Tag: public health

  • Using contact tracing and GPS to fight spread of COVID-19

    Using contact tracing and GPS to fight spread of COVID-19

    Tracing Location

    Contact tracing can help stem the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. It involves tracking the movement and interactions of infected individuals to identify others at risk.

    National and regional responses to the COVID-19 pandemic have included containment through quarantine and restriction of movement. When properly implemented, these solutions limit spread of the contagion to prevent it from overwhelming healthcare and emergency management systems.

    According to the World Health Organization, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and virtually all medical professionals, any effective strategy to return the world to normal requires three components: testing, contact tracing and isolation.

    While testing to find the people who are infected is the absolute top priority, contact tracing is vital for stopping a disease from spreading out of control. It involves tracking the movement and interactions of infected individuals to identify others at risk. Any positive test without contact tracing is bad public health — it misses an opportunity to reduce the spread of the virus.

    While the concept of contact tracing has just entered popular consciousness, it has been a standard public health tool for a century. For example, in the 1930s, Great Britain used it to contain the incidence of sexually transmitted infections. In the 1960s and 1970s, South American, African and Asian countries used it to eradicate smallpox. Additional diseases for which contact tracing is performed include tuberculosis, measles, HIV, Ebola, bloodborne infections, serious bacterial infections and novel infections.


    What Is Contact Tracing?

    The World Health Organization describes three basic steps:

    • Contact identification. Those who have been in contact with someone who has been confirmed to be infected are identified, by asking about their activities and those of the people around them.
    • Contact listing. All persons who have had contact with the infected person are informed of their status and told to receive early care if they develop symptoms.
    • Follow-up. Contacts are monitored for symptoms and tested for signs of infection.

    In some cases, quarantine or isolation is required for high-risk contacts.


    The enormous dimensions of the current pandemic, however, challenge traditional models of contact tracing, which are very resource intensive. In search of a technological assist, several Asian countries already have been taking advantage of the functionalities of smartphones to scale up contact tracing to match the pandemic’s rate of growth, such as the Trace Together app built by the Singapore government. Companies and organizations around the world are following suit, including Britain’s National Health Service, a pan-European initiative, and an unprecedented joint venture by Apple and Google.

    Automating Contact Tracing

    A study published on March 31 in Science concluded that “viral spread is too fast to be contained by manual contact tracing but could be controlled if this process [were] faster, more efficient and happened at scale.” A contact-tracing app that memorizes close contacts and immediately notifies users if they have had contact with infected individuals, prompting them to self-isolate, could control the pandemic without need for mass quarantines if enough people used it, the study argues.

    Privacy versus Protection. A similar app has been deployed in China, where people are required to use it to be allowed to move beyond their neighborhood, enter public spaces, or use public transport. A central database collects data on each user’s movement and coronavirus diagnosis, artificial intelligence analyzes these data, then the app displays a red, amber or green code that determines the user’s freedom of movement. This app has been credited with significantly helping China suppress the pandemic, but has been criticized for its disregard for data protection and privacy.

    Relying on fundamental epidemiological principles and common smartphone functionality, the Science study authors designed a simple algorithm to replace manual contact tracing. “Coronavirus diagnoses are communicated to the server, enabling recommendation of risk-stratified quarantine and physical distancing measures in those now known to be possible contacts, while preserving the anonymity of the infected individual.” Symptomatic individuals could use the app to request testing, and everyone could use it to access COVID-19-related health services, information and instructions, or even to request deliveries of food or medicine during self-isolation.

    Public trust in the app and how the gathered data are used would be critical to its success. The study’s authors lay out a series of requirements for its ethical implementation, then point out that “the algorithmic approach we propose avoids the need for coercive surveillance, since the system can have very large impacts and achieve sustained epidemic suppression, even with partial uptake.”

    The authors of a similar article in the journal JMIR mHealth and uHealth write that a contact-tracing system can limit any central coordination to notifying users who have been in contact with an infected person. Their core idea is that it does not matter where someone contacts an infected person, only that they were in close enough contact to risk infection. Particularly sensitive location data, such as GPS or phone cell data, “is actually neither necessary nor useful.” No one learns who the user is because the app is not linked to an identity, and it neither records nor stores location data.

    The authors argue their proposed app is the most effective epidemiologically because it would determine which people were in close proximity, and it would receive user cooperation. “Only if people trust a system — because it does not spy on them — will the system find broad support in the population.”

    GPS, Bluetooth or Both?

    Technologically, the concepts of location and proximity are embodied in two standard smartphone components: GPS receivers and Bluetooth transceivers. GPS-derived location data makes it possible to map and analyze the movements of individuals and of large numbers of people; for example, it is how we know that many in this country have begun relaxing social distancing rules ahead of the lifting of legal mandates. Bluetooth’s use of low energy, generally a drawback, becomes an advantage here because it can tell us whether two or more people have been within 1.5 to 2 meters of an infected person for at least 10 to 15 minutes — when the risk of infection is highest. This knowledge can enable newly infected, pre-symptomatic people to self-isolate and not infect others.

    Numerous companies are developing and proposing smartphone-based contact tracing apps.

    Vesedia Mobile Technologies proposes that people who test positive to COVID-19 be asked to provide information about public places they visited in the preceding days and at what times, using their phone location history for verification. The information would be anonymized by healthcare officials, and entered into a database that would be publicly accessible via a website and mobile app.

    Ramesh Raskar. (Photo: MIT/John Werner)
    Ramesh Raskar. (Photo: MIT/John Werner)

    Intersections. The COVID Safe Paths phone app and the Safe Places browser tool for contact tracers were created by Ramesh Raskar and other researchers at the MIT Media Lab. If a user tests positive and consents, his or her data is uploaded, redacted by healthcare authorities to remove any personally identifiable information, and downloaded by the app.

    The app then performs “intersections” — it identifies and notifies people with whom the infected person has crossed paths. By clicking on intersections, users can display their timeline for the past 14 days, in a calendar view, which tells them how many intersections have occurred each day.

    The app also provides news reports from authorized local news channels, based on each user’s position or if they tap the URL for their local healthcare authority, said Abhishek Singh, the program’s tech lead, who is helping with the app’s development.

    “We are also building an interoperable architecture,” Singh said. “Because there are many contact tracing apps already in the wild, we want to make sure that they have some common standards and guidelines that enable them to utilize data from other apps securely and through consent.” More than 1,200 people are voluntarily contributing to the project. “It is being led by the open-source community, and all our source code is out there and anybody can contribute,” Singh said.

    Safe Places is helping health authorities by making the data and insights visible, enabling them to make the right decisions such as targeting resources to areas that need them most, helping them impose restrictions such as lockdowns, or reopen the economy. “The economy will not reopen in a single burst, but step by step.” Singh said. “A dashboard that allows them to monitor where the infection is spreading and where it has been contained helps them decide where to take which steps.”

    The GPS Advantage. The uptake required for GPS-enabled contact tracing to be successful is generally lower than for Bluetooth-based contact tracing, Singh argues, citing an Oxford University simulation. “With GPS, you do not need people to have the app already downloaded for it to be effective,” he points out. A person who tests positive for the virus can use the Safe Place web tool to manually create a GPS trail and help healthy people. This is one of the biggest advantages of GPS compared to Bluetooth, because the latter requires exchanging information directly through the hardware, which cannot be done after the fact.

    Because the app is open source, any government can deploy it using its own IT infrastructure. However, a government that wants to adopt Safe Paths must sign a letter that commits it to complying with privacy and ethical guidelines. Preventing authoritarian governments and nosy employers from requiring people to use this app and reveal their data requires stringent guidelines as to how it is deployed and who can access the data, Singh said.

    Apple and Google Join Forces

    Apple and Google have joined in an unprecedented alliance to develop a system for notifying people who have been near others who have tested positive for COVID-19. Eight out of 10 people in the United States own smartphones, and the two companies’ operating systems run more than 99% of them. Apps built directly into iOS and Android, especially if interoperable, could dramatically increase the reach of public health authorities (the only organizations that would receive the data). To avoid fragmentation and encourage wider adoption, Apple and Google will allow only one app per country to use their system, but will allow U.S. states to use it and support countries that opt for a state or regional approach.

    The system will use Bluetooth signals from phones to detect encounters rather than GPS location data. It will not run ads, will require users to opt-in, be decentralized, and use randomized IDs not tied to a user’s actual identity to communicate potential contacts with individuals with a confirmed positive COVID-19 diagnosis.


    With GPS, you do not need people to have the app already downloaded for it to be effective.


    API Coming. On May 20, Apple and Google released an API to developers. Next, they will issue a system update to build in contact tracing at the OS level. Should a user’s phone notify them of a possible contact, they will be prompted to download and install a public health app from their local health authority to obtain trusted instructions.

    Developers of coronavirus-related apps for several U.S. states have argued that GPS location data is vital to identify infection hotspots and track outbreaks. However, for various technical reasons, workarounds designed to bypass the decision by Apple and Google and collect GPS data in connection with their contact tracing system would work poorly.

    Ethical and Equity Concerns

    “The work that we are doing for COVID-19 is pretty similar to work that we do on a routine basis with other reportable communicable diseases,” said Lisa Ferguson, nursing supervisor for Communicable Disease Investigations and Case Management for Multnomah County, Oregon, which includes the city of Portland. Most commonly, her unit is notified of illnesses by the state database, which receives electronic lab reports. “We assign that as a case to somebody on our team, and they call the person, interview them, ask some questions about their illness, their symptoms and where they could have possibly been exposed,” Ferguson explained. “Then, they talk about who that person might have exposed and where they were from two days before they became sick up until the time of the interview or the time that their symptoms were resolved.”

    The Multnomah County, Oregon, Disease Detection Team. (Photo: Multnomah County, Oregon)
    The Multnomah County, Oregon, Disease Detection Team. (Photo: Multnomah County, Oregon)

    How could technology — such as smartphone location data — best help Ferguson’s team conduct contact tracing for COVID-19? “In the public health world, we are not used to having access to technology in that way,” she said. “We need to have some ethical discussions before we are prepared to utilize something like a technology that can track people.” Also, unlike tracking measles, which requires knowing whether someone was in an airspace and who was there after them, “We do not automatically consider someone to have been exposed if they were in the same airspace as someone who tested positive.”

    If the privacy concerns could be adequately addressed, receiving a list of all the people who were less than six feet away for at least 10 minutes from someone who had tested positive could help her team scale up, Ferguson said. Her team would then reach out to those people, using such language as “You may have been exposed,” and “Please watch yourself closely.”

    Ferguson’s team always has “equity concerns,” fearing they might under-identify groups that do not have access to the technology. “It is a supplemental tool, but it certainly would not replace the work that we are doing,” she said.

    Help Wanted

    Safely reopening the United States will require a new workforce of at least 100,000 contact tracers, according to a report from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and other experts. Any technological assist to contact tracing does not diminish this need. For example, smartphone alerts can help filter out those at low or no risk so that human tracers can focus on genuine cases, people at higher risk, or those who are harder to contact.

    Two out of 10 people in the United States do not own a smartphone, and only 42% of those above the age of 65 — who suffer 80% of the deaths from COVID-19 — do, according to a 2017 Pew Research Center poll. Hardly any homeless people own a smartphone. Among those most vulnerable to the pandemic are immigrants who do not speak English and are fearful of efforts to collect their personal information, strengthening the need for this to be done in person by trusted community members.

    Finally, even if Google and Apple’s automated service is widely adopted and works well, it will require many thousands of health workers to conduct tests and follow-ups.


    Feature photo: da-kuk / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images

  • GPS tracking need not sit out COVID-19 because of privacy laws

    GPS tracking need not sit out COVID-19 because of privacy laws

    Photo: AntonioGuillem/iStock / Getty Images Plus/Getty Images
    Photo: AntonioGuillem/iStock / Getty Images Plus/Getty Images

    Commentary by Jeremy Meisinger

    Headshot: Jeremy Meisinger
    Jeremy Meisinger

    The scale and speed of the COVID-19 crisis has left policymakers searching for new tools to address an unprecedented challenge. Everything from faster testing to new treatments to more supplies for frontline providers is needed, and smart deployment of these resources requires an ability to track infections that is not yet available for a problem of the scale of COVID-19.

    The recent economic stimulus package passed by Congress — the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) – looks to fund this kind of tracking. Among its many priorities, the CARES Act appropriates half a billion dollars to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for modernization of its public health data surveillance capabilities, and specifically directs the CDC to report to Congress on the development of a “public health surveillance and data collection system for coronavirus within 30 days.”

    The legislation does not give much in the way of additional direction to the CDC, meaning that the CDC is likely to think expansively and look for proven models in other highly developed public health systems.

    Disease surveillance efforts around the world have taken a variety of approaches, in many cases informed by experience in battling prior pandemics. Public health systems in places such as South Korea, Singapore and China were built on the lessons of the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and similar conditions over the past several years.


    Location-based tracking using GPS provides greater insight and precision than, for example, asking an infected patient to remember and re-trace his or her steps.


    Among many other elements, these systems frequently employ GPS-enabled smartphone apps both to gather information and to target alerts to local populations. Location-based tracking using GPS provides greater insight and precision than, for example, asking an infected patient to remember and re-trace his or her steps.

    As discussions of similar solutions have begun in the United States, privacy advocates have rightly pointed out the risks inherent in systems that necessarily gather and communicate health information and pair that information with location-based information provided by GPS. But both legally and practically, there need not be an exclusive choice between health information privacy and using GPS and other technology to gather and provide information about COVID-19.

    On the legal front, HIPAA broadly exempts disclosures of protected health information for public health activities, allowing disclosures to public health authorities without first obtaining patient consent. Similarly, HIPAA permits data to be de-identified — subject to recognized standards laid out in regulations and guidance — and thereafter shared and used for research purposes, including public health research and similar purposes.


    Legal avenues certainly exist to permit significant information sharing about COVID-19 in order to help protect public health.


    Furthermore, federal authorities tasked with enforcing HIPAA have already signaled in guidance that they will take a flexible approach to enforcement in order to meet the exigencies of the crisis. Thus, while it is true that HIPAA has not been applied directly to a public health emergency on the scale of COVID-19, legal avenues certainly exist to permit significant information sharing about COVID-19 in order to help protect public health.

    On the practical front, HIPAA also points the way to sensible decision-making that balances privacy interests with the needs of the crisis. First, de-identification provides a significant opportunity to share data in a way that is protective of privacy. Second, we should not assume that widespread participation — both in information gathering and information dissemination — must be involuntary in order to be widely adopted.

    Smartphones users can — and should — be given a choice before enabling tracking features on their devices, just as they can and should be informed in a transparent way about what data would and would not be shared. HIPAA establishes a “minimum necessary” standard that should provide the guiding principle here: no more information should be shared than is necessary to accomplish the intended objective.

    As we search quickly for tools to enable the kind of tracking that we have not undertaken before, we should be careful not to construct a false dilemma between privacy and efficacy — the two go hand in hand. Strong and transparent privacy protections are both possible and necessary to secure the public buy-in that is necessary to make public health surveillance work.


    Jeremy Meisinger is a Boston-based attorney at Foley Hoag LLP.

  • Coronavirus and location: Is there a line?

    Coronavirus and location: Is there a line?

    No, I’m not talking about the line at the grocery store to buy toilet paper and hand sanitizer. Or the line at the doctor’s office. I’m talking about that gray privacy line invisible to the naked eye, but all too accessible on our mobile devices.

    On March 16, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his cabinet approved using citizens’ smartphones to track the locations of people infected with the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), as well as anyone they might have had contact with.

    Such a strategy might work — some citizens reported receiving smartphone alerts when they were near an infected person. However, it does raise the ubiquitous privacy concerns of allowing your government to know your every move.

    Some may think this an acceptable use of tracking, except that the Israeli Knesset — the citizenry’s representative legislature — was not involved in the decision. The tracking didn’t require a court order, and records were to be kept until the new regulation expired.

    A few days later, Israel’s top court put a stop to the program, saying there would be no tracking of Israelis by the Shin Bet without Knesset oversight.

    Of course, Israel is a democracy, and Netanyahu’s move is nowhere near the draconian measures undertaken by the Chinese government in response to the virus. Those actions included forcibly removing people from their homes and placing them in quarantine.

    Yet China’s actions worked. As of press time, the outbreak there is under control, with no new cases reported on March 19. That’s impressive, if one can trust the state news. After all, this is the same country that warned the doctor who discovered the virus not to talk about it. Dr. Li Wenliang died in February of the disease.

    Privacy versus public health: Something to think about while social distancing at home.

    Image: Yuuji/E+/Getty Images
    Image: Yuuji/E+/Getty Images
  • Cartographies of Disease traces long history of maps and medicine

    CartographyDisease-Esri-WThe new edition of Cartographies of Disease: Maps, Mapping, and Medicine from Esri traces the long history of how maps have been used to help unlock the mysteries behind the cause and spread of diseases such as cholera, yellow fever and Ebola. Ebola is the focus of two new chapters.

    Cartographies of Disease was first published in 2005 and showed how maps could be used as an important tool for studying both chronic conditions and disease epidemics. It became a must-read for policy makers and others working in public health and medicine.

    In this expanded edition, author Tom Koch adds new material to deepen readers’ understanding of medical mapping from the 17th to 21st centuries. The book covers the mapping of diseases and medical conditions such as cholera, yellow fever, typhoid fever, sandfly fever, hernia, lymphoma, arteriosclerotic heart disease, cancer, influenza, AIDS, West Nile virus and Ebola.

    Cartographies of Disease is a book about our confrontations with bacterial and viral agents across history,” Koch wrote in the book’s introduction. “It is also about how maps help us profile those conditions in our attempts to restrict them. Ebola in 2014 reminded us that it’s urgent to understand the conditions that promote disease and the ways we confront them on the ground.”

    The book provides a nontechnical narrative and a visual history of mapping’s role in studying what causes disease, understanding where and how diseases spread, and how they can be combated. The illustrations include more than 100 maps and charts, from a pair of 1694 maps of plague locations and containment zones in Bari, Italy, to digital maps of the 2014 Ebola outbreak, created using geographic information system (GIS) technology.

    Ebola charted

    Ebola is the focus of the two new chapters. In Chapter 13, the international perception of Ebola’s threat is charted and, with it, the fear engendered by the possibility that a local outbreak might become an international pandemic. Perceptions of the disease and reactions to it are mapped using contemporary technologies such as GIS.

    Chapter 14 is devoted to the practical issues of mapping an infectious virus like Ebola in developing countries. It describes how the potential for Ebola to spread was initially overlooked and how, in the future, new epidemics might be better contained. Mapping, Koch argues, can help identify disease threats, direct medical assistance when necessary, and educate people—locally and internationally — about new diseases.

    Koch is a medical ethicist and gerontologist based in Canada. As an adjunct professor at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, he developed a series of teaching labs for medical geography.

    Cartographies of Disease: Maps, Mapping, and Medicine, new expanded edition, is now available in print (ISBN: 9781589484672, 412 pages, US$79.99) or as an e-book (ISBN: 9781589484764, 412 pages, US$59.99). The print edition of the book can be obtained from online retailers worldwide, at esri.com/esripress, or by calling 1-800-447-9778.

    The e-book edition is available for purchase from online retailers. Outside the United States, visit esri.com/esripressorders for complete ordering options.