Tag: U.S. Congress

National Guard timing backup for GPS in House FY-2023 NDAA
On July 14, the U.S. House passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, which begins Oct. 1, 2022.

The report released with the legislation contains several provisions of interest for the GPS and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) communities. Perhaps most intriguingly, it indicates the National Guard is considering a program to ensure it has one or more sources of time independent from GPS.

Here are some of the more interesting PNT-related mentions in the report.

GPS Disruption & RF-Based Alternatives

A provision entitled “Briefing on Disruption of Global Positioning System” reiterates concerns Congress has expressed repeatedly over the last two decades.

On the civil side, these concerns have resulted in prohibiting the U.S. Coast Guard from disposing of old Loran facilities until a backup for GPS is decided upon and requiring the Department of Transportation to establish a timing alternative to GPS.

Most of Congress’ attention has been focused on the Department of Defense (DOD), though. Over the years, it has tasked the department with a wide variety of briefings and actions including reporting on threats to GPS, how DOD will operate in GPS-denied environments, progress (or lack thereof) in OCX and M-code, and development of alternative PNT systems.

The 2021 NDAA took a more activist approach and required DOD to “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation and timing signals.” It also directed the department to work with the National Security Council, the departments of Transportation, Homeland Security, and others “to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement” GPS. The act mandated that this all be completed within two years.

Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

The 2023 NDAA reinforces Congress’ long standing concerns about “increasing threats of disruption” to GPS, stating “it is critical to invest in technologies that provide resilient and assured positioning, navigation and timing capabilities…”

Language in that same provision, though, focuses just on alternate navigation capabilities as opposed to full PNT. The act requires a briefing before the end of this year about DOD’s plan across the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) for “alternative navigation broadcast services.” The briefing is required to include information about “progress on radio frequency-based alternative navigation solutions,” what the department is doing now, and cost estimates for infrastructure and other expenses across the FYDP.

Army MAPS Program

The Army’s Mounted Assured PNT System (MAPS) is focused on ground vehicles. Information on the service’s website seems to indicate the upgrade in the first generation of MAPS is an anti-jam antenna. The overall program of record is more ambitious, according to the site, and includes M-code, other GNSS and inertial sensors.

“Path to ALTNAV” and “Open Standards Interfaces” are also listed as features in the MAPS final version. This is likely incorporation of DOD’s mandate for modular open system architecture to ensure the ability to easily integrate future navigation and timing systems and signals.

The Army is already producing and fielding the Gen 1 version of MAPS. In March 2022, the Aberdeen Proving Ground News announced that 1,000 units had been fielded.

In its report accompanying the NDAA, Congress expressed concern with the pace of the MAPS program. It notes the Army has procured 2,000 units — a small fraction of the 225,000 ground vehicles the service operates.

The text of the congressional report also seems to indicate the program is not much beyond the point described on its website two years ago. The website says a Program of Record technical solution was planned to have been finalized in September 2020.

The House version of the bill would require the Army to provide a briefing on:
- technical performance of candidate systems to incorporate into MAPS
- the cost of these systems and integration
- plans to deploy MAPS to the Army’s fleet of vehicles
- plans to upgrade the Gen I MAPS units already fielded.
Another indication of the delayed pace of the program is that this briefing is not due for more than a year, in December 2023.

Autonomy Software for PNT-Denied Environments

While much less specific, another interesting PNT-related provision is a requirement for DOD to “Report on autonomy software for Next Generation Air Dominance.”

It describes a developing Air Force strategy for using piloted and unpiloted aircraft alongside each other. The software “could enable the continued operational capability of systems in positioning, navigation and timing-denied environments.” The Navy and Marine Corps are developing a similar concept.

Photo: Brian Kinney/Shutterstock.com

Little public information is available concerning any of the Next Generation Air Dominance programs or supporting systems. Experts have speculated, though, that operation in PNT-denied environments would likely involve some of the aircraft remaining outside the denied area and providing PNT information to the others via one or more links.

National Guard and Nationwide Alternative Timing

At the end of a section entitled “Collaboration on positioning, navigation, and timing research,” the House report reveals that the National Guard is concerned about relying entirely on GPS for timing and seems to have begun to address that shortfall.

It requires a report no later than February 2023 on the Guard’s “Nationwide Integration of Time Resiliency for Operations (NITRO) effort.” The report should address, among other things, mission need, capability gaps, estimated costs and how the department is collaborating with other federal, state and local entities.

The budget item for NITRO cites malicious cyberattacks that can impact command and control (C2) systems. It says the Guard’s ability to support civil authorities and critical infrastructure is at risk if not mitigated with resilient time.

While attempts to reach the National Guard for comment have been unsuccessful, PNT expert Pat Diamond said the Guard’s concerns and efforts are well justified. “Precision timing is a seriously weak link for everyone in the United States, including critical infrastructure and organizations like the National Guard,” Diamond said. “If GPS timing was not available for some reason, land mobile radios, common operational pictures, the ability to navigate, plus command-and-control systems would suffer greatly, potentially being completely degraded. It’s outstanding that the Guard has realized this and seems to be moving out. All the power to them.”

A Must-Pass Bill

The House version of the 2023 NDAA has yet to be conferenced and reconciled with that of the Senate. While the Senate’s version of the NDAA has been filed, the accompanying report has not yet been released. Since the House provisions seem relatively non-controversial, they are almost certain to be included along with others from the Senate in the final bill and report.

The resulting legislation is almost certain to pass into law.

Congress often struggles to pass even routine legislation. For example, it has only funded the government on time in four of the last 40 years. The annual defense authorization is an exception. NDAA’s are considered “must-pass” bills. Congress has sent one to the president in each of the last 61 years.

Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. He is also a member of the President’s National Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board.
July 27, 2022
Senate proposes $15M to develop GPS alternatives
This week Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, released that body’s version of nine different appropriations bills. The accompanying report for the bill to fund the Transportation Department (DOT) outlines the Senate’s intentions and way forward for establishing alternatives to GPS.

The report provides $15 million for the fiscal year that began on the first of October “to establish a program that leads to wide adoption of multiple technologies that provide the necessary GPS backup and complementary PNT as identified by the Department’s report.”

The department report referenced was on a demonstration project that examined GPS backup and complementary technologies from 11 different vendors. That DOT report found, based on the technologies demonstrated, a combination of signals delivered from space, terrestrial low frequency (LF) and ultra-high frequency (UHF) broadcasts, and fiber would best meet the nation’s needs.

The Senate report accompanying the funding bill outlines components of the GPS alternatives program, including:
- development of safety-critical PNT requirements and standards,
- user adoption models to facilitate responsible use of resilient PNT, and
- procurement of services deemed appropriate by the department.
The Senate Committee report can be found here. Relevant provisions are on page 12.

Services Contracts

While not setting a deadline for issuance of a Request for Proposal, the mention of procuring services is seen by many as a strong indication that Congress expects more than just additional studies.

Services contracts, as opposed to the government building its own system, have long been advocated by numerous members of industry and by the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. Contracting for services with commercial providers is a better model, they have argued, as the needed technologies are mature and commercially available. Also, issuing one or more services contracts would avoid the need for the huge funding lines and lengthy delays inherent in a government major systems acquisition.

Many have suggested that services contracts would also be a much more economical approach for the government. They say commercial interests can operate their systems more efficiently, and that they could offer additional services to other customers, potentially reducing costs to the government.

ADS-B Sets Example

Such an approach was used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for the ADS-B air traffic safety and management system. The FAA needed to monitor and use signals from ADS-B equipment aboard a wide variety of aircraft flying in U.S. airspace. Rather than building a nation-wide ground infrastructure, the FAA issued a long-term service contract for a company to collect and provide the signals. The awardee, Exelis (now L3Harris), won the contract, built the infrastructure, and now provides ADS-B information to the FAA and others on a subscription basis.

Most observers expect the portions of the Senate bill and report about the GPS alternatives program to be adopted in conference with the House and then enacted into law.

How far the Department of Transportation will be able to develop the program this fiscal year remains to be seen. The Senate provisions do require DOT to report on its progress in a year’s time. Earlier informal reports and updates to the committee are likely to inform funding and other legislation on this effort for fiscal year 2023.

Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation
October 20, 2021
GPSIA supports bipartisan RETAIN Act
J. David Grossman, executive director, GPSIA

Guided by the leadership of the U.S. Air Force, and now the Space Force, for four decades GPS has supported all aspects of military operations, from precision guided munitions to search and rescue missions. GPS, however, is also ingrained in our economy, enabling a wide range of civil and consumer applications, including aviation, precision agriculture, construction, banking and public safety.

It’s easy to take GPS for granted, because we use it every day and it works so well. But what if someone interfered with the reliability and accuracy of GPS on which we depend? A 2019 study sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) estimated a $1 billion-a-day impact to our economy if GPS were lost.

Regrettably, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rolled the dice on this scenario in 2020, when it approved an application from Ligado Networks, a satellite communications company, to repurpose satellite spectrum in the L-band for high-power terrestrial use.*

Ignoring the warnings of a broad coalition of stakeholders, including U.S. federal agencies, congressional leaders and businesses, the FCC moved to open the traditionally “quiet neighborhood” used by satellite-based navigation services like GPS to ground-based signals that are billions of times more powerful.

The FCC itself was clear on the risks when it issued the order, and so it’s no surprise they explicitly required Ligado to “repair or replace as needed any U.S. government GPS devices that experience harmful interference from Ligado’s operations.” At the time, however, a key constituency was excluded from these protections: the millions of U.S. consumers and businesses who rely on accurate, reliable GPS signals.

In fact, 99% of the more than 900 million GPS devices found in the United States are used by the private sector, consumers, as well as state and local governments. Under the FCC’s order, first responders, pilots, municipal governments, farmers and countless other GPS users have been left on the hook for costs associated with Ligado’s disruptions.

On June 22, a bipartisan group of senators, led by Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK), took a critical step toward addressing this inequality by introducing the Recognizing and Ensuring Taxpayer Access to Infrastructure Necessary for GPS and Satellite Communications Act (RETAIN Act). A bipartisan House companion bill was subsequently introduced on July 22. This carefully balanced proposal ensures that Ligado, as the license holder and source of interference, is the one responsible for paying the costs to upgrade or replace affected GPS receivers used by consumers and businesses.

Across the country, GPS is woven into the fabric of the economy and people’s everyday lives. More than 100 million vehicles are equipped with a GPS receiver, and trains and aircraft use GPS to move people and goods. Our farms depend on GPS to increase crop yields and reduce waste. Similarly, with accurate and reliable GPS,

America’s bridges, and roads are being built more accurately, improving safety, and reducing construction times.
The RETAIN Act also protects municipal fire crews that depend on GPS for improved situational awareness and to speed response times to people in danger. In the critical moments between a 911 call and the arrival of firefighters, seconds matter. An unexpected loss of GPS could therefore be catastrophic. This is why GPSIA and more than 100 industry organizations and companies are supporting the RETAIN Act.

The RETAIN Act also considers the thousands of businesses that are showcasing their grit and ingenuity to bounce back from the COVID pandemic. Many of these companies are implementing GPS-enabled solutions, including app-based delivery and contact-tracing tools to increase efficiency and protect the safety of their employees.

The GPS Innovation Alliance, an organization committed to furthering GPS innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship, is grateful to these leaders in Congress who are standing up in support of GPS users.
- Consistent with the terms of their litigation settlements with Ligado, Garmin International Inc. and Deere & Company do not affirmatively endorse or oppose the deployment of Ligado’s proposed mobile communications network. To the extent this op-ed discusses Ligado’s deployment of its proposed 5G mobile communications network (or any interference therefrom), GPSIA is not authorized, and does not purport, to speak for Garmin and Deere.
August 3, 2021
Sen. Inhofe introduces bill to make Ligado pay everyone harmed
The bipartisan RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act seeks to compensate all GPS and satellite communications users harmed by the April 2020 Ligado Order from the FCC.

Sen. Inhofe introduces the RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act. (Photo: RNTF)

On June 23, Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) held a press event on the lawn of the U.S. Capitol. There he announced his introduction of the “Recognizing and Ensuring Taxpayer Access to Infrastructure Necessary for GPS and Satellite Communications Act” or the “RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act.”

Inhofe is the ranking member of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee. That committee’s chair, Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), is a co-sponsor, as are Senators Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and Mike Rounds (R-SD).

The bill has several provisions, all of which are aimed at ensuring anyone using the frequencies the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allocated Ligado in April 2020 will compensate all GPS and satellite communications users that are harmed.

This would pose a significant increase in financial liability for Ligado. Under the current FCC order, is only responsible for reimbursing the federal government for costs to modify systems and replace equipment.

Many see this provision as manifestly unfair. “The FCC is requiring Ligado to pay damages to federal equipment, so the company should also pay damages to equipment owned by ordinary Americans,” said George Washington University economics professor Diana Furchtgott-Roth.

“With Ligado 5G transmitters overwhelming GPS signals, pipeline maintenance and systems operations would be affected. Plus, private pilots might find that navigation technology does not operate, joggers might find that their health trackers ceased to work, and firefighters might not be able to get to their destinations.”

She estimates the cost of damage to non-federal entities to run into the billions of dollars. Furchtgott-Roth previously served as and Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the Department of Treasury and Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Department of Transportation.

The FCC decision was, and remains, controversial. Seven different petitions to reconsider were filed by various organizations and coalitions, including the National Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA) on behalf of the entire executive branch.

The FCC has yet to respond to any of the petitions, though it has denied requests to stay its order pending resolution of concerns.

Inhofe has long been concerned about the FCC’s action. As then-chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, he held hearings, issued press releases, and made public statements aimed at Ligado’s financial backers and potential backers. All warn of disastrous consequences should Ligado’s plan for transmissions in the bands adjacent to GPS be put into operation.

Inhofe also ensured several provisions were included in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that addressed the FCC’s action. These include:
- A requirement for the Department of Defense (DOD) to estimate and report to Congress the cost of damage to department systems as a result of the FCC order.
- Prohibiting use of department funds to upgrade or modify military equipment to make it resilient to interference caused by broadcasts in the spectrum allocated (the FCC order requires this to be funded by Ligado).
- Prohibiting DOD from contracting with any entity using the frequency bands allocated to Ligado unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the use will not interfere with GPS services.
- Requiring the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for an independent technical review of the FCC order.
More information about the proposed “RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act” is available at the Senator’s website.

Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. The foundation has petitioned the FCC to reconsider its decision regarding Ligado Networks.
June 28, 2021
$17M proposed for DOT resilient PNT initiatives

Photo: E4C/E+/Getty Images

The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) seeks to extend Trump policies and repeal timing law counter to its own study and industry input

The Biden administration’s budget proposal delivered to Congress last week includes $17 million for the small Department of Transportation (DOT) office responsible for leading civil positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) efforts for the nation. This is a marked increase over the $2 million allocated in 2020 and estimated $5 million being spent this fiscal year.

At the same time, it seeks to repeal the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 that mandated DOT establish a terrestrial timing backup for GPS. This, despite the findings of a recently published RAND study completed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other input from a telecommunications industry group.

Proposed Spending

The administration’s budget proposes $17 million for the DOT Office of Research and Technology to be split among three areas of effort.

Monitoring and detection. The first is a $3.5 million “(GNSS) performance monitoring and interference detection” project. This is a one-time request that is expected to be followed by a request for $1 million in yearly funding to maintain and operate the capability.

While these may not seem like sufficient funds to many, DOT is tasked with working with other departments and agencies, and to leverage existing capabilities. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is specifically named as an important partner with DOT in this effort. NGA already has responsibility for issuing worldwide navigation warnings for U.S. interests. It also has access to a wide variety of information that could be used for the project.

Signal authentication. Another $3.5 million is proposed for Executive Order (EO) 13905 Implementation and GPS Signal Authentication. The EO was issued in February 2020. It seeks to leverage market forces and education to create additional sources of PNT and encourage users to access them. This approach has been criticized by many as unworkable without extensive regulation and mandates for users, while still not addressing the majority of American companies and users.

$1.5 million of this $3.5 million will go to further implement the EO through development of a “PNT threat space model” and otherwise support inter-department PNT profile and research and development efforts.

$2 million would be allocated for a one-time investment in GPS signal authentication to “result in the development and validation of requirements for data and signal authentication capability for civil GPS,” reads the proposal. DOT has regularly requested much greater sums to establish civil signal monitoring, leading many to believe the requirements are already well known. One industry observer suggested this could be “a study in lieu of action.”

GPS Backup. $10 million would be spent for “GPS Backup/Complementary PNT Technologies Research,” essentially follow-on studies to the DOT GPS Backup Technologies Demonstration. “These efforts will further develop PNT modeling, simulation, and testing tools, as well as standards and performance monitoring tools needed to evaluate integration of diverse positioning, navigation, and/or timing technologies into end-user applications. This work will also support development of cyber-secure receivers,” reads the proposal.

Proposed Repeal of Timing Law

More surprising to many than the significant increase in proposed funding is inclusion of a proposal to repeal the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 (NTRSA).

One congressional staff member expressed shock at seeing that provision. “The act was the epitome of thoughtful, bipartisan congressional effort,” the staff member said. “It was co-sponsored in the Senate by Markey and Cruz, for crying out loud. You can’t get more bipartisan than that. To have this dumped on us without any notice or consultation is amazing. It is not something I would expect from this White House. I am not sure how serious a proposal it is.”

Some observers on the hill and elsewhere have opined that, rather than the repeal proposal being a well-vetted administration policy, it is an effort by OMB staff held over from the previous administration to carry forward and preserve President Turmp’s Executive Order 13905 and other PNT policies. Rather than focusing on establishing a GPS backup capability, they instead urged PNT users to find and pay for alternatives on their own.

Harsh Tone, False Assertions

Compounding the surprise is the exceptionally harsh tone in the proposal, and assertions that many claim are outright false.
Among the problems with the language seen by observers is its assertion that NTRSA seeks to establish a single backup for GPS services.

“It’s unclear to me where such an assertion is supported in the record,” said Greg Winfree, former Assistant Secretary at DOT in the Obama administration. “NTRSA requires the department to incorporate findings from the GPS back-up demonstration program. That project found a variety of systems are needed to protect America,” he said. “NTRSA does require establishment of at least one system, which is incredibly important. Without at least one alternative in place, GPS is one of highest priority targets for our enemies. We have to get the bullseye off of GPS. NTRSA does that.”

This point on national security was reinforced by Scott Pace, head of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University (GWU). Pace was executive director for the Space Council in the Trump administration. At a recent GWU webinar on the topic, he commented that having an alternative to GPS will contribute to national security and improve global stability. It will “lower the pressure on us to escalate and respond” should GPS satellites be damaged, or services disrupted, he said.

China, Russia, and other nations have terrestrial PNT alternatives to GNSS already in operation. This imbalance creates strategic and tactical problems for the United States, according to many analysts.

The proposed budget also describes NTRSA’s goal of providing at least one backup as “inefficient, anti-competitive and potentially harmful to the existing market for back-up/complementary PNT services.”

“Exactly the opposite is true,” according to Diana Furchtgott-Roth, GWU economics professor. Until January of this year, she led civil PNT issues within the Trump administration as a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology at DOT. “DOT’s Complementary PNT and GPS Backup Technologies Demonstration Report, published in January, specifically stated that a variety of technologies are needed to complement GPS. What is the most cost-efficient in an urban area is not necessarily the most cost-efficient in a rural or maritime area.”

“PNT is a utility used by every American. Having affordable complementary service available to people in rural and urban areas is the height of efficiency. It is unquestionably in the interests of national and economic security. In fact, access to at least one alternative should be free so to encourage adoption and best protect the nation,” she said.

“GPS is now a free service provided by the government, and the government is responsible for making sure that it is reliable. GPS outages would cause harm across a broad range of economic activities, including emergency services, general aviation, pipelines, and the electricity grid,” according to Furchtgott-Roth.

No-So-New and Contradictory Research

The proposal to repeal NTRSA cites “recent federal analyses” as part of its justification. One of these is likely a report done for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the RAND Corporation. Touted in a press release last month as “new research” and labeled “Published 2021,” the work was actually completed in 2019. DHS representatives have said the delay in publication was needed for review and approval.

Yet the report was the basis for a DHS report to Congress submitted in April 2020. This has caused some to opine that its publication was timed to reinforce OMB’s effort to repeal NTRSA. “You don’t submit reports to Congress based on un-reviewed, un-approved material,” said a retired DHS official. “The timing of its release is clearly deliberate.”

The study, “Analyzing a More Resilient National Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capability,” takes a cost-benefit approach to the issue. One of its high-level findings is that government investment in a duplicate, GPS-like backup capability is not warranted.

At the same time, it found that government investment in a national timing network, such as the one mandated by the NTRSA, is likely warranted. Saying that a complete backup for all GPS services in all parts of the country is not cost-beneficial, the study says there are some “…federal initiatives that do appear to be cost effective or close to cost effective.” These include “Timing-only backup through fiber/FirstNet, eLoran, or STL [Satelles].”

According to the retired DHS official, this directly contradicts OMB’s assertion that NTRSA should be repealed. “Either they didn’t read the whole thing, or they counted on most people not reading farther than the top-level recommendations,” he said. “And those top recommendations were clearly selected to match OMB’s desired outcome.”

Telecommunications Industry Cites Need for NTRSA Provisions

The May 2021 “Report to the President on Communications Resiliency” also runs counter to claims made in the budget proposal. In it, the president’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (coordinated by DHS) cites the need for GPS alternatives in telecommunications and urges President Biden to fund them. It specifically mentions the need for a national timing architecture, and cites the provisions of NTRSA several times as a step in the right direction.

The industry group Alliance for Telecommunications Solutions also sent letters in May to congressional leaders urging funding for GPS alternatives.

Continuing the Discussion

Congress has become increasingly dissatisfied with executive branch actions on resilient PNT over the last decade.

The most recent evidence of this is an extensive and highly critical report of the Department of Defense’s approach to PNT resilience released May 10 by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Among its recommendations was to not rely on GPS as a primary PNT source but look to more resilient technologies.

While President Trump’s 2020 Executive Order did not make precisely the same recommendation to civil users, it did focus on “responsible use” of PNT and transitioning to using additional, non-GPS dependent sources.

The question still under discussion is how far the government should go to support such a transition.

Seasoned observers regularly comment that Congress has the “power of the purse” and every president’s budget is “dead on arrival” regardless of which party controls the White House.

It seems clear that resilient PNT will be a topic of lively debate between the Congress and the White House, as well as internally on the hill, for the foreseeable future.

Controversial GAO report on DOD nav webinar June 15

June 4, 2021
US Congress may move against Chinese-made drones
The FLIR M440 UAV. (Photo: Teledyne FLIR)

A bill moving through the U.S. Congress would impose a five-year ban on United States government purchases of drones manufactured or assembled in China, reports The Associated Press. The measure reflects bipartisan concerns that the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) made in China could facilitate Chinese spying on critical infrastructure.

Major commercial and consumer UAV-maker company DJI is based in Shenzhen, China. Many of its small, low-altitude drones are employed by local and regional government users in law enforcement, emergency response and surveying. The ban could affect police departments that rely on federal funds for equipment. In 2020, the Department of Homeland Security halted such grants for Chinese-made drones.

Chinese-made components, including GNSS receivers and inertial sensors, are not addressed in the bill, and the Pentagon has acknowledged that many components for non-Chinese-company drones are made in China.

While the ban wouldn’t go into effect until 2023, many federal agencies have already imposed temporary restrictions on the use of Chinese drones. The Interior Department had flown more than 11,000 drone missions before January, when the agency temporarily grounded its fleet of more than 500 DJI drones over cybersecurity concerns, according to The Hill. The Hill cites a May 6 Pentagon report. The report found no malicious code in the software for DJI’s Government Edition drones.

An analysis by Booz Allen Hamilton released in June 2020 found no evidence that DJI drones have shared sensitive information with the company or the Chinese Communist Party.

In August 2020, the Defense Department issued approval to drones from five companies:
- Skydio’s X2-D. Skydio is based in Redwood City, California.
- Parrot’s Anafi USA. While Parrot is based in Paris, France, the ANAFI USA drone is manufactured in the United States for U.S. customers.
- Teledyne FLIR’s Flir M440 Ion. The drone was originally made by Altavian in Florida, which was acquired by FLIR in December 2020, which was subsequently acquired by Teledyne Technologies in January. Teledyne FLIR is headquartered in Wilsonville, Oregon.
- Teal Drones’ Golden Eagle. Teal Drones is based in Salt Lake City, Utah.
- Vantage Robotics’ Vesper. Vantage is based in San Leandro, California.
June 3, 2021
Congressmen urge administration on GPS timing backup

In separate letters to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and new Secretary of Transportation Buttigieg, influential members of Congress have urged the Biden administration to take prompt action and establish a backup timing capability for GPS.

Danger and Benefits, Solution in Hand

On March 1, Republican representatives Sam Graves and Bob Gibbs wrote to the acting OMB director citing the dangers of not having a backup, and the benefits one would bring. Graves is the ranking member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

Calling backup timing for GPS “important telecommunications infrastructure,” they said the capability is essential. Without a backup “… it is not a question of if our transportation, financial, and telecommunications infrastructure systems will fail, it is a question of when.”

After describing some of the threats to GPS, they observed that America will suffer from an outage more than many of its adversaries. Russia and China were cited as examples of nations that already have terrestrial backup systems for space-based PNT.

The letter to OMB also cited the benefits to safety, autonomous and intelligent transportation systems, along with “5G & Future Telecommunications.” GPS interference has led to a near crash of a commercial passenger aircraft, drone accidents, and allowed white-hat hackers to force cars off the road. The letter also referenced a report by the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS) calling for a national timing solution to complement GPS. Such a solution would “…allow faster 5G implementation and enable it to reach more Americans.”

Graves and Gibbs also mentioned the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) January report to Congress on its GPS Backup Technology Demonstration. The report called for an architecture that included signals from space in the L band, terrestrial broadcasts in the Ultra High Frequency and Low Frequency spectra, and a fiber backbone to synchronize and feed precise time to terrestrial transmitters.

Studies and Broken Promises

By contrast, a letter signed by Democratic House members focused on decades of administration studies, a broken promise, and failure to follow the law.

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chair Peter Defazio, along with Representatives Garamendi and Carbajal, wrote to DOT Secretary Buttigieg on Feb. 25. The letter noted that the need for a GPS backup was first identified in a 2001 DOT report. Since then, “…there have been over 18 studies and recommendations by the Federal Government calling for a land-based, wireless nationwide backup system.” Also mentioned were comments in 2014 by DHS officials calling the nation’s over-dependence on GPS “a single point of failure” for critical infrastructure.

Congress was encouraged in 2015 when the Obama administration said it would establish an eLoran timing system and follow it with a broader approach to GPS vulnerability. “This well-reasoned approach gave Congress encouragement that this national security problem would finally be addressed.”

“However, in 2018, after no additional action was taken, Congress took responsibility to codify the commitments outlined in the 2015 letter, and on a nearly unanimous bipartisan basis in both Houses, passed the National Timing Resilience and Security Act (NTRSA) to implement the land-based timing back-up system.”

The letter also notes that Congress further nudged the administration on this issue in last year’s appropriations. The act for 2021 provided funding for six new DOT staff positions to support the project and directed the department to make the hires.

Timing and Positioning

Observers say that it is almost certain the capabilities implemented to satisfy the terrestrial timing requirement in NTRSA will also provide a positioning capability independent of GPS.

NTRSA requires DOT to “… incorporate the recommendations from any GPS back-up demonstration program” into the solution set. The combination of technologies recommended by the demonstration report will provide users one or more terrestrial services from which location can be derived.

Also, mobile devices must know their locations to use wireless timing signals. Location information independent of space-based signals is needed to provide these users resilient timing service.

Feature image: Toshe_O/iStock / Getty Images Plus/Getty Images

March 4, 2021
University revises PNT backgrounder In response to concerns

Beyond GPS report. Check out the report here. (Cover: NSI)

George Mason University has revised a briefing paper on positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) in response to concerns about its accuracy.

The university’s National Security Institute “NSI Backgrounder — Beyond GPS: The Frontier of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services” was first issued on Dec. 2. Some staff on Capitol Hill and members of industry soon had concerns about several of its assertions.

Responding to letters from industry, National Security Institute (NSI) Executive Director and Professor Jamil Jaffer said he determined that three of the issues raised, while not fatal to the document, warranted clarification.

ELoran callout. The first was a statement in the backgrounder that the National Timing Resilience and Security Act (NTRSA) “specifies 13 technical requirements for a GPS backup, which essentially define the eLoran system.”

This was a concern to some on the hill as Congress is generally reluctant to specify solutions. Legislators prefer to specify outcomes and then defer to the executive branch on how to make them happen.

Members of industry pointed out that government systems like WWVB and the low-frequency portion of DARPA’s STOIC program, as well as commercial systems like NextNav and Locata, could meet or be adapted to meet the NTRSA requirement.

The revised backgrounder says the NTRSA “specifies 13 mainly technical requirements for a GPS back-up, which align closely with the capabilities of the eLoran system. Other systems may meet the Act’s requirements to varying degrees.”

Multiple technologies. The revised backgrounder also corrects a statement that the NTRSA requires the Department of Transportation to establish an eLoran system. It now says “a system that complies with the Act, and DOT may pursue multiple technologies in implementing the Act.”

Department officials had previously said they were taking a system-of-systems approach and expected to employ multiple technologies. Subsequently, a DOT report was released that documents the need for several diverse systems. It lists transmissions using low frequency (eLoran, STOIC), ultra high frequency (NextNav, Locata) and L-band from space (GPS, Satelles). It also says the terrestrial transmitters should be interconnected by fiber.

Public-private partnership. A third correction was made in the document to reflect how the Congressional Budget Office regarded the possibility of using a public-private partnership in previously proposed legislation.

Members of industry also expressed concern that one of the authors of the document serves on the advisory board for Satelles Inc. and that this was not disclosed in the paper. The backgrounder appeared on the Satelles website the same day it was published.

The university concluded that such disclosure was not necessary as the paper said the author “provides advisory services to industry, including in the PNT area.” At the author’s request, though, his profile on NSI’s webpage will be updated to show his relationship with Satelles.

January 26, 2021
First Fix: New year, new opportunities for GNSS industry

J. David Grossman

By J. David Grossman
Executive Director
GPS Innovation Alliance

As we embark on a new year, 2021 ushers in a new administration and the start of the 117th Congress. With these changes comes a litany of opportunities, as well as challenges, for the nearly four-decade-old GPS industry.

Next month, the GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) will mark its eighth anniversary as the voice of the GPS industry, educating policymakers and regulators about the GPS success story of innovation, economic growth and job creation. It is a uniquely American story made possible because of bipartisan support for protecting the spectrum used by GPS and maintaining funding to enable the modernization of the GPS constellation, ground control and military ground user equipment.

Congressional Support. This commitment was evident in the last Congress through broad support from both parties for two Congressional resolutions, H.Res.219 and S.Res.216, that affirmed the importance of continuous availability, accuracy, efficiency, robustness, reliability and resiliency of the GPS constellation.

Innovation and modernization of the GPS constellation are well underway. Last year, under the emerging leadership of the U.S. Space Force, two new Lockheed Martin-built GPS III satellites were launched into space. This new generation of GPS satellites offers three times greater accuracy, up to eight times improved anti-jamming capability for military users, and the addition of the L1C signal to enable interoperability with other navigation systems, such as Europe’s Galileo.

GPS modernization also has led to the introduction of M-code, an advanced, new signal designed to improve anti-jamming and anti-spoofing, as well as to increase secure access to military GPS signals for U.S. and allied armed forces. In GPS-denied environments, M-code reduces the jamming radius, giving military planners and targeteers options to minimize or avoid collateral strike damage.

With at least two additional GPS III satellites set to launch this year and a new ground control segment known as the Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX), the continued success of the GPS program remains bright.

Ligado Still Looms

As GPSIA continues to urge Congress to allocate the funding needed to support the modernization of GPS, we also are fighting to ensure uninterrupted operation of the estimated 900 million GPS devices in the United States ranging from precision agriculture to consumer gadgets.

Last year, we were deeply disappointed by the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision approving the applications of Ligado Networks, despite the well-documented objections of the expert agencies charged with preserving the integrity of GPS, specifically, on the critical issue of what constitutes harmful interference to users of GNSS.

Regrettably, the FCC chose to ignore the established “1-dB Standard,” which has a long history of protecting GPS operations from harmful interference in both international and domestic regulatory proceedings.

“All Americans benefit from a competitive 5G landscape.”

At the same time, Ligado and its supporters continue to argue that their proposal is the fastest way to bring 5G to all Americans. In actuality, millions of Americans already have access to 5G services and, thanks to the efforts of the FCC, hundreds of megahertz of 5G spectrum in low-, mid- and high-band frequencies have been or will soon be made available for commercial use. GPSIA believes all Americans benefit from a competitive 5G landscape.

5G without compromise. However, that goal can be achieved without undermining GPS receivers and devices that are foundational to wireless technology in general, including 5G. We remain hopeful that a new administration and congress will commit to protecting GPS receivers from harmful interference using the appropriate standard for determining such interference to ensure that the more than $1 billion per day in U.S. economic impact created by GPS continues to flourish.

2020 also brought the issue of GPS resiliency into the national forefront. In February, the president signed an Executive Order aimed at fostering greater resiliency for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT)-based systems, including GPS.

GPSIA supported this order and outlined in subsequent regulatory filings why GPS remains the gold standard for delivering PNT functions to our military as well as a wide range of other sectors, including transportation, agriculture, electricity and finance.

Complementing GPS. As the federal government considers alternative PNT solutions, it is critical that they be complementary to GPS, able to easily integrate into current or future devices, and based on a recognition that each PNT application has unique requirements driven by its intended function, environment and design factors. In sum, there is no one-size-fits-all solution.

Protecting Consumer Privacy. Looking ahead, GPSIA expects 2021 will bring a robust discussion around consumer privacy protections. While GPS satellite broadcasts are one-directional and cannot track a user’s location, we recognize that GPS is one of many data points that can contribute to application-specific location tracking. As such, GPSIA would urge Congress to ensure that geolocation data is appropriately addressed as part of any U.S. federal privacy legislation. In doing so, we believe protections for precise geolocation information will empower consumer choice, enhance transparency, and strengthen security.

On the surface, infrastructure modernization, protecting GPS spectrum, PNT resiliency, and consumer privacy may seem like distinctly different issues. What they have in common, though, is an ability to garner bipartisan support, deliver substantial consumer benefits, and strengthen our nation’s economy. GPSIA stands ready as a resource and looks forward to working with the Biden-Harris Administration and leaders in the House and Senate to promote, protect and enhance GPS.

January 7, 2021
2021 Defense Act signals turning point for Congress and PNT
Senate poised to join House this week and override Trump’s veto

The U. S. Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees, have long been concerned about GPS and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) issues. Over the last two decades Congressional hearings, demands for reports, and investigations have dealt with acquisition, contingency plans for when space is not available, deliberate interference, and a host of other issues.

While these all evidenced Congress’ interest and concern, they were relatively passive measures.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

This began to change in 2018 with passage of the National Timing Resilience and Security Act. It requires the Department of Transportation to establish a terrestrial timing system to backup GPS signals.

Then in 2019, Congress appropriated money for a GPS Backup Technology Demonstration. And the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020 required the Air Force to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of its resiliency efforts.

The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

Capitol Hill observers say this is the result of several things that have come to a head over the last year. Taken together, they have convinced many legislators that GPS is under threat and PNT issues are not being taken seriously enough by the executive branch. These include increased jamming and spoofing (especially by China and Russia), full implementation of China’s BeiDou system and its marketing to other nations as a superior alternative to GPS, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision on Ligado Networks, and the Pentagon’s failure to respond to combatant commanders’ Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements for non-GPS PNT.

Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

Here are some of the provisions of the 2021 NDAA of interest to the PNT community.

Military Multi-GNSS Receiver Prototype

The 2018 NDAA required the Defense Department to incorporate Europe’s Galileo and Japan’s QZSS satellite navigation signals into military user equipment. The idea was to make it more resilient to disruption. Also required was an investigation into using non-allied signals.

Apparently not satisfied with progress on this project, Congress mandated a project to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of the 2020 NDAA.

The 2021 NDAA seems to indicate the Congress is still not happy. It withholds 20% of the funding for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until such time as the department certifies the prototype project is underway and provides briefings to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

Resilient Survivable PNT

Language in the 2021 NDAA also seems to show Congress is impatient with the Pentagon’s lack of responsiveness to combatant commanders’ requests for non-GPS PNT systems.

Section 1611 of the Act is entitled “Resilient and Survivable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capabilities.” It requires development, integration, and deployment of these capabilities for combatant commanders within two years. This, it says, is “… consistent with the timescale applicable to joint urgent operational needs statements…”

The act says the new PNT capabilities shall “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing signals” and “process resilient survivable data provided by signals of opportunity and on-board sensor systems.”

The act also reverses the Defense Department’s 2018 PNT Strategy’s plan for future systems to be classified and for military use only. It directs the department to work with the National Security Council, Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security and others “to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement the global positioning system.”

To help ensure prompt action on this, the act requires a report to Congress within six months and authorizes the department to reprogram funds from other areas to finance the effort.

Responding to FCC’s Decision on Ligado Networks

By far the most PNT-related text in the 2021 NDAA includes a host of measures responding to FCC Order 20-48 approving an application by Ligado Networks. An order which the executive branch is on record as strongly opposing saying it will degrade GPS service for many.

Senator Jim Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has regularly expressed outrage at the FCC’s decision and has called for its reversal.

Among its provisions the act:
- Requires the Department of Defense to estimate and report to Congress the cost of damage to department systems as a result of the FCC order.
- Prohibits using department funds to upgrade or modify military equipment to make it resilient to interference caused by broadcasts in the spectrum allocated (the FCC order requires this to be funded by Ligado)
- Prohibits contracting with any entity using the frequency bands allocated to Ligado unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the use will not interfere with GPS services
- Requires the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for an independent technical review of the FCC order.
December 29, 2020
32 US senators urge stay on FCC’s Ligado decision
Thirty-two United States senators wrote to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on May 15 expressing concerns with the commission’s determination on Ligado Networks. The senators also asked the FCC to address these concerns and stay their order while they were doing so.

The five-member FCC voted unanimously in April to approve an order to allow Ligado Networks to deploy a low-power nationwide 5G network.

“The hurried nature of the circulation and consideration of the Order itself — during a national crisis, no less — was not conducive to addressing the many technical concerns raised by affected stakeholders,” wrote the senators.

The senators continued,

“With this specific docket item pending before the FCC for almost 10 years, we are concerned with the pace by the Commission to push through an Order first announced on April 16, the approval for which was declared two business days later. We believe this accelerated timeline was not adequate to address the significant stakeholder concerns for an Order of this magnitude….”

“We are concerned that the FCC has discounted testing and assessments conducted by nine federal agencies in the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee process — all expressing concerns that the Ligado plan would interfere with millions of GPS receivers and satellite services across the nation. Further, the FCC did not provide a technical forum to resolve the significant disconnects between this testing and Ligado’s privately funded testing…”

“For these reasons, we urge the Federal Communications Commission to immediately stay and reconsider their Order on this matter, more fully consider the technical concerns raised by numerous federal agencies and private sector stakeholders, and outline a path forward that adequately addresses these concerns.”

A Resilient PNT Foundation editorial on the organization’s website says the main problem seems to be misunderstanding about the differences between radionavigation and communication.

“We share the concerns with the FCC’s actions that are outlined in this letter:
- - After ten years of deliberations a draft order was processed to a final decision within a couple days during a national crisis
  - The FCC discounted the testing done by the executive branch and did not say why
  - No technical forum was held to resolve the differences between Ligado’s and DoD/DoT’s testing
  - There was no public discussion of these differences and how they might be resolved
“Undoubtedly, a lot of the differences between the FCC and the Executive Branch on this issue boil down to a lack of appreciation of the fundamental differences between wireless communication and radionavigation.” The Resilient PNT Foundation website provides a table outlining the differences.

“When two parties start from completely different places, they are likely to talk past each other and end up in completely different places.

“We think the Federal Communications Commission might not have fully appreciated the needs of radionavigation as a safety-of-life utility and wound up in the wrong place.

“But that’s just us. A lot of folks think differently.

“That’s why we are urging an independent technical review, with both communications and radionavigation experts, to inform public policy decisions on this before anything moves forward.

“This is too important to get wrong.”

Feature photos:
Capitol building with flag/Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com
Capitol building at night/Brian Kinney/Shutterstock.com
May 18, 2020
The story of GIS at DHS: From Manhattan to Katrina
Part 1

In a rare historic moment, Congress understood geospatial technology’s important role would be key to support the new Department of Homeland Security.

Written by Nate Smith; edited and co-written by William Tewelow, GISP

If it doesn’t kill you it makes you stronger, but therein is the rub: You first have to avoid dying. Nothing sharpens the mind like trying to survive.

On Tuesday morning, Sept. 11, 2001, the United States suffered a near mortal wound. In order to recover, there was no margin for error. Surviving depended upon getting it right. Failing to “connect the dots” again could prove fatal.

The cause, in large part, were organizational silos in the intelligence and security agencies and no structure upon which intelligence data could be shared across the silos. With terminal lucidity at failure’s dire consequences, in a rare historic moment, Congress, seldom praised for innovative thinking, understood geospatial technology’s important role and would be key for supporting the agency’s mission.

Click for an overview presentation on the GMO. (Image: DHS)

The government had to be restructured and given new tools and technologies to ensure our safety. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was the centerpiece of this effort bringing a number of established security focused organizations under its umbrella.

The creation of DHS was an unprecedented task in the modern era. Many of Congress’ recommendations were codified in the founding of the Geospatial Management Office (GMO) established within DHS.

Connecting the Geospatial Dots. The GMO’s mission was to create community, infrastructure, and the sharing of data and ideas ensuring future dots get connected to anticipate trends and stay ahead of adversaries avoiding another shock to our nation.

The early GMO was modestly funded and staffed with employees on short-term assignments from other agencies in borrowed office space at Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) headquarters.

The first geographic information officer, Ryan Cast, developed the work plan, putting emphasis on discovering what data and opportunities already existed and identifying activities that supported and enhanced the component agencies. Integrating the agencies capabilities and optimizing their interoperability was the focus of his leadership laying a strong foundation for future GIO’s to build upon.

Weathering Hurricane Katrina

The GMO was still finding its sea legs when Hurricane Katrina struck in 2004. Since expectations were low, they did not bear the brunt of the critics. The GMO, seeing the negative attention directed towards FEMA, created innovative partnerships with National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA, which was NIMA at the time) and the United States Geographic Survey (USGS) employing their prototype technology to assist the recovery and response community, who were looking for innovations to ensure wide access to data and tools.

Before and after Hurricane Katrina: Photos taken off the coast of Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, show how the storm surge, estimated to have exceeded 20 feet in Waveland, destroyed homes and left only foundations. Trees have been denuded of all vegetation. (Photo: USGS)

Before and after Hurricane Katrina:In the top image, taken in 1998, notice the Deep South Motel to the left and the apartment building to the right. The bottom image shows the same location on Aug. 31, 2005, two days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. A small portion of the motel is only structure left standing. (Photo: USGS)

A key partnership was established between FEMA and Louisiana State University to develop a geospatial data clearinghouse, which proved to be useful to many agencies and researchers.

iCAV. One technical innovation in response to Katrina was the DHS Infrastructure Critical Asset Viewer (iCAV) interactive mapping platform branded as GIS for the Gulf.

iCAV was built on technology borrowed from NGA’s Palanterra Common Operational Picture (COP) system, repurposed for the DHS mission, providing map-based situational awareness.

From this operational experience, additional design elements were identified for improvement, including symbology on the front end and data modeling on the back end. These became central aspects of development for the GMO.

USNG. Katrina also highlighted the need for a more universally accepted referencing framework to assist field operations, planting the seeds for the development of a U.S. National Grid system (USNG).

I personally experienced the need for a USNG, having lived on the Mississippi Coast at the time. GIS in the government, especially the use of it domestically at the federal level was almost non-existent, and with all the landmarks and road signs gone, the entire coastal area was uncharted territory.

More than once I helped a lost Red Cross supply truck return to the main road.

Hurricane Harvey Hits Hard

Fast forward to Aug. 25, 2017, when there was a brief, collective sigh of relief as the full destructive force of Hurricane Harvey’s eye wall missed the highly populated areas of the Texas coast. The pause was brief. Coming into focus through rainfall observations and numerical weather models meteorologists and emergency managers understood another peril was imminent.

Harvey had lost its steering winds and would linger in the Houston area dumping over 50 inches of rain in the coming days. In Houston, there was alarm as this deluge would likely far exceed the engineered capacities of the channels and reservoirs and an epic flood was in the making. This anxiety was shared with the regional FEMA office and in the Washington, D.C. headquarters.

FEMA’s geospatial experts in D.C., having recently demonstrated their successful impact analysis approach in Louisiana, felt assured they could quickly grasp the magnitude of this event with high confidence, but were concerned about another type of flood — the flood of data and tools, as well as inquiries distracting them from their primary focus.

Partnerships, capabilities and expertise. Events such as these attract well intentioned and ambitious researchers and vendors seeking the time and attention of response leaders to share their resources and gain access to FEMA’s data. Even short conversations consume critical time.

These secondary groups often contribute valuable resources and services playing key roles in community learning and development so their outreach efforts need to be balanced.

Rather than ignoring these efforts, FEMA contacted the GMO to leverage their partnerships, capabilities and expertise to facilitate these exchanges. In one day, the GMO developed a publicly accessible portal and assigned a team of geospatial experts the responsibility to catalog and make discoverable all geospatial data related to Hurricane Harvey.

Over the following two weeks, this response became a model of transparency, innovation and collaboration, and the site is still available supporting research and providing an example for future events. The site was a great example of government getting it right, but it came at a price, and still there are two long shadows cast by towers no longer there.

Conclusion

From Greater Manhattan to Katrina’s desolation and the floods of Harvey, significant advances were on the horizon and expectations were on the rise for the GMO. In Part 2, we will explore this growth and see how these lessons and the efforts of many led to the current state of geospatial preparedness and capability in the DHS’ geospatial shop.

Read Geospatial Solutions’ interview of Christopher Vaughan, FEMA Geospatial Information Officer, and his account of Hurricane Harvey.

Further Reading

How GIS — and you — can aid in disaster response

Homeland Security Working Group

Hurricane Response Mapping

LSU GIS Information Clearinghouse

FEMA Enterprise GIS Services

Conference Report on S. 2845, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

Geospatial Management Office, established by Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 Title VII, Subtitle B, Section 8201, Homeland Security Geospatial Information – Implemented through DHS Management Directive 4030, 11/12/2004.

Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data (HIFLD) Hurricane Harvey Response.

September 11, 2001. Never forget.

Geographic Information Officers of GMO
- Ryan Cast (2003-2005)
- Dan Cotter (2005-2007)
- Jeff Booth (2007-2012)
- David Alexander (2012-2015)
- David Lilley (2015-2016)
- Michael Donnelly (2016-Present)
Guest author Nate Smith is an independent consultant who has worked for over 25 years advancing the adoption of geospatial technology to disaster management, humanitarian response and natural disaster risk reduction.
May 8, 2019