Tag: Putin

  • When will Russia attack GPS? Interview with former CIA analyst George Beebe

    When will Russia attack GPS? Interview with former CIA analyst George Beebe

    George Beebe
    George Beebe

    In mid-November, Russia destroyed a retired satellite with a ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. This created significant debris, which endangered other assets in low-Earth orbit, including the International Space Station (ISS). Two Russian cosmonauts were serving on the seven-person ISS crew at the time.

    Two weeks later, Russia followed up the ASAT demonstration with the boast that they could destroy all 32 Global Positioning System satellites at once, blinding the U.S. and NATO.

    Based on the ASAT demonstration and unclassified reports from the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, it is pretty clear that Russia can destroy all, or at least most, GPS satellites in one go.

    What is less clear, is whether Russia would really do that.

    To find out, Dana A. Goward spoke with George Beebe, who once served as the Central Intelligence Agency’s top analyst for Russia and Eastern Europe. He is now the director of programs at the Center for the National Interest, a center-right think tank.

    Dana A. Goward: Russia’s threat to destroy GPS was made shortly after they destroyed an old satellite in space. What do you make of that demonstration, and all the dangerous debris it created?

    George Beebe: Well, they were clearly sending a message — several messages, in fact. First, of course, that they have the ability to destroy satellites in space. This is part of a larger narrative they want to tell — that they are a world power which must be reckoned with. And it is no coincidence that this was done while they were amassing troops along Ukraine’s borders.

    Another message is that they know the U.S. and Europe are very dependent on space, and we are vulnerable there.

    DG: But the space debris will threaten satellites and people in low-Earth orbit for years to come. That seems to be reckless and counter to their own interest.

    GB: While others see that as reckless and irresponsible, Russian officials almost certainly see it as an expression of resolve. That was actually another message. They were saying, “We are willing to endanger our own equipment and people.”

    Translate that to their concern about keeping Ukraine from joining NATO and otherwise falling into the West’s sphere of influence. It might be, “We are willing to accept the pain in order to keep Ukraine from leaving our orbit.”

    Unfortunately, I am not sure most Western leaders picked up on the “We are resolved” message.

    DG: Attacking GPS would be a huge, devastating and dangerous move, though. How could things get so bad they would do that?

    Cover: Thomas Dunne Books
    Beebe is the author of The Russia Trap. (Cover: Thomas Dunne Books)

    GB: Russia sincerely believes it is generally threatened by the West, and specifically by NATO.

    Since the fall of the Soviet Union, they have seen their global influence recede, and Western influence on their borders greatly expand. Some of their neighbors have joined NATO. Others, like Ukraine, have not, but would like to eventually come under the NATO umbrella. For the Kremlin, this is unacceptable. It is akin to what Soviet missiles in Cuba were for the United States.

    Over the last decade and a half, Putin has rebuilt the Russian military. He is now looking to draw lines in the sand for the West to not cross.

    At the same time, the West feels threatened by Russia. Hitler’s aggression and refusal to be appeased by territorial concessions is standard reading in every Western history class. American and European leaders feel compelled to hold the line and not give into what they see as Putin’s territorial ambitions.

    This is a very dangerous situation as both sides see themselves acting defensively and the other acting aggressively.

    DG: I guess it is much easier to justify something to yourself and your compatriots if you think you are only acting in self-defense.

    GB: Exactly. The problem comes when one side does something in self-defense and, in response, the other side feels compelled to do something as well. This can spawn an escalating tit-for-tat that spirals out of control into a bigger conflict no one wants.

    DG: The West is imposing economic sanctions. At least that is harder to interpret as aggressive.

    GB: Before World War II, the U.S. imposed severe economic sanctions on Japan in response to its expansionist moves in Asia. The sanctions were so severe that they were crippling and threatened to bring down Japan’s military government. The week before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese delivered a diplomatic note to the United States saying the sanctions amounted to an act of war. So, economic sanctions are not always an absolutely safe route.

    DG: Do you think Russia would ever really attack GPS? And how might that go down?

    GB: It depends on how backed into a corner they feel. They certainly know that our military and our homeland are very dependent on GPS, and we have no real alternative in place. It doesn’t help that they are much less dependent on GLONASS and have an alternative for when signals from space are not available.

    So, they can definitely do more harm to us than we can to them by interfering with navigation satellites.

    It would take a lot to goad them into physically attacking GPS satellites. That would be an irreversible step they undoubtedly understand could lead to all-out war.

    Far more likely would be a cyber-attack on the systems controlling the GPS constellation. Such an attack could be harder to attribute to them. It could also be reversed if they got what they wanted.

    I could also see them jamming GPS and Galileo signals across Europe and the United States as part of an escalated conflict. Russian forces excel at electronic warfare, and the jamming could easily be turned off once they achieved their goals, or if things seemed to be getting out of hand.

    Photo: Stanislav Ostranitsa/iStock/Getty Images Plus/Getty Images
    Photo: Stanislav Ostranitsa/iStock/Getty Images Plus/Getty Images

     

  • PNT Roundup: Telecoms cite GNSS vulnerabilities

    In a technical report titled GPS Vulnerability released Sept. 15, the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Standards (ATIS) renewed its call for an eLoran system to support telecom and other critical infrastructure in the United States.

    As part of its “Recommendations to Assure Time for Telecom” the report says:

    “An eLoran system (or equivalent) should be developed and implemented in the U.S. to provide a near-term alternative to GPS for the telecom system and other critical infrastructure. The physical and cyber security of eLoran transmission stations should be a consideration in their operation.”

    ATIS termed its report “a major resource to help better understand and address a formidable telecommunications industry challenge: the vulnerabilities in the Global Positioning System (GPS).”

    Requirements for precise time delivery have driven the industry toward the increased use of GPS and GPS-dependent technologies, it says. Yet this dependency has left the industry vulnerable to disruptions and manipulations of the GPS signal.

    GPS Vulnerability (ATIS-0900005) provides insight into the sources of the most common problems with GPS and their impacts. The report also covers several mature proposed solutions that would satisfy telecommunications sector timing requirements.

    “GPS disruptions have economic, financial and service impacts to carrier network operators, suppliers, cellular services as well as adjacent industries and government agencies that depend on a functioning wireless communications sector,” said ATIS President and CEO Susan Miller. “We believe that our report on this topic will contribute to solutions to help secure the delivery of time — a function critical to many sectors in our economy.”

    Known vulnerabilities to deliver GPS time to a system include environmental phenomena, malicious interference and spoofing, incidental interference, adjacent band interference, poor antenna installations and rare but present GPS segment errors.

    GPS Vulnerability discusses techniques to address these vulnerabilities as well as alternatives to GPS timing, with the goal of mitigating GPS vulnerabilities for the timing receivers used in the critical infrastructure.

    Alternatives covered in the report include Navigational Message Authentication on modernized GPS civil signals, atomic clock time holdover, sync over fiber, eLoran, WWVB, terrestrial beacons and more.


    Putin shows taste for spoofing

    For several days in June, more than 20 ships reported problems with GPS reception in the Black Sea (see Expert Opinion column, August GPS World). Experts concluded the problems were probably the result of a spoofing attack in the area.

    Norwegian journalist Henrik Lied of NRKbeta compared this with accounts of similar episodes near the Kremlin complex in Moscow, where tourists have reported their smartphones showing them at an airport outside the city.

    Lied interviewed University of Texas professor Todd Humphreys about his theory that this is an effort to keep drones from flying in the area: “Several of us [researchers in GNSS] have concluded the Kremlin spoofing was likely trying to trigger UAV geo-fencing, which prevents UAVs from flying near airports,” Humphreys said.

    A Moscow correspondent for the Norwegian Broadcasting Company reports that these GPS problems only tend to occur when President Vladimir Putin is in town.

    Several of the ships spoofed in the Black Sea were sailing in the vicinity of the Russian premier’s Black Sea vacation home. Putin was actually in the area when the incidents occurred. This may indicate that Russian authorities are spoofing wherever the Russian president is located.

    Humphreys said, “It’s long been assumed that Russia, China and other nations (including the U.S.) have the technology to carry out a spoofing attack. What’s surprising is Russia’s willingness to use it openly and somewhat indiscriminately. It does fit nicely into what has been called Russian disinformation technology.”

  • Russia Turns IGS Data Back on — Sort of

    On June 2, GPS World reported that GPS tracking stations co-sponsored by U.S. interests but located in Russia had stopped making their data available to scientists and others.

    Now, “It looks like the tap has been turned back on, at least at slow flow,” reports Richard Langley, GPS World Innovation editor and University of New Brunswick professor. “Hourly and daily data files from the affected stations are once again being sent to IGS data archive centres. Grigory Steblov of the Geophysical Survey of the Russian Academy of Sciences has reported that ‘the transmission of the data from NEDA [North Eurasian Deformation Array] GPS sites [had] been temporarily suspended due to technical reasons.’

    Now, after reorganization, the data flow is being resumed on hourly basis.”

    Langley stresses, however, that the real-time flow of data from the NEDA stations has not been turned back on, which is important for some applications.

  • Russia Turns off Data from IGS GPS Tracking Stations

    As announced by Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin on May 13, 2014, GPS tracking stations co-sponsored by U.S. interests have stopped making their data available to scientists and others.

    The tap on the flow of data from 11 stations was turned off starting on May 31. The data flow included hourly and daily data files from the stations as well as the real-time flow of data over the Internet.

    In an item entitled “On Execution of the Instructions of the Government of the Russian Federation,” the website of Roscosmos, the Russian Space Agency, reported:

    “In accordance with the instructions of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Russian Space Agency in conjunction with the Federal Agency scientific organizations on June 1, 2014, implemented measures to avoid the use of information from the global seismographic network stations operating on the signals of the GPS system and located in the Russian Federation, for purposes not covered by existing agreements, including military uses.” (As translated by Google Translate.)

    It should be pointed out that none of the affected stations contribute to the day-to-day running of GPS; that is, they are not part of the GPS command and control network. They are stations participating in the work of the International GNSS Service, which provides data and products to scientists and other researchers for different purposes including geodesy, geodynamics, orbital mechanics, and atmospheric studies.

     

    It is believed that the Russian move is a tit-for-tat exercise in response to sanctions by western countries following recent events in Ukraine. However, the Russians say that the action was initiated by the refusal of the U.S. to enter into negotiations on the placement of Russian-operated GLONASS tracking stations on U.S. territory. Russia wishes to expand its global network of differential correction and monitoring stations, which could conceivably be also used to supply data for GLONASS command and control purposes.

    What isn’t widely known is that Roscosmos already uses sites on U.S. territory for monitoring the availability and health of the GLONASS satellites as the map below clearly shows.