Tag: GPS architecture

  • 10 questions on eLoran

    10 questions on eLoran

    the former Loran-C transmission antenna at Værlandet, Norway. (Photo: UrsaNav)
    Photo: UrsaNav

    A PNT expert suggested that my piece titled “Opposite and Complementary: eLoran is part of the solution to GNSS vulnerability” in our November 2021 issue could be augmented with information not currently available on the proposed eLoran capability. This expert also questioned my statement that eLoran “does not have any common failure modes with GNSS” and pointed to potential common threats such as from cyberattacks, physical attacks, and space weather.

    Matteo Luccio
    Matteo Luccio

    I welcome such feedback on the contents of these pages — and agree that in this case some hard questions are warranted. So, in the interest of further exploring the use of eLoran, I pose some questions, hoping that its advocates will provide answers. I know that at least some of them will not shy away from this challenge.

    Please note that I wish to keep the discussion on positioning, not the easier question of timing, because that was the primary focus of my article. I also wish to address long-term outages (weeks or months), which would have a greater impact on the United States.

    Some of these questions have been addressed, at least in part, in various studies and proposals, most of them now more than a decade old. So, it would be helpful to update those answers and consolidate them in the pages of this magazine.

    1. Accuracy specifics. While my November article stated that eLoran would have a two-dimensional accuracy of “better than 20 meters, and in many cases, better than 10 meters,” is that RMS, 95%, or some other statistic?

    2. Performance standard. GPS provides a commitment to users in a published performance standard. What specific measures of positioning accuracy, integrity and continuity would you recommend the proposed eLoran system be committed to provide (using the architecture described in the answer to Question 6)?

    3. Coverage. Would you recommend this eLoran positioning performance hold for the entire United States (including Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and other territories), only for the “lower 48” states, or only parts of these 48 states?

    4. Current users. By number of users, the predominant common current civil uses of GNSS for positioning are consumer devices (mostly cellphones). By contribution to the U.S. economy, the predominant uses are high-precision applications. For what fraction of these uses would eLoran positioning be adequate? Could an eLoran receiver and antenna fit in today’s consumer devices?

    5. Future uses. Emerging civil uses of GPS for positioning include autonomous ground and air vehicles, navigation to space and in space, and lane-accurate car navigation. Which of these could be served by eLoran?

    6. Architecture. To maintain accuracy during a prolonged GPS outage, eLoran would require reference stations to calibrate time-varying propagation errors, as well as a certain number of transmitters for good nationwide geometry and for redundancy, ensuring service even if a transmitter is attacked or is taken off-line for maintenance. What architecture would you recommend to achieve this?

    7.  Infrastructure cost. What would be the cost of installing the required transmitters, power supplies, reference stations, communication links and control system for the architecture described in the answer to Question 6? Can you reference a recent and independent estimate? To a ballpark figure, what cost fixed-price contract would you accept to implement it? Similarly, what would be the annual costs for operating and maintaining this infrastructure?

    8. Impact. eLoran transmitters are large and high-power. Providing positioning across the United States could require building some of them from scratch or significantly reconstructing old Loran sites. What issues — such as environmental, aviation safety and security — would this raise, and how would you recommend they be addressed?

    9. Receivers. Assuming all the above were achieved, it would accomplish nothing unless eLoran receivers were widely purchased, installed and used. How much would that cost? Who would pay? Should we assume that “if we build it, they will come”?

    10. Alternatives. Given the widespread development of other positioning technologies over the past decade, much has changed since the earlier recommendations for eLoran. How do we know that eLoran is the right investment — or even a needed part of the solution or needed system in a system of systems — for the future of U.S. PNT?

    Common threats to GNSS and eLoran could include the following:

     
    1. Cyber attacks. Given that GPS’s OCX is said to be the most cybersecure system built by the U.S. Department of Defense, how would eLoran’s control system be even more cybersecure than OCX, to avoid a common cyber-vulnerability?

    2. Physical attacks. Given concerns about possible physical attacks on GPS satellites, which move at multiple km/sec 20,000 km from Earth, would it not be easier to physically attack eLoran transmitters, which are stationary, terrestrial, in remote locations, and hundreds of feet tall and require massive power sources?

    3. Space weather. GPS is potentially vulnerable to severe space weather that could damage satellites or temporarily hinder signal propagation from space to Earth. However, severe space weather could also damage the power grid upon which megawatt eLoran transmitters rely. How would eLoran service be protected from the effects of severe space weather, such as a Carrington Event?

    Send me your thoughts at the e-mail address below, with “eLoran” in the subject line.

    Matteo Lucio | Editor-in-Chief
    [email protected]

  • 2nd SOPS reaches GPS milestone with AEP 7.5 command

    2nd SOPS reaches GPS milestone with AEP 7.5 command

    By Senior Airman William Tracy, 50th Space Wing Public Affairs

    The 2nd Space Operations Squadron took formal command of Architecture Evolution Plan 7.5, the largest GPS architectural change in operational history, after its successful installation at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, Nov. 16.

    “AEP 7.5 is a milestone in GPS history and improves our cybersecurity capabilities and postures us to better operate in a contested, degraded and operationally limited environment,” said 1st Lieutenant Jonathan Campbell, 2nd SOPS assistant operations flight commander.

    The 2nd SOPS installation replaced 600,000 lines of code in AEP and implemented more than $29 million worth of hardware and software changes.

    Additionally, AEP 7.5 sets the platform for the installation of AEP 8.0, which will deliver the capability to command and control GPS III satellite vehicles — the first GPS III satellite scheduled to be launched from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida, next month.

    Campbell said AEP 7.5 is a significant step up from the previous AEP 7.3, with overall improvements allowing Airmen to command and control satellites with better efficiency.

    The program’s successful installation was the result of extensive training from a Mission Operations Transfer at the squadron’s Alternate Master Control Station at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Both rotations of the Space Mission Force crew structure were activated to ensure full operational capabilities at both sites, performing security control assessments on the system and taking other measures.

    “Training consisted of acclimating to AEP 7.5, learning how to navigate it and utilize it to the best capability,” said Senior Airman Ryan Lape, 2nd SOPS satellite systems operator. “Because our constellation was so big, upon taking command at Schriever we had to iron out the changes on a large scale.”

    Campbell said the hard work was worth it — the successful installation and command of AEP 7.5 through the squadron’s efforts will prepare for changes in the near future.

    “This will provide combat ready space warfighters delivering position, navigation and timing to optimize the full range of Air Force, joint force and civilian operations, across all domains,” he said. “The updated hardware provided in the AEP 7.5 installation lays the foundation for a software update next year enabling the command and control of GPS Block III vehicles.”

    Campbell added not only will the installation advance the 2nd SOPS’s mission, but the 50th Space Wing’s as well, helping evolve space and cyberspace warfighting superiority through integrative and innovative operations.

    “The capabilities provided in this update, and those coming in the next year, provide a significant improvement to our warfighters,” he said.

    With this milestone, Campbell said the continuation of the U.S. military’s dominance in position navigation and timing systems is secured.

    “This update furthers the U.S. military’s and Schriever AFB’s position as the center of satellite command and control and space operations,” he said.

    Lape said the milestone will make an impact outside of the military as well.

    “We are the premier PNT system in the world with the largest satellite constellation,” he said.

    “With measures like these, it will definitely make our adversaries think twice.”

    The 2nd Space Operations Squadron operations floor is a flurry of activity during 2nd SOPS’s formal command of Architecture Evolution Plan 7.5. (Photo: USAF/Senior Airman William Tracy)
    The 2nd Space Operations Squadron operations floor is a flurry of activity during 2nd SOPS’s formal command of Architecture Evolution Plan 7.5. (Photo: USAF/Senior Airman William Tracy)