sent to the German control center, then uplinked to the Galileo satellite at ESTEC, where the satellites are tested for space in advance of launch. The Galileo satellite then broadcast the FOC PRS signal in turn, to be picked up by a pair of receivers also on site: one developed by Antwerp Space under ESA contract and the other developed by Leonardo as part of a national development undertaken by Italy’s Competent PRS Authority, charged with overseeing the country’s PRS use.
“This marks the first time we have integrated such a nationally developed receiver within a system test activity,” said Fabio Covello, who oversees system security for ESA. “Having achieved this for PRS makes us very proud. We are confident that this experience can pave the way for future fruitful collaborations between the Galileo Programme and EU Member States, in the frame of specific tests to guarantee compatibility between the ESA-developed system and nationally developed PRS receivers.”
This successful outcome sets the scene for the PRS qualification at ground segment and system level, followed by operational validation planned in coming months, culminating in the first FOC PRS Signal In Space operational broadcast, in the course of next year.
FOC PRS test receiver developed by Leonardo as part of a national development undertaken by Italy’s Competent PRS Authority, charged with overseeing the country’s PRS use. (Photo: ESA)
Galileo Second Generation Batch#1B satellites. (Image: ESA).
Technology multinational GMV has been awarded the NAVGUARD project by the European Commission.
NAVGUARD (Advanced Galileo PRS Resilience for EU Defence) will develop ground and space systems to detect illegal activities on GNSS frequencies and geolocate their sources. It also will build an information-management subsystem together with a user interface to provide a situational awareness picture.
The Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) is an encrypted navigation service for governmental authorized users and sensitive applications that require high continuity.
According to the EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), the PRS signal will ensure better continuity of service to authorized users when access to other navigation services may be degraded (resilience). In cases of malicious interference, PRS increases the likelihood of the continuous availability of the signal-in-space (robustness).
NAVGUARD is among various European Defence Fund (EDF) projects designed to sharpen the competitiveness of the European Union defense industry and strengthen the EU’s strategic autonomy. Besides navigation, the projects contracted to GMV will focus on developing missile defense system capabilities, systems for dismounted soldiers, avionics, command and control and cyber defense.
The Munich Satellite Navigation Summit program is now online and registration for the event is open. The summit will be held online March 7-8.
The Munich Satellite Navigation Summit focuses on satellite navigation in the present day and future, featuring global speakers and highlighting the latest developments in the field of GNSS. This year’s theme is “AI in GNSS – Intelligence brought to Navigation”.
The summit will feature 12 sessions from industry experts, including sessions on the following topics:
First and Second Generation of the European Satellite Navigation System Galileo
Modernization of the US Global Positioning System
Status and modernization of the Russian Global Satellite Navigation System GLONASS and the Chinese Beidou System (BDS)
Developments of regional systems like the Japanese QZSS and the Indian IRNSS and the Korean Positioning System (KPS)
Use of AI within the navigation world and its implications
GMV will supply its advanced navigation and timing solution to the Spanish Army, providing positioning information on armored vehicles with or without GNSS signals.
The 8×8 Dragón wheeled combat vehicle (WCV, or VCR in Spanish) will use GMV’s ISNAV system. GMV signed a contract with TESS Defence in August 2020 for €2.1 billion. The contract will equip 240 Dragóns with ISNAVs. GMV plans to produce the ISNAV units at its manufacturing facilities in Tres Cantos, which opened in 2019. The first units will be delivered in the fourth quarter of 2023.
The ISNAV system was developed by GMV as part of the VCR 8×8 Technology Program. It meets the demanding requirements of the program and has successfully passed both the mission system integration tests, and the functional tests installed on several demonstration units.
The ISNAV was designed to be modular equipment that can be adapted to various vehicle configurations, sensors and receivers. It includes the option of including Galileo PRS to provide advanced PNT (positioning, navigation and timing) capabilities, making it possible to determine the position of the vehicle in all kinds of scenarios, including scenarios without a GNSS signal.
Spain-based GMV is taking responsibility for integration of the GNSS/PRS receiver system for the European Union’s (EU’s) GEODE project.
GEODE (GalilEO for EU DEfence) is the biggest Galileo application development project ever launched and a crucial and decisive step towards the development of the Galileo Galileo PRS (PRS) military user segment. GEODE is and one of the most ambitious defense cooperation projects launched under the umbrella of the European Commission’s European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP).
Co-financed by Belgium, Germany, Italy, France and Spain, GEODE is supported by the EU with a grant of about 44 million Euros.
GMV, part of the Spanish industrial team, will develop the GNSS/PRS receiver’s signal-processing, navigation and timing functions. GMV also participated in the Feb. 8 GEODE kick-off meeting.
GEODE aims to boost the EU industry’s competitiveness in the highly strategic domain of military positioning, navigation, timing and synchronization (PNT) and to endow EU military forces with Galileo PRS capacity. The project will be implemented by a consortium of 30 undertakings from 14 EU countries.
The Spanish industrial team made up by GMV, Indra and Tecnobit, takes on first-level responsibility for the complete development of the solution for naval military platforms (GNSS/PRS receiver with security module and CRPA antenna). GMV is responsible for the integration of the GNSS/PRS receiver system and, in particular, for the development of all the receiver’s signal-processing, navigation and timing functions.
GEODE will provide the EU Industry with an even playing field in the Defense PNT market, where military GPS’s essentialness at the moment ensures U.S. industry’s supremacy. It will also reinforce EU military capability and autonomy and maximize the benefits of the Galileo program by promoting take-up of its crucial PRS service.
Following an initial specification and standardization phase, the project will then prototype, test and qualify all the elements of a complete PRS solution:
A PRS solution for spacecraft will be also designed and prototyped. Complementarily, a PRS infrastructure will be developed to ensure the availability of the security assets necessary for operational testing.
Military operational field testing will be organized on military naval and land platforms, RPAS, and a timing and synchronization system.
GEODE will boost the EU industry competitiveness in the highly strategic domain of military positioning, timing and synchronization, it will foster the equipment of EU Member States’ military forces with the Galileo PRS capability, essential to reinforce their interoperability and autonomy. It also will facilitate access to complex security certified technologies and make them affordable through means of standardization and by creating the necessary critical mass.
A crucial step toward the development of the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) military user segment took place Monday, Feb. 8, with the kick-off meeting in Brussels of the GEODE (GalilEO for EU DEfence) project, according to a press release from FDC.
GEODE is the biggest Galileo application development project ever launched.
Sponsored by Belgium, Germany, Italy, France and Spain — contributions should exceed 82.7 million euros — GEODE is supported by the EU with a grant of about 44 million euros. The ambitious defence-cooperation project is under the umbrella of the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) of the European Commission.
GEODE will establish the framework for developing the Galileo PRS user segment for defense applications. At kick-off, the project involved 30 companies and organizations from 14 EU Member States: Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Romania.
The GEODE Roadmap
National defense organizations — in close cooperation with industry — have defined a roadmap for the Galileo PRS military user segment development, beginning with a specification and standardization phase. GEODE will prototype, test and qualify
seven PRS security modules developed from various technologies
nine PRS receivers (including two server-based variants)
four GPS/Galileo PRS-compatible anti-jamming controlled radiation pattern antennas (CRPA).
A common and standardized test environment will be developed as well as a PRS infrastructure to ensure the availability of the security assets for operational testing.
Finally, military operational field testing will be organized on military platforms (naval, land and drones) and timing and synchronization systems in (at least) Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece and Romania.
A PRS solution for spacecraft will also be designed and prototyped.
Beyond paving the way for the equipment of EU Member States defense forces with Galileo PRS, the military user segment that is developed, tested and certified under GEODE is planned to be available for export to other countries that have the necessary PRS security agreements with the EU.
The GEODE project will be completed in 2026.
Plans are for GEODE to
boost EU competitiveness in the highly strategic domain of military positioning, timing and synchronization.
foster the equipment of EU Member States’ military forces with Galileo PRS capability, essential to reinforce their interoperability and autonomy.
facilitate access to complex security-certified technologies and make them affordable through means of standardization and by creating the necessary critical mass.
In brief, the project will bolster EU Member States’ military capability, create business opportunities for the EU industry in the field of military application of satellite navigation, and maximize the benefits of the Galileo programme by energizing the adoption of its PRS service in all EU Member States and beyond.
Background on GEODE
This project has received funding from the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) under grant agreement No 039.
The GEODE industrial consortium is led by FDC and comprises the major industry players of the field: Airbus Defence and Space, Antwerp Space, Cy4gate, Diehl Defence, Elettronica, Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits IIS, GMV Aerospace and Defense, Indra Sistemas, Safran Electronics and Defense, Leonardo, Siemens Aktiengesellshaft, Orolia, Tecnobit, Telespazio, Thales Alenia Space Italia, Thales AVS France, Thales SIX GTS France, accompanied with 12 other EU companies acting as subcontractors (c.f. picture hereafter).
The GEODE project is developed in the context of the European Radio-navigation Solution (EURAS) project of the Permanent Structure Cooperation (PESCO). The EURAS project aims at promoting the development of EU military positioning, navigation and timing) capabilities and future cooperation taking advantage of Galileo and the PRS.
With Brexit on the horizon, the U.K. Space Agency is interested in creating its own GNSS.
The agency is investing in research and development that explores challenges and ideas around receivers for a future UK global navigation satellite system.
Specifically, the agency is seeking UK organizations that are interested in investigating and developing concepts for satellite system receivers.
Following Brexit, the UK would be locked out from the European Union’s Galileo-provided services, including the upcoming Public Regulated Service (PRS), an encrypted navigation signal for governmental-authorized users and sensitive applications such as the military.
The 2019 Munich Satellite Navigation Summit, which will take place March 25-27 in Munich, Germany, will offer a number of educational sessions to attendees.
One of the sessions will key in on the future use of the Galileo public regulated service (PRS). According to show organizers, this session will discuss the deployment of the Galileo ground- and space-segment — including the PRS relevant components — which will reach full operational capability in the next years. The session will also cover PRS-receiver developments and PRS testing.
Other sessions offered by the conference will include legal aspects on selected topics in the field of GNSS; augmented reality meets high-accuracy positioning; GNSS program updates; satellite and terrestrial navigation trends; and more.
According to organizers, the Summit is part of the efforts of the Bavarian government and the cluster on aerospace and satellite navigation to stimulate applications and services in this high-tech field.
Spirent Communications plc has partnered with Fraunhofer IIS and LZE GmbH to ensure continuity of supply of Spirent’s Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) Radio Frequency Constellation Simulator (RFCS) product extension after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union (EU).
The new partnership will see sales and order processing hosted by LZE GmbH of Erlangen, Germany, with Munich-based Fraunhofer lIS taking on responsibility for the future development, fulfillment and support of Galileo PRS in the Spirent GSS9000 GNSS test solution.
Fraunhofer will become the sole owner of the SimPRS software/firmware, which will no longer be accessible to Spirent after the U.K. leaves the EU.
Spirent is exhibiting this week at ION GNSS+ 2018 in Miami.
This partnership and strategy is technically made possible through Spirent’s RFCS system architecture providing a clearly defined interface, with strict need-to-know separation between the core RFCS and PRS hardware and software components. This well-defined delineation ensures that both the RFCS and PRS simulation tools can be developed independently, the companies said.
“We are delighted with this new partnership with Fraunhofer and LZE,” said Martin Foulger, general manager of Spirent’s global positioning business. “We have been actively exploring contingency strategies to address the possibility that our UK-based Positioning Technology Division would be disallowed from engaging with Galileo PRS-related activities following Brexit. With this partnership in place, LZE, Fraunhofer IIS and Spirent are confident that this new approach will successfully deliver continuity of supply for Galileo PRS on the GSS9000 RFCS.”
Spirent and Fraunhofer IIS, together with key Spirent Galileo RFCS customers, can confirm that authorization was given by the relevant authorities to proceed with the partnership and that a legal framework was agreed between the two organizations.
That framework is allowing both parties to execute on a focussed technology transfer, training and quality assurance plan that will result in Fraunhofer IIS taking qualified technical ownership of the SimPRS product by the end of 2018.
The technical challenge and programmatic risks associated with this migration exercise are significantly mitigated by Spirent’s similar experience in working with a third-party U.S. entity to add GPS Modernized Navstar Security Algorithm (MNSA) support to the GSS9000.
Growing awareness of the vulnerabilities of GNSS signals — weak, unencrypted and easily jammed or spoofed — have made GNSS less important to steering the driverless vehicle. What’s up with that?
Extensive visual map databases are being created that, when coupled with cameras, radars and lidars on the vehicle and processed by artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, enable the driverless car to be steered much the way humans drive. Pattern recognition processing in the vehicle allows it to “read” street signs and recognize landmarks, registering its position on the map.
This is the way a person drives in his or her home town, where they always know their orientation and don’t need GNSS. The AI processing “brain,” with access to huge map databases, either through local storage or a network connection, will always be in its familiar home environment: continuously knowing its own position and properly oriented for navigation.
So, will GNSS become unnecessary in the car of the future? Probably not.
First, no one method of navigation is foolproof, and today, GNSS is our primary method of navigating our cars. It is a cost-effective, accurate way of determining position in real time, and with the integration of inertial navigation sensors to handle cases when GNSS is intermittently unavailable, it is improving.
Second, it is not just the car itself that needs to know its location for navigation, but also others outside the car. Ride-sharing apps like Uber and Lyft, car-sharing, usage-based insurance apps, dynamic toll charging, and parking apps all depend on knowing where the car is at all times. GNSS offers sufficient accuracy for all these apps by providing location coordinates. Therefore, a GNSS receiver will most likely remain in the car.
The case for jamming and spoofing
Recall, however, that one of the weaknesses of GNSS is its open, unencrypted format. It is becoming increasingly easier to spoof these signals. Car-sharing, usage-based insurance and dynamic toll charging apps all create a monetary incentive for fraud that can be implemented with a spoofer. For example, a car in a car-sharing network can report a fake position indicating that it is safely parked in a secure area — while in reality, a thief is busy driving it away.
(Image: Orolia)
Let’s assume that all wireless connections to and from the car are secure. This is a reasonable assumption, although recently there have been demonstrations of carjacking via unsecure remote links. Standard SSL encryption, similar to what is used to enter credit card information on the internet, works well here. We have both the awareness and the technology now to prevent such carjackings from ever reoccurring.
However, even if communication links are secure, a GNSS spoofer in the car can fool the GNSS receiver into reporting a fake “safe” position right as it is being stolen. The same is true for insurance or toll apps. And the fraud does not have to be sophisticated. A simple, low-cost jammer can deny proper position just long enough to skirt payment. A secure location method is needed.
Other signals for localization
What would an ideal signal for localizing a driverless car look like?
It needs to be much stronger than GNSS so it is not easily jammed.
It needs to be encrypted so it cannot be spoofed.
It must be ubiquitous, available worldwide.
It must be reliable and robust — with 99.999% availability or better.
It must be practical and priced for the mass-market automotive application.
Though accuracy is always important, the signal used for localization does not have to be as accurate as GNSS is today. Accuracy to 10s of meters is sufficient for all these applications needing fraud protection since it would not be used for steering the car, but rather, only localization. It can also be used in tandem with GNSS to authenticate a reported position when a GNSS signal is available.
Such a signal is available today, worldwide: STL (Satellite Time and Location). Carried on the Iridium satellites, it is a special purpose signal that is more than 30 dB stronger than GNSS and encrypted for anti-spoof protection. Decoding of this signal is available via a subscription model to users.
Here’s how it would work using a car-sharing example. A group of people subscribe to a car-sharing service that provides X number of cars to serve Y number of people, where X is less than Y. The service optimally schedules people when and where a car will be available. The service provider needs to know the whereabouts of the cars at all times to maximize utilization of the fleet, so every car has a GNSS receiver in it.
But to ensure the authenticity of these reports, they also have a secure localization receiver. This receiver is assigned a unique ID that is authorized to decode the encrypted signal. (Eventually, we expect this receiver and GNSS to converge into one device much the way multi-GNSS receivers operate today).
If a position report does not agree with the authentic localization report, the fleet manager can act to recover the car immediately. Insurance providers who cover secure localization-equipped cars would also give preferential rates as an anti-theft device.
(Image: Pavel Vinnik/Shutterstock.com)
Could PRS do it?
The new Public Regulated Service (PRS) from Galileo is encrypted and could provide a similar level of authentication protection, if made available. However, it is still a weak GNSS signal that can easily be jammed. Of course, any signal can be jammed, even one that is a thousand times stronger than GNSS.
However, given the robust nature of a very strong signal, the managing system that is monitoring the cars — the insurance, toll or car-sharing system, for example — can alarm upon the loss of positioning information. Such alarms on a GNSS-only car would be frequent and often erroneous due to simple fades, yielding so many false alarms that it would render the monitoring system useless. But a loss of both the strong localization signal and GNSS would likely be considered suspicious and result in a valid alarm.
GNSS navigation is truly one of the great advances of the modern era, giving us precise time and location for any place in the world. Its two major weaknesses — that it is easy to jam and spoof — can be overcome by augmenting it with other stronger encrypted signals, such as STL, providing robust jam-resistance and positive authentication.
