What works well and what needs improvement in the GPS program regarding technology, policy, or management?
Jules McNeff
“GPS technology and operational performance continue to set the standard for GNSS, but necessary modernization is late to need, and becoming later by the day. This reflects what I see as loss of focus on ‘Job 1’ (delivering effective GPS service to the Joint Force) and a diminution in the sense of ‘GPS uniqueness and exceptionalism’ in its management as it was fragmented within the old SMC and is no longer the ‘shiny new object’ within the evolving Space Force. Even so, its value to its global user base, and particularly to U.S. and allied militaries, is stronger than ever and it remains the cornerstone among diverse complements within the Department of Defense PNT Enterprise. It is incumbent on the DOD to ensure the GPS services our warfighters will depend on can sustain that vital role.”
— Jules McNeff Overlook Systems Technologies
Ellen Hall
“What works well? There is good focus on the areas that need development: M-code, CRPA, resiliency. What needs improvement? More thorough and timely sharing of information by the government with industry.” — Ellen Hall, Spirent Federal Systems
Mitch Narins
“The ‘GPS program’ has set the standard for all other GNSS efforts, but there are always lessons to be learned. I have full confidence that USSF leadership is well equipped to deal with both the technology and management aspects of the program. As for policy, which supports military and civil uses worldwide, there is a clear distinction, based on mission areas and acceptable risk. However, risks to civil users have increased as GPS PNT services permeate all civil critical infrastructure systems. Therefore, system improvements directed at civil user PNT resilience should be given a higher priority and funded through appropriate civil channels. I encourage a policy to enable more resilient PNT services from space — and to consider that by looking both ‘up’ and ‘down’ for PNT services, unfortunate ‘situations’ might be avoided.” — Mitch Narins,
Strategic Synergies
Bernard Gruber
“One of the most consistent and enduring enablers of the GPS program is national policy. NSPD-39 re-baselined requirements buttressed by GPS being provided to the world for free, that it must be sustained and have an ever-present focus on performance improvement and robustness. Accordingly, NSPD-7 acknowledges an ever-changing world with a nod to cybersecurity, augmentations and direction to “improve NAVWAR capabilities to deny hostile use of United States Government space-based PNT services, without unduly disrupting civil and commercial access to civil PNT services.” — Bernard Gruber,
Northrop Grumman
We all need to be careful that the numbers we are throwing around to support our case aren’t really undermining it.
Dana Goward, President, Resilient PNT Foundation
Over the last several weeks, I have repeatedly heard government officials and others talking about the value of GPS to the U.S. economy.
In each case they cited a 2019 report sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. It determined that, if GPS services were to go away, the U.S. economy would lose one billion dollars a day.
A billion dollars is a lot of money.
Yet the U.S. annual gross domestic product is more than $22 trillion a year. That’s more than $60B a day. One billion dollars is less than 1.7%.
That just doesn’t seem right.
A member of the White House’s National Security Council said “GPS is still a single point of failure” for America. That sounds like a pretty big hit to the economy. Not to mention our national security.
GPS signals are critical for networks, transportation, communications, power grid operations, first responders…virtually every critical infrastructure. If they go away, the U.S. GDP will certainly suffer much more loss than 1.7%. The economy would likely go from growing to shrinking and continue that way for quite a while.
I don’t know exactly how much the U.S. will suffer if GPS suddenly goes away, but I am sure it will be a lot. Texas alone lost an estimated $195 billion with at least 57 dead as a result of its February 2021 week-long power crisis. Although not caused by a GPS outage, the number gives us real-world benchmarks for the impacts of a major tech infrastructure failure.
If GPS fails, there will certainly be more accidents while people across the nation get used to it not being available. First responders will have a much harder time getting places and using land mobile radios. All kinds of essential services will be disrupted. More people will die than would have been the case otherwise.
In December 2021, a member of the White House’s National Security Council said “GPS is still a single point of failure” for America. That sounds like a pretty big hit to the economy. Not to mention our national security.
The authors of the NIST-sponsored study were undoubtedly diligent. But they were faced with an impossible task – to quantify the unquantifiable. And like any analysis, they were limited in what they could do by the available time, money, and hard data. They were asked for a number. They delivered one that could be easily supported.
A billion dollars is a lot of money. It might be a fairly impressive sound bite for general audiences.
Government budget analysts and policy makers, though, are accustomed to dealing with dollars in the hundreds of billions and trillions. A billion a day, while not chump change, is not a major issue.
Protecting GPS and ensuring the nation has resilient positioning, navigation and timing services are major issues.
We all need to be careful that the numbers we are throwing around to support our case aren’t really undermining it.
Dana A. Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation.
As PNT becomes critical to more economic activities, any disruption in availability, reliability, resilience and integrity would weaken the critical infrastructure that sustains national security, business operations and public safety, according to experts speaking at the Geospatial World Forum.
This growing dependency on PNT services — and the potentially high economic cost of vulnerabilities — underscores how vital GPS and GNSS systems are to the global economy and national security of countries worldwide, the experts said. Resilient PNT systems are necessary to combat GPS/GNSS outages.
Robert Cardillo (Photo: GWF)
Building resilience into these systems will require multiple technologies ranging from network time-transfer services to terrestrial wireless infrastructure and low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellites.
The Geospatial World Forum opened in Amsterdam on May 10. The second plenary of the day focused on the value of PNT in the global economy. Geospatial World is a global think tank working towards raising awareness around the use of geospatial data and technologies among governments and policymakers, businesses, and the public at large.
Robert Cardillo, president of The Cardillo Group and former director of the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), headed the panel of experts.
“Our existence on this planet has been shaped by our individual and collective awareness of place and our confidence to be able to move securely and efficiently from one place to another, all within that common framework of position, navigation and timing, or PNT,” he said.
“The smartphone is a wonderful example of how far PNT has been integrated into our lives,” said Trimble founder Charlie Trimble. He laid down three basic phases involved in leading PNT to its place in the world economy.
“The path from the dawn of space age to the smartphone was anything but obvious or straightforward,” Trimble said. “First, Sputnik led to the global navigation systems. Second, the Shuttle disaster led us to the realization that the satellite system was an information utility. And now, the integration of PNT into the mobile and immobile internet is changing our world.”
From left: Charlie Trimble, Martin Sweeting, Rodrigo da Costa and Gillian Smith. (Photo: GWF)
“Our first contract was with ESA (European Space Agency) to look at the feasibility of using a navigation and timing satellite using small-satellite techniques, which in 1985 was considered a wacky idea,” recounted Martin Sweeting, executive chairman of Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. “At ESA, we have embarked on a project called Hydro GNSS, which uses Surrey’s GNSS reflectometry to address several climate related issues, be it water detection or biomass, etc. This doesn’t stop here; we are looking at the lunar economy. PNT has indeed a very bright future, not just on Earth but also looking through this decade into the use of PNT on the lunar surface.”
Rodrigo da Costa
“New things are happening, particularly in the area of governmental satellite communications, space situational awareness and others, which are benefitting citizens every day,” said Rodrigo da Costa, executive director, EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA). “Galileo, EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service), Copernicus and GOVSATCOM programs are key areas of EU space activities. All these programs are massive investments and in the end, the result comes from their utilization in the different areas of our economy and daily life.”
“Just in the United States alone, GPS is approaching USD 1 trillion in terms of economic impact and is doubling every 2-3 years. But it is a single point of failure. This highlights the need for resilient PNT,” said Gillian Smith, vice president of marketing, NextNav. “We believe that our needs have evolved beyond technology that was really created in the ’60s. We need increased accuracy and availability in the urban environments in particular.
“I think many of you have experienced it if you’ve tried to use it in any major city,” Smith said. “That blue dot is going to bounce off of buildings and not be very accurate. We need indoor tracking and mapping. We need altitude data so that you know what floor you’re on when you’re thinking about accurate location. We also need to increase resilience and redundancy. That’s going to give us all increased security as well.”
The Value of GPS
GPS jamming and interference is a grave issue that has come under the spotlight particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, according to Geospatial World.
In 2019, a Washington, D.C., think tank documented more than 10,000 cases of GPS interference (jamming and spoofing) in the previous five years from Russia. By 2021, these had become increasingly sophisticated. In a peculiar case, the crew onboard NATO ships in Odessa saw their position being given as Crimea.
In the past six months, even before the war on Ukraine began, there were reports of GPS jamming in and around that region. In March, the EU Aviation Safety Agency had issued warnings of GNSS spoofing and jamming for flights over Europe, in particular around countries neighboring Ukraine and Russia.
Globally, the economic impact of GPS/GNSS disruption is difficult to state. The potential economic consequences of failing to sufficiently protect sources of PNT are enormous, with estimates ranging from millions to billions of dollars depending on the type, length, severity and geographic scope of the disruption.
Furthermore, the impact of a GPS/GNSS outage extends beyond basic economics and could result in risk to life. Emergency services, distress beacons and telecommunications networks all rely on PNT services — any disruption could cause serious consequences.
A 2019 report sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology estimated that the loss of GPS would cost the U.S. economy USD 1 billion a day.
A 2017 study in the United Kingdom estimated a five-day GNSS disruption would lead to an economic impact of GBP 5.2 billion (USD 7.2 billion), with road, maritime and emergency service impacts accounting for 88 percent of the cost.
News from the British government appears to be a part of the United Kingdom’s diversification away from primary reliance on GNSS for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services, and toward a more diverse set of sources.
The nation has previously undertaken establishment of a National Timing Centre for distribution of time from suites of atomic clocks and has long transmitted an eLoran timing signal from a government facility in Anthorn.
Thursday’s press release, titled “Government to explore new ways of delivering ‘sat nav’ for the U.K.,” reinforces the government’s commitment to space-based PNT, but not necessarily from GNSS.
OneWeb satellites
The announcement follows significant criticism in Parliament of the nation’s purchase of a 45% share of the bankrupt communications satellite company OneWeb, with the India’s Bharti Holdings having the majority stake. OneWeb had 74 of its planned 648 satellites in orbit when it declared insolvency. With new ownership and financing in place, it plans to resume operations and launch another 36 satellites in December.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s motivation for making the investment was to offset Britain’s post-Brexit exclusion from Europe’s Galileo system. The idea was that OneWeb assets in low earth orbit (LEO) could provide a global British PNT capability.
This concept faced political and technical opposition from the start. Many technologists in the U.K. and elsewhere doubted that the constellation could be easily adapted to provide sufficiently accurate PNT services. The doubts were so serious that the senior career civil servant responsible for signing the agreement to invest in OneWeb took the very unusual step of refusing to do so without written direction from the political appointee she worked for.
Before the OneWeb investment, the U.K. government had been studying establish of its own GNSS like America’s GPS and Europe’s Galileo. Sources say the required investment was much higher than the nation wanted to make and would provide little added capability beyond that available from extant systems.
According to Thursday’s press release, the UK GNSS effort was exploratory and will end this month. It will be “reset” as the Space-Based Positioning Navigation and Timing Programme (SBPP). This project “will explore new and alternative ways that could be used to deliver vital satellite navigation services to the United Kingdom which are critical for the functioning of transport systems, energy networks, mobile communications and national security and defence, whilst boosting the British space industry and developing the U.K.’s own capabilities in these services.”
While the press release is short on detail, it does mention satellites at low earth orbit and that “a wider range of options” will be examined. This could suggest redoubling efforts on getting PNT from OneWeb, and/or investing in regional PNT satellites.
Galileo again?
The press release also says SBPP will “consider collaboration with international allies to share satellite navigation services, costs and technology.” This may signal reengagement with Europe on involvement with Galileo.
Some observers have said that Brexit did not have to automatically mean that the U.K. was excluded from the Galileo project. European Union membership is not required for participation in the European Space Agency which is responsible for Galileo. Switzerland and Norway, for example, are not EU members, but are members of ESA and sit on its governing board.
The U.K. government has been very concerned with PNT and GNSS vulnerability since at last 2012 when large solar flares became part of its National Risk Register. In 2017 a London Economics Report found that a five-day GNSS disruption would cost the nation more than $1.3B per day.
This most recent announcement indicates that Britain is still intent on going its own way and diversifying PNT sources, while still acknowledging the ongoing importance of GNSS and keeping its options open with allies.
Dana Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. He is the proprietor at Maritime Governance LLC. In August 2013, he retired from the federal Senior Executive Service, having served as the maritime navigation authority for the United States. As director of Marine Transportation Systems for the U.S. Coast Guard, he led 12 different navigation-related business lines budgeted at more than $1.3 billion per year. He has represented the U.S. at IMO, IALA, the UN anti-piracy working group and other international forums. A licensed helicopter and fixed-wing pilot, he has also served as a navigator at sea and is a retired Coast Guard Captain.
Not just supporting players, alternative positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) systems strengthen, augment and — when needed — replace GNSS. We explore how companies are using alternative PNT, and talk with John Fischer of Orolia and Alexis Guinamard of SBG Systems about their companies’ latest developments.
Since the 1990s, GPS has provided the United States military with a substantial tactical edge. Civilian GPS applications are now deeply embedded in every aspect of our lives. The U.S. Department of Transportation recently reaffirmed that GPS’ positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services are critical to the safe and efficient use of the national transportation system, and a Feb. 12 presidential executive order declared that satellite-based PNT services “have become a largely invisible utility for technology and infrastructure.”
It has long been equally well known, however, that GPS is vulnerable to accidental and intentional interference (the latter known as jamming), spoofing, and degradation or denial of signals. Additionally, GPS satellites are increasingly vulnerable to damage or destruction by space debris or intentional attack. The executive order mentioned above declared it U.S. policy “to ensure that disruption or manipulation of PNT services does not undermine the reliable and efficient functioning of [the country’s] critical infrastructure.”
Protecting PNT requires not just strengthening GPS, but also developing alternative sources of PNT data and ways to integrate them into the myriad systems that currently rely on GPS.
The National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 (passed by the U.S. Senate as part of that year’s Coast Guard authorization act), called for “a complement to and backup for” the GPS timing component “to ensure the availability of uncorrupted and non-degraded timing signals for military and civilian users in the event that GPS timing signals are corrupted, degraded, unreliable or otherwise unavailable.” It mandated the procurement of a wireless, terrestrial system that would provide wide-area coverage and be synchronized with UTC, resilient and extremely difficult to disrupt or degrade, able to penetrate underground and inside buildings, and capable of deployment to remote locations.
A report released on April 8 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), however, recommends “that responsibility for mitigating temporary GPS outages be the responsibility of the individual user and not the responsibility of the federal government.” It points out that research by one of DHS’ agencies “shows that users can mitigate short-term GPS disruptions (e.g., inability to read a GPS signal) with various strategies, ranging from using local backup capabilities to delaying operations until GPS is restored.” The report then focuses on “mitigation against long-term or permanent disruption or loss of GPS PNT capabilities.” It determines that the PNT functions in critical infrastructure “are so diverse that no single PNT system, including GPS, can fulfill all user requirements and applications” and notes that maximum resilience is found in diversity of solutions. Therefore, it recommends that the federal government “encourage adoption of multiple PNT sources [to expand] the availability of PNT services based on market drivers.”
In the interviews below, I discussed these challenges with John Fischer, vice president of Advanced R&D at Orolia, and Alexis Guinamard, chief technical officer of SBG Systems.
NASA will be hosting the national space-based PNT advisory board meeting on July 1. The meeting will be held virtually, rather than in-person, 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. Eastern Time.
NASA sponsors the advisory board on behalf of the National Executive Committee for Space-Based PNT. Advisory board members are nominated by the agencies of the National Executive Committee and appointed by the NASA administrator.
According to NASA, this meeting will be formally called the “24th Interim Meeting” in preparation for the 25th meeting in the fall of 2020.
The meeting will cover a number of topics, including:
Updates on emerging U.S. PNT policies;
the status of GPS constellation services and modernization;
techniques to protect, toughen and augment to GPS/GNSS services for multiple user sectors;
alternative or complimentary PNT signals sources to GPS/GNSS signals in a stressed spectrum environment;
opportunities for enhancing the interoperability of GPS with other emerging international GNSS constellations; and
emerging trends and requirements for new PNT services in U.S. and international fora.
Those participating must use a touch-tone phone. Any interested person may dial the USA toll-free conference call number 1-844-467-4685 or toll number 1-720-259-7012, passcode 106724, to participate in this meeting by telephone.
For more information, contact James J. Miller, Designated Federal Officer, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546, (202) 358-4417, fax (202) 358-4297, or [email protected].
With the rise in public unrest from COVID-19 and increasing numbers of remote operations, the susceptibility and vulnerability of a cyber attack has never been greater.
On a regular basis, we hear intelligence experts proselytize an eventual cyber doomsday where our critical infrastructure (CI) — communications systems, information technology (IT) capabilities and financial networks — are compromised or disabled. These kinds of attacks could devastate our national and economic security and even disrupt basic day-to-day activities like turning on lights or buying groceries with a debit card. Even worse, a significant cyber event could escalate to the point of military actions between nation-states.
In 2012, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned about a potential “Cyber Pearl Harbor.” These threats were echoed by then head of Cyber Command, Gen. Keith Alexander, with hope the public, private and CI sectors would take notice of the broad, detrimental impacts of cyber threats.
Geoff Hella, Centauri Corp.
In kind, the Obama administration took aggressive steps to protect CI networks, and the Trump White House followed suit by enacting measures to strengthen the resilience of other technologies integral to our CI.
The latest White House Executive Order specifically addresses our reliance on position, navigation and timing (PNT) services and directs agencies to work in close coordination with the private sector to identify, secure and continue to improve the resilience of these technologies.
PNT services, such as GPS, are an extension of our IT systems, but despite this, PNT has been a relatively invisible utility and is oftentimes unknowingly utilized by most CI owners and operators. In the coming years, our reliance on PNT will only increase, making now a critical time to foster close collaboration between public and private sectors and determine which systems, networks and assets are dependent on PNT services. Identifying these dependencies will allow us to verify appropriate resilient PNT services being used, determine downstream effects of the disruption and manipulation of PNT services, and manage the associated risks to dependent systems.
The new directive is fast paced — outlined in 90-, 180- and 360-day increments — and instructs agencies to utilize existing public-private sector cybersecurity and CI information sharing relationships, such as Sector Specific Agencies (SSA), to share threat data, educate stakeholders and promote a responsible use of PNT.
What’s the rush?
So, why is this happening right now? PNT systems are crucial to American life, and successfully securing them requires a coordinated response and sooner rather than later. In fact, malicious nation-states, such as Russia, are spreading their wings into new threat vectors to inflict damage and are shifting their attention to PNT.
Because of these risks, we must do more as a country to establish safeguards around these technologies. That being said, agencies and organizations cannot expect their current workforce to become PNT security experts overnight. Rather, business owners and operators would be better served bringing in third-party experts that have been building security into PNT even prior to this directive.
These private-sector partners can map out a systematic approach to prioritize PNT security in a three-step plan:
Find. Identify PNT systems and “profile” them — establish point A.
Fix. Find and correct vulnerabilities — many can be non-material/tactics, technique and procedures (TTP) solutions.
Fortify. Develop TTPs, timelines and guidance for users to upgrade CI where needed — the path to Point B.
When PNT services were first developed, the systems could be openly used by anyone and security was not built into the original PNT architecture — similar to when the internet was created. This has made it easy for adoption into almost everyday life and revolutionized the world. Likewise, it has also made it easy for bad actors to access and compromise it, forcing the country to scramble, backtrack and implement cybersecurity best practices.
The good news is that we aren’t completely starting from scratch. The Department of Defense has been working to secure its PNT systems and will be updating its processes and practices as part of the recent White House directive.
The security community can also look to best practices in assessing risk of vital systems and model PNT security measures on existing guidelines such as Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and NIST Special Publication 800 Series.
Path Forward
Per the Executive Order, lead agencies such as the Department of Transportation and the Department of Commerce will work in concert with the private sector to define “PNT profiles” and share these attributes with stakeholders. The coalition of partners will then be able to account for where and how PNT is used by CI owners and operators and will promote the responsible use of PNT services moving forward.
Beyond defining PNT profiles, the EO allocates new research and development funding for Commerce to develop an alternative to GNSS, which provides real-time PNT data to planes, trains, ships and automobiles that transport vital goods and resources — all in an effort to reduce the level of acceptable risk.
The White House also requires the public and private sectors to develop vulnerability testing and incident response plans and, simultaneously, encourage the private sector to use and develop more robust PNT services in anticipation of new Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FARC) contract requirements.
While these changes may seem like a fast moving and overwhelming process, there are many cases where CI owners and operators will not be required to integrate material solutions, but rather procedural training and behavioral adjustments. The information sharing processes already exist to provide improved situational awareness, coordination among the public and private sectors, increased reporting, solidified baseline risk assessments and a broader understanding of how systems rely on PNT. The challenge is facilitating widespread adoption across all stakeholders, increasing collaboration and education among and across the CI groups.
For this effort to be successful, it will require a whole-community, multi-pronged approach to operating in a new “threat top-of-mind” paradigm that is grounded on cross-sector information sharing, training and education. Both public and private sectors should also outsource expertise and leverage existing models like the DoD PNT doctrine, NIST standards and incident response capabilities.
Gregory Gerten is director of PNT Operations at Centauri, supporting the PNT enterprise through innovative use of modeling and simulation, hardware-in-the-loop and field testing, and process automation. He earned his master’s degree in electrical engineering from the University of Dayton, and has completed post-graduate courses in GPS from the Air Force Institute of Technology. He has more than 20 years of experience in system design, development and integration in the areas of communications, navigation, electronic warfare tactics and weapon systems.
Geoffrey Hella is a senior engineer for Centauri assigned to a Space Command contract through the Joint Navigation Warfare Center (JNWC). He has worked to achieve a Master of Aeronautical Science (MAS) from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in 1994. During his 40 years of experience, he has been a leader in product development and system design to successfully carry out a vast range of assignments in multiple engineering disciplines. His assignments include: aircrew member of the United States Air force (USAF); National Air Space (NAS) engineer for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Special Nuclear testing and safeguards engineer for the Department of Energy/Sandia National Laboratories; and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) engineer for both public and private Industry, electric and gas utility companies. Hella currently holds a six-sigma certification and a general radio operator license from the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) and a remote pilot operator certificate from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The PNT Coffee Talk event will be held online and is open to those interested in learning more and discussing this national priority from the industry and government perspectives.
The Executive Order, issued Feb. 12, is a federal initiative to protect critical infrastructure from GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing threats, and other disruptions to critical PNT services. These threats can deny access to, or compromise, essential PNT data that critical infrastructure needs to operate.
This initiative, titled “Executive Order on Strengthening National Resilience through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation and Timing Services,” includes the following critical infrastructure: defense, homeland security, transportation, power grids, communications/mobile, precision agriculture, weather forecasting and emergency response.
Key actions include assessing jamming, spoofing and other PNT disruption risks across these critical infrastructure programs, developing customized PNT profiles to address risks, and deploying Resilient PNT technology to increase resilience.
Survey seeks feedback. Orolia asks those interested to share questions and comments and let the company know what you’d like to discuss during this PNT Coffee Talk event through an anonymous survey.
