The UK Royal Institute of Navigation has released a special report on GNSS-interference and its impact on the maritime sector.
Impacts of GNSS Interference on Maritime Safety is a special report by the RIN Maritime GNSS Interference Working Group on the impacts of GNSS Interference. Survey data was compiled from more than 100 sector experts and 300 vessel captains, supported by interviews with dozens of people involved in the operations and supply chain of vessels that regularly encounter GNSS interference.
GNSS interference refers to anything that disrupts a ship’s satellite-based positioning signals, usually caused by jamming and spoofing.
In 2025, at least two collisions and groundings were reported in mainstream media linked to GNSS interference in regions such as the Baltics, Straits of Hormuz and the Red Sea. With hundreds of vessels being affected daily, the RIN report details for the first time the scale of the problem on modern digital vessels, where GNSS jamming and spoofing present a significant cybersecurity vulnerability and urgent risks to maritime safety.
Survey data exposes the vulnerability of critically important systems such as Global Maritime Distress and Safety Systems (GMDSS) and other SOLAS-mandated equipment that rely on satellite positioning and timing.
“The report has highlighted serious safety concerns and has underlined the fact that these issues are rooted in significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and are not just disruptions to navigation,” said Ramsey Faragher, director of the RIN.
Operating within regions of known GNSS interference carries serious safety-of-life and liability implications, as key systems are expected to fail or malfunction with high probability in these conditions. The report also highlights unnecessary dependencies between GNSS receivers and a range of onboard electronics — including radar, radios (VHF/MF/HF), Navtex, speed logs, ship clocks and satellite communications — many of which do not require GNSS data for their primary function, creating avoidable points of failure and compounding operational risk.
“The issue of GNSS interference must be taken seriously. It cannot be overcome by traditional navigation techniques when GNSS receivers are ‘baked in’ to modern ships’ critical systems, including safety systems,” said Ivana-Maria Carrioni-Burnett, maritime captain and chair of the RIN Maritime Navigation Group. “These are no longer isolated incidents and pose a real risk to life: people, property and the environment. We must do more to safeguard our seas today and the shipping of tomorrow.”
“Despite measures to improve resistance to jamming, spoofing and other harassment measures, the threat is real and growing,” said Retired Commodore James Taylor OBE and fellow of the RIN advises. “And this threat is not only to positioning and navigation; it is to every part of every transport and navigation means and to every part of national infrastructure where timing is derived from space-based timing signals.”
The Royal Institute of Navigation will continue to work with report partners (GLA, IALA, Nautical Institute and others) and regulatory bodies to provide expert guidance to mitigate these issues, and to establish industry-wide adoption of solutions to this problem. RIN thanks National PNT Office for its support.
