Tag: IMO

  • US Coast Guard protests GPS disruption to UN body: ‘urgent issue’

    US Coast Guard protests GPS disruption to UN body: ‘urgent issue’

    The International Maritime Organization headquarters in London. (Photo: Anastasia Yakovleva/iStock Editorial / Getty Images Plus/Getty Images)
    The International Maritime Organization headquarters in London. (Photo: Anastasia Yakovleva/iStock Editorial / Getty Images Plus/Getty Images)

    Responding to a plea from 14 maritime organizations in the fall of 2019, the U.S. Coast Guard has protested disruption of GPS and GNSS signals to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

    IMO is the United Nations body that coordinates and sets standards for international maritime operations and safety.

    In a paper dated March 10, the service said that GNSS signals are “essential to safe and efficient navigation and an integral component of all maritime operations.” Interfering with them “jeopardizes the safety of life at sea.”

    Deliberate disruptions in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the paper says, affect vessels operating in international waters and engaged in innocent passage through territorial seas.

    While nations typically have a right to do as they wish in their sovereign territory, they are also obliged to not have that intrude into other nations’ territory or international waters. This is also true for vessels passing through their waters but not calling at their ports, known as “innocent passage.”

    The International Law of the Sea Treaty stipulates that, in the absence of some clear wrongdoing such as piracy, drug smuggling or discharging oil, vessels be allowed to pass through territorial seas unmolested by the coastal state.

    The Coast Guard paper also points out that nations have other treaty obligations that prohibit this kind of activity. International Telecommunication Union Radio Regulations prohibits “All transmissions with false or misleading identification…”

    Citing a March 2019 report in GPS World, the paper also documents that GNSS disruption is a global problem not confined to just one or two areas. A study by the German Aerospace Center (DLR) found interference during every phase of a vessel’s voyage between Europe and the Far East.

    The Coast Guard paper was submitted for consideration at IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee that had been scheduled to meet on May 13, but has been postponed due to the COVID-19 emergency.

    This planned consideration at IMO follows a resolution by the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in May 2019. In a paper entitled “An Urgent Need to Address Harmful Interferences to GNSS,” the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers’ Association (IFATCA), the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA), and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) had introduced the issue.

    This resulted in a resolution describing the eliminating interference as an urgent need.

    About the same time the U.S .Coast Guard paper was due to be considered, IMO was to engage in the early stages of considering rules for autonomous vessels. Its Facilitation Committee was scheduled hold a “Regulatory scoping exercise for the use of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS)” at a meeting the end of April. This meeting has also been postponed.

    While not specifically mentioned, navigation issues will undoubtedly be part of the considerations when discussion of rules for autonomous shipping eventually takes place.

    Public input to these international meetings is always sought in advance. For example, the U.S. State Department had announced a meeting for April 6 to receive public input on U.S. positions for the various issues to be discussed at the Facilitation Committee.

    While we understand that this meeting will also be also be postponed, comments can be submitted to the points of contact listed in the Federal Register announcement as well as be raised during the eventual meeting.

    Image: IMO Headquarters Wikimedia Commons

  • PNT Roundup: Resilient PNT for the maritime sector

    PNT Roundup: Resilient PNT for the maritime sector

    Table 1. Capability and status of complementary positioning technologies. (Chart: GLA)
    Table 1. Capability and status of complementary positioning technologies. (Chart: GLA)

    The General Lighthouse Authorities of the U.K. and Ireland (GLA) reached Initial Operational Capability for eLoran on the East coast of the U.K. Although it was shown to work well technically, it has not been possible to implement the system in Europe on a regional basis.

    The GLA have also been involved in the potential development of other, non-satellite based, alternative systems. These may now form the basis of positioning resiliency either individually, or as a tapestry of systems serving the maritime navigator in Europe, unless current plans for commercial operation of eLoran come to fruition.

    Here we consider the technical and regulatory status of eLoran in comparison with the other options, and explore necessary steps to protect the maritime navigator in the face of increasing GNSS outages. Several alternative backup technologies could be considered complementary to GNSS for future introduction into ships’ Integrated Navigation Systems. They have varying capabilities, and different limitations and levels of maturity, summarized in Table 1. Figure 1 shows estimated timescales for development and implementation.

    Figure 1. Timeline for resilient PNT. (Image: GLA)
    Figure 1. Timeline for resilient PNT. (Image: GLA)

    Conclusions

    ■ eLoran is the only complementary backup system that can be implemented within the timescale envisaged for the introduction of e-navigation; however, there are political obstacles to implementation, at least in Europe.

    ■ R-mode and possibly radar positioning could be introduced by about 2030; however, both have inherent coverage limitations. Feasibility studies are needed to assess their economic viability.

    ■ Other options, such as inertial systems and signals of opportunity, might emerge as viable alternatives by 2030, but there are large uncertainties about technical and regulatory matters.

    ■ Quantum devices and options such as bathymetric and geomagnetic positioning can only be considered as longer term and uncertain possibilities.

    ■ A multi-system solution may offer the best approach. The IMO concept of the Integrated Navigation System aboard vessels, incorporating a multi-system receiver, provides flexibility for the inclusion of the above positioning technologies, if and when they become available, at an affordable cost.