Tag: NDAA

National Guard timing backup for GPS in House FY-2023 NDAA
On July 14, the U.S. House passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, which begins Oct. 1, 2022.

The report released with the legislation contains several provisions of interest for the GPS and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) communities. Perhaps most intriguingly, it indicates the National Guard is considering a program to ensure it has one or more sources of time independent from GPS.

Here are some of the more interesting PNT-related mentions in the report.

GPS Disruption & RF-Based Alternatives

A provision entitled “Briefing on Disruption of Global Positioning System” reiterates concerns Congress has expressed repeatedly over the last two decades.

On the civil side, these concerns have resulted in prohibiting the U.S. Coast Guard from disposing of old Loran facilities until a backup for GPS is decided upon and requiring the Department of Transportation to establish a timing alternative to GPS.

Most of Congress’ attention has been focused on the Department of Defense (DOD), though. Over the years, it has tasked the department with a wide variety of briefings and actions including reporting on threats to GPS, how DOD will operate in GPS-denied environments, progress (or lack thereof) in OCX and M-code, and development of alternative PNT systems.

The 2021 NDAA took a more activist approach and required DOD to “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation and timing signals.” It also directed the department to work with the National Security Council, the departments of Transportation, Homeland Security, and others “to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement” GPS. The act mandated that this all be completed within two years.

Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

The 2023 NDAA reinforces Congress’ long standing concerns about “increasing threats of disruption” to GPS, stating “it is critical to invest in technologies that provide resilient and assured positioning, navigation and timing capabilities…”

Language in that same provision, though, focuses just on alternate navigation capabilities as opposed to full PNT. The act requires a briefing before the end of this year about DOD’s plan across the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) for “alternative navigation broadcast services.” The briefing is required to include information about “progress on radio frequency-based alternative navigation solutions,” what the department is doing now, and cost estimates for infrastructure and other expenses across the FYDP.

Army MAPS Program

The Army’s Mounted Assured PNT System (MAPS) is focused on ground vehicles. Information on the service’s website seems to indicate the upgrade in the first generation of MAPS is an anti-jam antenna. The overall program of record is more ambitious, according to the site, and includes M-code, other GNSS and inertial sensors.

“Path to ALTNAV” and “Open Standards Interfaces” are also listed as features in the MAPS final version. This is likely incorporation of DOD’s mandate for modular open system architecture to ensure the ability to easily integrate future navigation and timing systems and signals.

The Army is already producing and fielding the Gen 1 version of MAPS. In March 2022, the Aberdeen Proving Ground News announced that 1,000 units had been fielded.

In its report accompanying the NDAA, Congress expressed concern with the pace of the MAPS program. It notes the Army has procured 2,000 units — a small fraction of the 225,000 ground vehicles the service operates.

The text of the congressional report also seems to indicate the program is not much beyond the point described on its website two years ago. The website says a Program of Record technical solution was planned to have been finalized in September 2020.

The House version of the bill would require the Army to provide a briefing on:
- technical performance of candidate systems to incorporate into MAPS
- the cost of these systems and integration
- plans to deploy MAPS to the Army’s fleet of vehicles
- plans to upgrade the Gen I MAPS units already fielded.
Another indication of the delayed pace of the program is that this briefing is not due for more than a year, in December 2023.

Autonomy Software for PNT-Denied Environments

While much less specific, another interesting PNT-related provision is a requirement for DOD to “Report on autonomy software for Next Generation Air Dominance.”

It describes a developing Air Force strategy for using piloted and unpiloted aircraft alongside each other. The software “could enable the continued operational capability of systems in positioning, navigation and timing-denied environments.” The Navy and Marine Corps are developing a similar concept.

Photo: Brian Kinney/Shutterstock.com

Little public information is available concerning any of the Next Generation Air Dominance programs or supporting systems. Experts have speculated, though, that operation in PNT-denied environments would likely involve some of the aircraft remaining outside the denied area and providing PNT information to the others via one or more links.

National Guard and Nationwide Alternative Timing

At the end of a section entitled “Collaboration on positioning, navigation, and timing research,” the House report reveals that the National Guard is concerned about relying entirely on GPS for timing and seems to have begun to address that shortfall.

It requires a report no later than February 2023 on the Guard’s “Nationwide Integration of Time Resiliency for Operations (NITRO) effort.” The report should address, among other things, mission need, capability gaps, estimated costs and how the department is collaborating with other federal, state and local entities.

The budget item for NITRO cites malicious cyberattacks that can impact command and control (C2) systems. It says the Guard’s ability to support civil authorities and critical infrastructure is at risk if not mitigated with resilient time.

While attempts to reach the National Guard for comment have been unsuccessful, PNT expert Pat Diamond said the Guard’s concerns and efforts are well justified. “Precision timing is a seriously weak link for everyone in the United States, including critical infrastructure and organizations like the National Guard,” Diamond said. “If GPS timing was not available for some reason, land mobile radios, common operational pictures, the ability to navigate, plus command-and-control systems would suffer greatly, potentially being completely degraded. It’s outstanding that the Guard has realized this and seems to be moving out. All the power to them.”

A Must-Pass Bill

The House version of the 2023 NDAA has yet to be conferenced and reconciled with that of the Senate. While the Senate’s version of the NDAA has been filed, the accompanying report has not yet been released. Since the House provisions seem relatively non-controversial, they are almost certain to be included along with others from the Senate in the final bill and report.

The resulting legislation is almost certain to pass into law.

Congress often struggles to pass even routine legislation. For example, it has only funded the government on time in four of the last 40 years. The annual defense authorization is an exception. NDAA’s are considered “must-pass” bills. Congress has sent one to the president in each of the last 61 years.

Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. He is also a member of the President’s National Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board.
July 27, 2022
GAO Report: ‘Use resilient tech vs. GPS as DOD primary PNT’
Click to open the GAO Report.

A new report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) questioned the Department of Defense (DOD) strategy of keeping GPS as the central pillar of its positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) capabilities.

It said policymakers “could consider selecting the most resilient technologies as the cornerstone of the PNT suite for military missions, rather than defaulting to GPS.”

The 51-page report takes a comprehensive view of alternative PNT policy and leadership across the department. Its findings are an interesting and informative look at issues and efforts.

Increasing demands

The report comes at a time when U.S. forces have been seeing increasing interference with their own and allied GPS-enabled systems. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has regularly reported that its surveillance drones in the Ukraine have been jammed. Chinese press recently bragged that jamming caused U.S. Navy ships in the South China Sea to switch from using GPS to the Chinese BeiDou system. Additionally, U.S. military commanders have regularly described the Middle East as the most contested electronic warfare area on the planet, in large part because of regular interference with GPS signals.

The GAO study also comes on the heels of a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for this year which directs DOD to provide non-GPS PNT to combatant commanders by 2023. The act says this timeline is consistent with responding to Joint Urgent Operational Needs, a formal method for commanders to communicate with department leadership. According to some sources, this suggests that the Pentagon has been receiving such requirements from field commanders, but has not responded to them in what Congress considers a timely manner.

Alternative PNT “not a priority,” resisted

Despite chronic GPS signal interference across the globe, outside experts and officials across the DOD told the GAO study team that developing alternative sources of PNT was not a priority for DOD. One example cited was the lack of a central program office.

One expert said, “PNT — It’s everyone’s need, but nobody’s business.” Another expert said, “Everyone wants to use [PNT], no one wants to pay or care for [PNT].” One DOD official characterized alternative PNT as an afterthought. DOD’s PNT Roadmap states that PNT capabilities, despite being mission critical, are not normally considered a key requirement, but rather may be treated as “a second-tier requirement.”

Worse, the report indicated that some forces within the department resist alternative PNT efforts.
According to one DOD official cited anonymously in the report “bureaucratic and political obstacles [represent] the biggest challenges for alternative PNT” and “anything that threatens GPS, such as alternative PNT technologies, faces pushback.”

The report cited another DOD official as agreeing that “there is an impression that the GPS program has a lot of political clout within DOD, and that those trying to develop alternative PNT technologies may face political challenges.”

Realistic requirements

Many missions do not need the accuracy provided by GPS, according to the report. Nevertheless. DOD programs often default to GPS performance standards when developing requirements. Many alternative technologies, while more resilient, are unable to achieve the same accuracy as GPS and therefore fail to meet the over-stated requirements.

Open architecture

Both DOD and GAO see development of modular open system architecture (MOSA) as key to PNT success in the future. This will allow addition of new PNT sources to a platform without the need for a major retrofit. With MOSA, all that would be needed is a new sensor module for the desired PNT source.

The GAO report endorsed this approach and encouraged DOD to institutionalize it with dedicated funding.

Working with industry

Decades of civil GPS use have benefited DOD in many ways. Broad academic and commercial research has resulted in a host of applications and improvements in the size, weight, and power requirements of equipment, as well as lowered costs. These benefits would almost certainly not have been realized at the current scale if the market for GPS equipment and apps had been restricted to military users.

The 2021 NDAA directs the department to “…enable civilian and commercial adoption…” of the GPS alternative technologies it develops for field commanders. The GAO report suggests DOD also work to leverage industry advances in technologies.

Scope and recommendations

GAO’s tasking for this effort did not include examining efforts to make GPS signals and equipment more resilient to disruption, nor use of non-U.S. satellite navigation systems. Neither were non-defense uses of PNT, nor improvements in such things as tactics, techniques, and procedures considered.

The study focused solely on department efforts to complement GPS services.

Six recommendations for policymakers are included in the report:
1. Increase Collaboration — Consider mechanisms to coordinate across DOD to clarify responsibilities and authorities in prioritizing the need for alternative PNT technologies.
2. Focus on Resiliency — Consider selecting the most resilient technologies as the cornerstone of the PNT suite for military missions, rather than defaulting to GPS.
3. Clarify Requirements — Consider opportunities to clarify what level of PNT performance is actually needed for missions, rather than defaulting to requirements that match GPS performance.
4. Coordinate with Industry — Consider ensuring that DOD and commercial industry coordinate so that industry is prepared to meet DOD’s needs, and DOD can leverage industry advances.
5. Institutionalize Open Architecture — Consider making the open architecture initiative more permanent, including providing funding.
6. Analyze Vulnerabilities — Consider having DOD conduct ongoing analysis of vulnerabilities of different PNT systems.
The May 2021 GAO report “Defense Navigation Capabilities: DOD is Developing Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Technologies to Complement GPS” is available here.

Dana Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation.

Feature image: gorodenkoff/iStock/Getty Images Plus/Getty Images
May 11, 2021
2021 Defense Act signals turning point for Congress and PNT
Photo: Toshe_O/iStock / Getty Images Plus/Getty Images

Senate joined House to override Trump’s veto, making bill into law

The U. S. Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees, have long been concerned about GPS and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) issues. Over the past two decades, Congressional hearings, demands for reports and investigations have dealt with acquisition, contingency plans for when space is not available, deliberate interference, and a host of other issues.

While these all evidenced Congress’ interest and concern, they were relatively passive measures.

This began to change in 2018 with passage of the National Timing Resilience and Security Act. It requires the Department of Transportation to establish a terrestrial timing system to backup GPS signals.

Then in 2019, Congress appropriated money for a GPS Backup Technology Demonstration. And the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020 required the Air Force to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of its resiliency efforts.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

GPS Under Threat

Capitol Hill observers say this is the result of several factors that have come to a head over the last year. Taken together, they have convinced many legislators that GPS is under threat and PNT issues are not being taken seriously enough by the executive branch. These include increased jamming and spoofing (especially by China and Russia), full implementation of China’s BeiDou system and its marketing to other nations as a superior alternative to GPS, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision on Ligado Networks, and the Pentagon’s failure to respond to combatant commanders’ Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements for non-GPS PNT.

Here are some of the provisions of the 2021 NDAA of interest to the PNT community.

Military Multi-GNSS Prototype

The 2018 NDAA required the Defense Department to incorporate Europe’s Galileo and Japan’s QZSS satellite navigation signals into military user equipment. The idea was to make it more resilient to disruption. Also required was an investigation into using non-allied signals.

Apparently not satisfied with progress on this project, Congress mandated a project to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of the 2020 NDAA.

The 2021 NDAA seems to indicate Congress is still not happy. It withholds 20% of the funding for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until the department certifies the prototype project is underway and provides briefings to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

Resilient, Survivable PNT

Language in the 2021 NDAA also seems to show Congress is impatient with the Pentagon’s lack of responsiveness to combatant commanders’ requests for non-GPS PNT systems.

Section 1611 of the act is entitled “Resilient and Survivable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capabilities.” It requires development, integration and deployment of these capabilities for combatant commanders within two years. This, it says, is “… consistent with the timescale applicable to joint urgent operational needs statements…”

The act says the new PNT capabilities shall “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing signals” and “process resilient survivable data provided by signals of opportunity and on-board sensor systems…”

The act also addresses the Defense Department’s 2018 PNT Strategy’s plan for future systems to be classified and for military use only. It directs the department to work with the National Security Council, Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security and others “…to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement the global positioning system.”

To help ensure prompt action on this, the act requires a report to Congress within six months and authorizes the department to reprogram funds from other areas to finance the effort.

Responding to Ligado Decision

By far the most PNT-related text in the 2021 NDAA includes a host of measures responding to FCC Order 20-48 approving an application by Ligado Networks. An order that the executive branch is on record as strongly opposing, saying it will degrade GPS service for many.

Senator Jim Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has regularly expressed outrage at the FCC’s decision and has called for its reversal.

Among its provisions, the act:
- requires the Department of Defense to estimate and report to Congress the cost of damage to department systems as a result of the FCC order.
- prohibits using department funds to upgrade or modify military equipment to make it resilient to interference caused by broadcasts in the spectrum allocated (the FCC order requires this to be funded by Ligado).
- prohibits contracting with any entity using the frequency bands allocated to Ligado unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the use will not interfere with GPS services.
- requires the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for an independent technical review of the FCC order.
Dana Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation (rntfnd.org).
January 25, 2021
2021 Defense Act signals turning point for Congress and PNT
Senate poised to join House this week and override Trump’s veto

The U. S. Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees, have long been concerned about GPS and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) issues. Over the last two decades Congressional hearings, demands for reports, and investigations have dealt with acquisition, contingency plans for when space is not available, deliberate interference, and a host of other issues.

While these all evidenced Congress’ interest and concern, they were relatively passive measures.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

This began to change in 2018 with passage of the National Timing Resilience and Security Act. It requires the Department of Transportation to establish a terrestrial timing system to backup GPS signals.

Then in 2019, Congress appropriated money for a GPS Backup Technology Demonstration. And the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020 required the Air Force to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of its resiliency efforts.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

Capitol Hill observers say this is the result of several things that have come to a head over the last year. Taken together, they have convinced many legislators that GPS is under threat and PNT issues are not being taken seriously enough by the executive branch. These include increased jamming and spoofing (especially by China and Russia), full implementation of China’s BeiDou system and its marketing to other nations as a superior alternative to GPS, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision on Ligado Networks, and the Pentagon’s failure to respond to combatant commanders’ Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements for non-GPS PNT.

Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

Here are some of the provisions of the 2021 NDAA of interest to the PNT community.

Military Multi-GNSS Receiver Prototype

The 2018 NDAA required the Defense Department to incorporate Europe’s Galileo and Japan’s QZSS satellite navigation signals into military user equipment. The idea was to make it more resilient to disruption. Also required was an investigation into using non-allied signals.

Apparently not satisfied with progress on this project, Congress mandated a project to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of the 2020 NDAA.

The 2021 NDAA seems to indicate the Congress is still not happy. It withholds 20% of the funding for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until such time as the department certifies the prototype project is underway and provides briefings to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

Resilient Survivable PNT

Language in the 2021 NDAA also seems to show Congress is impatient with the Pentagon’s lack of responsiveness to combatant commanders’ requests for non-GPS PNT systems.

Section 1611 of the Act is entitled “Resilient and Survivable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capabilities.” It requires development, integration, and deployment of these capabilities for combatant commanders within two years. This, it says, is “… consistent with the timescale applicable to joint urgent operational needs statements…”

The act says the new PNT capabilities shall “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing signals” and “process resilient survivable data provided by signals of opportunity and on-board sensor systems.”

The act also reverses the Defense Department’s 2018 PNT Strategy’s plan for future systems to be classified and for military use only. It directs the department to work with the National Security Council, Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security and others “to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement the global positioning system.”

To help ensure prompt action on this, the act requires a report to Congress within six months and authorizes the department to reprogram funds from other areas to finance the effort.

Responding to FCC’s Decision on Ligado Networks

By far the most PNT-related text in the 2021 NDAA includes a host of measures responding to FCC Order 20-48 approving an application by Ligado Networks. An order which the executive branch is on record as strongly opposing saying it will degrade GPS service for many.

Senator Jim Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has regularly expressed outrage at the FCC’s decision and has called for its reversal.

Among its provisions the act:
- Requires the Department of Defense to estimate and report to Congress the cost of damage to department systems as a result of the FCC order.
- Prohibits using department funds to upgrade or modify military equipment to make it resilient to interference caused by broadcasts in the spectrum allocated (the FCC order requires this to be funded by Ligado)
- Prohibits contracting with any entity using the frequency bands allocated to Ligado unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the use will not interfere with GPS services
- Requires the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for an independent technical review of the FCC order.
December 29, 2020
Coalition supports NDAA provisions to protect GPS against Ligado

Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

The Keep GPS Working Coalition issued the following statement in support of the inclusion of provisions related to GPS in the William M. “Mac” Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2021. Provisions included are intended to protect GPS signals against interference, specifically against any caused by Ligado Networks.

The coalition was formed in response to a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) order allowing Ligado Networks to operate a terrestrial wireless network that the coalition says will threaten the reception of millions of GPS devices.

The coalition stated,

“The Keep GPS Working Coalition applauds this year’s NDAA, which includes important provisions addressing the potential for interference to GPS caused by the use of the L-band spectrum owned by Ligado Networks. The inclusion of these provisions signals a clear understanding by Congress that preventing GPS interference is a matter of safeguarding our national security. First and foremost, the legislation provides for a thorough, independent review of the Federal Communications Commission decision allowing Ligado to operate its planned terrestrial wireless network.

“The FCC’s Ligado order, which relies heavily on inaccurate and incomplete technical submissions by Ligado, was issued despite national and economic security concerns raised by the Department of Defense, along with the Departments of Commerce, Interior, Justice, Homeland Security, Energy and Transportation, as well as NASA, the National Science Foundation, the Coast Guard and the Federal Aviation Administration. Independent review is an important first step in ensuring that Ligado’s operations will not damage the nation’s critical GPS based infrastructure or the hundreds of millions of GPS devices used in critical activities. This review and the other NDAA provisions included will also help ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place to hold Ligado accountable for all costs to U.S. taxpayers, businesses and consumers that will result from these operations.

“We are particularly grateful to Senators Inhofe and Reed and Representatives Smith, Thornberry, Turner and Cooper for their leadership on this critical issue.”

More than 50 organizations signed a Nov. 20 letter urging the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to continue their support for provisions aimed at protecting GPS from harmful interference from Ligado Networks’ planned network.

According to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The bill protects both critical military applications and numerous civilian uses of the Global Positioning System (GPS) from potentially harmful interference, and outlines a path forward following the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision to approve Ligado Networks’ request for bandwidth for a terrestrial-based cellular network that put critical GPS signals at risk. The bill prohibits the use of DOD funds to comply with the FCC Order on Ligado until the Secretary of Defense submits an estimate of the costs associated with the resulting GPS interference, and directs the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Science and Engineering for an independent technical review of the order to provide additional technical evaluation to review Ligado’s and DOD’s approaches to testing. The bill also prohibits the Secretary of Defense from entering into or continuing a contract with any entity engaged in commercial terrestrial operations within the frequency bands specified in the Ligado FCC order.”

December 4, 2020
Congress makes moves against FCC’s Ligado decision
At first it was a flurry of letters and public statements from U.S. senators and members of the house. Then there was a senate hearing on the topic, and the issue was discussed in several other hearings.

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) approval of a long-standing request by Ligado Networks continues to be controversial. The request was to make terrestrial broadcasts on a frequency near that used by GPS. Broadcasts which, according to analyses by the departments of Defense and Transportation, will interfere with GPS reception for many users.

Now it looks as though Congress is ready to move beyond talk and enact one or more pieces of legislation. These would require an independent technical review of the FCC’s decision and place limits on the ability of Ligado Networks to use the license it was granted.

Congressional interest has been fueled both by member concerns and a regular drumbeat of input from constituents. The recently formed Keep GPS Working Coalition is just one example. It was created from a larger group of more than 70 companies and organizations across a broad swath of industries that has gone on record against the decision and has been supporting congressional action.

National Defense Authorization Act

A primary vehicle for congressional action looks to be the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2021. Unlike other “annual” legislation that often gets sidetracked or delayed during election years, Congress has passed an NDAA for each of the past 59 years. As such, it is a particularly powerful tool.

This is doubly so in this case, as the member of Congress that has been the most outspoken critic of the FCC’s decision is Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK). He chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee that has direct responsibility for the NDAA.

The Senate version of the NDAA has several provisions that directly address the FCC’s decision.

Responding to conflicting claims about the findings of government and private tests, the bill requires the Defense department to contract with the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine for an independent technical review.

Evaluating Potential Impact on GPS

Among other things, the review will compare the different methods of evaluating the potential impact on GPS services from Ligado’s transmissions, and determine which of those was the most effective in guarding against any harm.

The bill also prohibits the Defense Secretary from spending any money to comply with the FCC’s order until the Congress has been given an estimate of the total cost to the department of coping with Ligado’s transmissions.

While the FCC order requires Ligado to modify or replace any government receivers impacted by its operations, the Defense department and others have said this is only a small fraction of the overall costs they would incur.

The bill requires the Defense Department estimate to consider a much larger scope of costs including:
- To upgrade, repair, or replace potentially affected receivers
- To modify, repair, or replace equipment, pares, associated ancillary equipment, software, facilities, operating manuals, training, or compliance with regulations, including with regard to the underlying platform or system in which a capability of the Global Positioning System is embedded; and,
- For personnel of the department to engineer, validate, and verify that any required remediation provides the Department with the same operational capability for the affected system prior to terrestrial operation in the 1525 to 1559 megahertz or 1626.5 to 1660.5 megahertz bands of electromagnetic spectrum.
The House version of the NDAA also provides that:

“The Secretary of Defense may not enter into a contract, or extend or renew a contract, with an entity that engages in commercial terrestrial operations using the 1525–1559 megahertz band or the 1626.5–1660.5 megahertz band unless the Secretary has certified to the congressional defense committees that such operations do not cause harmful interference to a Global Positioning System device of the Department of Defense.”

RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act

Senator Inhofe has also announced he will introduce stand-alone legislation when Congress returns from summer recess. His “Recognizing and Ensuring Taxpayer Access to Infrastructure Necessary for GPS and Satellite Communications Act,” or “RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act,” would require Ligado to modify or replace any receiver, including those used by private citizens, that would be impacted by Ligado’s operations.

This modification would be required before the FCC’s order allowing them to transmit could come into force. Most observers opine that the number of impacted civil receivers in the U.S. is so great that this would effectively deny Ligado use of the frequency.

Introduction of the RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act was planned for before the summer recess. Its delay until after was likely to provide more time to recruit co-sponsors.

GPS Interference a ‘Niche’ Issue

One observer commented that “GPS and the FCC Ligado order are really niche issues. As time goes on, more and more members of Congress will hear about it from constituents and be appalled.”

The delay will also allow time for the mammoth NDAA bill to clear Congress. RETAIN GPS would then have more chance for the spotlight.

Many industry observers have opined that regardless of congressional action, Ligado will struggle to find a successful 5G or other business model that will generate a significant revenue stream from the spectrum.

As public concern continues to grow and Congress responds with legislation, it may turn out that Ligado finally won the battle at the FCC but ended up losing the war.

Photo of the U.S. Capitol/RNT Foundation.
July 13, 2020
Money doesn’t buy progress for GPS

Alan Cameron

While it sounded like good news at first, once the real results were plucked from the slurry, they resemble nothing so much as the same old uncertainties.

About the future of GPS III, I mean.

Additional money allocated by Congress to the Department of Defense budget — $80 billion on top of $549 billion for FY18 and $85 billion added to the $562 billion previously set for FY19 — alleviated longstanding worries about sufficient funding for GPS. The satnav system has always been at the mercy of raiding by other military programs, over budget and cash-strapped. At least that pressure will be off, we thought.

But money on paper does not always lead, expeditiously or at all, to boots on the ground or birds in the sky. The funds come with an enthusiasm for reorganizing everything. To streamline it, effectivize it, make it more…businesslike.

In the case of the Space and Missile Defense Command, this means eliminating three top-level decision-making positions, and designating someone other than the secretary of the Air Force as responsible for space budget prioritization.

Congress stopped short of its initial idea, which was to establish a whole new department for military space activities, separate from and equal to the Air Force. But there’s no doubt that the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act strongly rebukes the current way of doing space things in the Pentagon and the Air Force — while proffering more money to do them.

Like many announced initiatives to drain the swamp elsewhere, this one has just drawn in more murky water. It may take four or five years, according to some with Pentagon insight, to figure out new procedures, lines of command and the actual fulcrums of decision-making. In the meantime, matters will — you guessed it — slow down.

All this as the GPS III launch schedule and OCX next-generation ground-control readiness slide rightward, and military GPS user equipment can count on at least a decade to even partially update. Mind you, Increment I of the new M-code cards is not yet complete. Once it is, the three major contractors who have developed them will compete to sell their varying versions to the different branches of the military, the different arms of those branches, and the different weapon systems (716, by GAO’s count) operated by those arms.

The pursuit of increased resilience in space, clearly destined to be a contested domain in the event of large-scale international conflict, may actually inhibit itself in the near term.

As noted below, the previous wielder of this space has relinquished satnav matters to take up, as he says, “some unfinished business with life.” I owe him a great debt. He gave me my start here.

Glen Gibbons Retires

Glen Gibbons announced his retirement from active leadership of Inside GNSS magazine at the end of last year, when he wrote he was “promoting myself to Editor Emeritus.” Gibbons was editor of GPS World from 1989 to 2005, and editor and publisher of Inside GNSS from 2006 through 2017.

In 2003, he received the U.S. Institute of Navigation’s Norman P. Hays Award for inspiration and support contributing to the advancement of navigation. GPS World joins all those around the industry and the international GNSS community in recognizing and thanking him for his many years of coverage of and service to the field of positioning, navigation and timing.

March 15, 2018
Out in Front: Complements of the Season

Alan Cameron

In the wake of last month’s Expert Advice column on eLoran — “The Low Cost of Protecting America” by Dana Goward of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation — come several positive comments and encouraging developments. Rather than rehearse all the arguments why we should care about this, I’ll repeat the one word that I heard most often in GNSS circles in 2013: jamming. Followed closely by: spoofing.

“I have been advocating strongly for reconsideration of the government’s domestic Loran decision for the last year or so,” writes one reader positioned on Washington’s Beltway, “and specifically working within the Department of Defense (DoD) to ensure it is aware of international developments for eLoran in the UK and South Korea, and the possibilities inherent in other former Loran chains.

“The DoD is beginning to recognize the value of eLoran as a complement to GPS, not only for international missions, but in cooperation with the departments of Transportation and Homeland Security for domestic critical infrastructure.”

Last fall, Don Jewell’s Defense PNT newsletter on the same subject drew this reply from another well-known expert:

“One of the key short-term actions is to prevent the decommissioned [Loran] sites from being sold off for subdivisions. These sites are a national treasure with unique properties: soil conductivity, water content, metal content, and more that are hugely important in siting low-frequency positioning systems. Those long-gone engineers of the 1940s and ’50s knew this and chose accordingly.”

Before last month’s issue appeared but after it had gone to press, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2014. It contained several favorable New Year’s auguries for positioners, navigators, and timers.The act evinced an acute awareness of the vulnerability of space systems to disruption. The act is also a law governing the land. Through it Congress requires the administration to, among other things, explain biennially in its “Space Protection Strategy” report exactly how, in the event space systems are disrupted, DOD and the intelligence community “plan to provide necessary national security capabilities through alternative space, airborne, or ground systems.”

Since said administration acted early in its first term to decommission Loran-C, the congressional directive is pointed.

The next big thing coming up on the GNSS international horizon takes place in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, April 15–17: the European Navigation Conference, ENC-GNSS 2014. It includes a track session on “eLoran and other Low-Frequency Systems,” and I’ll be there with pencil sharpened.

Brad Parkinson will give the ENC keynote, and he is on record as one of an august group of Institute for Defense Analyses experts who unanimously recommended that the existing Loran-C be greatly updated and modernized to eLoran. We should hear more from him on this subject amid the wharves, waterways, and docks of Europe’s largest port (world’s third busiest).

There’s barely room left to report the successful tests of Enhanced Differential Loran (eDLoran) by Dutch specialists Reelektronika: absolute accuracy of 5 meters in the North Sea and in the Rotterdam Europort harbor area.

February 1, 2014