Tag: National Defense Authorization Act

As launch looms, threat from Ligado returns

Luccio

“The new LightSquared business plan and the new FCC rules significantly expand the terrestrial transmission increasing the potential for interference to GPS receivers,” the U.S. departments of Defense and Transportation (DOD and DOT) wrote to the Federal Communications Commission in 2011 after the FCC granted the company permission to offer broadband via its satellite and base station networks to a wide variety of mobile broadband partners. The move — heralded by supporters as hastening the advent of 4G services across the country, especially in underserved communities — sent shockwaves across the GNSS/PNT community, which opposed the plan forcefully for the threat it posed to GPS.

Reborn in December 2015 as Ligado Networks, the company obtained the FCC’s unanimous approval in April 2020 for the use of spectrum near the L-bands used by GPS for its 5G network. It is scheduled to launch its first deployment at the end of September.

Nearly all the federal government, including DOD and DOT, as well as most manufacturers of GNSS receivers, are very strongly opposed. On September 9, the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine’s Committee to Review FCC Order 20-48 will release its independent evaluation of the issue, as mandated by the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.

The study, begun in May 2021, considered three issues:

1. Which of two prevailing proposed approaches for evaluating harmful interference is most effective to mitigate the risk of harm.

2. The potential for harmful interference from Ligado to mobile satellite services — such as Iridium.

3. The feasibility and practicality of the remedies proposed by the FCC.

A summary of the report can be found here.

Welcome Penny Axelrad

I am very pleased to announce that Prof. Penina “Penny” Axelrad has joined GPS World’s Editorial Advisory Board.
Penny is a University of Colorado (CU) Distinguished Professor in the Ann and HJ Smead Department of Aerospace Engineering Sciences. She received her B.S. and M.S. degrees in Aeronautical and Astronautical Engineering from MIT and her Ph.D. in Aeronautics and Astronautics from Stanford University. She has been a member of the faculty at CU since 1992, serving as primary advisor for 25 Ph.D. graduates and many M.S. and undergraduate research students.

Penny has been active in research on GPS and PNT technology and applications for aircraft, spacecraft and remote sensing, as well as estimation of satellite orbits and attitude, since 1985, co-authoring more than 60 journal papers and 130 conference papers. She has served as principal investigator or co-investigator on grants and contracts totaling $17 million. She is a Fellow of the Institute of Navigation and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and a member of the National Academy of Engineering. Since 2013 she has served as a member of the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board.

I overlapped with Penny at MIT in the mid-1980s. Now, nearly 40 years later, I look forward to her contributions to this magazine.

September 13, 2022
2021 Defense Act signals turning point for Congress and PNT
Photo: Toshe_O/iStock / Getty Images Plus/Getty Images

Senate joined House to override Trump’s veto, making bill into law

The U. S. Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees, have long been concerned about GPS and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) issues. Over the past two decades, Congressional hearings, demands for reports and investigations have dealt with acquisition, contingency plans for when space is not available, deliberate interference, and a host of other issues.

While these all evidenced Congress’ interest and concern, they were relatively passive measures.

This began to change in 2018 with passage of the National Timing Resilience and Security Act. It requires the Department of Transportation to establish a terrestrial timing system to backup GPS signals.

Then in 2019, Congress appropriated money for a GPS Backup Technology Demonstration. And the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020 required the Air Force to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of its resiliency efforts.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

GPS Under Threat

Capitol Hill observers say this is the result of several factors that have come to a head over the last year. Taken together, they have convinced many legislators that GPS is under threat and PNT issues are not being taken seriously enough by the executive branch. These include increased jamming and spoofing (especially by China and Russia), full implementation of China’s BeiDou system and its marketing to other nations as a superior alternative to GPS, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision on Ligado Networks, and the Pentagon’s failure to respond to combatant commanders’ Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements for non-GPS PNT.

Here are some of the provisions of the 2021 NDAA of interest to the PNT community.

Military Multi-GNSS Prototype

The 2018 NDAA required the Defense Department to incorporate Europe’s Galileo and Japan’s QZSS satellite navigation signals into military user equipment. The idea was to make it more resilient to disruption. Also required was an investigation into using non-allied signals.

Apparently not satisfied with progress on this project, Congress mandated a project to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of the 2020 NDAA.

The 2021 NDAA seems to indicate Congress is still not happy. It withholds 20% of the funding for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until the department certifies the prototype project is underway and provides briefings to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

Resilient, Survivable PNT

Language in the 2021 NDAA also seems to show Congress is impatient with the Pentagon’s lack of responsiveness to combatant commanders’ requests for non-GPS PNT systems.

Section 1611 of the act is entitled “Resilient and Survivable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capabilities.” It requires development, integration and deployment of these capabilities for combatant commanders within two years. This, it says, is “… consistent with the timescale applicable to joint urgent operational needs statements…”

The act says the new PNT capabilities shall “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing signals” and “process resilient survivable data provided by signals of opportunity and on-board sensor systems…”

The act also addresses the Defense Department’s 2018 PNT Strategy’s plan for future systems to be classified and for military use only. It directs the department to work with the National Security Council, Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security and others “…to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement the global positioning system.”

To help ensure prompt action on this, the act requires a report to Congress within six months and authorizes the department to reprogram funds from other areas to finance the effort.

Responding to Ligado Decision

By far the most PNT-related text in the 2021 NDAA includes a host of measures responding to FCC Order 20-48 approving an application by Ligado Networks. An order that the executive branch is on record as strongly opposing, saying it will degrade GPS service for many.

Senator Jim Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has regularly expressed outrage at the FCC’s decision and has called for its reversal.

Among its provisions, the act:
- requires the Department of Defense to estimate and report to Congress the cost of damage to department systems as a result of the FCC order.
- prohibits using department funds to upgrade or modify military equipment to make it resilient to interference caused by broadcasts in the spectrum allocated (the FCC order requires this to be funded by Ligado).
- prohibits contracting with any entity using the frequency bands allocated to Ligado unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the use will not interfere with GPS services.
- requires the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for an independent technical review of the FCC order.
Dana Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation (rntfnd.org).
January 25, 2021
2021 Defense Act signals turning point for Congress and PNT
Senate poised to join House this week and override Trump’s veto

The U. S. Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees, have long been concerned about GPS and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) issues. Over the last two decades Congressional hearings, demands for reports, and investigations have dealt with acquisition, contingency plans for when space is not available, deliberate interference, and a host of other issues.

While these all evidenced Congress’ interest and concern, they were relatively passive measures.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

This began to change in 2018 with passage of the National Timing Resilience and Security Act. It requires the Department of Transportation to establish a terrestrial timing system to backup GPS signals.

Then in 2019, Congress appropriated money for a GPS Backup Technology Demonstration. And the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020 required the Air Force to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of its resiliency efforts.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

Capitol Hill observers say this is the result of several things that have come to a head over the last year. Taken together, they have convinced many legislators that GPS is under threat and PNT issues are not being taken seriously enough by the executive branch. These include increased jamming and spoofing (especially by China and Russia), full implementation of China’s BeiDou system and its marketing to other nations as a superior alternative to GPS, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision on Ligado Networks, and the Pentagon’s failure to respond to combatant commanders’ Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements for non-GPS PNT.

Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

Here are some of the provisions of the 2021 NDAA of interest to the PNT community.

Military Multi-GNSS Receiver Prototype

The 2018 NDAA required the Defense Department to incorporate Europe’s Galileo and Japan’s QZSS satellite navigation signals into military user equipment. The idea was to make it more resilient to disruption. Also required was an investigation into using non-allied signals.

Apparently not satisfied with progress on this project, Congress mandated a project to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of the 2020 NDAA.

The 2021 NDAA seems to indicate the Congress is still not happy. It withholds 20% of the funding for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until such time as the department certifies the prototype project is underway and provides briefings to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

Resilient Survivable PNT

Language in the 2021 NDAA also seems to show Congress is impatient with the Pentagon’s lack of responsiveness to combatant commanders’ requests for non-GPS PNT systems.

Section 1611 of the Act is entitled “Resilient and Survivable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capabilities.” It requires development, integration, and deployment of these capabilities for combatant commanders within two years. This, it says, is “… consistent with the timescale applicable to joint urgent operational needs statements…”

The act says the new PNT capabilities shall “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing signals” and “process resilient survivable data provided by signals of opportunity and on-board sensor systems.”

The act also reverses the Defense Department’s 2018 PNT Strategy’s plan for future systems to be classified and for military use only. It directs the department to work with the National Security Council, Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security and others “to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement the global positioning system.”

To help ensure prompt action on this, the act requires a report to Congress within six months and authorizes the department to reprogram funds from other areas to finance the effort.

Responding to FCC’s Decision on Ligado Networks

By far the most PNT-related text in the 2021 NDAA includes a host of measures responding to FCC Order 20-48 approving an application by Ligado Networks. An order which the executive branch is on record as strongly opposing saying it will degrade GPS service for many.

Senator Jim Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has regularly expressed outrage at the FCC’s decision and has called for its reversal.

Among its provisions the act:
- Requires the Department of Defense to estimate and report to Congress the cost of damage to department systems as a result of the FCC order.
- Prohibits using department funds to upgrade or modify military equipment to make it resilient to interference caused by broadcasts in the spectrum allocated (the FCC order requires this to be funded by Ligado)
- Prohibits contracting with any entity using the frequency bands allocated to Ligado unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the use will not interfere with GPS services
- Requires the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for an independent technical review of the FCC order.
December 29, 2020
Coalition supports NDAA provisions to protect GPS against Ligado

Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

The Keep GPS Working Coalition issued the following statement in support of the inclusion of provisions related to GPS in the William M. “Mac” Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021. Provisions included are intended to protect GPS signals against interference, specifically against any caused by Ligado Networks.

The coalition was formed in response to a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order allowing Ligado Networks to operate a terrestrial wireless network that the coalition says will threaten the reception of millions of GPS devices.

The coalition stated,

“The Keep GPS Working Coalition applauds this year’s NDAA, which includes important provisions addressing the potential for interference to GPS caused by the use of the L-band spectrum owned by Ligado Networks. The inclusion of these provisions signals a clear understanding by Congress that preventing GPS interference is a matter of safeguarding our national security. First and foremost, the legislation provides for a thorough, independent review of the Federal Communications Commission decision allowing Ligado to operate its planned terrestrial wireless network.

“The FCC’s Ligado order, which relies heavily on inaccurate and incomplete technical submissions by Ligado, was issued despite national and economic security concerns raised by the Department of Defense, along with the Departments of Commerce, Interior, Justice, Homeland Security, Energy and Transportation, as well as NASA, the National Science Foundation, the Coast Guard and the Federal Aviation Administration. Independent review is an important first step in ensuring that Ligado’s operations will not damage the nation’s critical GPS based infrastructure or the hundreds of millions of GPS devices used in critical activities. This review and the other NDAA provisions included will also help ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place to hold Ligado accountable for all costs to U.S. taxpayers, businesses and consumers that will result from these operations.

“We are particularly grateful to Senators Inhofe and Reed and Representatives Smith, Thornberry, Turner and Cooper for their leadership on this critical issue.”

More than 50 organizations signed a Nov. 20 letter urging the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to continue their support for provisions aimed at protecting GPS from harmful interference from Ligado Networks’ planned network.

According to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The bill protects both critical military applications and numerous civilian uses of the Global Positioning System (GPS) from potentially harmful interference, and outlines a path forward following the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision to approve Ligado Networks’ request for bandwidth for a terrestrial-based cellular network that put critical GPS signals at risk. The bill prohibits the use of DOD funds to comply with the FCC Order on Ligado until the Secretary of Defense submits an estimate of the costs associated with the resulting GPS interference, and directs the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Science and Engineering for an independent technical review of the order to provide additional technical evaluation to review Ligado’s and DOD’s approaches to testing. The bill also prohibits the Secretary of Defense from entering into or continuing a contract with any entity engaged in commercial terrestrial operations within the frequency bands specified in the Ligado FCC order.”

December 4, 2020
Congress makes moves against FCC’s Ligado decision
At first it was a flurry of letters and public statements from U.S. senators and members of the house. Then there was a senate hearing on the topic, and the issue was discussed in several other hearings.

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) approval of a long-standing request by Ligado Networks continues to be controversial. The request was to make terrestrial broadcasts on a frequency near that used by GPS. Broadcasts which, according to analyses by the departments of Defense and Transportation, will interfere with GPS reception for many users.

Now it looks as though Congress is ready to move beyond talk and enact one or more pieces of legislation. These would require an independent technical review of the FCC’s decision and place limits on the ability of Ligado Networks to use the license it was granted.

Congressional interest has been fueled both by member concerns and a regular drumbeat of input from constituents. The recently formed Keep GPS Working Coalition is just one example. It was created from a larger group of more than 70 companies and organizations across a broad swath of industries that has gone on record against the decision and has been supporting congressional action.

National Defense Authorization Act

A primary vehicle for congressional action looks to be the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2021. Unlike other “annual” legislation that often gets sidetracked or delayed during election years, Congress has passed an NDAA for each of the past 59 years. As such, it is a particularly powerful tool.

This is doubly so in this case, as the member of Congress that has been the most outspoken critic of the FCC’s decision is Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK). He chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee that has direct responsibility for the NDAA.

The Senate version of the NDAA has several provisions that directly address the FCC’s decision.

Responding to conflicting claims about the findings of government and private tests, the bill requires the Defense department to contract with the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine for an independent technical review.

Evaluating Potential Impact on GPS

Among other things, the review will compare the different methods of evaluating the potential impact on GPS services from Ligado’s transmissions, and determine which of those was the most effective in guarding against any harm.

The bill also prohibits the Defense Secretary from spending any money to comply with the FCC’s order until the Congress has been given an estimate of the total cost to the department of coping with Ligado’s transmissions.

While the FCC order requires Ligado to modify or replace any government receivers impacted by its operations, the Defense department and others have said this is only a small fraction of the overall costs they would incur.

The bill requires the Defense Department estimate to consider a much larger scope of costs including:
- To upgrade, repair, or replace potentially affected receivers
- To modify, repair, or replace equipment, pares, associated ancillary equipment, software, facilities, operating manuals, training, or compliance with regulations, including with regard to the underlying platform or system in which a capability of the Global Positioning System is embedded; and,
- For personnel of the department to engineer, validate, and verify that any required remediation provides the Department with the same operational capability for the affected system prior to terrestrial operation in the 1525 to 1559 megahertz or 1626.5 to 1660.5 megahertz bands of electromagnetic spectrum.
The House version of the NDAA also provides that:

“The Secretary of Defense may not enter into a contract, or extend or renew a contract, with an entity that engages in commercial terrestrial operations using the 1525–1559 megahertz band or the 1626.5–1660.5 megahertz band unless the Secretary has certified to the congressional defense committees that such operations do not cause harmful interference to a Global Positioning System device of the Department of Defense.”

RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act

Senator Inhofe has also announced he will introduce stand-alone legislation when Congress returns from summer recess. His “Recognizing and Ensuring Taxpayer Access to Infrastructure Necessary for GPS and Satellite Communications Act,” or “RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act,” would require Ligado to modify or replace any receiver, including those used by private citizens, that would be impacted by Ligado’s operations.

This modification would be required before the FCC’s order allowing them to transmit could come into force. Most observers opine that the number of impacted civil receivers in the U.S. is so great that this would effectively deny Ligado use of the frequency.

Introduction of the RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act was planned for before the summer recess. Its delay until after was likely to provide more time to recruit co-sponsors.

GPS Interference a ‘Niche’ Issue

One observer commented that “GPS and the FCC Ligado order are really niche issues. As time goes on, more and more members of Congress will hear about it from constituents and be appalled.”

The delay will also allow time for the mammoth NDAA bill to clear Congress. RETAIN GPS would then have more chance for the spotlight.

Many industry observers have opined that regardless of congressional action, Ligado will struggle to find a successful 5G or other business model that will generate a significant revenue stream from the spectrum.

As public concern continues to grow and Congress responds with legislation, it may turn out that Ligado finally won the battle at the FCC but ended up losing the war.

Photo of the U.S. Capitol/RNT Foundation.
July 13, 2020
Homeland Security reports on PNT backup, Satelles responds
DHS report cover

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a report on alternative sources of PNT on May 6. It was submitted to U.S. congressional committee leaders on April 8.

The Report on Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Backup and Complementary Capabilities to the Global Positioning System (GPS) highlights the urgent need for GPS backup for critical applications, and it identifies and characterizes a variety of solutions available to meet this need today.

Section 1618 of the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Dec. 23, 2016, required the DHS to address the need for a GPS backup by identifying and assessing viable alternate technologies and systems.

The report is a summary and analysis of that assessment by the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) of PNT systems currently used by critical infrastructure. It also provides recommendations for the federal government’s next steps to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure to disruption of GPS services.

Update: U.S. Congressmen demand rewrite.

In the report, DHS offers the following recommendations to address the nation’s PNT requirements and backup or complementary capability gaps:
1. Temporary GPS disruptions: End users should be responsible for mitigating temporary GPS disruptions. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration maintains sufficient PNT capabilities to assure the continued safe operation of the national airspace, albeit at a reduced capacity, during GPS disruptions. The federal government can facilitate this mitigation for various critical infrastructure sectors, but should not be solely responsible for it.
2. PNT Diversity and Segmentation: The federal government should encourage adoption of multiple PNT sources, thus expanding the availability of PNT services based on market drivers. Encouraging critical infrastructure owners and operators to adopt multiple PNT systems will diffuse the risk currently concentrated in wide-area PNT services such as GPS. Federal actions should focus on facilitating the availability and adoption of PNT sources in the open market.
3. System Design: PNT provisioning systems, assets, and services must be designed with inherent security and resilience features. Critical infrastructure systems that use PNT services must be designed to operate through interference and to identify and respond to anomalous PNT inputs. These attributes are applicable to the PNT receivers and the systems that use them.
4. Pursue Innovation that Emphasizes Transition and Adoption: Incorporating PNT signal diversity into the PNT ecosystem should be pursued with an emphasis on research and development that prioritizes successful transition and adoption into existing GPS receivers, taking into account factors such as business case considerations, financial costs, technical integration, and logistical deployment.
Table 1 shows timing requirements for critical infrastructure are, according to the report.

Table 1. (Image: DHS report)

Table 2 from the report shows proposed timing solutions submitted by industry to DHS during a Request for Information (RFI) in December 2018. Systems that can meet or exceed timing requirements for critical infrastructure are indicated in green.

Table 2 (Image: DHS report)

Satelles responds

The Satelles company, which offers STL, issued a statement on the report. “This important report highlights the urgent need for GPS backup for critical applications, and it identifies and characterizes a variety of solutions that are available to meet this need today,” said Michael O’Connor, CEO of Satelles. “The report also describes the essential role of the federal government in urging industry to implement multiple technologies, without making the mistake of providing or selecting a single PNT solution.”

Continued O’Connor, “DHS goes on to define a baseline requirement for timing services accuracy for critical infrastructure. Not only does Satelles meet or exceed the precision timing specifications stated by DHS, but also our solution provides national coverage (including Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories) and is commercially available now.”

Read O’Connor’s full statement.
June 8, 2020
PNT Executive Order helpful, but delays market solutions

Dana Goward, President, Resilient PNT Foundation

On Feb. 12, the White House released an “Executive Order on Strengthening National Resilience through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services.”

It is gratifying to see White House attention to this issue. The increase in public awareness it brings will benefit individual users and the nation as a whole.

The order also hints at market driven solutions that could quickly improve America’s PNT resilience.

Needless delays

Unfortunately, the order fails to direct immediate action on this critical national and economic security issue. Instead it needlessly pushes most action and responsibility off for a year or more to do “more study.”

This is hard to understand as most of the “more study” has already been completed. For example, the order tells the Department of Commerce to take up to a year to examine PNT use in various sectors, and identify vulnerabilities and user needs. The Department of Homeland Security has already completed a National Risk Assessment and, according to congressional staff, has recently completed a report on user requirements mandated in 2017’s National Defense Authorization Act.

The Office of Science and Technology Policy is given a year to develop a plan to test robust and resilient non-GNSS PNT services (but is not required to actually do any testing). Congress mandated such a test program in 2017 and funded it with $10 million in 2018. After much delay, the Department of Transportation will complete the testing in May of this year.

The order gives the Department of Commerce six months to make available a time source to support critical infrastructure. For more than 60 years, the nation’s master clock has been available to users at the department’s NIST Laboratory in Boulder, Colorado.

Note the challenge has not been the clock, but that the nation has no way — other than vulnerable GPS signals — to distribute time at the needed level of accuracy to millions of critical infrastructure nodes. Government studies in 2007 and 2014 determined that the best way to do this was with a ground-based system. The Department of Transportation’s ongoing testing program is examining this issue again.

Market-driven solutions

Aside from increasing public awareness, the best thing the Executive Order does is to point a way forward for market-driven resilient PNT solutions.

The order calls for federal contracts to (in 21 months, if everyone does their jobs on time) require that vendors use existing and new resilient PNT sources.

If this eventually happens, the government could leverage its enormous influence in the market and stimulate creation of one or more commercial distribution systems for resilient, non-GNSS PNT. This is a great concept, and very much in keeping with America’s tradition of letting market forces solve some of its biggest problems.

But this solution will not spring into life on its own.

No commercial entity will invest tens of millions of dollars, or more, in a PNT system without assurance in advance of an income stream. Especially since federal contracting officers can and will waive the requirement if offerors cannot reasonably meet it.

If stimulating a market solution is the administration’s intent, it must stay actively involved and encourage the process for some time to come.

This includes complying with the 2018 law that requires establishment of at least one wireless, terrestrial, difficult-to-disrupt source to back up the timing signals provided by GPS.

Fortunately, this can be done by leveraging the free market at minimal cost and with little administrative effort.

By contracting to subscribe to a commercial service that will provide resilient PNT signals, the government need only invest a relatively small yearly sum using a fairly simple contract vehicle. Such a contracting technique has been used before with great success.

In 2007 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) did this as a way to establish its ADS-B aviation tracking and safety network. Once the subscription contract was let, the commercial provider was able to get financing and quickly build out the system.

Today, the FAA gets the information it needs, doesn’t have the headache of owning and maintaining a large network, and even shares in the revenue the system owner earns from selling data to other companies.

Additional leadership needed

It is important to remember that, regardless of the issue, presidential pronouncements are not enough.

In 2004, President G.W. Bush directed a number of actions to protect the nation’s critical PNT, including establishment of a GPS backup capability. While 16 years later his directive is still official executive branch policy, that mandate and many others from his order are still unexecuted.

Real improvements to PNT resilience and our nation’s security depend not on one-time pronouncements, but continued leadership focus and engagement.

This is always a challenge for initiatives driven by the White House. It will be doubly so in this case as there is no clear department leader for civil PNT issues the administration can rely on while it attends to the next issue of the day.

February 20, 2020
Money doesn’t buy progress for GPS

Alan Cameron

While it sounded like good news at first, once the real results were plucked from the slurry, they resemble nothing so much as the same old uncertainties.

About the future of GPS III, I mean.

Additional money allocated by Congress to the Department of Defense budget — $80 billion on top of $549 billion for FY18 and $85 billion added to the $562 billion previously set for FY19 — alleviated longstanding worries about sufficient funding for GPS. The satnav system has always been at the mercy of raiding by other military programs, over budget and cash-strapped. At least that pressure will be off, we thought.

But money on paper does not always lead, expeditiously or at all, to boots on the ground or birds in the sky. The funds come with an enthusiasm for reorganizing everything. To streamline it, effectivize it, make it more…businesslike.

In the case of the Space and Missile Defense Command, this means eliminating three top-level decision-making positions, and designating someone other than the secretary of the Air Force as responsible for space budget prioritization.

Congress stopped short of its initial idea, which was to establish a whole new department for military space activities, separate from and equal to the Air Force. But there’s no doubt that the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act strongly rebukes the current way of doing space things in the Pentagon and the Air Force — while proffering more money to do them.

Like many announced initiatives to drain the swamp elsewhere, this one has just drawn in more murky water. It may take four or five years, according to some with Pentagon insight, to figure out new procedures, lines of command and the actual fulcrums of decision-making. In the meantime, matters will — you guessed it — slow down.

All this as the GPS III launch schedule and OCX next-generation ground-control readiness slide rightward, and military GPS user equipment can count on at least a decade to even partially update. Mind you, Increment I of the new M-code cards is not yet complete. Once it is, the three major contractors who have developed them will compete to sell their varying versions to the different branches of the military, the different arms of those branches, and the different weapon systems (716, by GAO’s count) operated by those arms.

The pursuit of increased resilience in space, clearly destined to be a contested domain in the event of large-scale international conflict, may actually inhibit itself in the near term.

As noted below, the previous wielder of this space has relinquished satnav matters to take up, as he says, “some unfinished business with life.” I owe him a great debt. He gave me my start here.

Glen Gibbons Retires

Glen Gibbons announced his retirement from active leadership of Inside GNSS magazine at the end of last year, when he wrote he was “promoting myself to Editor Emeritus.” Gibbons was editor of GPS World from 1989 to 2005, and editor and publisher of Inside GNSS from 2006 through 2017.

In 2003, he received the U.S. Institute of Navigation’s Norman P. Hays Award for inspiration and support contributing to the advancement of navigation. GPS World joins all those around the industry and the international GNSS community in recognizing and thanking him for his many years of coverage of and service to the field of positioning, navigation and timing.

March 15, 2018