GPS World

Tag: GNSS jammer

  • Testing for Efficient Transportation in War Zones

    Testing for Efficient Transportation in War Zones

    The demand for efficient transportation systems extends beyond traditional development projects, such as subsea transportation tunnels or deployment scenarios where positioning technology delivers centimeter-level accuracy for fleet vehicles. In active conflict zones, positioning signals are more susceptible to jamming and spoofing, which disrupts civilians’ daily activities. 

    In the northern Israeli city of Haifa, after decades of relying on digital navigation, shopkeepers have started stocking paper maps again. The reason is not nostalgia, but survival in an age of electronic warfare.

    The coastal city has become a testing ground for advanced GNSS technologies, where traditional satellite navigation systems regularly fail due to sophisticated spoofing attacks. These attacks not only disrupt military operations but also affect every smartphone, smartwatch and navigation device that relies on standard GPS signals.

    Dror Meiri, business development and strategy advisor at oneNav, said that in Haifa, “You start driving. Everything is fine. You know that the drive is going to last for 37 minutes or so, and then all of a sudden, you lose your location.”

    Researchers from oneNav conducted a comprehensive GPS resilience test in an active conflict zone near Haifa. The company’s mission was to compare how different navigation technologies perform when under electronic attack.

    The Journey North 

    For the test, four devices were mounted side-by-side on a car dashboard: three leading smartphones and one device equipped with experimental L5-direct receiver technology. All four would make the same journey from south of Haifa toward the city center, passing through zones where GPS spoofing is known to occur.

    The drive began in an area free from interference, where all devices accurately displayed their location in northern Israel. But as the car moved north toward Haifa, it entered what researchers describe as a “spoofed zone” — an area where military defense systems actively jam and spoof GPS signals.

    While still physically driving through Haifa’s streets, the three commercial smartphones suddenly began displaying a location more than 100 km away in Beirut, Lebanon. A fitness smartwatch included in the test showed the same false location. Only the L5-direct enabled device maintained accuracy to within 1 m of the actual position.

    The Technical Challenge 

    OneNav explains the vulnerability stems from the aging L1 GPS signal on which most consumer devices rely. First deployed decades ago, L1 signals are relatively easy to spoof with commercially available equipment. According to U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) documentation, spoofing has become so prevalent that it affects devices across vast geographical areas; in some cases, every smartphone and smartwatch tested was spoofed across distances exceeding 120 km.

    In response to the March 6 FCC inquiry on “Promoting the Development of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Technologies and Solutions,” oneNav provided technical insights into spoofing vulnerabilities across different satellite navigation bands. The company explained that “spoofing in the L5 band will be much more difficult because the spoofing transmitter must have 10x wider bandwidth and 10x more precise spoofing correlator peaks to capture the L5 receiver. Spoofing transmitter power needs to be 20x higher in the L5 (GPS) band and 40x higher in the E5 band (Galileo) compared to spoofing L1C/A.”

    This technical assessment highlights why the newer L5 signal represents a significant advancement in navigation security. The enhanced signal architecture, with its wider bandwidth and more sophisticated coding structure, creates substantial barriers for potential attackers. The exponentially higher power requirements — 20 times greater for GPS L5 and 40 times greater for Galileo E5 compared to legacy L1 signals — combined with the demanding technical specifications, make widespread L5 spoofing both technically challenging and prohibitively expensive for most threat actors.

    Beyond the Battlefield 

    While Haifa’s situation is tied to regional security concerns, the implications extend far beyond conflict zones and affect autonomous vehicles, ride-sharing services, and logistics networks that have become essential infrastructure in modern cities. 

    “When I want to wait for a bus or public transportation, for gas or something like that, my phone tells me exactly where the bus is and how long it will take to reach the station,” Meiri said. “But the core system for that is the GPS, which is based on the bus, so the bus cannot send the right information to the server.”

    Local businesses are grappling with the unreliable GPS environment. According to oneNav researchers, companies in the region — including one that uses drones to clean windows on Haifa’s skyscrapers — face significant operational challenges when their navigation systems are deceived into believing they are operating in a different country entirely.

    Meiri, who conducted the oneNav test, notes the challenging conditions affecting transportation in Haifa could emerge in other urban areas as spoofing technology becomes more accessible.

    The ground transportation implications are particularly concerning for emergency services. When 911 calls are placed in areas experiencing GPS spoofing, emergency responders may be directed to locations hundreds of kilometers from the actual emergency. This challenge has prompted regulatory discussions about upgrading emergency location accuracy requirements. Current GPS emergency location systems can achieve accuracy within 50 m in ideal conditions, but dense urban environments and electronic warfare zones significantly degrade this performance.

    As spoofing technology proliferates beyond military applications, transportation systems worldwide may face the same navigational chaos currently seen in Haifa. 

  • Jammers at dachas add to Russia’s ability to silence GPS

    A new investigative report by the Russian independent media group “The Project” into luxury dachas owned by high-ranking government officials revealed that most all include GNSS jammers among their amenities. Attempts by the journalists to photograph the dachas from the air using drones were routinely foiled by jamming.

    Most all nations’ military and security services have equipment that can block GPS and other satellite navigation signals over areas both large and small. Russia, though, has advanced this to a fine art which it regularly demonstrates.

    Russian forces always been proud of their electronic warfare capabilities. They see them as an essential counter to the effectiveness of western high-tech weapons. The news outlet “Sputnik” reported in 2015 Russian military claims that their ability in electronic warfare “makes aircraft carriers useless.”

    GPS is an underlying technology for many western weapons, and for much of the west’s critical networked infrastructure. As a result, jamming and spoofing GPS and other GNSS has long been a priority for Russian forces.

    In 1997 a Russian company offered a handheld four-watt GPS and GLONASS jammer that was effective at ranges of up to 150 to 200 kilometers. They also reported working with the Russian military on directional antennas for this jammer. These antennas would focus the disruption on a particular target while leaving most other users unaffected. The U.S. Army was sufficiently interested that, in 2002, they reportedly spent almost $200,000 to purchase the jammers for testing and evaluations.

    In 2016 Russia announced a program to add GPS jammers to more than 250,000 cell towers as a partial defense against a U.S. cruise missile attack.

    That same year a Moscow Times headline proclaimed, “Kremlin Eats GPS for Breakfast!” GPS users near the Kremlin had been regularly finding their cell phones reporting that they were 20 kilometers away at an international airport. This was playing havoc with Uber and Lyft drivers, as well as delivery services that depended upon satellite navigation. This spoofing, or sending false information to receivers, was reported to be an effort to protect the Kremlin and leaders from attack and surveillance by drones. Most drones are programmed at the factory with the locations of airports and to fly away from them. Convincing receivers near the Kremlin or elsewhere that they are really near an airport helps keep the area drone-free.

    Independent technologists in Moscow also reported that this spoofing employed a classic electronic warfare technique called “herding.” GPS L2 and L5 signals and Russia’s GLONASS satellite navigation signals were jammed. This forced receivers to rely upon the L1 signal which was spoofed.

    That same year this same kind of activity was also detected in the Black Sea. The RNT Foundation reported that over 600 ships had been “transported” to airport locations ashore. A subsequent report in 2019 by the non-profit group C4ADS revealed almost 10,000 instances of ships being spoofed in the Black Sea, the Baltic and in Russia’s west near Vladivostok between 2016 and 2018. It also drew a strong correlation between the movements of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the spoofing events.

    Russian jamming and spoofing has not been limited to its homeland. Vehicles, ships and aircraft in other nations, as well as in international waters and airspace, have been impacted. This despite Russia’s treaty obligations under the International Telecommunications Union radio regulations which provide that “All transmissions with false or misleading identification are prohibited.”

    The C4ADS report documented a massive Russian “smart jammer” operating almost continuously in Syria that had impact far beyond that nation’s borders. Smart jammers, by their definition, transmit messages that seem to be valid GPS signals, but with content that does not allow receivers to calculate a location. The operation in Syria has caused multiple warnings by the U.S. Maritime Administration of GPS disruptions in nearby international waters, and the European air traffic agency issuing warnings for international airspace in the eastern Mediterranean.

    The Baltic and Scandinavia have also seen Russian GPS jamming in recent years. In 2017 the Secretary General of NATO complained about Russian naval jamming that also degraded cell phone service in Latvia, Norway and Sweden.

    Early this year Norway protested Russian jamming in its far north, some of which was timed for NATO exercises. Five significant jamming events in the previous 17 months impacted, aviation, construction and other users.

    Russia regularly demonstrates that GNSS jamming and spoofing can be a useful tool for internal security and an effective method of power projection. Its actions, along with the portability and proliferation of jamming and spoofing equipment, are undoubtedly meant to remind the west that Russia can take away essential GNSS services at any moment with a just the flip of a switch.

    Dana A. Goward is the president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, and is a regular contributor to GPS World.