Tag: RF interference

  • Four innovations strengthening navigation resilience against RF interference

    Four innovations strengthening navigation resilience against RF interference

    1. Anti-jamming antenna
    For defense, marine and critical infrastructure

    The CR8894SXF+ is an advanced controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA) for anti-jamming. It is engineered to provide efficient interference protection and real-time situational awareness across critical infrastructure, marine and defense environments where GNSS continuity is mission critical. It is specifically designed to provide a low-power and lightweight solution in a compact size. It features advanced in-band null forming to protect GPS L1/L2 and Galileo E1/E5b signals, helping ensure resilient positioning, navigation and timing in environments with contested, congested or degraded radio frequency conditions. The antenna incorporates Calian’s eXtended Filtering interference mitigation technology to maintain performance and reliability when RF threats are present. The CRPA supports in-band null-forming of 20 dB to 40 dB and out-of-band rejection up to 80 dB across 700 MHz to 2,500 MHz. It includes two independent low-noise amplifier channels, allowing continued operation if one signal band is compromised. The antenna forms nulls in both upper (L1/E1) and lower (L2/E5b) GNSS bands to actively suppress jamming sources. A serial output interface provides real-time feedback, enabling users to monitor RF conditions and system status. Calian GNSS, calian.com

    2. PNT system
    Integrates GNSS receiver, INS, atomic clock

    Photo: SAFRAN
    Photo: Safran

    The BlackNaute autonomous positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) system integrates Safran’s HRG dual-core inertial navigation technology, the Skylight multi-mode GNSS receiver board, and an atomic clock to offer navigation resilience in challenging electronic warfare environments. BlackNaute’s built-in atomic clock is designed to maintain precise timing, which is essential for secure communications and collaborative combat operations. The system features advanced anti-jamming and anti-spoofing algorithms, which have been validated in more than 16,000 operational cases. These capabilities allow BlackNaute to detect compromised signals and automatically switch to autonomous and trusted navigation and timing sources to ensure continuity of operations. Its modular design allows it to be adapted across a variety of platforms. Airbus Helicopters has selected the NH90 to be equipped with this new Embedded GNSS and Time INS (EGTI). Safran Electronics & Defense, safran.com

    3. Interference detection
    Suite enhanced for greater accuracy, coverage and insight

    Photo: US NAVY
    Photo: US Navy

    HawkEye 360’s GNSS-I Detection suite includes powerful enhancements to its GNSS interference detection capabilities. The upgrades — designed with defense, intelligence and national security operations in mind — offer unprecedented accuracy, coverage and insight into global GPS jamming and spoofing threats. The update includes a new wider frequency algorithm that better distinguishes individual emitters, incorporates GPS spoofing detection, and is terrain adjusted for better geolocation accuracy, delivering greater situational awareness and more precise geolocation of interference sources worldwide. The enhanced product suite supports strategic decision-making by providing timely, precise insight into potential signal disruptions, enabling stakeholders to better assess risk, respond confidently, and maintain operational continuity in dynamic environments. HawkEye 360, he360.com

    4. VTOL UAS
    For complex intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions

    Photo: ESEN
    Photo: ESEN

    The GöKHUN unmanned aerial system (UAS) is a tactical vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) drone system developed for versatile missions on land or at sea. GöKHUN combines the compact mobility of a NATO Class I UAV with the performance data of a Class II tactical system. It uses the SP 210 FI GS 2-stroke engine from Sky Power International. With a take-off weight of up to 110 kg and a maximum fuel and payload capacity of 26 kg, the GöKHUN can remain in the air for up to 16 hours with a minimum payload. Even with a demanding sensor load of 12 kg, it can achieve a flight duration of around nine hours, making it suitable for long-endurance reconnaissance and surveillance missions. The GöKHUN’s cruising speed is between 96 and 158 km/h. The maximum range with direct line-of-sight is over 150 km, with the system reaching a service ceiling of approximately 5,500 m. ESEN, esensi.com.tr

  • Poll: Experiences with jamming, spoofing and RF interference

    Poll: Experiences with jamming, spoofing and RF interference

    jimi-purple-hazeNot with Purple Haze, but with signal interference — although, come to think of it, the two may be not unalike, phenomenologically.

    The October reader’s poll asked “Have you directly experienced any of the following? Check all that apply.

    • GPS/GNSS jamming.
    • GPS/GNSS spoofing.
    • Unintentional RF interference.
    • RF interference from unknown source; unknown whether intentional or not.
    • None of the above.
    • Other, please specify.

    The answers rather stunned me in their magnitude. To be sure, respondents were self-selected and thus not totally representative of the electorate (you) out there. People who have undergone jamming or spoofing would be much more likely to step forward and say “Yeah, here,” than those who had not would be to fill out an online form, however brief, simply to say “Nah, not me.”

    At any rate, the answers came back:

    • Jamming: 70 percent (70 percent!)
    • Spoofing: 25 percent
    • Unintentional RF interference: 55 percent
    • Unknown RF interference: 65 percent
    • None of the above: 5 percent

    Among the “other” answers we received were these:

    I’ve participated in official test activities; Incidents caused by GPS booster (low-cost repeater); We regularly see our vehicle tracking systems jammed or providing incorrect positions believed to be via organised theft using sophisticated jammers; Every time I drive past Newark, NJ on I-95; Badly installed GPS antennas, RF interference from old GPS antennas.

    Scanning the affiliations of those answering, the names of organizations actively involved in monitoring or countering jamming and spoofing rise to the top. Still, to get such overwhelming response — only one in 20 was not experienced in this realm — suggests time and energy invested in protections and countermeasures should be doubled, quadrupled or more. Disasters of many kinds loom.

    Speaking of disasters, and of our fondness for placing our finger on the pulse of the GNSS/PNT community, we held a mock presidential plebiscite at ION GNSS+ in September. “Who will be the best GPS president?” That is, who would be the best president for GPS, in terms of funding and support? The answers: Clinton 60 percent, Trump 34 percent. The real results may already be known by the time you read this. And, to paraphrase Gerald Ford (something I never thought I’d find myself doing), our long national nightmare may be over.

    Is it tomorrow, or just the end of time?