Tag: GPS backup technology demonstration

GPS backup funding continues Trump’s admire-the-problem approach

Dana Goward, President, Resilient PNT Foundation

The appropriation for fiscal year 2022 enacted this month included $15M for “Position navigation and timing [PNT] technologies and global positioning system [GPS] backup” in the Department of Transportation (DOT) budget. At first glance, this might seem like a small but important step toward establishment of the system or systems President Bush mandated in 2004, the Obama administration promised in 2015, and called for by law in 2018.

Make no mistake, having the issue mentioned in the act is a very positive step. Unfortunately, a careful read of the report that came with the appropriations act shows the funds are not for solving, but for continuing to admire, the problem.

Here’s what the appropriation report says (in italics) and what it means. This is based on our reading of the text and conversations with hill insiders who said they had a tough battle with the administration to get any funding or mention of PNT or “GPS backup” in the budget at all.

“The agreement provides $15,000,000 to establish a program…” – This is not really a lot of funding for any federal effort. It is enough to hire several people, set up an office, and maybe do a few studies.

“…that leads to wide adoption of multiple technologies that provides the necessary GPS backup and complementary PNT as identified by the Department’s report.” The report referred to is DOT’s January 2021 report to Congress on the GPS Backup Technology Demo.

Notice that the appropriation language talks about “[leading] to wide adoption of multiple technologies.” It makes no mention of establishing any systems or signals.

Theoretically, this might be done by following the path in the Trump administration’s 2020 Executive Order on responsible use of PNT. The order addresses critical infrastructure and encourages such users to protect themselves with alternate PNT services they find on their own.

DOT might try this with all users to achieve “wide adoption,” though there are many obstacles. Principal among these is that GPS is free while commercial services are not. Providers of alternative PNT services have long recognized that it is impossible for them to compete with free GPS and argued that the government needs to be the customer.

“…Funding will enable, among other things…” An interesting turn of phrase that seems to say, ‘you must do all of this, but if you have any money left over you can do other things.’ This is pretty much a throw-away phrase since, with this worklist, they won’t have money left over for anything else. In fact, they will probably come up short.

“…the development of safety-critical PNT requirements and standards…” In other words, study the problem some more. Developing requirements and standards is important, but it doesn’t provide anything for the United States to use when Putin jams GPS or there is a huge solar storm.

“…vulnerability and performance testing…” Again, more study and little to no progress implementing solutions.

“…certification protocols for safety-critical functions”… Still more study.

“…the procurement of services as deemed appropriate by the Department…” Some might see this as a ray of hope. It could, conceivably, allow DOT to contract for PNT signals from space, fiber, or terrestrial broadcast and move toward establishing one or more systems. Unfortunately, $15M isn’t much for such an effort, even if DOT didn’t have to also create an office and do all the required studies and standards. In this context “services” almost certainly means contracted staff to help with administration and hiring think tanks.

“…and user adoption models in order to facilitate the responsible use of resilient PNT services to meet Federal requirements for widespread adoption.”

Since there are no “federal requirements for widespread adoption” to meet, this seems like another throwaway phrase that someone thought sounded actiony and proactive.

Additionally, we are not sure what a “user adoption model” is.

The best translation we can come up with is “DOT must figure out how to get Americans to adopt alternate PNT services that are either expensive or haven’t been invented yet. All in the absence of a government mandate for them to do so.”

Most in the PNT community have long recognized the need to “get the bullseye off of GPS” by making it a less attractive target, while at the same time protecting the nation against a wide variety of threats to satellites and signals. For them, the language in this year’s appropriation bill can be discouraging.

Yet there is some reason for hope. At least the problem was discussed in the bill, and some money was put toward it, regardless of how flawed the underlying assumptions and mandated actions might be.

Maybe we should all take comfort in the old Hollywood maxim – “It doesn’t matter what they say as long as they are still talking about you.” Let’s all keep the conversation going.

March 24, 2022
GWU hosts webinar on DOT GPS backup demos

Top-level current, former PNT leaders to discuss findings

A “Who’s Who” of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) leaders will gather virtually at 11 a.m. PDT/2 p.m. EDT on May 5 to discuss findings of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) GPS Backup Technology Demonstration, which took place in 2020.

Included in the “What Technologies Can Secure GPS?” webinar will be DOT Research and Technology leaders from the Obama and Trump administrations, Greg Winfree and Diana Furchtgott-Roth, and currently serving career DOT officials Karen Van Dyke and Andrew Hansen.

Robert Hampshire, current DOT Acting Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, will make his first public appearance discussing PNT issues.

The event is sponsored by George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute and moderated by Scott Pace. Pace served as the executive director for the Space Council in the last administration. In that capacity, he was responsible for a series of directives and policies impacting PNT in the United States.

Describing the plan for the event, the formal announcement states, “Three separate laws have required the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to back up and complement the Global Positioning System, subject to congressional appropriations. To provide a roadmap, in January the department released its Complementary PNT and GPS Backup Technologies Demonstration Report.”

The program will open with remarks from Scott Pace, director of the Space Policy Institute, who will also moderate the discussion. Hampshire will offer introductory remarks. Van Dyke and Hansen will follow up with a presentation of the report. George Washington University Adjunct Professor Diana Furchtgott-Roth and the Texas Transportation Institute’s Greg Winfree will provide comments.”

A question-and-answer session will follow the addresses and discussion.

The event is free and open to the public, though advance registration is required. Registrants will receive a Zoom link. The webinar will also be recorded.

Register for the webinar here.

Feature photo: Monty Johnson of OPNT demonstrates precise time transfer through 100 kilometers of spooled fiber-optic cable. (Photo: RNT Foundation)

April 26, 2021
Federal policy aimed at GPS interference, critical infrastructure
In its closing days, the Trump administration issued several new policy documents affecting positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) issues.

Some have questioned the long-term impact of these, given the significant policy differences between the previous and current administrations. Yet policies in relatively non-controversial areas such as PNT are generally developed by career personnel who tend to remain in place from administration to administration. While they must adhere to the philosophical tenets of extant elected officials, these policies tend to endure longer than others.

Even if this weren’t the case, considering the wealth of other issues the new administration is grappling with, these new policies could remain in force for some time, even if the new regime ultimately decides to change them.

Several themes run through many of the documents. These include:
- Space-based PNT is vulnerable and must be protected.
- America needs to monitor for GNSS disruption.
- More sources of PNT than just GPS are needed.
National Space Policy

The first of these late-term documents to be published was the National Space Policy issued on Dec. 9, 2020. Highlights and possible impacts for the PNT community include:
- A goal to “Promote and incentivize private industry” could have implications for low-Earth orbit (LEO) PNT services.
- A goal to “Increase the assurance of national critical functions” could include GPS/PNT resilience.
- A pledge to “Safeguard space components of critical infrastructure” undoubtedly includes GPS. The section also has ominous statements about U.S. responses to purposeful interference and tasks the Defense and Homeland Security secretaries with having those responses ready.
- Another pledge to “Maintain and Enhance Space-based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Systems” is followed by eight explanatory paragraphs, many of which repeat previous policy. One new item is a promise to invest in detection and mitigation of harmful interference. A mention is also made of the need for multiple and diverse PNT sources, and responsible use of PNT, echoing the February 2020 Executive Order on the subject. Both of the latter two mentions were in the context of critical infrastructure and mission essential functions versus the security of the nation and economy as a whole.
Report to Congress: GPS Backup Tech Demo

Congress mandated a GPS backup technology demonstration in 2017, and $10 million was subsequently provided for that purpose. Various internal government delays resulted in the project not getting underway until March 2019. It concluded about a year later.

On Jan. 14, the Department of Transportation (DOT) posted its 457-page “Complementary PNT and GPS Backup Technologies Demonstration Report” to Congress on its website.

While some people have been critical, it is important to remember the report documents 11 vendor demonstrations, not engineering tests. Technologies were demonstrated in different locations and under differing conditions.

There is no silver bullet for meeting the nation’s needs. It must be a system of systems.

Also, the amount of effort and equipment in the demonstrations depended in some cases upon infrastructure available and the amount of money the government and vendors were able to spend. This meant that at least one technology was “demonstrated” mostly by explaining the concept, and other vendors were able to only partially demonstrate their technologies.

All of that said, the report offers valuable information about how America should make its national PNT much more resilient and reliable. First, it reinforces DOT’s message that there is no silver bullet for meeting the nation’s needs. It must be a system of systems. Second, the report goes further and says what that system of system should look like: “Those technologies are LF and UHF terrestrial and L-band satellite broadcasts for PNT functions with supporting fiber-optic time services to transmitters/control segments.”

From a policy perspective, this is a huge step forward. It resolves previous ambiguity and positions the nation to establish a resilient PNT architecture, one that will do more than be a “GPS backup.” It will be an architecture that will better support current applications and better enable emerging ones like autonomy, 5G and “NextG.”

National Research and Development Plan for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Resilience

Published one hour and fourteen minutes before the end of the administration on inauguration day, this plan was mandated as part of the February 2020 Executive Order on responsible use of PNT. By taking a comprehensive look at how we can do better, it provides an interesting outline of the challenges associated with America’s current over-reliance on GPS. While not a policy or directive document, it does suggest two or three departments and agencies that might be tasked with addressing each challenge.

It also addresses the need for interference detection and monitoring, and diverse sources of PNT.

U.S. Space-Based PNT Policy (Space Policy Directive 7)

This directive was published five days before the end of the administration and replaced the previous policy, 2004’s NSPD-39.

While the old policy calls for performance monitoring of GPS signals, the new one also has investment in interference detection and monitoring as a goal.

Perhaps the most significant change in the new policy was the absence of the words “backup capability” and the lack of a mandate for DOT to lead its establishment. Yet the policy hammers home multiple times the need for more than GPS as a source of PNT. And it doesn’t abandon the idea of government involvement in making that happen.

In addition to reinforcing Executive Order 13905 on responsible use of PNT, the directive defined a new (for presidential policies) term. “Alternative PNT Service” was described as “a PNT service that has the capability to operate completely independent of, or in conjunction with, other PNT services.” The directive goes on to say that “Multiple, varied PNT services used in combination may provide enhanced security, resilience, assurance, accuracy, availability and integrity. An alternative PNT service allows a user to transition from the primary source of PNT signals in the event of a disruption or manipulation.”

And while the policy does not say the government will establish or support an alternative PNT service, it comes pretty close. One of its goals is “Invest in… as appropriate, alternative sources of PNT for critical infrastructure, key resources, and mission-essential functions.”

It goes on to task the departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Transportation with making that happen.

So “backup” is out, “alternative PNT” is in. We agree words are important and are happy to have the new words. Let’s hope the new administration will match the new words with action (as appropriate).

Feature image: niarchos/DigitalVision Vectors/Getty Images
March 7, 2021
DOT report: L-band, UHF, LF and fiber PNT needed to protect US
In a report issued on Jan. 14, the Department of Transportation (DOT) outlined the results of its GPS Backup Technology Demonstration project. As officials had previously projected, it called for a system-of-systems approach using multiple complementary technologies.

The report called for an architecture that included signals from space in the L-band, terrestrial broadcasts in the ultra high frequency (UHF) and low frequency (LF) spectra, and a fiber backbone to synchronize and feed precise time to terrestrial transmitters.

The demonstration project and report were mandated by Congress in legislation passed in late 2017 and funded in early 2018. Delays within the administration resulted in the project beginning in early 2019.

Monty Johnson of OPNT demonstrates precise time transfer through 100 kilometers of spooled fiber-optic cable. (Photo: RNT Foundation)

Demonstrations

Of 21 firms that offered to demonstrate their wares, 11 were selected. They were:
- Echo Ridge LLC and Satelles Inc. Satellite-based PNT technologies using the S and L bands, respectively.
- OPNT B.V. and Seven Solutions S.L. Fiber-optic time transfer using the White Rabbit Precision Time Protocol technology.
- TRX Systems Inc. Dead reckoning technology with inertial measurement units and localized map matching supplemented with ultra-wideband beacons.
- Hellen Systems LLC and UrsaNav. eLoran that uses LF transmissions.
- Serco Inc. Medium frequency R-mode.
- NextNav LLC. Metropolitan beacon system using UHF frequencies.
- PhasorLab Inc. and Skyhook Wireless Inc. Both use Wi-Fi frequencies. Phasorlab uses a dedicated network of transmitters. Skyhook leverages existing Wi-Fi access points.
Five of the demonstrations were conducted at Joint Base Cape Cod, with the remainder at NASA’s Langley Research Center in Virginia.

Timing demonstrations were assessed for system:
- coverage (service availability) within an “appropriate area” (wireless systems only)
- accuracy and stability across an appropriate area
- long-term accuracy and stability of time transfer to a fixed location
- time transfer availability and accuracy to a fixed location under challenged GPS signal conditions.
Positioning was evaluated for:
- coverage within a defined region
- 2D and 3D dynamic positioning service availability and accuracy
- availability and accuracy of static positioning
- long-term availability and accuracy of static positioning
- long-term availability and accuracy of static positioning under challenged GPS signal conditions
DHS work referenced

The report also mentions an earlier set of demonstrations done by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

In December 2018, DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate performed the work through the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute. The project “demonstrated a combination of position and timing use cases for dynamic vs. static and indoor vs. outdoor applications, along with a time-transfer use case for critical infrastructure applications.” Systems from Locata Corp, NextNav, and Satelles were evaluated.

The DoT report says that eLoran was not part of the DHS effort because of the lack of transmitters in the area. However, “DHS had previously studied eLoran performance under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with Harris Corporation and UrsaNav and had an understanding of its capabilities.”

A report of DHS’ December 2018 work is not publicly available, though DOT says it was used to inform their efforts.

The only publicly available information from DHS about the eLoran CRADA seems to be a 2016 press release. A presentation and other information is available on the UrsaNav websit e.

Findings

The 437-page DOT report is filled to the brim with detailed information about the project, individual technologies, and demonstration results.

The Executive Summary says that, in addition to the findings from the DHS December 2018 effort (which were not listed), the DOT demonstration had four key findings:
1. All TRL-qualified vendors offered showed PNT “performance of value” and one showed value in all scenarios.
2. Neither eLoran company succeeded in the Static Basement Timing scenario.
3. R-mode ranging did not meet the minimum technical readiness level (TRL) of 6.
4. Deployment effort and coverage (infrastructure per unit area) are significant cost factors.
Addressing the needs of critical infrastructure owners and operators, the report concluded the needed “technologies are LF and UHF terrestrial and L-band satellite broadcasts for PNT functions with supporting fiber optic time services to transmitters/control segments.”

Reactions and way forward

Government officials and industry observers alike have welcomed the report, though it does leave some questions on the table.

One is about other national PNT needs. The congressional tasking was to report on GPS backup technologies for critical infrastructure and national security. The Jan. 14 report focuses on critical infrastructure needs. Information on national security requirements, some of which is classified, was provided to Congress separately by DHS and the Department of Defense.

“Economic and homeland security are sometimes considered by agencies and Congress as subsets of national security, sometimes not,” according to one analyst. “So, we don’t know if the needs of first responders, delivery services, civil government agencies, and other essential users were ever formally considered. The good news is that the combination of systems identified, if implemented and made available to all, would likely meet the needs of most.”

Other open issues are about implementing the report’s recommendations.

Some have been quick to point out that the demonstrations were to inform the government, not part of a procurement.

“If this was for an acquisition, it would have been done differently,” said one government retiree. “Rather than having vendors set up and operate the equipment, government evaluators would have been much more hands on. And they would have made every effort to do all the trials at the same location.”

Going forward, cost will also an important factor, as mentioned in the report’s key findings. “Depending on who you want to serve and where, the costs of different technologies vary by orders of magnitude,” said one provider.

Reaction from those involved with the demonstration project has been generally upbeat with praise for DOT’s effort and anticipation of more progress.

Typical were comments from Ganesh Pattabiraman, CEO at NextNav, who appreciated the real-world scenarios DOT used in the project. Regarding next steps he said, “We look forward to working with Congress on implementing the report’s recommendations.”
January 19, 2021
$15M for GPS backup demo part of Congress’ march to terrestrial PNT
Administration struggling to keep up.

Most observers missed the $5 million for a GPS backup technology demonstration in the U.S. Department of Defense appropriation passed in September. Congressional staff say it is included in an obscure research and development line item for “Electronics and Electronic Devices.”

This funding is in addition to the $10 million Congress provided for the project last fiscal year (note: since these are R&D funds, the monies remain available for three years after they are appropriated).

This additional funding is part of Congress’ long but accelerating march to establishing a terrestrial PNT system to backup and complement GPS, an effort with which the administration is struggling to keep pace.

Image: @SENTEDCRUZ

Members in both the Senate and House were surprised and concerned in 2009 when the Obama administration suddenly went against the advice of its departments, national advisory board, and virtually every technologist and engineer in government. That is when the administration decided to terminate plans to convert the old Loran-C system to eLoran as a complement and backup for GPS.

Congress’ concern was not completely allayed when, in a report Congress had mandated, the administration said that a wireless GPS navigation backup was not needed. Users could easily resort to paper maps and charts. The same report did admit that the need for wireless precise timing was another issue. The administration said it would study this, even as the Loran-C system was being terminated.

Subsequent hearings in Congress revealed ongoing concerns about the lack of a terrestrial capability. These were magnified by the nation’s major adversaries, Russia and China, retaining terrestrial Loran systems to inoculate themselves from the effects of disruptions to their space-based PNT systems.

More mixed signals from administration officials amplified Congress’ concerns and frustrations. These included:
- The Department of Defense committing to establishing a terrestrial backup for GPS within the United States, then reversing its position just before its authorization bill was finalized. This reversal was not based upon technical or national security grounds; rather, that it “wasn’t the department’s job.” This reversal nullified almost two years of coordination and effort by Congressional members and staff.
- A senior Department of Defense official at a hearing providing grossly inaccurate information about GPS resilience and backup systems. The official subsequently retired.
- The Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Transportation in 2015 promising action to the chairman of the House Transportation Committee. In a December letter they said the administration would establish a GPS backup by first establishing an eLoran timing system, and then an eLoran navigation system. Aside from signing the letter, no further action was taken.
Congress’ growing skepticism about administration positions on this has led to a series of hearings, informal inquiries, demands for reports, and legislation. Together they chart a very deliberate effort to bypass bureaucratic infighting and confusion as much as possible en route protecting the nation with a terrestrial complement and backup for GPS.

Legislative action has included :
- in 2015, halting demolition of Loran-C infrastructure pending a decision on a GPS backup system. (USCG Authorization Act)
- in 2016, requiring the departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Transportation to identify requirements for a domestic GPS backup and report before the end of 2017. (National Defense Authorization Act/ NDAA)
- in 2017, requiring a plan for a GPS backup technology demonstration by April 2018, completion of the project by June 2019, and authorizing $10 million for the program. (NDAA)
- in March 2018, providing $10 million for the GPS backup technology demonstration (DoD Appropriations)
- in August 2018, reaffirming Congress’ interest in the backup demonstration, requiring a progress brief by Dec. 1 2018, and authorizing another $5 million for the project (NDAA)
- In September 2018, funding an additional $5 million for the backup demonstration (DoD Appropriations)
- In December 2018, the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 was signed into law. It directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish a terrestrial, difficult-to-disrupt, wireless timing system to provide backup capability for GPS. A report on requirements and an implementation plan are due in June 2019, and system operation is mandated by December 2020.
Contacts with members and staff in the new, 116th Congress show that interest in this topic has increased. So has frustration with the administration missing many, if not most, of its deadlines for reports and briefings.

A recent GAO report that U.S. weapons systems are vulnerable to GPS spoofing; the need for a strong navigation and timing infrastructure for autonomous vehicles, drones, and intelligent transportation systems; and continued high visibility instances of deliberate GPS jamming and spoofing are all adding to concerns.

Also of note, Congressman Peter DeFazio (D-OR) has been named chairman of the powerful House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Rep. DeFazio has long believed in the need for action to provide a backup capability for GPS.

Congress is clearly set on a determined course. Perhaps the administration will catch up before it earns more of the Congress’ ire, and before a major disruption demonstrates the consequences of inattention to the entire nation and the world.
January 16, 2019