The appropriation for fiscal year 2022 enacted this month included $15M for “Position navigation and timing [PNT] technologies and global positioning system [GPS] backup” in the Department of Transportation (DOT) budget. At first glance, this might seem like a small but important step toward establishment of the system or systems President Bush mandated in 2004, the Obama administration promised in 2015, and called for by law in 2018.
Make no mistake, having the issue mentioned in the act is a very positive step. Unfortunately, a careful read of the report that came with the appropriations act shows the funds are not for solving, but for continuing to admire, the problem.
Here’s what the appropriation report says (in italics) and what it means. This is based on our reading of the text and conversations with hill insiders who said they had a tough battle with the administration to get any funding or mention of PNT or “GPS backup” in the budget at all.
“The agreement provides $15,000,000 to establish a program…” – This is not really a lot of funding for any federal effort. It is enough to hire several people, set up an office, and maybe do a few studies.
Notice that the appropriation language talks about “[leading] to wide adoption of multiple technologies.” It makes no mention of establishing any systems or signals.
Theoretically, this might be done by following the path in the Trump administration’s 2020 Executive Order on responsible use of PNT. The order addresses critical infrastructure and encourages such users to protect themselves with alternate PNT services they find on their own.
DOT might try this with all users to achieve “wide adoption,” though there are many obstacles. Principal among these is that GPS is free while commercial services are not. Providers of alternative PNT services have long recognized that it is impossible for them to compete with free GPS and argued that the government needs to be the customer.
“…Funding will enable, among other things…” An interesting turn of phrase that seems to say, ‘you must do all of this, but if you have any money left over you can do other things.’ This is pretty much a throw-away phrase since, with this worklist, they won’t have money left over for anything else. In fact, they will probably come up short.
“…the development of safety-critical PNT requirements and standards…” In other words, study the problem some more. Developing requirements and standards is important, but it doesn’t provide anything for the United States to use when Putin jams GPS or there is a huge solar storm.
“…vulnerability and performance testing…” Again, more study and little to no progress implementing solutions.
“…certification protocols for safety-critical functions”… Still more study.
“…the procurement of services as deemed appropriate by the Department…” Some might see this as a ray of hope. It could, conceivably, allow DOT to contract for PNT signals from space, fiber, or terrestrial broadcast and move toward establishing one or more systems. Unfortunately, $15M isn’t much for such an effort, even if DOT didn’t have to also create an office and do all the required studies and standards. In this context “services” almost certainly means contracted staff to help with administration and hiring think tanks.
“…and user adoption models in order to facilitate the responsible use of resilient PNT services to meet Federal requirements for widespread adoption.”
Since there are no “federal requirements for widespread adoption” to meet, this seems like another throwaway phrase that someone thought sounded actiony and proactive.
Additionally, we are not sure what a “user adoption model” is.
The best translation we can come up with is “DOT must figure out how to get Americans to adopt alternate PNT services that are either expensive or haven’t been invented yet. All in the absence of a government mandate for them to do so.”
Most in the PNT community have long recognized the need to “get the bullseye off of GPS” by making it a less attractive target, while at the same time protecting the nation against a wide variety of threats to satellites and signals. For them, the language in this year’s appropriation bill can be discouraging.
Yet there is some reason for hope. At least the problem was discussed in the bill, and some money was put toward it, regardless of how flawed the underlying assumptions and mandated actions might be.
Maybe we should all take comfort in the old Hollywood maxim – “It doesn’t matter what they say as long as they are still talking about you.” Let’s all keep the conversation going.
Technology evaluation capabilities inaugurated in demonstration for U.S. Department of Homeland Seurity
NextNav and Satelles Inc. have partnered on an alternative positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) testbed in the San Francisco Bay area.
Designed and managed by NextNav with a timing source from Satelles, the testbed creates scenarios and conditions to rigorously test the precision and resilience of alternative PNT solutions, allowing technologies to be evaluated in the absence of signals from GPS and other GNSS.
NextNav used the testbed to demonstrate the precision and resilience of the company’s TerraPoiNT network in a GPS-denied environment using STL from Satelles as its absolute timing source. This demonstration for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) showcased the timing accuracy and resilience of TerraPoiNT, which delivered timing synchronization better than 50 nanoseconds in urban and semi-urban settings.
As a source of GPS/GNSS-independent time that the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) determined is highly consistent with Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) — including in deep indoor environments — STL provided the timing signal for the demo instead of GPS.
The advent of the alternative PNT testbed is timely given the recent publication of “Understanding Vulnerabilities of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing” by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (part of DHS). This important CISA publication urges owners and operators of critical infrastructure to adopt the responsible use of PNT as defined in Executive Order 13905. The new testbed will be used to demonstrate applications for emergency services, telecommunications, financial markets, the electrical grid, and other critical infrastructure sectors.
“Demonstrating the accuracy and resilience of alternative PNT solutions is integral in validating the capabilities of alternative PNT solutions and, ultimately, increasing adoption across use cases and applications,” said Ashu Pande, TerraPoiNT VP at NextNav. “With the development of this testbed, we can emulate real world deployment scenarios and can more effectively instill confidence across the PNT industry in the viability of alternate PNT solutions.”
“The development of this testbed will enable the rigorous, transparent, and replicable testing of alternative PNT solutions,” said Christina Riley, VP of Commercial PNT at Satelles. “We’re excited to be integrated as the GNSS-independent timing reference for this alternative PNT testbed and are looking forward to continuing our collaborative work to build stronger PNT solutions to augment GPS globally.”
The U.S. Department of Transportation categorized TerraPoiNT from NextNav and STL from Satelles as the top-ranked PNT systems in its technology demonstration report released in January. The testbed collaboration between these complementary alternative PNT service providers underscores the companies’ commitment to promoting the adoption of multiple technologies that complement and augment GPS/GNSS to protect the operations of critical infrastructure.
ADVA’s aPNT platform is key for the development of PGE’s critical network infrastructure (Photo: Business Wire)
Portland General Electric (PGE) is deploying Oscilloquartz PTP grandmaster clock technology as it upgrades to packet-based synchronization and protects its network against GNSS vulnerabilities and cyberattacks. The upgrades also conform to PNT Executive Order 13905.
PGE, one of the largest power utilities in the Western United States, is using the ADVA scalable timing solution to enable a smooth transition from legacy synchronization and ensure new levels of accuracy, reliability and resiliency. The new system will timestamp data and control grid substations at the edge.
With multi-band GNSS receivers and artificial-intelligence (AI) threat detection, ADVA’s assured PNT (A-PNT) platform helps maintain resilient timing, even in challenging circumstances such as deliberate jamming and spoofing attacks. It also provides multi-source backup, including PTP network timing and in-device holdover oscillators for when GNSS signals are unavailable or disrupted.
The solution is built on the OSA 5410 and OSA OSA 5420 series of edgeSync+ grandmaster clocks. It features multi-band, multi-constellation GNSS receivers and supports multiple PTP profiles, including substation power and core telecom backup sync, while also allowing conversion between them and supporting legacy interfaces.
The products are part of ADVA’s new aPNT platform, integrating threat detection, multi-source backup and ADVA’s intelligent Ensemble Sync Director.
The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) seeks to extend Trump policies and repeal timing law counter to its own study and industry input
The Biden administration’s budget proposal delivered to Congress last week includes $17 million for the small Department of Transportation (DOT) office responsible for leading civil positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) efforts for the nation. This is a marked increase over the $2 million allocated in 2020 and estimated $5 million being spent this fiscal year.
At the same time, it seeks to repeal the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 that mandated DOT establish a terrestrial timing backup for GPS. This, despite the findings of a recently published RAND study completed for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other input from a telecommunications industry group.
Proposed Spending
The administration’s budget proposes $17 million for the DOT Office of Research and Technology to be split among three areas of effort.
Monitoring and detection. The first is a $3.5 million “(GNSS) performance monitoring and interference detection” project. This is a one-time request that is expected to be followed by a request for $1 million in yearly funding to maintain and operate the capability.
While these may not seem like sufficient funds to many, DOT is tasked with working with other departments and agencies, and to leverage existing capabilities. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is specifically named as an important partner with DOT in this effort. NGA already has responsibility for issuing worldwide navigation warnings for U.S. interests. It also has access to a wide variety of information that could be used for the project.
Signal authentication. Another $3.5 million is proposed for Executive Order (EO) 13905 Implementation and GPS Signal Authentication. The EO was issued in February 2020. It seeks to leverage market forces and education to create additional sources of PNT and encourage users to access them. This approach has been criticized by many as unworkable without extensive regulation and mandates for users, while still not addressing the majority of American companies and users.
$1.5 million of this $3.5 million will go to further implement the EO through development of a “PNT threat space model” and otherwise support inter-department PNT profile and research and development efforts.
$2 million would be allocated for a one-time investment in GPS signal authentication to “result in the development and validation of requirements for data and signal authentication capability for civil GPS,” reads the proposal. DOT has regularly requested much greater sums to establish civil signal monitoring, leading many to believe the requirements are already well known. One industry observer suggested this could be “a study in lieu of action.”
GPS Backup. $10 million would be spent for “GPS Backup/Complementary PNT Technologies Research,” essentially follow-on studies to the DOT GPS Backup Technologies Demonstration. “These efforts will further develop PNT modeling, simulation, and testing tools, as well as standards and performance monitoring tools needed to evaluate integration of diverse positioning, navigation, and/or timing technologies into end-user applications. This work will also support development of cyber-secure receivers,” reads the proposal.
One congressional staff member expressed shock at seeing that provision. “The act was the epitome of thoughtful, bipartisan congressional effort,” the staff member said. “It was co-sponsored in the Senate by Markey and Cruz, for crying out loud. You can’t get more bipartisan than that. To have this dumped on us without any notice or consultation is amazing. It is not something I would expect from this White House. I am not sure how serious a proposal it is.”
Some observers on the hill and elsewhere have opined that, rather than the repeal proposal being a well-vetted administration policy, it is an effort by OMB staff held over from the previous administration to carry forward and preserve President Turmp’s Executive Order 13905 and other PNT policies. Rather than focusing on establishing a GPS backup capability, they instead urged PNT users to find and pay for alternatives on their own.
Harsh Tone, False Assertions
Compounding the surprise is the exceptionally harsh tone in the proposal, and assertions that many claim are outright false.
Among the problems with the language seen by observers is its assertion that NTRSA seeks to establish a single backup for GPS services.
“It’s unclear to me where such an assertion is supported in the record,” said Greg Winfree, former Assistant Secretary at DOT in the Obama administration. “NTRSA requires the department to incorporate findings from the GPS back-up demonstration program. That project found a variety of systems are needed to protect America,” he said. “NTRSA does require establishment of at least one system, which is incredibly important. Without at least one alternative in place, GPS is one of highest priority targets for our enemies. We have to get the bullseye off of GPS. NTRSA does that.”
This point on national security was reinforced by Scott Pace, head of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University (GWU). Pace was executive director for the Space Council in the Trump administration. At a recent GWU webinar on the topic, he commented that having an alternative to GPS will contribute to national security and improve global stability. It will “lower the pressure on us to escalate and respond” should GPS satellites be damaged, or services disrupted, he said.
China, Russia, and other nations have terrestrial PNT alternatives to GNSS already in operation. This imbalance creates strategic and tactical problems for the United States, according to many analysts.
The proposed budget also describes NTRSA’s goal of providing at least one backup as “inefficient, anti-competitive and potentially harmful to the existing market for back-up/complementary PNT services.”
“Exactly the opposite is true,” according to Diana Furchtgott-Roth, GWU economics professor. Until January of this year, she led civil PNT issues within the Trump administration as a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology at DOT. “DOT’s Complementary PNT and GPS Backup Technologies Demonstration Report, published in January, specifically stated that a variety of technologies are needed to complement GPS. What is the most cost-efficient in an urban area is not necessarily the most cost-efficient in a rural or maritime area.”
“PNT is a utility used by every American. Having affordable complementary service available to people in rural and urban areas is the height of efficiency. It is unquestionably in the interests of national and economic security. In fact, access to at least one alternative should be free so to encourage adoption and best protect the nation,” she said.
“GPS is now a free service provided by the government, and the government is responsible for making sure that it is reliable. GPS outages would cause harm across a broad range of economic activities, including emergency services, general aviation, pipelines, and the electricity grid,” according to Furchtgott-Roth.
No-So-New and Contradictory Research
The proposal to repeal NTRSA cites “recent federal analyses” as part of its justification. One of these is likely a report done for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by the RAND Corporation. Touted in a press release last month as “new research” and labeled “Published 2021,” the work was actually completed in 2019. DHS representatives have said the delay in publication was needed for review and approval.
Yet the report was the basis for a DHS report to Congress submitted in April 2020. This has caused some to opine that its publication was timed to reinforce OMB’s effort to repeal NTRSA. “You don’t submit reports to Congress based on un-reviewed, un-approved material,” said a retired DHS official. “The timing of its release is clearly deliberate.”
At the same time, it found that government investment in a national timing network, such as the one mandated by the NTRSA, is likely warranted. Saying that a complete backup for all GPS services in all parts of the country is not cost-beneficial, the study says there are some “…federal initiatives that do appear to be cost effective or close to cost effective.” These include “Timing-only backup through fiber/FirstNet, eLoran, or STL [Satelles].”
According to the retired DHS official, this directly contradicts OMB’s assertion that NTRSA should be repealed. “Either they didn’t read the whole thing, or they counted on most people not reading farther than the top-level recommendations,” he said. “And those top recommendations were clearly selected to match OMB’s desired outcome.”
Telecommunications Industry Cites Need for NTRSA Provisions
The May 2021 “Report to the President on Communications Resiliency” also runs counter to claims made in the budget proposal. In it, the president’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (coordinated by DHS) cites the need for GPS alternatives in telecommunications and urges President Biden to fund them. It specifically mentions the need for a national timing architecture, and cites the provisions of NTRSA several times as a step in the right direction.
The industry group Alliance for Telecommunications Solutions also sent letters in May to congressional leaders urging funding for GPS alternatives.
Continuing the Discussion
Congress has become increasingly dissatisfied with executive branch actions on resilient PNT over the last decade.
The most recent evidence of this is an extensive and highly critical report of the Department of Defense’s approach to PNT resilience released May 10 by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Among its recommendations was to not rely on GPS as a primary PNT source but look to more resilient technologies.
While President Trump’s 2020 Executive Order did not make precisely the same recommendation to civil users, it did focus on “responsible use” of PNT and transitioning to using additional, non-GPS dependent sources.
The question still under discussion is how far the government should go to support such a transition.
Seasoned observers regularly comment that Congress has the “power of the purse” and every president’s budget is “dead on arrival” regardless of which party controls the White House.
It seems clear that resilient PNT will be a topic of lively debate between the Congress and the White House, as well as internally on the hill, for the foreseeable future.
Dual-frequency timing module provides anti-jamming and anti-spoofing capabilities
Photo: Trimble
Trimble has introduced its first dual-frequency embedded timing module that provides next-generation networks with 5-nanosecond accuracy.
Surface mountable, the Trimble RES 720 GNSS timing module can be integrated into network equipment. It uses L1 and L5 GNSS signals to provide superior protection to jamming and spoofing, mitigates multipath in harsh environments, and adds security features to make it suitable for resilient networks.
Precise timing and synchronization optimizes and improves wireless network performance. At 19 x 19 millimeters, the RES 720 module provides a low-cost, easy-to-use, highly accurate and reliable GPS timing source for critical infrastructure in a broad range of industries. The RES 720 is suitable for 5G Open RAN/XHaul, smart grids, data centers, industrial automation and satellite communication networks, as well as calibration services and perimeter monitoring applications.
The RES 720 meets the resilient timing requirement mandated by the U.S. 2020 Executive Order (EO13095) for timing services and critical infrastructure operators. Using dual-frequency (L1 and L5), RES 720 provides better multipath detection capabilities than single frequency, and provides protection against signal jamming and spoofing. Multi-band capability helps compensate for the ionospheric error from multi-GNSS satellite constellations, while reducing the timing error under clear skies to less than 5 nanoseconds. To further improve its accuracy locally, the RES 720 module features differential timing modes for highly accurate local timing.
Powered by Trimble’s Smart GNSS Assurance technology, the RES 720 offers protection against jamming and hacking of signals with automatic fallback to available GNSS signals. Infrastructure equipment suppliers, system integrators and network operators can benefit by integrating highly accurate synchronization capabilities into their network and synchro-phasor devices, while enabling resilient timing for critical infrastructure.
The RES 720 is expected to be available in the second quarter of 2021.
To mark the one-year anniversary of the PNT Executive Order, Orolia will host an interactive Coffee Talk webinar on March 24 to explore the latest developments in the national initiative to protect U.S. critical infrastructure from GPS/GNSS jamming, spoofing and interference.
Panelists from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), among others, will focus on key actions and priorities for 2021 and beyond, including insights and context on recently published works such as the NIST Foundational PNT Profile issued on Feb. 11, 2021, and the DHS Conformance Framework of Dec. 18, 2020.
Critical infrastructure and PNT industry panelists will also share their perspectives on practical ways to increase resiliency and key factors to consider, in view of the latest Executive Order guidance.
More information about Resilient PNT and GNSS jamming/spoofing is available in Orolia’s online resource center.
Panelists include:
Ernest Wong, Technical Manager, Science and Technology Directorate, DHS
Jim McCarthy, Senior Security Engineer, National CyberSecurity Center of Excellence, NIST
Register here for the Coffee Talk “PNT Executive Order Update: 2021 Actions and Priorities,” 11 a.m. EDT, March 24. Use the registration form to share questions or comments on what to discuss.
NIST’s new cybersecurity profile is designed to help mitigate risks to systems that use PNT data, including finance, transportation, energy and other critical infrastructure. While its scope does not include ground- or space-based PNT source signal generators and providers (such as satellites), the profile still covers a wide swath of technologies. (Image: B. Hayes/NIST)
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has drafted guidelines for applying its Cybersecurity Framework to critical technologies such as GPS that use positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) data. Part of a larger NIST effort to safeguard systems that rely on PNT data, these cybersecurity guidelines accompany NIST efforts to provide and test a resilient timekeeping signal that is independent of GPS.
Formally titled the “Cybersecurity Profile for the Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Services (NISTIR 8323),” the new guidelines are designed to help mitigate cybersecurity risks that endanger systems important to national and economic security, including those that underpin modern finance, transportation, energy and additional economic sectors.
The draft profile is part of NIST’s response to the Feb. 12, 2020, Executive Order on PNT. In early 2020, NIST sought public input regarding the general use of PNT data. The PNT profile will join the growing list of profiles created to help apply the NIST Cybersecurity Framework to particular economic sectors, such as manufacturing, the power grid and the maritime industry. The scope of the profile includes any system, network or other asset that uses PNT services, including systems that receive and rebroadcast PNT data.
While its scope does not include ground- or space-based source PNT signal generators and providers (such as satellites), the profile still covers a wide swath of technologies. Partly for this reason, NIST’s Jim McCarthy said that it is intended to be a foundational set of guidelines that PNT users can customize.
“The profile is meant to help a broad set of users address their cybersecurity needs,” said McCarthy, one of the draft’s authors. “Rather than focus on a single economic sector, we designed it to apply to all users of PNT. Agencies and companies can tailor it to their needs based on their particular cybersecurity risk and other sector-specific factors.”
As directed by the Executive Order, the profile can help organizations accomplish four tasks:
identify systems that use PNT data, and/or that propagate this data based on a source signal
identify PNT data sources, such as a GPS signal
detect disturbance to and manipulation of systems that use PNT services
manage the risks that come with responsible use of these PNT services
“Our premise is that there are organizations that may not realize they are using PNT data, or know how they are using it,” McCarthy said. “Part of our goal is to help them make these connections so they can protect their operations more effectively.”
The Executive Order also delegates to the Department of Commerce the critical task of providing a source of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) that is independent of GPS. To this end, NIST also recently conducted initial tests of a special calibration service for companies, utilities or other organizations that wish to receive NIST’s version of the global time standard, UTC(NIST), through commercial fiber-optic cable.
The service aims to provide a time reference directly traceable to UTC(NIST) with an accuracy of 1 microsecond — good enough for telecom networks, the power grid and financial markets, and thereby boosting the resilience of accurate time distribution and the infrastructure sectors and subsectors that use timing services.
The initial link is a collaboration between NIST and OPNT, a commercial time-service provider based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. While the work was led by researchers at NIST’s Boulder, Colorado, campus, the dedicated optical fiber connects the reference time scale at NIST headquarters in Gaithersburg, Maryland, to a facility in McLean, Virginia, that will ultimately serve as the hub for East Coast distribution of timing data.
OPNT has extended the initial fiber link to Atlanta, Georgia, about 800 kilometers from McLean. Preliminary data suggest that this link will be able to support the requirements of the Executive Order.
As we embark on a new year, 2021 ushers in a new administration and the start of the 117th Congress. With these changes comes a litany of opportunities, as well as challenges, for the nearly four-decade-old GPS industry.
Next month, the GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) will mark its eighth anniversary as the voice of the GPS industry, educating policymakers and regulators about the GPS success story of innovation, economic growth and job creation. It is a uniquely American story made possible because of bipartisan support for protecting the spectrum used by GPS and maintaining funding to enable the modernization of the GPS constellation, ground control and military ground user equipment.
Congressional Support. This commitment was evident in the last Congress through broad support from both parties for two Congressional resolutions, H.Res.219 and S.Res.216, that affirmed the importance of continuous availability, accuracy, efficiency, robustness, reliability and resiliency of the GPS constellation.
Innovation and modernization of the GPS constellation are well underway. Last year, under the emerging leadership of the U.S. Space Force, two new Lockheed Martin-built GPS III satellites were launched into space. This new generation of GPS satellites offers three times greater accuracy, up to eight times improved anti-jamming capability for military users, and the addition of the L1C signal to enable interoperability with other navigation systems, such as Europe’s Galileo.
GPS modernization also has led to the introduction of M-code, an advanced, new signal designed to improve anti-jamming and anti-spoofing, as well as to increase secure access to military GPS signals for U.S. and allied armed forces. In GPS-denied environments, M-code reduces the jamming radius, giving military planners and targeteers options to minimize or avoid collateral strike damage.
With at least two additional GPS III satellites set to launch this year and a new ground control segment known as the Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX), the continued success of the GPS program remains bright.
Ligado Still Looms
As GPSIA continues to urge Congress to allocate the funding needed to support the modernization of GPS, we also are fighting to ensure uninterrupted operation of the estimated 900 million GPS devices in the United States ranging from precision agriculture to consumer gadgets.
Last year, we were deeply disappointed by the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision approving the applications of Ligado Networks, despite the well-documented objections of the expert agencies charged with preserving the integrity of GPS, specifically, on the critical issue of what constitutes harmful interference to users of GNSS.
Regrettably, the FCC chose to ignore the established “1-dB Standard,” which has a long history of protecting GPS operations from harmful interference in both international and domestic regulatory proceedings.
“All Americans benefit from a competitive 5G landscape.”
At the same time, Ligado and its supporters continue to argue that their proposal is the fastest way to bring 5G to all Americans. In actuality, millions of Americans already have access to 5G services and, thanks to the efforts of the FCC, hundreds of megahertz of 5G spectrum in low-, mid- and high-band frequencies have been or will soon be made available for commercial use. GPSIA believes all Americans benefit from a competitive 5G landscape.
5G without compromise. However, that goal can be achieved without undermining GPS receivers and devices that are foundational to wireless technology in general, including 5G. We remain hopeful that a new administration and congress will commit to protecting GPS receivers from harmful interference using the appropriate standard for determining such interference to ensure that the more than $1 billion per day in U.S. economic impact created by GPS continues to flourish.
2020 also brought the issue of GPS resiliency into the national forefront. In February, the president signed an Executive Order aimed at fostering greater resiliency for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT)-based systems, including GPS.
GPSIA supported this order and outlined in subsequent regulatory filings why GPS remains the gold standard for delivering PNT functions to our military as well as a wide range of other sectors, including transportation, agriculture, electricity and finance.
Complementing GPS. As the federal government considers alternative PNT solutions, it is critical that they be complementary to GPS, able to easily integrate into current or future devices, and based on a recognition that each PNT application has unique requirements driven by its intended function, environment and design factors. In sum, there is no one-size-fits-all solution.
Protecting Consumer Privacy. Looking ahead, GPSIA expects 2021 will bring a robust discussion around consumer privacy protections. While GPS satellite broadcasts are one-directional and cannot track a user’s location, we recognize that GPS is one of many data points that can contribute to application-specific location tracking. As such, GPSIA would urge Congress to ensure that geolocation data is appropriately addressed as part of any U.S. federal privacy legislation. In doing so, we believe protections for precise geolocation information will empower consumer choice, enhance transparency, and strengthen security.
On the surface, infrastructure modernization, protecting GPS spectrum, PNT resiliency, and consumer privacy may seem like distinctly different issues. What they have in common, though, is an ability to garner bipartisan support, deliver substantial consumer benefits, and strengthen our nation’s economy. GPSIA stands ready as a resource and looks forward to working with the Biden-Harris Administration and leaders in the House and Senate to promote, protect and enhance GPS.
Orolia will host a second industry discussion on the positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) Executive Order, a federal initiative to protect critical infrastructure from GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing threats, and other PNT service disruptions.
Speakers include:
John Pottle, Director, Royal Institute of Navigation
Greg Gerten, Director of PNT Operations, Centauri Corp.
Tyler Hohman, Director of Products, Orolia Defense and Security
The first Orolia PNT Coffee Talk, which focused on jamming and spoofing, is available here.
The second session — which takes place July 16, 2 p.m. EST — will explore the importance of vulnerability testing to protect critical infrastructure with Resilient PNT technologies. The defense industry has addressed complex GNSS and PNT threats longer than any other sector, and experts will share their insights and best practices to help inform the protection strategy for critical infrastructure identified in the Executive Order.
Vulnerability testing with GNSS simulation is essential to protect critical infrastructure. However, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. This testing requires the ability to customize scenarios per application. It also needs to identify gaps across a variety of unique and geographically distributed systems.
Test results provide the basis to select the best PNT technologies to increase resilience, while ongoing regular testing ensures that critical systems can adapt and overcome evolving threats.
The Orolia PNT Coffee Talk is for those interested in learning more and discussing the latest developments in this national priority from industry and government perspectives.
Orolia PNT Coffee Talk
Vulnerability Testing for Critical Infrastructure: Lessons Learned from Defense
