New Combined Program Office to enhance U.S. ability to prevail against threats in space, including new hypersonic weapons
Space Systems Command (SSC) is leading a new tri-agency Combined Program Office (CPO) comprised of representatives from SSC, the Space Development Agency (SDA) and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The CPO was established on Aug. 19 to enhance the United States’ ability to deter, defend and win against competitors’ challenges in space.
The Space Acquisition Council, established by Congress to manage space procurements across the Department of Defense, concurred on the CPO proposal, enabling the coordinated development and fielding of capabilities in the missile warning (MW), missile tracking (MT), and missile defense (MD) mission areas.
The CPO will address growing challenges resulting from the transition of space from a peaceful domain to one that is congested, contested and competitive. Other nations now challenge access to and movement in space, and have demonstrated the capability and intent to hold U.S. and allied space assets at risk.
“The MW/MT/MD mission is driving the U.S. Space Force’s new ‘requirements to execution’ roadmap, rapidly turning USSF Force Design into operational capabilities that will outpace and defeat very determined threats,” said U.S. Space Force Col. Brian Denaro, Space Sensing program executive officer and leader of the new CPO. “Our adversaries continue to develop missile technologies that are faster burning, dimmer and more maneuverable. This Combined Program Office, in partnership with SDA and MDA, will drive critical integration across a new resilient multilayer architecture that will warn, track and defeat these increasingly advanced and elusive missile threats.”
Establishing this partnership among MW/MT/MD acquisition organizations will enhance the interface between requirements, operators and users, optimizing delivery of integrated and resilient sensor-to-shooter capabilities for the United States and its allies.
“We are focused on delivering MW/MT/MD capabilities to the warfighter and the nation,” said U.S. Army Lt. Col. Alexander Rasmussen, Tranche 1 Tracking Layer program manager, SDA. “The Combined Program Office is a critical component in delivering this capability and enabling our nation to counter hypersonic and advanced missile threats. Together, SDA, MDA and SSC will ensure a synchronized end-to-end capability that sets the foundation for a continually evolving and advancing MW/MT/MD architecture.”
“With the emerging advanced threats, space-based sensors are essential to missile defense,” said Walter Chai, director for space sensors at MDA. “The close collaboration between SDA, SSC and MDA will ensure that we are able to defeat these threats.”
The CPO organizational structure integrates strategic decision-making across the interagency, establishing:
clear roles, responsibilities, and authorities for SSC, SDA, MDA and other mission partners
end-to-end system of systems accountability between requirements and weapon system delivery
development and management of standards (models, open architecture, data, etc.)
integration with operators, combatant commands and other weapon systems.
Space Systems Command is the U.S. Space Force field command responsible for rapidly identifying, prototyping and fielding resilient space capabilities for joint warfighters. SSC delivers sustainable joint space warfighting capabilities to defend the nation and its allies, while disrupting adversaries in the contested space domain. SSC mission areas include launch acquisition and operations; space domain awareness; positioning, navigation and timing; missile warning; satellite communication; and cross-mission ground, command and control, and data.
DIU accelerates commercial GEOINT and NAVWAR tools and capabilities to the warfighter
The U.S. Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) will be testing ways to mitigate disruptions to GNSS signals this fall.
Disruptions include those from intentional sources, such as spoofing, as well as intentional or unintentional jamming. Intentional tactics can be applied by adversarial nation states, criminal networks or privateers.
The shared interests between the government and private citizens alike for awareness of GPS disruptions make commercial solutions ideal; information and insight can be broadly shared not just within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), but across agencies, allied partners and the public as needed.
In the Fall of 2021, the DIU launched the Harmonious Rook prototype project to address the need for scalable, persistent awareness of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) disruptions across the globe.
This September, the Harmonious Rook team will support the U.S. Army 1st Armored Division’s Command Post Exercise (CPX) at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. The exercise is focused on large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and intended to stress the division headquarters’ ability to deploy to an austere location and command and control its units utilizing a synthetic training environment.
U.S. and multinational maritime forces participate in SEACAT 2021. (Photo: NTC)
Parallel to this training event is the 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division’s external validation exercise, also at NTC, in which the 2nd Brigade will be stressed and evaluated on its ability to deploy while contested and conduct LSCO exercises against a live opposing force.
Several DOD and civilian agencies are participating, including the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) and the National Space Intelligence Center (NSIC). Multiple non-traditional vendors and non-governmental organizations are also supporting Harmonious Rook, from data delivery, to machine learning analytics, to visualization and contextualization.
Vendor Participation
Several Harmonious Rook vendors will participate in notable DOD and international exercises. In August 2022, prototyping companies will support the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT) exercise, where more than 20 Indo-Pacific countries will train and collaborate on the common goal of maritime crises and illegal activities response.
During this multinational exercise, commercial firms will provide space-based geolocation reports and maritime analytical services, and integrate the insights into the U.S. Navy’s and Department of Transportation’s shared visualization platform, Seavision.
DIU is also working to explore the use of publicly available PNT data to draw insight from domestic GPS interference events.
“Mapping GPS disruptions and contextualizing patterns of behavior are key to mitigating the effects of degraded PNT as well as enabling safety of navigation under such conditions,” said Lt. Col. Nicholas Estep, Harmonious Rook program manager, USAF. “Instead of developing, building, and deploying hardware tailored for collection of navigation warfare operations, we are accessing currently available commercial data and analytics to address the need for PNT situational awareness. There are billions of GPS users and devices distributed across the world that may be adversely affected and turning the vulnerability into an advantage for discovery, classification and attribution of such malicious activity is a key aspect of this effort.”
“The Harmonious Rook project is a very promising new approach that complements traditional collection methodologies, as it will help our customers by sharing analysis due to the unclassified and commercial nature of the data,” said Scott Feairheller, senior analyst at NSIC.
“While the Army works diligently to acquire relevant equipment to assist in the real-time recognition and characterization of potential adversary interference, we must leverage non-organic, commercially available software and equipment, like Harmonious Rook, as a stopgap to increase awareness, seize digital key terrain and maximize lethality,” said Lt. Col. Patrick Jones of 1st Armored Division’s Space Support Element (SSE). During the exercise, capabilities will be tested to support intelligence, information operations, and command and control elements with commercial geospatial and navigation warfare awareness at the tactical level.
DIU’s Harmonious Rook program is not limited to the DOD and the malicious activity more commonly observed overseas and in combat environments. DIU is also working to explore the use of publicly available PNT data to draw insight from domestic GPS interference events, a mission with interest from the U.S. civil agencies.
With widespread users and subscribers that rely on PNT services, any intentional or unintentional disruption can lead to severe transportation, communication and financial implications. This highlights the importance of bringing both government and private-sector industries together to identify, attribute and mitigate GPS interference as quickly as possible.
DroneShield’s RfPatrol MKII body-worn system antennas. (Photo: DroneShield)
DroneShield has received and delivered upon a follow-on order by a U.S. government agency for the company’s portable and handheld counter-UAS (C-UAS) solutions.
DroneShield is the maker of the counter-drone or anti-drone systems including RfPatrol and DroneGun MkIII. It has received contracts from the U.S. departments of Defense and Homeland Security, as well as other federal and state law enforcement agencies.
“We’re grateful for the continued trust that this organization has placed in us to help address a unique set of operational challenges. Our customer relationships are what fuel our commitment to push the boundaries of what’s possible in the counter unmanned space,” said Tom Branstetter, director of business development, DroneShield. “Every teammate at DroneShield understands the significance of the problems we’re solving for our end-users and it’s something we’re proud to support.”
DroneShield also recently announced deployments of its solutions for high-profile events including the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, and IRONMAN Texas 2022.
On July 14, the U.S. House passed its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2023, which begins Oct. 1, 2022.
The report released with the legislation contains several provisions of interest for the GPS and positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) communities. Perhaps most intriguingly, it indicates the National Guard is considering a program to ensure it has one or more sources of time independent from GPS.
Here are some of the more interesting PNT-related mentions in the report.
GPS Disruption & RF-Based Alternatives
A provision entitled “Briefing on Disruption of Global Positioning System” reiterates concerns Congress has expressed repeatedly over the last two decades.
On the civil side, these concerns have resulted in prohibiting the U.S. Coast Guard from disposing of old Loran facilities until a backup for GPS is decided upon and requiring the Department of Transportation to establish a timing alternative to GPS.
Most of Congress’ attention has been focused on the Department of Defense (DOD), though. Over the years, it has tasked the department with a wide variety of briefings and actions including reporting on threats to GPS, how DOD will operate in GPS-denied environments, progress (or lack thereof) in OCX and M-code, and development of alternative PNT systems.
The 2021 NDAA took a more activist approach and required DOD to “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation and timing signals.” It also directed the department to work with the National Security Council, the departments of Transportation, Homeland Security, and others “to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement” GPS. The act mandated that this all be completed within two years.
Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com
The 2023 NDAA reinforces Congress’ long standing concerns about “increasing threats of disruption” to GPS, stating “it is critical to invest in technologies that provide resilient and assured positioning, navigation and timing capabilities…”
Language in that same provision, though, focuses just on alternate navigation capabilities as opposed to full PNT. The act requires a briefing before the end of this year about DOD’s plan across the Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) for “alternative navigation broadcast services.” The briefing is required to include information about “progress on radio frequency-based alternative navigation solutions,” what the department is doing now, and cost estimates for infrastructure and other expenses across the FYDP.
Army MAPS Program
The Army’s Mounted Assured PNT System (MAPS) is focused on ground vehicles. Information on the service’s website seems to indicate the upgrade in the first generation of MAPS is an anti-jam antenna. The overall program of record is more ambitious, according to the site, and includes M-code, other GNSS and inertial sensors.
“Path to ALTNAV” and “Open Standards Interfaces” are also listed as features in the MAPS final version. This is likely incorporation of DOD’s mandate for modular open system architecture to ensure the ability to easily integrate future navigation and timing systems and signals.
The Army is already producing and fielding the Gen 1 version of MAPS. In March 2022, the Aberdeen Proving Ground News announced that 1,000 units had been fielded.
In its report accompanying the NDAA, Congress expressed concern with the pace of the MAPS program. It notes the Army has procured 2,000 units — a small fraction of the 225,000 ground vehicles the service operates.
The text of the congressional report also seems to indicate the program is not much beyond the point described on its website two years ago. The website says a Program of Record technical solution was planned to have been finalized in September 2020.
The House version of the bill would require the Army to provide a briefing on:
technical performance of candidate systems to incorporate into MAPS
the cost of these systems and integration
plans to deploy MAPS to the Army’s fleet of vehicles
plans to upgrade the Gen I MAPS units already fielded.
Another indication of the delayed pace of the program is that this briefing is not due for more than a year, in December 2023.
Autonomy Software for PNT-Denied Environments
While much less specific, another interesting PNT-related provision is a requirement for DOD to “Report on autonomy software for Next Generation Air Dominance.”
It describes a developing Air Force strategy for using piloted and unpiloted aircraft alongside each other. The software “could enable the continued operational capability of systems in positioning, navigation and timing-denied environments.” The Navy and Marine Corps are developing a similar concept.
Photo: Brian Kinney/Shutterstock.com
Little public information is available concerning any of the Next Generation Air Dominance programs or supporting systems. Experts have speculated, though, that operation in PNT-denied environments would likely involve some of the aircraft remaining outside the denied area and providing PNT information to the others via one or more links.
National Guard and Nationwide Alternative Timing
At the end of a section entitled “Collaboration on positioning, navigation, and timing research,” the House report reveals that the National Guard is concerned about relying entirely on GPS for timing and seems to have begun to address that shortfall.
It requires a report no later than February 2023 on the Guard’s “Nationwide Integration of Time Resiliency for Operations (NITRO) effort.” The report should address, among other things, mission need, capability gaps, estimated costs and how the department is collaborating with other federal, state and local entities.
The budget item for NITRO cites malicious cyberattacks that can impact command and control (C2) systems. It says the Guard’s ability to support civil authorities and critical infrastructure is at risk if not mitigated with resilient time.
While attempts to reach the National Guard for comment have been unsuccessful, PNT expert Pat Diamond said the Guard’s concerns and efforts are well justified. “Precision timing is a seriously weak link for everyone in the United States, including critical infrastructure and organizations like the National Guard,” Diamond said. “If GPS timing was not available for some reason, land mobile radios, common operational pictures, the ability to navigate, plus command-and-control systems would suffer greatly, potentially being completely degraded. It’s outstanding that the Guard has realized this and seems to be moving out. All the power to them.”
A Must-Pass Bill
The House version of the 2023 NDAA has yet to be conferenced and reconciled with that of the Senate. While the Senate’s version of the NDAA has been filed, the accompanying report has not yet been released. Since the House provisions seem relatively non-controversial, they are almost certain to be included along with others from the Senate in the final bill and report.
The resulting legislation is almost certain to pass into law.
Congress often struggles to pass even routine legislation. For example, it has only funded the government on time in four of the last 40 years. The annual defense authorization is an exception. NDAA’s are considered “must-pass” bills. Congress has sent one to the president in each of the last 61 years.
Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. He is also a member of the President’s National Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board.
RedTail Lidar Systems has delivered six lidar systems to the 707th Ordnance Company stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord. The systems will provide explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians an opportunity to assess how lidar can be used to enhance their operations.
The RedTail Lidar Systems RTL-450 was integrated onto the Teledyne FLIR SkyRaider unmanned aerial system (UAS) to address a broad range of the EOD community’s 3D mapping needs. Captain William R. Hartman, the commander of the 707th EOD Company, stated that the highlight of the testing was using the lidar system to map terrain.
The RTL-450 also can be used to calculate crater volumes from improvised explosive device (IED) blasts, perform route planning for unmanned ground vehicles, aid in mission planning, and conduct surveillance. The 3D point clouds generated allow operating areas to be viewed from any perspective using the rotation and zoom capabilities provided within the viewer software.
The underlying lidar technology used in the RTL-450 was licensed from the Army Research Laboratory (ARL). The micro-electromechanical (MEMS) mirror-based design provides enhanced 3D imagery suitable for applications where artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) algorithms can be used for target detection and classification, because of the high point density of the point clouds.
The system can operate in either a raster scan mode for surveillance missions or a side-to-side line scan mode for area mapping while the UAS is flying. The intuitive command and control, high brightness display integrated into the ground control station (GCS), and real-time 3D map generation allows operators to begin mission planning and analysis even before the mapping or surveillance missions are completed.
“Delivering these six lidar systems to EOD technicians for test and evaluation is a significant step forward in using MEMS mirror-based lidar technology to address a broad range of Department of Defense 3D mapping needs,” said said Brad DeRoos, president and CEO of RedTail Lidar Systems. In addition, this delivery represents a true success story in transitioning a technology out of a Department of Defense laboratory and back into the hands of military operators.”
Orolia, through its Orolia Defense & Security business, announced in November 2020 the launch of M-code military GPS receivers in its line of positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) solutions.
The line includes M-code-enabled mobile mission timing and synchronization platforms, such as the SecureSync IDM resilient time and frequency reference solution, the first time server approved by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and the Versa mobile PNT platform to meet rugged size, weight, power and cost (SWaP-C) requirements.
M-code is a military signal used in the L1 and L2 GPS bands. It is required by congressional mandate for U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) military operations.
M-code is designed to enhance PNT capabilities and improved resistance to existing and emerging threats to GPS, such as jamming and spoofing. Operational benefits of M-code include:
a higher power signal that offers improved resistance to jamming and interference
advanced security features to prevent unauthorized access or exploitation
improved message formats and signal modulation techniques for faster and more accurate performance.
Orolia has long supported the DOD’s need for selective availability anti-spoofing module (SAASM)-enabled PNT equipment, explained Hironori Sasaki, president of Orolia Defense & Security. “This announcement emphasizes our move toward M-code and the availability of M-code in our products,” Sasaki said. “Our focus has always been on staying in sync with the DOD and providing the latest and greatest technologies.”
Orolia now supports M-code in all its user products and offers two capabilities: simulation and M-code-enabled end-user devices. “They will each have a different approval process for export,” Sasaki said. “We follow DOD guidance on getting that capability out there.”
SecureSync, which is SAASM-enabled, has been deployed with DOD for many years, so Orolia has “a very good install base” of these devices, according to Sasaki. “We are providing a very easy and seamless upgrade path to go from SAASM to M-code in that platform.” The company’s Versa platform consists of the VersaSync and the VersaPNT, both small form-factor PNT devices designed for rugged application in military vehicles or military aircraft.
DOD has given Orolia approval to advertise the fact that it has these capabilities in its products. “We are expecting shipments to start in early 2021,” said Sasaki. “So, we are well on our way in development, implementation and productization.”
“We have been focusing on providing products that have a modular architecture, both in software and hardware,” Sasaki added. “We are embracing this approach of open architecture and continue to support the DOD in providing different layers of sensing and PNT protection in a way that can be incorporated into future DOD systems.
“We have already demonstrated our ability to deliver PNT solutions in various form factors, so I think we are in a good position to continue pushing forward with that open architecture approach,” Sasaki said.
“We cannot have GPS signals be a single point of failure for transportation and other critical infrastructure sectors. More safety applications will depend on PNT in the future. Public confidence in these will be critical.
“People will not be comfortable getting into an automated vehicle or with platooning driverless trucks heading down the highway if they think that their invisible hand is not reliable and that their GPS might be spoofed.
“Getting public adoption of other PNT capabilities — space-based, terrestrial, and self-contained — integrated with GPS technology will be critical to the success of any such system.”
— Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology, U.S. Department of Transportation, Nov. 20, 2019, Edinburgh, U.K.
A Single Point of Failure
The Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for leading civil positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) issues for the United States. At the moment, the U.S. GPS provides the vast majority of PNT services in the U.S. and around the world. Yet, like all space-based systems, its signals are weak and very vulnerable to interference.
A recent example of how dangerous that can be in automated transportation systems was revealed recently in an accident report released by the British government. Interference from an unknown source caused a 15.5 kg drone to get away from its operator and crash. Fortunately, no one was hurt. The report cited analysis showing that such a weight could have easily killed someone on the ground.
Even more concerning, GPS signal characteristics are well known and therefore easy to imitate. Thousands of cases of “spoofing” have been documented with government and malicious actors causing receivers to report they are far from their actual location. In the worst cases, this can cause accidents or enable criminal acts.
One result of all of this is the President of the United States issuing an Executive Order encouraging “responsible use” of PNT systems. It also directs steps to encourage development and adoption of alternative systems. This includes a White House-level plan for research and development of non-Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) PNT.
In Europe the European Union (EU) has warned that space based PNT alone is insufficient for “…critical applications requiring continuous availability and fail-safe operations.” The EU has also established a monitoring system to detect sources of GNSS interference, and the European Space Agency (ESA) has established an on-going program funding study of both space and terrestrial alternate PNT systems.
Multiple Cooperating Systems
The ultimate solution, though, according to senior government officials, will be development and use of many diverse PNT systems working together to ensure users have what they need when and where they need it.
Image: DOT
The National PNT Architecture, jointly developed by the US departments of Defense and Transportation, envisions a multitude of PNT sources ranging from GNSS provided by national governments, to inertial and clock suites acquired by users as needed.
“Many people are fond of talking about a GPS backup,” said one administration official.
“It’s more appropriate to use the plural ‘backups’ since one system isn’t going to meet everyone’s needs. Even GPS doesn’t meet everyone’s needs which is why we require complementary PNT capabilities.”
The idea that multiple redundancies are required for an essential function as long been a core principle of systems engineering. This is clearly foundational in the National PNT Architecture.
It is also a feature in more recent documents.
One example is the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD) PNT strategy publicly released in August of last year. It envisions use of a multitude of systems as a way of “Ensuring a U.S. Military PNT Advantage.”
Image: DOD
It categorizes these in three layers. A global layer of GNSS and other satellites, a regional layer that includes STOIC and eLoran, and a local/autonomous layer populated by inertial, clock, lidar, radar, scene matching and beacon-based systems.
Another project taking the architecture approach is described in detail by the recently completed MarRINav report. Sponsored by the European Space Agency, it analyzed the PNT needs of maritime commerce in the United Kingdom.
The project concluded that a “hybrid approach” using GNSS, eLoran, and the short-range R-mode VDES would be the best and least expensive combination for maritime. It also recommended a local navigation system such as Locata for port cargo operations. The study found that such a combination of systems would also benefit other transportation and infrastructure sectors.
Implementation
Yet identifying solutions is often much easier than making them happen. Especially for national projects with dozens of stakeholders. Stakeholders who may often have competing interests. And there is always the question of “Who pays?”
In the United States both the Congress and the executive branch of the U.S. government are addressing these issues, and in potentially complementary ways.
Congressional Mandates. With GPS as the cornerstone, both the DoD strategy and the National PNT Architecture show the need for one or more complementary systems to “overcome PNT capability gaps, predominantly resulting from the limitations of GPS.”
According to one senior official close to the issue, these systems need to be, “integrated with GPS and each other” and within the U.S. “serve all parts of the country — urban, rural, wilderness — even coastal maritime areas.” The idea being that they will constantly reinforcing GPS services while also serving as a safety net for users when during GPS disruptions.
The National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 requires DoT to begin filling this layer in the National Architecture by the end of this year. The law, passage of which was overwhelmingly supported by both parties, mandates the department establish a difficult to disrupt, wide area, terrestrial timing system to backup (and complement) GPS timing signals. The system also must be expandable to provide navigation services. Even as a timing service, though, it has the potential to make navigation more reliable. Studies have shown that combining such a timing signal with GPS and other GNSS signals can dramatically decrease users’ vulnerability to jamming and spoofing.
The law also enables the system or systems to be established by leveraging commercial entities and expertise through cooperative agreements, public-private partnerships, and similar arrangements. These tend to be the most expeditious and least costly methods for putting such services in place. As such, they are expected to be very attractive to government program and contracting officials.
On military side, the in-process National Defense Authorization Act for 2021 requires DoD to quickly complete this part of their architecture also. Hinting that the department has failed to respond to combatant commanders “Joint Urgent Operational Needs,” it directs DoD to provide warfighters non-GPS PNT by 2023. It also directs the department to “enable civilian and commercial adoption of [these] technologies and capabilities”.
Presidential Order. The administration’s approach is outlined in a February 2020 presidential Executive Order. The order focuses on commercial entities that contract with the government, critical infrastructure, and research and development.
It calls for, within the next 24 months, agencies to “develop contractual language for inclusion … n the requirements for Federal contracts … with the goal of encouraging the private sector to use additional PNT services and develop new robust and secure PNT services.” The hope is that these new services will be adopted beyond just those companies who routinely serve government needs.
The departments of Energy, Transportation, and Homeland Security are also required to publish plans on how they will engage various critical infrastructure sectors to evaluate the degree of responsible use of PNT by each.
Also, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is tasked to “coordinate the development of a national plan… for the R&D and pilot testing of additional, robust, and secure PNT services that are not dependent on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS).” OSTP has already begun this and is seeking input from the public.
Competition and Many Players
Because PNT user needs are so varied and nuanced, most industry observers see growing opportunities for existing and potentially new providers.
“Systems and equipment that improve GNSS services, or that complement and augment GNSS are likely to find ready markets,” said Andrew Bach, a consultant on financial and other PNT issues. “User demands and needs are only going to become more sophisticated as their economic exposure increases.”
Congressional and administration focus on alternative PNT should enhance and multiply such opportunities. So, while there may be no silver bullet for solving national PNT concerns, the need for a robust and resilient architecture of PNT systems will likely mean abundant opportunities for providers.
At first it was a flurry of letters and public statements from U.S. senators and members of the house. Then there was a senate hearing on the topic, and the issue was discussed in several other hearings.
The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) approval of a long-standing request by Ligado Networks continues to be controversial. The request was to make terrestrial broadcasts on a frequency near that used by GPS. Broadcasts which, according to analyses by the departments of Defense and Transportation, will interfere with GPS reception for many users.
Now it looks as though Congress is ready to move beyond talk and enact one or more pieces of legislation. These would require an independent technical review of the FCC’s decision and place limits on the ability of Ligado Networks to use the license it was granted.
Congressional interest has been fueled both by member concerns and a regular drumbeat of input from constituents. The recently formed Keep GPS Working Coalition is just one example. It was created from a larger group of more than 70 companies and organizations across a broad swath of industries that has gone on record against the decision and has been supporting congressional action.
National Defense Authorization Act
A primary vehicle for congressional action looks to be the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2021. Unlike other “annual” legislation that often gets sidetracked or delayed during election years, Congress has passed an NDAA for each of the past 59 years. As such, it is a particularly powerful tool.
This is doubly so in this case, as the member of Congress that has been the most outspoken critic of the FCC’s decision is Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK). He chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee that has direct responsibility for the NDAA.
Responding to conflicting claims about the findings of government and private tests, the bill requires the Defense department to contract with the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine for an independent technical review.
Evaluating Potential Impact on GPS
Among other things, the review will compare the different methods of evaluating the potential impact on GPS services from Ligado’s transmissions, and determine which of those was the most effective in guarding against any harm.
The bill also prohibits the Defense Secretary from spending any money to comply with the FCC’s order until the Congress has been given an estimate of the total cost to the department of coping with Ligado’s transmissions.
While the FCC order requires Ligado to modify or replace any government receivers impacted by its operations, the Defense department and others have said this is only a small fraction of the overall costs they would incur.
The bill requires the Defense Department estimate to consider a much larger scope of costs including:
To upgrade, repair, or replace potentially affected receivers
To modify, repair, or replace equipment, pares, associated ancillary equipment, software, facilities, operating manuals, training, or compliance with regulations, including with regard to the underlying platform or system in which a capability of the Global Positioning System is embedded; and,
For personnel of the department to engineer, validate, and verify that any required remediation provides the Department with the same operational capability for the affected system prior to terrestrial operation in the 1525 to 1559 megahertz or 1626.5 to 1660.5 megahertz bands of electromagnetic spectrum.
The House version of the NDAA also provides that:
“The Secretary of Defense may not enter into a contract, or extend or renew a contract, with an entity that engages in commercial terrestrial operations using the 1525–1559 megahertz band or the 1626.5–1660.5 megahertz band unless the Secretary has certified to the congressional defense committees that such operations do not cause harmful interference to a Global Positioning System device of the Department of Defense.”
RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act
Senator Inhofe has also announced he will introduce stand-alone legislation when Congress returns from summer recess. His “Recognizing and Ensuring Taxpayer Access to Infrastructure Necessary for GPS and Satellite Communications Act,” or “RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act,” would require Ligado to modify or replace any receiver, including those used by private citizens, that would be impacted by Ligado’s operations.
This modification would be required before the FCC’s order allowing them to transmit could come into force. Most observers opine that the number of impacted civil receivers in the U.S. is so great that this would effectively deny Ligado use of the frequency.
Introduction of the RETAIN GPS and Satellite Communications Act was planned for before the summer recess. Its delay until after was likely to provide more time to recruit co-sponsors.
GPS Interference a ‘Niche’ Issue
One observer commented that “GPS and the FCC Ligado order are really niche issues. As time goes on, more and more members of Congress will hear about it from constituents and be appalled.”
The delay will also allow time for the mammoth NDAA bill to clear Congress. RETAIN GPS would then have more chance for the spotlight.
Many industry observers have opined that regardless of congressional action, Ligado will struggle to find a successful 5G or other business model that will generate a significant revenue stream from the spectrum.
As public concern continues to grow and Congress responds with legislation, it may turn out that Ligado finally won the battle at the FCC but ended up losing the war.
CAST Navigation LLC has developed the capability to support development and implementation of the Modernized Navstar Security Algorithm (MNSA). The U.S. Department of Defense granted in January CAST MNSA security approval, enabling its simulators to test M-code.
The new software will support M-code using the classified security algorithm. M-code is an updated GPS military signal that is part of the modernization of the current GPS constellation.
The CAST-MNSA is a significant addition to CAST Navigation’s suite of classified signal capabilities and is available on all of the company’s simulators. The feature will be instrumental in the effort toincorporate MNSA capability into GPS receivers. CAST provides development, integration and testing life-cycle support for the next generation of navigation systems.
“Our GNSS/INS simulators and test equipment are critical tools used to validate and verify the performance of navigation systems, and this feature ensures that our customers can keep pace with advances in technology and capability,” said Susan Gove, president and CEO of CAST Navigation.
“The classified product feature continues our 38-year history of innovation as anindustry leader whose products are critical to the support of numerous government, military, prime contractors and U.S. Department of Defense programs,” Gove said.
The U.S. Air Force has released the 5th Edition of the GPS Standard Positioning System (SPS) Performance Standard (PS), according to U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN) Civil GPS Service Interface Committee (CGSIC).
With final signature by the U.S. Department of Defense, the standard was cleared for public release on April 16. This is the first update to the SPS PS since 2008 and, for the first time, includes pre-Initial Operating Capability (IOC) performance standards for new civil GPS signals L2C and L5, in addition to L1 C/A.
The SPS PS specifies the levels of SPS performance in terms of broadcast signal parameters and GPS constellation design. According to NAVCEN, the U.S. government is committed to meeting and exceeding the minimum levels of service specified in the SPS PS.
Undersecretary of Defense Michael Griffin. (Photo: DOD)
Augmenting GPS with other systems was suggested as the most promising area of improvement in a recently released memo establishing a Defense Science Board task force on positioning, navigation and timing (PNT).
On Dec. 16, the Department of Defense released a memo from Undersecretary Michael Griffin to the chair of the Defense Science Board. In it he outlined terms of reference for a year-long study of defense “position, navigation and timing control.”
Setting the stage for the effort, Griffin, who serves as undersecretary for research and engineering, outlined some challenges of relying too heavily on GPS. “The current system has less susceptibility to jamming and spoofing, but challenges remain — slow fielding of user M-code capability, cyber and kinetic threats. Degradation can occur in canyons, cities, and high signal multipath environments.”
He also seemed to indicate that, while further improvements to GPS were possible, they would likely yield only marginal returns and be very expensive.
“While performance and resilience continue to improve, the system has matured to the point that these changes have resulted in incremental improvement to overall system performance,” Griffin said. “The cost of the system and ongoing upgrades have experienced significant growth, making it hard to increase the density of the satellites to address the more challenging environments.
The memo suggests that, rather than focusing entirely on continual improvements to GPS, adding other systems to a PNT architecture for users will likely be more effective and economical.
One such addition may well be leveraging thousands of planned commercial communications satellites to also provide PNT.
“A future multi-mission constellation that can transmit and receive RF signal[s] across a broad spectrum will allow both the ability [to] provide and deny communication and PNT globally and will provide support to all essential warfighting missions,” Griffin said.
This idea is already being explored by Army Futures Command in partnership with the University of Texas at Austin’s Radionavigation Laboratory.
Yet Griffin cautions that using commercial communications satellites may or may not be a good idea. The memo asks the group to evaluate the benefits and risks of the military depending upon commercial systems.
Reinforcing the theme of focusing on architecture, Griffin’s final question to the study group deals with “the performance and resilience benefits” of adopting other PNT sources such as portable atomic clocks, visual sensors, and terrestrial-based navigation and timing.
This parallels the recently released DoD PNT Strategy, which calls for a wide diversity of PNT sources to create an architecture for greatly increased resilience and mission assurance. It envisions a multi-layered architecture of PNT sources with GPS providing a global layer, wide-area terrestrial systems like DARPA’s STOIC or eLoran for the regional layer, and short-range systems, interials, sensors and clocks providing the local layer.
The task force’s efforts are to conclude no later than February 2021, with a report by August of that same year.
A copy of Undersecretary Griffin’s memorandum is available here.
Europe’s scattered monitoring of GNSS signals found almost 500,000 interference events over three years. About 59,000 were clearly intentional. European standards for resilient receivers have been published and acquisition of an interference detection network is underway.
Russia is improving its terrestrial Loran/Chayka PNT system for military use and has promised to make the upgraded service available to civilians.
China has retained its terrestrial Loran PNT system as an augmentation/backup for its BeiDou GNSS. It is also testing PNT satellites in low earth orbit (LEO) to provide more powerful and reliable signals than available from current GNSS.
In contrast to the actions of other countries, little is being done in the United States to protect civilian GPS/GNSS users.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has been very active protecting its own with GPS M-code signals and receivers. It is exploring use of LEO communications satellites and high-powered, low-frequency ground transmissions, such as Loran, to add to the GPS signals.
Yet DoD claims civilian use of GPS has limited its ability to use it as a military tool. It says it has no intention of sharing any new PNT systems with civilians.
At the same time, the 99% of GPS use in the U.S. that is non-military is arguably more important to the nation’s safety and security. GPS signals are used by every networked technology and every mode of transportation. They are so important that officials at the Department of Homeland Security have called GPS “a single point of failure for critical infrastructure.”
The U.S. military recently updated its PNT strategy, has a designated leader for its PNT efforts, and clearly defines the responsibilities of its various staffs and organizations.
Civil agency responsibilities were last updated in 2004 and are spread across more than a dozen departments, agencies, and staffs.
Most significantly, no one is in charge.
This has meant that over the past 15 years, many of the civil mandates and responsibilities to protect signals and users have gone unfulfilled. As just one example, rather than ramp up to address increases in jamming, the Federal Communications Commission has reduced its enforcement equipment and staff.
Putting someone in charge is key to reversing America’s civil PNT decline and energizing both federal and private stakeholders.
A single, empowered federal leader should be responsible, not for doing everything, but for leading and coordinating federal and other civil efforts. This would be someone to be held accountable, and to hold others accountable — an evangelist for the essentiality of these services, and their advocate at the highest levels of government.
Such a leader should be positioned outside the daily turmoil of the White House and National Security Council. They should be in the civil department with the portfolio that most depends on GPS and other PNT. The one that suffers first when GPS and other PNT are not available — the Department of Transportation (DOT).
DOT is already the federal interface with civil GPS users, and co-chairs the national PNT executive committee with DOD. A few edits to national policy and a few staff reassignments could establish a national PNT leader in DOT and make all the difference.
Regaining U.S. PNT leadership is essential to America’s future security and prosperity. We must take the first step by appointing and empowering a single federal leader to make it happen.
Space Systems Command (SSC) is leading a new tri-agency Combined Program Office (CPO) comprised of representatives from SSC, the Space Development Agency (SDA) and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The CPO was established on Aug. 19 to enhance the United States’ ability to deter, defend and win against competitors’ challenges in space.
