GPS World

Tag: GNSS vulnerability

  • Hoptroff livestreams GNSS vulnerabilities roundtable

    Hoptroff livestreams GNSS vulnerabilities roundtable

    Hoptroff will host its thought leadership industry roundtable, “GNSS, the time is up,” on March 21. The virtual roundtable will explore the impact of escalating GNSS vulnerabilities to business continuity and how organizations can best protect business-critical operations.

    “Businesses and financial institutions need to accept and start planning how they are going to mitigate the risks associated with GNSS,” said Tim Richards, CEO at Hoptroff. “This livestream roundtable will allow business and financial institutional decision-makers to better understand the impact and disruption GNSS vulnerabilities can have on their bottom line, and why they need to act now.”

    The roundtable is an opportunity for those in the financial and business sector to learn more about the status of GPS, the growing potential risks from increased jamming, spoofing and cyberattacks, what disruption looks like, and the new technologies available to provide complementary positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) technologies to help mitigate risk.

    “GNSS vulnerabilities create serious consequences for critical infrastructure,” said Richard Hoptroff, founder and chief time officer at Hoptroff. “To effectively mitigate these threats, complementary PNT solutions need to be deployed.”

    The event will be moderated by Robert Hampshire, deputy assistant secretary for Research and Technology, U.S. Department of Transportation.

    Speakers at the roundtable event include:

    • Robert Hampshire – Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, U.S. Department of Transportation
    • Diana Furchtgott-Roth – Heritage Foundation and George Washington University
    • Judah Levine – Fellow, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
    • Karen Van Dyke – Director for PNT, U.S. Department of Transportation
    • Steve Suarez – Global Head of Innovation, Financial Services
    • Kathryn Condello – Senior Director, National Security/ Emergency Preparedness, Lumen Technologies
    • Richard Hoptroff – Founder and Chief Time Officer, Hoptroff

    Areas of discussion at the roundtable include:

    • The rising GNSS vulnerabilities and the potential consequences of GNSS disruption such as service outages, errors, or inaccuracies.
    • Example use cases where GNSS vulnerabilities can have a significant impact on your business continuity.
    • How to enable new resilient complementary technologies for your disaster recovery plans.
    • How to start utilizing these technologies today in your real-life applications such as precision timing for global financial services.
    • Practical advice for businesses on reducing GNSS risk in financial transactions, fraud detection, compliance and data integrity.

    Those interested in attending the livestream roundtable can sign up on the Hoptroff website.

  • Russia’s attack raises vulnerability concerns

    Russia’s attack raises vulnerability concerns

    Matteo Luccio

    Russia’s brutal aggression on Ukraine changed the world in a few days. Devastation and displacement in Europe already are on a scale unseen since World War II, and the risk of a catastrophe greater by orders of magnitude has not been as high since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the year I was born. Given the long production timeline of a monthly magazine, I will not venture a guess as to what the headlines will be on the day you read this.

    The Russian assault has sharply raised concerns about GNSS vulnerabilities. In a March 17 bulletin, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) warned of a GNSS outage leading to the degradation of navigation and surveillance. Reports analyzed by EASA indicate that since Feb. 24, GNSS spoofing and jamming has intensified in the Baltic Sea, neighboring states, Eastern Finland, the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. “The effects of GNSS jamming and/or possible spoofing,” the bulletin stated, “were observed by aircraft in various phases of their flights, in certain cases leading to re-routing or even to change the destination due to the inability to perform a safe landing procedure.”

    Russia already has aided in the proliferation of handheld GPS jammers, the deployment of road-mobile jammers, and even development and testing of space-based jammers. Now, it could turn its substantial cyberspace hacking capability against the ground-control segments of GPS and Galileo.

    When Russia tested an anti-satellite weapon on Nov. 15, 2021, the Kremlin claimed on state television that this capability “means that if NATO crosses our red line, it risks losing all 32 of its GPS satellites at once.” This threat was particularly dangerous because GPS satellites carry, as a secondary payload, the U.S. nuclear detonation detection system.

    At a panel discussion about resilient GPS that I moderated at the International Wireless Communications Expo in Las Vegas on March 24, Diana Furchtgott-Roth, an adjunct professor at George Washington University and former deputy assistant secretary for Research and Technology at the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), titled her presentation “Russia Proves America Needs Backup GPS.” She cited the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018, and the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018, which instructed DOT to provide a complement and backup for civilian GPS. The legislation required the Secretary of Transportation to put in place a backup system for GPS by the end of 2020, subject to congressional appropriations. However, she pointed out, these funds have not yet materialized.

    Multiple technologies can and should be used to complement GPS. Several of them are mature and commercially available, including signals from low Earth orbit satellites and terrestrial broadcast stations.

    Meanwhile, the United States should accelerate the launch schedule for GPS III satellites already produced. They provide better accuracy, anti-jamming capabilities, and opportunities for civilian connectivity that could offer critical assistance to its European allies.

    Matteo Luccio | Editor-in-Chief
    [email protected]

  • Modern miracle brings timing to the ‘Information Superhighway’

    Modern miracle brings timing to the ‘Information Superhighway’

    Photo: Orolia
    John Fischer, vice president, advanced R&D, Orolia

    In 1990, I had just left the military electronics industry (radars, electronic warfare) and entered the growing wireless telecom industry. Recall, this was at the end of the Cold War with shrinking U.S. defense budgets. Alas, after eagerly waiting for the full operational performance of GPS throughout the 1980s, I unfortunately missed its early successes.

    I spent the 1990s in startups, working to provide wireless alternatives to dial-up and leased lines. We founded Clearwire, which eventually became WiMax — the broadband wireless on-ramp to this new “information superhighway” we now call the internet.

    However, within a few years, we started to look for a way to synchronize our adjacent basestations to avoid interference at overlapping regions. Those of us who came from the military navigation sector turned to GPS. We began to use a GPS receiver to give us a 1PPS sync.

    This worked well, although we had to train our installers not to put the GPS antenna high up on the tower with all the others, but low, away from the transmission beams. It was hard for them to believe we got better reception on the ground than up high!

    The Trimble Accutime 2000. (Photo: Trimble)
    The Trimble Accutime 2000. (Photo: Trimble)

    By the late 1990s, Trimble had introduced its Accutime 2000, which made our lives easier. (Everything futurist in those days was called Something-2000 — the new millennium was approaching). Today, it is the standard for time sync, but back then, it was novel.

    When I think of the progress in terms of Moore’s Law (semiconductor performance doubles every 18 months), we have been through 20 doublings since 1990. That is an improvement factor of a million!

    However, technological advancement alone does not account for GPS’ huge success. The fact that the U.S. military opened its system for use by everyone in the world, and the continued cooperation of all nations in making all GNSS systems interoperable, is mind blowing.

    We are living in the world that John Lennon only “Imagine(d)”: all the people sharing. In 2020, we are now focused on GNSS vulnerabilities and protecting the integrity of GNSS signals, which are such an integral part of our daily lives. GPS is truly a modern miracle.

  • Oscilloquartz launches enhanced PRTC system for 5G network timing

    Oscilloquartz has launched its enhanced primary reference time clock (ePRTC) system to enable unprecedented timing accuracy and stability, even when the GNSS signal is lost.

    The system provides a timing source for mission-critical transport systems, such as utility networks, government infrastructure and radio access networks, and provides the strict synchronization needed for LTE-A and 5G applications, the company said.

    The Oscilloquartz 3230B.

    Featuring the OSA 3230B ePRC atomic cesium clock connected to an Oscilloquartz clock combiner and grandmaster, the new solution offers the extremely stable frequency of a cesium clock with the UTC-traceable signal provided by GNSS.

    When combined with the OSA 5430, the OSA ePRTC system provides full hardware redundancy and multiple fan-out options including PTP over 10Gbit/s.

    “With our ePRTC system, we’re taking reliability and accuracy to the next level. This solution meets the requirements of next-generation mobile networks, offers the precise synchronization needed by many of today’s industries and removes vulnerability to GNSS outages,” said Gil Biran, general manager, Oscilloquartz.

    The Oscilloquartz OSA 5430.

    “Combining our advanced multi-constellation GNSS receiver with our atomic cesium clock technology creates an outstandingly accurate source of time with guaranteed holdover performance,” Biran said. “This provides vital protection against loss of satellite signal due to jamming, which can be a major problem.

    “With the flexibility and redundancy of our OSA 5430, operators can deploy a precise, secure and robust UTC-traceable time and frequency source with high capacity. What’s more, the Syncjack sync probing and assurance technology embedded in our ePRTC enables detection and reporting of inconsistencies between the different references provided to the ePRTC as well as detection of the GNSS spoofing.”

    GNSS interference concerns

    The dangers of reliance on GNSS alone have become a serious concern across a wide range of industries. Without backup, loss of signal would have a profound impact on critical infrastructure, financial institutions, and military capabilities.

    PTP packet-based mobile networks are also highly susceptible to outages unless they are able to hold time and maintain accuracy when GNSS is unavailable.

    The OSA ePRTC system removes this vulnerability while delivering higher performance levels than standard PRTC systems and giving operators control of their network synchronization.

    The solution comprises two OSA devices: an OSA 3230B ePRC cesium clock compliant to G.811.1 ePRC, which is connected to either an OSA 5421 or OSA 5430 clock combiner and grandmaster clock compliant to G.8272.1 ePRTC. This provides phenomenal holdover accurate to UTC within +/-100 nanoseconds for up to two weeks, ensuring resilience and optimized performance.

    “Our OSA ePRTC system is about leveraging the advantages of both timing methods, ensuring the long-term accuracy of GNSS alongside the stability of a cesium beam atomic clock. It even provides major benefits when locked to GNSS by delivering a three-fold improvement in timing accuracy,” said Nir Laufer, product line director, Oscilloquartz.

    “In recent years, we’ve seen a big increase in GNSS vulnerabilities due to deliberate spoofing and jamming attacks as well as the natural threats of solar flares and space weather events,” Laufer said. “From global data centers to government institutions, there’s now an urgent need to move away from reliance on GNSS alone. Ensuring backup is now a mandatory step towards secure synchronization. And with our OSA ePRTC, this can be achieved without adding a lot of cost and complexity. We’re giving operators peace of mind and the power to do more with existing infrastructure.”

  • PNT Roundup: Telecoms cite GNSS vulnerabilities

    In a technical report titled GPS Vulnerability released Sept. 15, the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Standards (ATIS) renewed its call for an eLoran system to support telecom and other critical infrastructure in the United States.

    As part of its “Recommendations to Assure Time for Telecom” the report says:

    “An eLoran system (or equivalent) should be developed and implemented in the U.S. to provide a near-term alternative to GPS for the telecom system and other critical infrastructure. The physical and cyber security of eLoran transmission stations should be a consideration in their operation.”

    ATIS termed its report “a major resource to help better understand and address a formidable telecommunications industry challenge: the vulnerabilities in the Global Positioning System (GPS).”

    Requirements for precise time delivery have driven the industry toward the increased use of GPS and GPS-dependent technologies, it says. Yet this dependency has left the industry vulnerable to disruptions and manipulations of the GPS signal.

    GPS Vulnerability (ATIS-0900005) provides insight into the sources of the most common problems with GPS and their impacts. The report also covers several mature proposed solutions that would satisfy telecommunications sector timing requirements.

    “GPS disruptions have economic, financial and service impacts to carrier network operators, suppliers, cellular services as well as adjacent industries and government agencies that depend on a functioning wireless communications sector,” said ATIS President and CEO Susan Miller. “We believe that our report on this topic will contribute to solutions to help secure the delivery of time — a function critical to many sectors in our economy.”

    Known vulnerabilities to deliver GPS time to a system include environmental phenomena, malicious interference and spoofing, incidental interference, adjacent band interference, poor antenna installations and rare but present GPS segment errors.

    GPS Vulnerability discusses techniques to address these vulnerabilities as well as alternatives to GPS timing, with the goal of mitigating GPS vulnerabilities for the timing receivers used in the critical infrastructure.

    Alternatives covered in the report include Navigational Message Authentication on modernized GPS civil signals, atomic clock time holdover, sync over fiber, eLoran, WWVB, terrestrial beacons and more.

    Putin shows taste for spoofing

    For several days in June, more than 20 ships reported problems with GPS reception in the Black Sea (see Expert Opinion column, August GPS World). Experts concluded the problems were probably the result of a spoofing attack in the area.

    Norwegian journalist Henrik Lied of NRKbeta compared this with accounts of similar episodes near the Kremlin complex in Moscow, where tourists have reported their smartphones showing them at an airport outside the city.

    Lied interviewed University of Texas professor Todd Humphreys about his theory that this is an effort to keep drones from flying in the area: “Several of us [researchers in GNSS] have concluded the Kremlin spoofing was likely trying to trigger UAV geo-fencing, which prevents UAVs from flying near airports,” Humphreys said.

    A Moscow correspondent for the Norwegian Broadcasting Company reports that these GPS problems only tend to occur when President Vladimir Putin is in town.

    Several of the ships spoofed in the Black Sea were sailing in the vicinity of the Russian premier’s Black Sea vacation home. Putin was actually in the area when the incidents occurred. This may indicate that Russian authorities are spoofing wherever the Russian president is located.

    Humphreys said, “It’s long been assumed that Russia, China and other nations (including the U.S.) have the technology to carry out a spoofing attack. What’s surprising is Russia’s willingness to use it openly and somewhat indiscriminately. It does fit nicely into what has been called Russian disinformation technology.”

  • Microsemi’s new time clock protects against GNSS vulnerabilities

    Microsemi’s new time clock protects against GNSS vulnerabilities

    Microsemi Corporation has announced its TimeSource Enhanced Primary Reference Time Clock (TimeSource Enhanced PRTC), a new system protecting against serious threats associated with GNSS vulnerabilities.

    It also enables telecommunications and mobile operators to meet the new G.8272.1 recommendation from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The stringent new ITU-T Recommendation G.8272.1 requires accuracy to within 30 nanoseconds (ns) or better when verified against a time standard such as UTC.

    Microsemi's new TimeSource Enhanced Primary Reference Time Clock protects against serious threats associated with GNSS vulnerabilities.
    Microsemi’s new TimeSource Enhanced Primary Reference Time Clock protects against serious threats associated with GNSS vulnerabilities.

    The TimeSource Enhanced PRTC “generates time” by producing its own independent time scale aligned with GNSS, while its phase, time and frequency signal outputs remain autonomous. This provides customers within the communications, power, public safety, data center and government network markets with a secure infrastructure, reducing dependency on GNSS and enabling network operators to retake control of the timing source used for network synchronization.

    “Worldwide telecommunications, power utilities and other infrastructure customers are in critical need of protection against GNSS vulnerability, and Microsemi’s new TimeSource Enhanced PRTC provides a powerful, high performance solution to address this need,” said Randy Brudzinski, vice president and business unit manager of Microsemi’s Frequency and Time division. “In addition, maintaining less than 30 ns performance is important to mobile operators who require a high level of accuracy to support LTE/4G and the upcoming deployment of 5G.”

    Massive deployment of GNSS as a timing source for synchronizing telecommunications networks (both wired and wireless) has created security risks to a point where governments, major telecommunications/mobile operators and enterprises are now urgently looking to protect their networks against both regional GNSS issues as well as the potential of a global GNSS outage. Microsemi’s TimeSource Enhanced PRTC works with the company’s cesium clocks to ensure time is generated in an autonomous manner. Specifically, the TimeSource Enhanced PRTC’s “source of time” aligns accurately with GNSS time without being dependent upon it—avoiding any vulnerability to threats caused by jamming and spoofing.

    According to Research and Markets’ report from market research firm Markets and Markets titled, “Anti-Jamming Market for GPS by Technique (Nulling System, Beam Steering System, Civilian System), Receiver Type (Military & Government Grade, Commercial Transportation Grade), Application, End User, and Geography – Global Forecast to 2022,” the anti-jamming market for GPS is expected to reach $4.8 billion and more than 309,000 units by 2022, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7 percent and 10 percent, respectively, between 2016-2022. Demand for secured weapons guided systems and increasing vulnerability of GPS signals due to development of low-cost GPS jammers are the major growth drivers of the market.

    Microsemi’s technical experts will be showcasing the new TimeSource Enhanced PRTC, along with its integrated GNSS Grandmaster (IGM) 1100 series, SyncServerS600 series, TimeProvider 2700 and TimeProvider 5000, in booth #17 at the International Timing & Sync Forum (ITSF), taking place Nov. 1-3 in Prague, Czech Republic.