Tag: GPS disruption

  • National Guard timing backup for GPS in House FY-2023 NDAA

    National Guard timing backup for GPS in House FY-2023 NDAA

    On July 14, the U.S. House passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, which begins Oct. 1, 2022.

    The report released with the legislation contains several provisions of interest for the GPS and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) communities. Perhaps most intriguingly, it indicates the National Guard is considering a program to ensure it has one or more sources of time independent from GPS.

    Here are some of the more interesting PNT-related mentions in the report.

    GPS Disruption & RF-Based Alternatives

    A provision entitled “Briefing on Disruption of Global Positioning System” reiterates concerns Congress has expressed repeatedly over the last two decades.

    On the civil side, these concerns have resulted in prohibiting the U.S. Coast Guard from disposing of old Loran facilities until a backup for GPS is decided upon and requiring the Department of Transportation to establish a timing alternative to GPS.

    Most of Congress’ attention has been focused on the Department of Defense (DOD), though.  Over the years, it has tasked the department with a wide variety of briefings and actions including reporting on threats to GPS, how DOD will operate in GPS-denied environments, progress (or lack thereof) in OCX and M-code, and development of alternative PNT systems.

    The 2021 NDAA took a more activist approach and required DOD to “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation and timing signals.” It also directed the department to work with the National Security Council, the departments of Transportation, Homeland Security, and others “to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement” GPS. The act mandated that this all be completed within two years.

    Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com
    Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

    The 2023 NDAA reinforces Congress’ long standing concerns about “increasing threats of disruption” to GPS, stating “it is critical to invest in technologies that provide resilient and assured positioning, navigation and timing capabilities…”

    Language in that same provision, though, focuses just on alternate navigation capabilities as opposed to full PNT. The act requires a briefing before the end of this year about DOD’s plan across the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) for “alternative navigation broadcast services.” The briefing is required to include information about “progress on radio frequency-based alternative navigation solutions,” what the department is doing now, and cost estimates for infrastructure and other expenses across the FYDP.

    Army MAPS Program

    The Army’s Mounted Assured PNT System (MAPS) is focused on ground vehicles. Information on the service’s website seems to indicate the upgrade in the first generation of MAPS is an anti-jam antenna. The overall program of record is more ambitious, according to the site, and includes M-code, other GNSS and inertial sensors.

    “Path to ALTNAV” and “Open Standards Interfaces” are also listed as features in the MAPS final version. This is likely incorporation of DOD’s mandate for modular open system architecture to ensure the ability to easily integrate future navigation and timing systems and signals.

    The Army is already producing and fielding the Gen 1 version of MAPS. In March 2022, the Aberdeen Proving Ground News announced that 1,000 units had been fielded.

    In its report accompanying the NDAA, Congress expressed concern with the pace of the MAPS program. It notes the Army has procured 2,000 units — a small fraction of the 225,000 ground vehicles the service operates.

    The text of the congressional report also seems to indicate the program is not much beyond the point described on its website two years ago. The website says a Program of Record technical solution was planned to have been finalized in September 2020.

    The House version of the bill would require the Army to provide a briefing on:

    • technical performance of candidate systems to incorporate into MAPS
    • the cost of these systems and integration
    • plans to deploy MAPS to the Army’s fleet of vehicles
    • plans to upgrade the Gen I MAPS units already fielded.

    Another indication of the delayed pace of the program is that this briefing is not due for more than a year, in December 2023.

    Autonomy Software for PNT-Denied Environments

    While much less specific, another interesting PNT-related provision is a requirement for DOD to “Report on autonomy software for Next Generation Air Dominance.”

    It describes a developing Air Force strategy for using piloted and unpiloted aircraft alongside each other. The software “could enable the continued operational capability of systems in positioning, navigation and timing-denied environments.” The Navy and Marine Corps are developing a similar concept.

    Photo: Brian Kinney/Shutterstock.com
    Photo: Brian Kinney/Shutterstock.com

    Little public information is available concerning any of the Next Generation Air Dominance programs or supporting systems. Experts have speculated, though, that operation in PNT-denied environments would likely involve some of the aircraft remaining outside the denied area and providing PNT information to the others via one or more links.

    National Guard and Nationwide Alternative Timing

    At the end of a section entitled “Collaboration on positioning, navigation, and timing research,” the House report reveals that the National Guard is concerned about relying entirely on GPS for timing and seems to have begun to address that shortfall.

    It requires a report no later than February 2023 on the Guard’s “Nationwide Integration of Time Resiliency for Operations (NITRO) effort.” The report should address, among other things, mission need, capability gaps, estimated costs and how the department is collaborating with other federal, state and local entities.

    The budget item for NITRO cites malicious cyberattacks that can impact command and control (C2) systems. It says the Guard’s ability to support civil authorities and critical infrastructure is at risk if not mitigated with resilient time.

    While attempts to reach the National Guard for comment have been unsuccessful, PNT expert Pat Diamond said the Guard’s concerns and efforts are well justified. “Precision timing is a seriously weak link for everyone in the United States, including critical infrastructure and organizations like the National Guard,” Diamond said. “If GPS timing was not available for some reason, land mobile radios, common operational pictures, the ability to navigate, plus command-and-control systems would suffer greatly, potentially being completely degraded. It’s outstanding that the Guard has realized this and seems to be moving out. All the power to them.”

    A Must-Pass Bill

    The House version of the 2023 NDAA has yet to be conferenced and reconciled with that of the Senate. While the Senate’s version of the NDAA has been filed, the accompanying report has not yet been released. Since the House provisions seem relatively non-controversial, they are almost certain to be included along with others from the Senate in the final bill and report.

    The resulting legislation is almost certain to pass into law.

    Congress often struggles to pass even routine legislation. For example, it has only funded the government on time in four of the last 40 years. The annual defense authorization is an exception. NDAA’s are considered “must-pass” bills. Congress has sent one to the president in each of the last 61 years.


    Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. He is also a member of the President’s National Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board.

  • Double trouble: GNSS over-reliance and its costs

    Double trouble: GNSS over-reliance and its costs

    This month’s column deals with two troublesome topics: the U.S. government’s over-reliance on GPS, and the potential costs of GPS disruption toward which such a policy may be leading us.

    First things first.

    When someone utters the words “I’m nearly perfect,” get on your toes. Such self-appraisal usually masks something. It could be insecurity, denial, ignorance or simply fear. At the very least, some level of illusion, if not delusion, is involved.

    With that precept in mind, let’s examine a June 16 press release from the U.S. Air Force, under the headline “New reports confirm near-perfect performance record for civil GPS service.”

    The press release actually says, “The U.S. Air Force released two technical reports demonstrating that the Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to deliver exceptional performance to civilian users around the world….The 2014 and 2015 performance reports confirm that the GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) satisfied nearly all measurable performance commitments documented in the GPS SPS Performance Standard.”

    Fair enough. Those are demonstrable facts. Nowhere does the release — other than in its headline — employ the words “perfect” or “near-perfect.”

    The problem is, as current events repeatedly show, people remember only the headline. That may be all that they read or register in the first place.

    Affixing the label “near-perfect” to GPS is “potentially dangerous,” points out Dana Goward of the Resilient PNT Foundation, “because it could exacerbate the public’s growing over-reliance on, and often blind faith in, GPS.  Even if GPS did always perform perfectly, all kinds of things can happen to signals after they leave the satellites and before they get to receivers. Personal privacy devices, other jammers, spoofers, solar activity, other electromagnetic interference, even the local geography can significantly degrade or disable a receiver’s performance. That’s why in the GPS System Performance Standard the Air Force specifically says its responsibility ends once signals are in space.”

    Perfection might exist in space, but it doesn’t down here.

    Even in space, accidents sure will happen. The Air Force release documents GPS performance for 2014 and 2015. This conveniently draws up short of January 2016, when several GPS satellites broadcast a timing error that triggered equipment faults and failures globally for nearly 12 hours. Thus demonstrating something far from perfection.

    Issuing a statement in the manner done on June 16 perpetuates a dangerous myth, keeps users in the dark about the actual state of affairs, cultivates a What-Me-Worry? approach to positioning, navigation and timing, and abets the lack of political will and understanding of GNSS vulnerabilities.

    We have expanded the focus of this magazine to cover other technologies relevant and applicable to the field precisely because GPS, and by extension GNSS, great though they may be, are not perfect. Not even nearly.

    At What Cost Ignorance?

    A report recently compiled and released in the UK attempts to quantify the cost of a GNSS disruption, should one occur.  The figure the authors came up with? 1 billion pounds sterling per day.  That’s approximately $1,273,710,000.

    Per day.

    The report, available in either 11-page or 133-page versions, and titled The economic impact to the UK of a disruption to GNSS, looks at what would happen to the UK economy if GNSS were unavailable for five days. Five days is, indeed, a long time. One hopes that a fix could be obtained in less than that amount of time. But one never knows, does one?

    “The economic impact to the UK of a five-day disruption to GNSS has been estimated at £5.2bn.” Thus the per diem figure above.

    The report was commissioned by Innovate UK, the UK Space Agency and the Royal Institute of Navigation. It followed from the January 2016 accident referenced earlier, in which an error in the GPS signal from certain satellites, triggered by the decommissioning of one of those satellites, brought a number of key industrial servers to their knees. The episode lasted 12 hours.

    This report hypothesizes a more fleshed-out disaster and estimates the likely impact of a disruption to GNSS availability for up to five days across ten application domains in the UK: Road, Rail, Aviation, Maritime, Food, Emergency and Justice Services, Surveying, Location-Based Services (LBS), Other Infrastructure, and Other Applications.

    The report is worth reading, not only for its figures, methodology, and discussion of mitigation, but also for two salient pages: “A day in the UK with GNSS” and “A day in the UK without GNSS.” At home, on the move, with others, at work, at the shops, when things go wrong, back at home. A post-modern (or post-Beatles) “Day in the Life.”

    Even if the hypothetical disruption were not to last 5 days, but a much shorter period, perusing the two chronologies of with and without can serve to remind us how many of our daily activities are keyed to and thus dependent on GPS/GNSS.

    Having no viable, working back-up — not even on the visible horizon — to such an essential system makes sense how?