Tag: Palestine

  • Unmanned systems updates

    Unmanned systems updates

    Have you been to the gas station this week?

    The ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel, along with the unrest in various universities across the United States in support of Gaza Palestinians, and the continued aggression by the Houthi rebels in Yemen against shipping, are impacting several aspects of our lives, including the rising cost of gasoline.

    Since the United States began seeking out Houthi strongholds, it is now being reported that another MQ-9 Reaper drone has been shot down – making an apparent total of five such expensive U.S. UAVs lost over and around Yemen, according to US military reports.

    Screenshot of a Houthi-released video of the downing of the MQ-9 Reaper drone (Photo: UAS Vision)
    Screenshot of a Houthi-released video of the downing of the MQ-9 Reaper drone (Photo: UAS Vision)

    At $30 million each, compared to about $2 million for a surface-to-air missile, the Houthis are apparently ahead on cost. With a 50,000 ft ceiling, the Reaper is capable of avoiding short-range surface-to-air missiles. However, more visual or infra-red (IR) low-level detail may have been sought on this mission. In response, the U.S. military reported the downing of five Houthi UAVs over the Red Sea.

    According to a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, Iran is supplying the Houthis with attack UAVs and longer-range missiles, which are often, if not always, re-assembled, repainted and re-named locally. The DIA said that one of the favorite Kamikaze UAVs used is the Iranian Shahed-136/Houthi Waid-2, which is reported to have a range of almost 1,600 miles. Neither side has yet acknowledged which drones were brought down by the United States.

    Shahed-136 (Photo: bbsferrari / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images)
    Shahed-136 (Photo: bbsferrari / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images)

    However, around the same time, it was reported that perhaps two Houthi missiles hit the MV Andromeda Star oil tanker with reportedly little damage — no casualties were reported on the ship as it continued towards its destination Vadinar, India. Another ship, the MV Maisha, avoided a third missile. The missile landed nearby in the water, but the vessel put some distance between itself and the MV Andromeda, continuing safely.
    The US/UK forces operating in the Red Sea have countered the more than 100 Houthi attacks on shipping with several airborne strikes on Houthi facilities. This renewed Houthi action over the weekend is thought to have been possible because they were restocked with weapons following the US/UK airstrikes, which slowed their attacks on shipping.

    Hence the renewed threat to oil tanker traffic in the Red Sea has raised the already high threat level, and increased oil and gas prices at the pump are one of the consequences.


    Meanwhile, Pakistan has bought 10 additional Chinese Caihong-4, which reportedly look and perform very similarly to the MQ-9 Reaper.

    (Photo: OE Data Integration Network (ODIN))
    Caihong-4 looks very similar to the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper
    (Photo: OE Data Integration Network (ODIN))

    The CH-4 can be used for both attack and reconnaissance. It features a flight endurance of 30 to 40 hours, a range of 2,200 to 3,100 miles and can carry up to six weapons.

    This brings Pakistan’s complement to 20 CH-4 UAVs. The new purchase may be to offset India’s purchase of 31 General Atomics MQ-9s, which is included in a huge, recently approved $3.99 billion weapons purchase from the United States. The two countries continue to feud over the contested Kashmir region.


    AeroVironment (AV) has developed an add-on for fielded Puma class hand-launched reconnaissance UAVs, which brings autonomy and machine-learning to a worldwide, mostly military fleet of thousands of air vehicles. Referred to as the Autonomy Retrofit Kit (ARK), with AVACORE software, the new update allows operators to command and control one or more vehicles autonomously. This provides computer vision capabilities and enables connection to a distributed, mobile comms network to access data for several separated operating groups.

    ARK retrofit kit for Puma 3AE and LE UAVs (Photo: AV)
    ARK retrofit kit for Puma 3AE and LE UAVs (Photo: AV)

    According to AV, autonomous operating tasking is possible when communications are jammed and the UAV is then still able to execute its mission without manual input. Updated computer vision allows finding, classifying, positioning and daylight or nighttime tracking of objects such as people, vehicles, aircraft and ships. AVACORE includes several software interfaces for different autopilots, sensors and radios to provide integration flexibility.

    A neat way to provide significantly enhanced capability for already fielded airborne vehicles when they have some downtime.


    Finally, we have a short introduction to a new transport UAV being put together by a California company called MightyFly. The company is led by a woman who was highly instrumental in the success of the flight controls for the Zipline UAV, which is still blazing drone delivery trails overseas and now in North America — with more than one million deliveries. With advisory input from a retired FedEx exec, the team at MightyFly seems well on their way with both a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approved Part 135 application and a 20 mile ‘point-to-point’ flight corridor approval for test flights.

    Cento gen 3 cargo drone (Photo: MightyFly)
    Cento gen 3 cargo drone (Photo: MightyFly)

    The MF-100 prototype made its first flight and demonstration delivery in April 2021, while the third-generation Cento flew for the first time in December 2022. Cento has a 6’ x 1’ x 1’ cargo hold that can accommodate 96 small USPS packages, weighing up to 100lb and Cento and later models are expected to have a range of 600 miles at up to 150 mph. While their UAVs are currently all-electric, the plan is to add a gas/rotary engine to charge batteries to achieve this forecast range for the drone.

    MightyFly has significant support from the U.S. Air Force Agility Prime program and the Air Mobility Command, who continue to invest in autonomous cargo developments as an alternative to leasing helicopters to transport parts, medical supplies and more. MightyFly came up with an auto-loading capability, which resolves the issue of a potentially changing weight and balance of a last-mile cargo drone.

  • 3 US troops killed, up to 34 injured in Jordan UAV strike linked to Iran

    3 US troops killed, up to 34 injured in Jordan UAV strike linked to Iran

    Image: NiseriN/ iStock / Getty Images Plus/ Getty Images
    Image: NiseriN/ iStock / Getty Images Plus/ Getty Images

    Three U.S. service members were killed and dozens wounded during a UAV attack on U.S. forces stationed in northeastern Jordan near the Syrian border, President Joe Biden and U.S. officials said on January 28.

    Biden blamed Iran-backed groups for the attack, the first deadly strike against U.S. forces since the Israel-Hamas war erupted in October 2023 and sent shock waves throughout the Middle East.

    “While we are still gathering the facts of this attack, we know it was carried out by radical Iran-backed militant groups operating in Syria and Iraq,” Biden said in a statement.

    At least 34 personnel were being evaluated for possible traumatic brain injury, a U.S. official told Reuters, speaking on the condition of anonymity. Two officials said some wounded U.S. forces were medically evacuated from the base for further treatment.

    The Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella organization of Iran-backed militant groups — claimed attacks on three bases, including one on the Jordan-Syria border.

    The attack is a major escalation in the already tense situation in the Middle East, where war broke out in Gaza after the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas attacked Israel on October 7, killing 1,200 people. Israel’s subsequent assault on Gaza has killed more than 26,000 Palestinians as of January 2024, according to the local health ministry.

    Since then, U.S. forces have come under attack more than 150 times by Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria. U.S. warships have also been fired at by Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen, who are regularly attacking commercial ships passing through Red Sea waters off Yemen’s coast.

    While the United States has maintained an official line that Washington is not at war in the region, it has been retaliating against the Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria and carrying out strikes against Yemen’s Houthi military capabilities.

    Referring to the fallen soldiers, in his statement released by the White House Biden said: “We will carry on their commitment to fight terrorism. And have no doubt — we will hold all those responsible to account at a time and in a manner of our choosing.”

  • Beyond the frontlines: The far-reaching effects of electronic warfare

    Beyond the frontlines: The far-reaching effects of electronic warfare

    Image: guvendemir/ E+/Getty Images
    Image: guvendemir/ E+/Getty Images

    Electronic warfare in the Middle East and Ukraine is affecting air travel far beyond the battlefields, unnerving pilots and revealing unintended consequences of a tactic that experts believe will become more widespread, reported The New York Times 

    Planes are losing satellite signals, flights have been diverted and pilots have received false location reports or inaccurate warnings that they were flying close to terrain, according to European Union safety regulators and an internal airline memo viewed by The New York Times. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has also warned pilots about GPS jamming in the Middle East. 

    Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, radio frequency interference only continues to increase across the Middle East as of autumn 2023. These interferences can involve jamming GNSS signals to obstruct or block them using noise, or mimicking signals to trick GNSS receivers into picking up counterfeit satellite signals, known as spoofing.  

    Aircraft systems have been unable to detect GPS spoofing and ultimately correct for it. According to Opsgroup, an organization that monitors changes and risks in the aviation industry, one Embraer jet bound for Dubai nearly veered into Iranian airspace in September before the pilots figured out the plane was chasing a false signal. 

    “We only realized there was an issue because the autopilot started turning to the left and right, so it was obvious that something was wrong,” crew members reported to Opsgroup. 

    Issues arise 

    With the rise of electronic warfare, the strain on aviation could be a sign of more serious economic and security issues.  

    The U.S. government calls GNSS signals “an invisible utility.” Smartphones, cars, stock exchanges, data centers and countless industries rely on them for time, navigation or both. Similar systems exist around the world, such as Galileo in Europe, Glonass in Russia, QZSS in Japan, NavIC in India and BeiDou in China. One study from Britain said a five-day disruption of satellite signals could cost the country $6.3 billion. 

    Minor interference with GPS signals is fairly common. GPS jamming devices, while illegal to use, are inexpensive and easy to obtain from vendors on the internet. Governments, too, have been more willing to overtly interfere with signals as a tactic in electronic warfare. 

    It is not always possible to distinguish jamming from spoofing, or to determine who is behind the interference. Israel said in mid-October it had restricted GPS in the region and had warned pilots not to rely on satellite navigation systems for landing.  

    Russian interference is well-documented. A 2019 report by the Washington-based analytical nonprofit group C4ADS showed extensive spoofing from a Russian-controlled air base in Syria. Reports also indicated that, when Russian President, Vladimir Putin, traveled to remote locations or Russian-occupied Crimea, he was flanked by mobile GPS-spoofing technology. 

    Russia has disrupted GPS signals to misdirect Ukrainian UAVs and throw precision-guided shells off their targets. Ukraine also jams Russian receivers but lacks the same level of sophistication 

    Jamming is common in conflict zones. Spoofing, until recently, was considered rare.   

    The interference has been felt up to 190 miles away from battlefields and “appears to go well beyond simple military mission effectiveness,” according to Eurocontrol, Europe’s primary air-traffic-control manager. The worst-affected regions include the aerial space above the Black Sea area from Turkey to Azerbaijan; the Mediterranean Sea extending from Cyprus to Libya; the Baltic Sea near Poland and Latvia; and the Arctic near Finland and Norway. 

    Airbus said it recorded nearly 50,000 interference events on its aircraft last year, more than four times as many as the year before. This came on top of an over twentyfold jump in radio-interference events from 2017 to 2018, as recorded by a voluntary incident reporting system run by Eurocontrol. Eurocontrol said the increased jamming since 2018 was most likely meant to interfere with battlefield UAVs. 

    In the Middle East, there have been reports of false signals telling pilots their aircraft were directly above the airport in Tel Aviv despite being far away. Opsgroup said it had received around 50 similar reports. In some cases, onboard equipment showed that planes were approaching airports in Baghdad, Cairo or Beirut, Lebanon, when they were not. 

    Looking ahead 

    Spoofing is hard to distinguish because the signal appears legitimate. Only Europe’s Galileo incorporates an authentication system that can verify when a signal is from its satellites. Galileo, which currently is the most accurate and precise navigation satellite system, plans to introduce an even stronger level of authentication, according to the European Commission. 

    But even Galileo’s authentication cannot protect against one of the most dreaded types of spoofing, known as “meaconing.” In a meaconing attack, a spoofer would record satellite signals, and then rebroadcast them with an amplification or a delay. Experts have not publicly confirmed any meaconing attacks in the Middle East. 

    Opsgroup said the latest events should prompt manufacturers to re-examine the integration of satellite signals in aircraft electronics, known as avionics, without a safeguard that can identify false signals.

    In this environment of intentional GPS jamming and spoofing, Israel has produced a leading anti-jam technology company, InfiniDome, located in Caesarea. According to co-founder Omer Sharar, the company has been working to defend GPS signals for more than seven years and has also seen the rise of devices to jam the GPS L1 frequency that anyone can buy online for $100.   

    Gpsdome-1 (left) protects GPS L1. GPSdome-2 (right) protects GPS L1/L2 or GPS L1/GLONASS L1.
    Gpsdome-1 (left) protects GPS L1. GPSdome-2 (right) protects GPS L1/L2 or GPS L1/GLONASS L1. (Image: InfiniDome)

    Most readily available jammer electronics only output interference disrupting GPS L1, which is commonly installed for vehicle tracking and UAV guidance. InfiniDome says it has successfully protected trucking, UAV operations and others in Israel and around the world with its Infinidome GPSdome-1 and GPSdome-2 anti-jam products. 

    It is clear the conflict’s repercussions extend well beyond the battlefield, highlighting the critical need for security assessments or alternative PNT systems to protect civilians. While there is going to be a significant impact on commercial airline travel to and from Israel while hostilities continue, there is hope for a possible long-term solution for the intense jamming that has plagued the region for years.  

  • GPS jamming in Israel

    GPS jamming in Israel

    Just as I was beginning to write this article, war broke out between Israel and terrorist forces in Gaza. It would seem that the rockets used by Gaza were aimed rather than carrying on-board guidance, while Israeli airforce bomb/rocket attacks have been carried out with some degree of precision. Nevertheless, jamming in Israel may still be relevant to the ongoing conflict and any on-going commercial aircraft activity. However, it seems from the diagram of jamming below, that the Gaza strip is virtually interference free.

    One of the things you can be sure of in the Ukraine-Russia war is that one side or the other is jamming the other’s communications and sat-nav guidance systems. An apparent consequence is that there is likely some “spill-over” to adjacent areas. For Israel, however, it looks like it’s more directed jamming rather than incidental.

    Israel GPS jamming. (Image: GPS Jam.org)
    Israel GPS jamming. (Image: GPS Jam.org)

    In this environment of intentional GPS jamming, it’s not surprising that Israel has produced a leading anti-jam technology company, called InfiniDome, in Caesarea (between Haifa and Tel-Aviv). According to co-founder Omer Sharar, the company has been working to defend GPS signals for more than seven years and has also seen the rise of devices to jam the GPS L1 frequency that anyone can buy online for $100.  

     Just as Ukraine is throwing explosive cardboard UAVs with little cost at Russian occupying forces, a few carefully placed low-cost jammers could inflict serious damage on a country’s navigation capabilities. 

     However, a 2019 presentation by Todd Humphreys identified the source of interference and spoofing at that time, a Russian high-power jammer located at a Russian base in Syria. 

    Humphreys used instrumentation on the International Space Station (ISS) to gather data on the directed interference but concluded that the jamming in Israel could be a consequence of Russia’s efforts to protect its troops in Syria from UAV attacks. The Russian Khmeimim Air Base is on the Mediterranean coast and attacks are thought to come from rebels within Syria.

    With the current GPS jamming out of Syria, most commercial aircraft traffic flying into Ben Gurion International Airport is significantly affected as flights cross from over the coast from the Mediterranean. Longer flight tracks deeper southeast into Israel are necessary, probably relying on VOR and DME ground station waypoints before turning back northwest to capture the instrument landing system (ILS) into the airport. This costs time and fuel and causes aircraft to overfly settlements where noise can be a real problem.

    Most readily available jammer electronics only output interference disrupting GPS L1, which is most commonly installed for vehicle tracking and UAV guidance. InfiniDome has successfully protected trucking, UAV operations and others in Israel and around the world with its Infinidome GPSdome-1 and GPSdome-2 anti-jam products.

    Gpsdome-1 (left) protects GPS L1. GPSdome-2 (right) protects GPS L1/L2 or GPS L1/GLONASS L1.
    Gpsdome-1 (left) protects GPS L1. GPSdome-2 (right) protects GPS L1/L2 or GPS L1/GLONASS L1.

    Two antennas 10 cm to 25 cm apart enable GPSDome-1 algorithms to detect and null out a GPS L1 jammer. GPSDome-2 accommodates up to four antennas and can null up to three directional signals on both GPS L1 and L2 or GPS L1 and GLONASS L1. 

    InfiniDome is currently working with an aerospace company to integrate its anti-jam technology with airborne inertial/GPS and qualify the integrated system for use in civil aviation, with the objective of maintaining max 3% drift when fully jammed. This will introduce certified anti-jam technology into civil aviation use — something that will provide some jamming protection, which airlines desperately need going forward. In addition, other high-end UAV manufacturers are potential customers for this new system. 

    While the ongoing conflict and the devastating loss of life is forefront as each day of the war passes, these anti-jam solutions may ultimately help solve signal degradation problems. While there is going to be a significant impact on commercial airline travel to and from Israel while hostilities continue, we can maybe see the way to a possible long-term solution for the intense jamming from which the region has suffered for many years. 

  • GPS jamming increases amid Israel Hamas conflict

    GPS jamming increases amid Israel Hamas conflict

    Image: GPSJam.org
    Image: GPSJam.org

    Israel has declared war on the Palestinian militant group  Hamas after it carried out an unprecedented attack by air, sea and land on October 7, 2023.

    The large-scale surprise attack has left more than 1,200 dead in Israel, said Israel Defense Forces spokesperson Lt. Col. Jonathan Conricus in an update on October 11. It has since prompted retaliatory Israeli airstrikes on Gaza that have killed more than 1,055 people.

    During the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East is witnessing a significant shift in the patterns of GPS interference, with data showing an increase in disruptions compared to just a week prior, according to Defence and Security Middle East.

    Reports have surfaced indicating Hamas has actively jammed Israeli communication systems during the initial stages of the conflict. This strategic move highlights the increase of jamming GPS and communication networks in modern warfare scenarios, where precision and coordination are imperative.

    Positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services play a role in a variety of military systems and civil technologies. These services not only guide precision warfare, but also facilitate efficient transportation, communication and various civilian applications.

    The Middle East has a history of being a focal point for jamming and spoofing activities, impacting not only security but also regional stability and even commercial flights.

    For example, there have been recent reports of recurring interference allegedly caused by Russian systems in Syria, which frequently disrupts air traffic at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion airport. Regulatory bodies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and Israel’s aviation authority, advised airlines to exercise caution when operating in the airspace of the region. Multiple airlines have now canceled or suspended flights.

    With airlines reducing services and regulatory bodies advising caution, the conflict’s repercussions extend well beyond the battlefield, highlighting the critical need for security assessments or alternative PNT systems to protect civilians.  

  • GNSS data show Lebanon blast affected ionosphere

    GNSS data show Lebanon blast affected ionosphere

    A 2020 explosion in Lebanon’s port city of Beirut led to a southward-bound, high-velocity atmospheric wave that rivaled ones generated by volcanic eruptions.

    The epicenter in Beirut, before and after the explosion.(Image: Bhaskar Kundu, et al. Scientific Reports. Feb. 2, 2021).
    The epicenter in Beirut, before and after the explosion.(Image: Bhaskar Kundu, et al. Scientific Reports. Feb. 2, 2021).

    Just after 6 p.m. local time (15:00 UTC) on Aug. 4, 2020, more than 2,750 tons worth of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate exploded in Lebanon’s port city of Beirut, killing around 200 people, making more than 300,000 temporarily homeless, and leaving a 140-meter-diameter crater in its wake. The blast is considered one of the most powerful non-nuclear, man-made explosions in human history.

    Now, calculations by Hokkaido University scientists in Japan have found that the atmospheric wave from the blast led to electron disturbances high in Earth’s upper atmosphere. They published their findings in the journal Scientific Reports.

    The team of scientists, which included colleagues from the National Institute of Technology Rourkela in India, calculated changes in total electron content in Earth’s ionosphere: the part of the atmosphere from around 50 to 965 kilometres in altitude. Natural events like extreme ultraviolet radiation and geomagnetic storms, and man-made activities like nuclear tests, can cause disturbances to the ionosphere’s electron content.

    “We found that the blast generated a wave that travelled in the ionosphere in a southwards direction at a velocity of around 0.8 kilometres per second,” says Hokkaido University Earth and Planetary scientist Kosuke Heki. This is similar to the speed of sound waves travelling through the ionosphere.

    The team calculated changes in ionospheric electron content by looking at differences in delays experienced by microwave signals transmitted by GPS satellites to their ground stations. Changes in electron content affect these signals as they pass through the ionosphere and must be regularly taken into consideration to accurately measure GPS positions.

    The ionospheric disturbance caused by an explosion can be detected by differential ionospheric delays of microwave signals of two carrier frequencies from global navigation satellite system (GNSS) satellites. (Image: Bhaskar Kundu, et al. Scientific Reports. Feb. 2, 2021).
    The ionospheric disturbance caused by an explosion can be detected by differential ionospheric delays of microwave signals of two carrier frequencies from global navigation satellite system (GNSS) satellites. (Image: Bhaskar Kundu, et al. Scientific Reports. Feb. 2, 2021).

    The scientists also compared the magnitude of the ionospheric wave generated by the Beirut blast to similar waves following natural and anthropogenic events. They found that the wave generated by the Beirut blast was slightly larger than a wave generated by the 2004 eruption of Asama Volcano in central Japan, and comparable to ones that followed other recent eruptions on Japanese islands.

    The energy of the ionospheric wave generated by the Beirut blast was significantly larger than a more energetic explosion in a Wyoming coal mine in the USA in 1996. The Beirut blast was equivalent to an explosion of 1.1 kilotons of TNT, while the Wyoming explosion was equivalent to 1.5 kilotons of TNT. The total electron content disturbance of the Wyoming explosion was only 1/10 of that caused by the Beirut blast. The scientists believe this was partially due to the Wyoming mine being located in a somewhat protected pit.

    Original Article

    Bhaskar Kundu et al. Atmospheric wave energy of the 2020 August 4 explosion in Beirut, Lebanon, from ionospheric disturbances. Scientific Reports. February 2, 2021. DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-82355-5