The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) granted in part the European Commission’s request for a waiver of the commission’s rules so that non-federal devices in the United States may access specific Galileo signals. While private users were free to use the European GNSS, with this ruling entities such as telecommunications companies can now also use Galileo.
With today’s action, consumers and industry in the United States will now be permitted to access the E1 and E5 Galileo signals to augment GPS.
Since the debut of the first consumer handheld GPS device in 1989, consumers and industry in the United States have relied on the U.S. GPS to support satellite-based positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services that are integral to everyday applications ranging from driving directions to precision farming.
The order, approved Nov. 15, finds that Galileo is uniquely situated as a foreign GNSS system with respect to the U.S. GPS, since the two systems are interoperable and radiofrequency compatible pursuant to the 2004 European Union/United States Galileo-GPS Agreement.
Specifically, the order permits access to two of the Galileo system’s satellite signals — the E1 signal that is transmitted in the 1559-1591 MHz portion of the 1559-1610 MHz Radionavigation-Satellite Service (RNSS) frequency band, and the E5 signal that is transmitted in the 1164-1219 MHz portion of the 1164-1215 MHz and 1215-1240 MHz RNSS bands. These are the same RNSS bands in which the U.S. GPS satellite signals operate.
The order does not grant access to the Galileo E6 signal, which is transmitted over the 1260-1300 MHz frequency band, since this band is not allocated for RNSS in the United States or used by the U.S. GPS to provide PNT services.
The commission noted that granting access to the Galileo E6 signal could constrain U.S. spectrum management in the future in spectrum above 1300 MHz, where potential allocation changes are under consideration.
Polaris Wireless, a provider of high-accuracy, software-based wireless location solutions, has signed a multi-year, multi-phase contract for delivery of a wireless location solution that complies with the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) most recent E911 wireless location accuracy mandate with The Alaska Wireless Network, a company wholly owned by GCI Communication Corp (GCI).
The first phase of the contract extension includes the Polaris Wireless Evolved Serving Mobile Location Center (E-SMLC) with hybrid location software for LTE networks that complies with FCC-mandated indoor location requirements. Subsequent phases include delivery of additional location technologies and hybrid algorithms as cellular networks and mobile devices continue to evolve and become more capable.
Polaris Wireless describes its hybrid location solution as inherently future proof to take advantage of improvements in cellular networks and mobile devices.
“We are excited to continue working with GCI in providing our software-based location solutions,” said Amir Sattar, vice president of global operations for Polaris Wireless. “Polaris takes great pride in GCI trusting us to provide GCI E9-1-1 callers with the highest level of location accuracy when and where they need it most.”
“We have enjoyed a long-term relationship with Polaris Wireless delivering wireless E9-1-1 location solutions for many years,” said Gene Strid, chief technology officer of GCI. “As the carriers must now locate E9-1-1 callers in challenging indoor environments, we are happy to leverage Polaris Wireless’s technological innovation and commitment in delivering high-accuracy, software-based location solutions.”
“Polaris Wireless E-SMLC product leverages all available and emerging technology to deliver the best location position accuracy we can for our subscribers’ emergency calls,” said John Myhre, vice president of wireless technology at GCI.
Satellite operator Iridium asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in April 2017 to modify its license to add a new class of ground stations called Certus for expanded terrestrial, maritime and aeronautical operations.
Iridium’s 66-satellite constellation provides, in addition to mobile communications signals, the Satelles time and location service: microsecond timing accuracy and 20- to 50-meter unaided position accuracy worldwide (see the “Innovation” column, July 2017 GPS World).
GPSIA. The GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) commented in September, “GPSIA seeks to ensure that radio navigation satellite service (RNSS) receivers operating in the 1559–1610 MHz band are adequately protected from out-of-band emissions (OOBE) generated from the new Certus mobile Earth station (MES) terminals that will operate on the second-generation Iridium satellite system.
“GPSIA and Iridium are actively engaged in constructive discussions regarding the adequacy of that protection, but no final resolution has yet been reached. [….]
“In the unlikely event that GPSIA is unable to reach an agreement with Iridium, it asks the commission to impose limitations on the operation of Certus terminal devices to protect GPS/RNSS operations in the 1559–1610 MHz band at a level equivalent to what terrestrial terminals in the same and other frequency ranges provide at –95 dBW/MHz.”
Iridium Certus infographic.
Hexagon. Hexagon, the parent company of GPS manufacturer NovAtel, commented on Jan. 8, “Certain statements in the modification application regarding output power and amount of terminals to be deployed cause great concern regarding the unimpeded operation of radio navigation satellite service (RNSS) receivers. The application does not include enough information to simulate the impact properly.
“Hexagon politely requests that the FCC will exercise the same due diligence [as] during previous modification applications close to the RNSS bands (for example docket 11-109) and establish a technical working group or a similar testing process that ensures unimpeded coexistence of the modified Iridium terminals with the established RNSS systems.”
Documents related to the case can be found here, on the FCC International Bureau website.
Ligado Networks will appear and present at the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board’s (PNTAB) meeting on Nov. 15 in Southern California.
Ligado and its predecessors have sought to install high-powered ground transmitters that have been shown to harm and overwhelm GPS signals and receivers in their general vicinity. The controversy has simmered for at least eight years without resolution.
That final resolution will ultimately be taken by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), although congressional participation is also conceivable, since national infrastructure security is involved.
Meeting Locale. The PNTAB meeting will take place Wednesday, November 15, 2017, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; and Thursday, Nov. 16, 9 a.m. to 1 p.m., at the Crowne Plaza Redondo Beach & Marina Hotel, 300 North Harbor Drive, Redondo Beach, California, approximately a half hour’s drive south of Los Angeles International Airport. The meeting will be open to the public up to the seating capacity of the room. Visitors will be requested to sign a visitor’s register.
From June 28, 2017, PNTAB presentation by Brad Parkinson.
The central issue in this long-running fight is the as-yet unknown — though uniformly predicted by the various rounds of testing over the last eight years — effects of Ligado signals on a huge installed industrial and governmental base of GPS receivers, some of which are essential to the nation’s critical infrastructure.
Ligado Networks, the current-day incarnation of once-bankrupt LightSquared, seeks FCC permission to apply the satellite-based frequency licenses it owns to be broadcast from a ground-based network. This would put a powerful nearby signal immediately adjacent to the much weaker, more distantly emanating GPS signals, and by the way, those from other GNSS as well. Tests in 2011 and further testing in 2016 demonstrated these powerful signals interfering with GPS receivers.
Brad Parkinson
The Ligado appearance comes in response to an open letter, posted on Oct. 10 by PNTAB First Vice-Chair Brad Parkinson, inviting Ligado CEO Doug Smith to speak to the Advisory Board. That invitation itself emerged after a season of what have been termed “attack” statements issued in various forums by Ligado, which were in turn stimulated by two early-summer letters:
1. A June 27 letter from the American Geophysical Union, Aerospace Industries Association, American Meteorological Society, Aircraft Owners and Pilot s Association, Airlines for America, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, International Air Transport Association, Iridium Communications, Thales USA and other organizations (totaling 22) to the FCC opposing Ligado’s request.
“The undersigned organizations . . . write to reiterate that the threat of harmful interference from Ligado’s proposed ancillary terrestrial component (“ATC”) service remain real and persistent. Contra ry to the assertions in Ligado’s FCC advocacy and recent media blitz, its proposed terrestrial operations continue to pose a significant interference risk to numerous parties . . . . The risks to these critical services are very real and, consistent with the public interest, cannot be brushed aside.
That letter further notes that “Ligado seeks the ability to sell its spectrum to the highest bidder, underscoring the uncertainty of any prospective value of the services it has on previous occasions suggested it may provide. There is a clear effort by Ligado to downplay the significance of the technical concerns it continues to receive from numerous directions.”
2. A July 5 letter from the PNT Advisory Board to Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work and Deputy Secretary of Transportation Jeffrey A. Rosen, the co-chairs of the National Executive Committee for Space‐based Positioning, strongly opposing the Ligado proposal.
From June 28, 2017, PNTAB presentation by Brad Parkinson.
“The revised [Ligado] proposal to the FCC is fundamentally unchanged from a previous proposal reviewed in 2011. Extensive government testing in 2011 and in 2016, clearly shows that both proposals cause definitive harmful interference to many classes of GPS receivers.”
“All GPS stakeholders should be wary of any incremental approaches to deploying mobile broadband services in the mobile satellite systems (MSS) band. For example, initial services could operate at reduced power levels on a temporary basis to protect only a subset of GPS users, before moving to full — power levels that will cause widespread interference to many other classes of GPS users. Regulatory decisions must be based on the ultimate end-state of any systems proposed for operation in the bands adjacent to GPS, and must protect all classes of GPS users. Unfortunately, the latest industry proposal does not acknowledge the legitimacy of, and the need to protect, dozens of precise applications of great national importance.”
From June 28, 2017, PNTAB presentation by Brad Parkinson.
Round Two. The struggle has been a prolonged one, with many twists and turns, however coalescing into two main periods of activity:
2011-12, when the first round of tests showed then-LightSquared’s proposed network would overload the vast majority of GPS receivers. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) tabled the proposal, and the company, holding spectrum licenses whose value could range far into the billions of dollars, filed for bankruptcy.
2016–18. LightSquared emerged from Chapter 11 in 2015 as Ligado Networks, positing a modified network plan, but one whose organizing concept remains unchanged, causing deep and continued alarm over GPS interference. 2017 tests, conducted by a firm and a government organization hired by Ligado, essentially reconfirmed the 2011 results. The tests found that the proposed ground towers would significantly interfere with GPS receivers as far away as 4 to 5 kilometers, “killing them dead” in the words of one expert who reviewed the test data.
Parkinson’s October 10 letter invites Ligado CEO Doug Scott “to provide the committee with clear up-to-date design information. . . . How might the system as now envisioned be deployed? How many ground terminals are needed, for example, and where would they be?”
Previous LightSquared and Ligado presentations have been long on promise but short on details. In fact, sound technical underpinning has not been communicated.
From June 28, 2017, PNTAB presentation by Brad Parkinson.
Parkinson writes “we would therefore encourage you to specifically describe your implementation plan , with a corresponding test plan address ing the issues we have openly raised . We request you specifically focus on those regarding the potential for interfering with any GPS /GNSS services that operate in the protected Space – to – Earth L band (1559 – 1610 MHz) . Included should be all modes of operation and the use of all current and future GNSS sign als. Without these specific technical details and corresponding evaluations, we can only conjecture as to what you are really proposing .”
Later, he affirms “our focus is to provide advice based on deep engineering and related expertise . As you know, interference to GPS/GNSS can adversely affect numerous safety – of – life systems , other vital national assets, and applications comprising over $60 billion of annual U.S. productivity benefits .”
Parkinson and the PNTAB have had better luck securing a Ligado appearance than did GPS World magazine. In August of this year, Ligado’s senior vice president and chief engineer for radio access technologies thrice declined an invitation to give a brief Expert Opinion for the September issue on the question: How can the safety, security, and full utility of GNSS applications be ensured while evolving best, most efficient use of limited, very valuable electromagnetic spectrum?
Just a Refresher. The PNTAB meeting will be held Wednesday, November 15, 2017, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; and Thursday, November 16, 2017, 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., at the Crowne Plaza Redondo Beach & Marina Hotel, 300 North Harbor Drive, Redondo Beach, CA, approximately a half hour’s drive south of Los Angeles International Airport. The meeting will be open to the public up to the seating capacity of the room. Visitors will be requested to sign a visitor’s register.
Ligado is by no means the only item on the Committee’s docket, but is very likely to be the pièce de résistance. The full agenda for the meeting includes:
Update on U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Policy and Global Positioning System (GPS) modernization.
Prioritize current and planned GPS capabilities and services while assessing future PNT architecture alternatives with a focus on affordability.
Examine methods in which to Protect, Toughen, and Augment (PTA) access to GPS/Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) services in key domains for multiple user sectors.
Assess economic impacts of GPS/GNSS on the United States and in select international regions, with a consideration towards effects of potential PNT service disruptions if radio spectrum interference is introduced.
Review the potential benefits, perceived vulnerabilities, and any proposed regulatory constraints to accessing foreign Radio Navigation Satellite Service (RNSS) signals in the United States and subsequent impacts on multi-GNSS receiver markets.
Explore opportunities for enhancing the interoperability of GPS with other emerging international GNSS.
Examine emerging trends and requirements for PNT services in U.S. and international fora through PNT Board technical assessments, including back-up services for terrestrial, maritime, aviation, and space users.
Sessions on indoor navigation and a keynote from Google at February’s International Navigation Conference (INC15), organised by the Royal Institute of Navigation, addressed the revised E911 positioning requirements in the United States, and flowed over into speculation about E112 emergency calling parameters in Europe’s near future.
According to the 2014 U.S. Federal Communications Commission report, 75 percent of 911 calls now come from mobile phones, more than half of those originate indoors, and around 1 percent of emergency calls contain no location information from the caller (due to distress, confusion, language issues, illness, and so on). The report estimates 10,000 deaths per year in the United States might have been avoided if a landline had been used instead, since location information for landlines can be provided confidently.
Discussion in the breaks of INC highlighted a misunderstanding amongst some parties that E911 mandates the use of GPS for position location determination. In fact,E911 does not mandate any specific technology; it specifies performance criteria in terms of accuracy that must be met. The recently revised performance criteria include indoor performance, and some of the technology discussed at the INC is able to meet these requirements without using GNSS at all.
This could be troublesome for Europe, which is looking at the imposition of Galileo as part of an A-GNSS technology push for the E112 application. The real problems, discussed during INC and in European consultation processes with safety of life services such as E112, are:
the accuracy of the position derived by the device and/or network, and
the timeliness of the delivery of that position to the Public Service Answering Point (PSAP).
The E911 directives address these points directly, and the infrastructure in the cellular networks is in place. Does simply implementing a Galileo capability into a European mobile device solve these problems?
In many outdoor cases, implementing Galileo can bring benefits, including signal diversity. And of course the E112 proposal is greater than just “adding Galileo.” It does address the second problem of timeliness of delivery and data transfer, but there are significant infrastructure upgrades required across Europe for the provision of this location data to the PSAPs.
What the E112 processes do not currently do is specify performance criteria for the position location accuracy. This means that the position estimate provided under E112 is likely to be a cell-ID fix, with an accuracy ranging from hundreds of meters to dozens of kilometers.
Galileo on Mobiles. Further discussion during the conference delved into the realms of the specifics of implementing A-GNSS, including Galileo, onto a mobile device. Conversations centered around if any future E911 or E112 positioning capability would be aligned around a single-chip solution as generally currently deployed on a device, or if some of the functions will be moved up the stack into the operating system (OS) of the device, into software.
Most opinions were against this latter concept, and a panel at the ION GNSS+ last year in Florida concluded the same thing. However, questions were asked about some ideas relating to identifying the emergency number at the time of dialing and then starting the position location determination functions in readiness for the need to provide the device location. This addresses the first bullet point earlier, the accuracy of the position derived by the device and/or network. If this is carried out in the OS or software layers, vulnerability of the system will be increased overall as the OS of a mobile device is a target for the cyber criminal community.
A robust software-based solution is, however, being rolled out in the United Kingdom in the form of eSMS, bringing mobile operators, government and handset vendors together to provide location data via SMS to the PSAP. The advantage of this approach is that no new standards or major infrastructure changes are required, and the time to implement is small.
Further discussions established that future chipsets are likely to use whatever GNSS signals are available, regardless of whether they are GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, Beidou and so on. This, coupled with new signal processing techniques (single-frequency observable for example), increasing sensor clustering on devices, and user demand for services, may make the use of a specific GNSS system above others somewhat redundant. Certainly picking up on a point made by Chandu Thota from Google, GNSS is “not relevant” for their indoor positioning solutions, and technologies they are working on, in both hardware and mapping improvements, are looking at meeting indoor accuracy requirements down to a target requirement of 1 meter, without GNSS.
Taking these points into account, questions were asked from the floor of the conference about the legal position of the EC mandating Galileo as a positioning method as well as the willingness of the global mobile chipset and device industry to be told what to do. Perhaps specifying strong performance criteria, as in the United States, is the way forward to “reboot” the European E112 system. No one disputes that a properly functioning E112 is a life saver and a good thing to do; however, the points discussed here detail some of the concerns expressed during and after hours at INC15.
In February 2015, the Royal Institute of Navigation hosted the International Navigation Conference in Manchester, UK. Keynotes at this well-attended conference included Harold Martin, director of the GPS Coordination Office; Gian Gherardo Calini, the head of market development at the European GNSS Agency; Todd Humphreys from the University of Texas; Chandu Thota from Google; and others. The conference covered multiple technology tracks including indoor navigation, autonomy, quantum technology and the resilience of GNSS systems.
Andy Proctor is lead technologist for satellite navigation at InnovateUK, the UK’s innovation agency. He acknowledges Ramsey Faragher, Cambridge University, for help in the preparation of this article.
What if the U.S. government stepped in and confiscated all your bananas? Grown foreignly, they lack proper accreditation to enter this country. That they have done so for years is no excuse. They are illegal. Those who consume said bananas engage in unlawful activity. Those who facilitate such consumption — you, in this case, whom we imagine to be a vendor of shakes, smoothies, and fruit juices — are aiding and abetting, colluding, conspiring, something like that.
Bananas are no more above the law than anyone or anything else. They must fill out the proper forms.
And the same goes for all you other tropical fruits out there! If you spring from foreign soil, and if you pack exotic flavors unfamiliar and most important, unapproved, in the land of apple pie.
Today’s bananas are GLONASS signals, and the other fruits, those from other international GNSS. The PNT user community within the United States who use such multi-GNSS signals, other than GPS, technically do so illegally.
These revelations come via the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Some in the industry-user community have been aware of this technicality, and have been patiently awaiting a blanket waiver that would take care of the matter. The waiver will appear, we have been told, any day now.
We are waiting. Sitting, and waiting. Like good citizens of the republic.
A spokesperson for the the GPS Innovation Alliance (formerly the U.S. GPS Industry Council) stated that it, too, is very patiently waiting. “The process for securing a waiver of FCC regulations requiring authorization to receive international RNSS satellite signals was identified in an FCC Public Notice released in 2011. This process is initiated by National RNSS System providers, which have the satellite information needed to secure a waiver. GPSIA members remain fully committed to producingmulti-GNSS signal user equipment consistent with U.S. policy, and to working with the FCC and NTIA in considering these requests.”
To review the FCC/NTIA briefing: “Radio Regulator Spectrum Management Perspectives & Priorities: Emerging Trends in Spectrum-Efficient Technologies,” see www.gps.gov/governance/advisory/meetings/2014-12/.
The NTIA and FCC perform these functions on our behalf:
Allocate spectrum, while promoting new technologies and services.
Develop service rules: share spectrum while minimizing interference risks.
Assign frequencies, for interference protection among authorized stations.
Enforce rules.
Some of the frequencies used by GLONASS, Galileo, and other foreign PNT systems are not authorized for use in the United States, as they may interfere with other signals. Since they are not authorized or certified, they have no guarantee of protection in the United States. The NTIA and FCC protect users from unauthorized foreign PNT signals.
The European Union and Galileo have formally asked for a waiver and are completing the necessary paperwork.
Let’s hope that common sense prevails soon over international gamesmanship, a waiver is granted, and this all goes away. Such a waiver reportedly sits on the desk of the appropriate person. Sits and has sat.
To our mantra of location, location, location, we must add a corollary.
First, Lockheed Martin began investigating options for its GPS III payload supply line last year. Then in June of this year, the U.S. Air Force opened a “sources sought” initiative for a production-ready GPS space vehicle, equipped with an alternate payload, for consideration alongside the Lockheed Martin-built GPS III vehicle. Grumman and Boeing have responded to the U.S. Air Force call. Now the U.S. Senate has jumped into the act, with a 2015 defense spending bill that directs the Air Force to allocate at least $20 million for work on a space-based “digital navigation instrument” as a possible alternative to the payload developed for the GPS III satellites.
The Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee stated that it “believes that early Air Force investment, when combined with industry investment, into the development of a digital navigation payload will significantly reduce cost and schedule risk for the future GPS constellation.” What exactly is meant by a “digital navigation payload” — as opposed to the current payload under construction — is unclear. The systems on earlier GPS satellites probably used some analog components. Even modern receivers have an analog front end before the analog-to-digital converter. Perhaps the Senate Appropriations subcommittee wants more digitization in the nav unit.
Disaggregation. Further, the committee “firmly believes that movement away from large satellites, where possible, will result in significant cost savings and reduce the schedule to deliver payloads into orbit.”
This idea calls for dispersing space capabilities away from large platforms and into smaller ones.It would require, at the very least, a new constellation architecture for GPS III, an as-yet unexplored concept.
Status. Lockheed Martin is under contract to deliver the first eight GPS III satellites, but the award for up to 22 further IIIs remains open. Difficulties with the payload for the first batch of satellites mean that although Lockheed has three space vehicles ready, it has no signal payload to put aboard them. Subcontractor Exelis is at work on that.
Lockheed Martin spokesperson Chip Eschenfelder has stated that “signal cross talk issues are resolved. The SV01 navigation payload forecast delivery to Lockheed Martin is fall 2014. Once the first navigation payload is delivered, we are into the production phase.”
General John E. Hyten
General Support. At June’s ION Joint Navigation Conference, General John E. Hyten, currently vice and soon to be commander of USAF Space Command, while evincing unqalified support for the system operators, did not address the GPS III manufacturing and supply issue. He confined his industry-related remarks to warning commercial PNT vendors and government program managers to cease placing commercial GPS receivers in critical government systems that support warfighters, government users, and critical national infrastructure.
He strongly advocated for Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Modules and M-Code to help secure these critical systems against interference, jamming and spoofing, and urged manufacturers to build their devices in strict adherence to the U.S. government’s ICD process.
FCC Seeks Spectrum but Supports GPS
In a June 20 workshop on “GPS Protection and Receiver Performance,” the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reiterated the need to safeguard critical infrastructure and public safety — two key uses of GPS.
Despite fears that the FCC would call for new GPS receiver standards, the meeting took a protective and conciliatory tone, even as the FCC continues to seek more frequencies for mobile broadband, citing the need “get more out of the radio spectrum.”
FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler stated, “Today is not about FCC-mandated receiver standards. Rather it is about the best way to protect GPS operations in the context of evolving technology and adjacent spectrum activities.”
The specter of adjacent spectrum use hovered through the day, fully appearing in LightSquared and administration presentations. Otherwise, scant mention was made of the 2012 notion that GPS receivers should be modified to stop alleged “peeking” into adjacent spectrum.
Panel discussions focused on GPS in critical infrastructure and public safety, with presentations by Qualcomm, Motorola, and AT&T. Speakers from T-Mobile, Spirent, Garmin, NovAtel, and John Deere covered GPS’s role in timing and the power grid, financial markets, telecommunication network, and precision agriculture. Paul Galyean of Deere said that “Certainty on the spectrum environment is needed. It’s difficult to design for the future without it.” If GPS receivers had to filter out cellular activity, this “might impact sensitivity, involve excessive size or cost, and might cause distortion of GPS measurements.”
Chris Hegarty, MITRE Corporation, gave a compelling argument for not overhauling receiver methodology: the extremely long lead times for commercial passenger aircraft. “Until 2022 every new Boeing and Airbus is going to fly off with $250,000 worth of navigation equipment that has three $50,000 GPS receivers and antennas and everything else, and they are going to want to use that for 20 to 25 years. So, you have a timing issue. Even if we all decided today that we wanted to do that, some communities simply aren’t going to be able to get it into place until we’re all dead.”
Power Loss Strikes Galileo Satellite
In-Orbit Validation Vehicle May Be Lost to Further Use
The disappearance of signals from Galileo GSAT0104, the fourth in-orbit (IOV) Galileo satellite, arose from a sudden, unexpected loss of power aboard the space vehicle. The exact cause is unknown, or at least unreported as of press time. Some have speculated that the cause could lie in a failure of components around the solid-state power amplifier, including the output multiplexer, cables, or antenna.
If such proves to be the case, ground operators may be powerless to repair the problem. The satellite would be a total loss.
The power outage flashed on May 27, shutting down the satellite’s E1 signal. The signal “re-established itself almost immediately. But as soon as it was back in service, the two other channels’ power dropped and did not recover. The full satellite then was shut down by ground teams,” reported correspondent Peter de Selding.
Looking for a Fix. European Space Agency (ESA) officials stated on July 3 that they would power-on the satellite again during the week of July 7–11 to continue an investigation into the problem, but there have been no subsequent reports. Investigation has been ongoing since the shutdown but has not identified a cause; officials state they have established that it is not related to the onboard atomic clocks.
The four IOV satellites currently aloft differ in both technology and manufacturer from the next phase of Galileo satellites to be launched. The GSAT0104 satellite now in silent orbit was built by Astrium. The newer, operational satellites are produced by OHB-System, following a different payload design. Two of the newer generation are at the Guyana spaceport awaiting a possible late August lift date.
Reporting History. The possibility of a satellite failure was first floated in the June 30 EAGER newsletter (European GNSS and Earth Observation Report), by contributing editor Tim Reynolds. He wrote:
“Has anyone heard anything from Galileo GSAT0104 recently? According to the European GNSS Service Centre, the fourth IOV satellite is ‘unavailable until further notice.’ The setting of unavailability may be due to in-orbit validation testing, as the website implies may be the case, but no further official statement has appeared, nor active user notifications (NAGUs) at http://www.gsc-europa.eu/system-status/user-notifications.”
Two days later, GPSWorld.com posted a follow-up story: “According to reports, the root cause of the outage is under investigation. Some unofficial sources have gone so far as to speculate that GSAT0104’s useful transmission life may be over.”
Then, on July 3, correspondent Peter de Selding (who also contributes to EAGER) reported in Space News, after questioning sources at ESA, that the trouble aboard the fourth IOV Galileo satellite arose from a sudden, unexpected loss of power, as stated in the first paragraph of this article.
Largest Fine in FCC History — $35M — for Chinese Jammer
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) plans to issue the largest fine in its history against C.T.S. Technology Co., Limited, a Chinese electronics manufacturer and online retailer, for allegedly marketing 285 models of signal jamming devices to U.S. consumers for more than two years.
The FCC applied the maximum fine allowed to each jammer model allegedly marketed by C.T.S., resulting in a planned fine of $34,912,500.
“All companies, whether domestic or foreign, are banned from marketing illegal jammers in the U.S.,” said Travis LeBlanc, acting chief of the Enforcement Bureau. “Signal jammers present a direct danger to public safety, potentially blocking the communications of first responders. Operating a jammer is also illegal, and consumers who do so face significant civil and criminal penalties.”
C.T.S. operates a website that markets consumer electronics to individuals in the United States, where it allegedly misled U.S. consumers by falsely claiming that certain signal jammers were approved by the FCC. In fact, the use of such devices by U.S. consumers is illegal under any circumstance. C.T.S. also sold 10 high-powered signal jammers to undercover FCC personnel.
The FCC also is ordering C.T.S. to cease marketing illegal signal jammers to U.S. consumers and provide information to the FCC about any persons and entities in the United Sates that purchased its devices.
Signal jammers are radio frequency transmitters that intentionally block, jam, or interfere with authorized communications, such as cellphone calls, GPS systems, Wi-Fi networks, and first responder communications. It is a violation of federal law to market, sell, import, or use a signal jammer in the United States and its territories, except in very limited circumstances involving federal law enforcement.
The FCC asks people to report the sale or use of an illegal jammer by contacting the FCC Enforcement Bureau through the FCC online complaint portal, or by calling 1-888-CALL-FCC (or 1-888-225-5322). To voluntarily relinquish a signal jammer, e-mail [email protected]. Additional information, including a Consumer Alert and Enforcement Advisory to retailers, is available at www.fcc.gov/jammers.
The U.S. Federal Communications Commission convened a June 20 workshop on “GPS Protection and Receiver Performance” whose bite turned out to be far less than its bark had led some in the GPS industry to fear. The hastily assembled workshop — three weeks notice was given — appeared at first notice to derive from the call for “GPS receiver performance standards” that was one of the outcomes of the LightSquared controversy of 2012. The FCC chief emphatically noted, however, before anyone else could say anything, that the meeting was “not about FCC-mandated receiver standards.” A nearly audible sigh came from the collected dignitaries.
Perhaps the slotting of “GPS Protection” into first position within the workshop’s title might have given some clue. The meeting did turn out to be a less-than-alarming gathering of stakeholders, and in fact a reiteration of the need to emphasize and safeguard critical infrastructure and public safety — two key uses of GPS.
Two weeks prior to the workshop, Brad Parkinson declared to the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board that “A number of manufacturers are quite panicked over this because of the possibility of some superposition of, in essence, how you design a receiver for GPS. This could vastly affect the whole substance of what we are if carried to the point that someone dictates how you design a receiver. I think that’s kind of dangerous.”
But the meeting, in the end, took a positive, protective, and conciliatory tone, even as the FCC continues beating the drum for more frequencies for mobile broadband, citing the need “get more out of the radio spectrum.”
“Today is about federal and non-federal leaders coming together to discuss successful industry-driven collaborations and GPS receiver performance,” said FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler in his opening remarks. “These are not abstract issues. But let me also be specific about what today is not. It is not about FCC-mandated receiver standards. Rather it is about the best way to protect GPS operations in the context of evolving technology and adjacent spectrum activities.”
The specter of adjacent spectrum use hovered intermittently throughout the day, appearing fully in the presentation by LightSquared and one from the President’s representative. Otherwise, scant mention was made of the oft-expressed 2012 sentiment that GPS receivers needed to be modified in the way they work, to stop their alleged “peeking” into adjacent spectrum.
Peekin’? We don’t need no steenkin’ peekin’!
After further introductory remarks from the FCC’s head of Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, the audience heard a technology market update from the U.S. Consumer Electronics Association (CEA). The report relied almost entirely upon the European GNSS Agency’s (GSA’s) 2013 GNSS Market Report for its global statistics, while displaying some domestic charts of its own. Among the conclusions: GPS/GNSS is an enabling technology for innovation and disruption; and the consumer market, defined as road and location-based services (LBS), represents the biggest opportunity. The CEA presentation is available here.
The morning’s first panel discussion focused on the importance of GPS for critical infrastructure and public safety users, with presentations by Qualcomm, Motorola, and AT&T in addition to various government agencies. Cormac Conroy, vice president at Qualcomm, emphasized the critical role of GPS in emergency calls from mobile phones (E-911) and what he called “enhanced location services”: vehicle and pedestrian navigation, location-based alerts and reminders, and location as context in mobile apps.
Other speakers, including representatives from Ericsson, T-Mobile, Spirent, Garmin, NovAtel, and John Deere, covered GPS’s role in timing and thus controlling the nation’s power grid, the financial markets, the telecommunication network including cable TV, and the national breadbasket, precision agriculture. Paul Galyean of Deere said that “Certainty on the spectrum environment is needed. It’s difficult to design for the future without it.” And further, if GPS receivers had to filter out cellular activity, this “might impact sensitivity, involve excessive size or cost, and might cause distortion of GPS measurements.” The Deere presentation is available here.
Chris Hegarty from the MITRE Corporation gave one of the day’s most compelling arguments for not overhauling GPS receiver methodology: the extremely long lead times for commercial passenger aircraft. “Until 2022 every new Boeing and Airbus is going to fly off with $250,000 worth of navigation equipment that has three $50,000 GPS receivers and antennas and everything else, and they are going to want to use that for 20 to 25 years. So, you have a timing issue. Even if we all decided today that we wanted to do that, some communities simply aren’t going to be able to get it into place until we’re all dead.”
White House Espouses Adjacent Spectrum
Tom Power, deputy chief technology officer for telecommunications, held up the banner for “efficient use of spectrum” and pronounced the Administration opposed to “listening in.” Ironic, given its other proclivities. He advocated against some technologies exerting undue elbow room on “nearby users who want to make a change.”
Many of the nation’s leading public safety and public health organizations submitted comments this week in support of a proposed Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rule to help emergency responders more quickly and accurately find 911 callers using wireless phones from indoor locations. More than 300 individuals and organizations filed during the initial comment period with the overwhelming majority supporting the FCC proposal.
Among those supporting the rule were many of the largest and most respected organizations representing 911 professionals, police officers, fire fighters, EMS workers, public safety professionals, older Americans, heart attack and Alzheimer’s patients, and the deaf and hard of hearing. They were joined by hundreds of individual 911 dispatchers and first responders who submitted personal comments through the FCC’s web site or in survey responses that were filed with the FCC.
“The support for this rule across the public safety and public communities is truly breathtaking,” said Jamie Barnett, director of the Find Me 911 Coalition and former chief of the FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. “These organizations are on the front lines of emergency response, and they know that lives are being lost every day because 911 professionals cannot quickly find indoor callers using wireless phones. The urgency of this rulemaking is unquestionable, and we commend Chairman Wheeler and the other commissioners for their leadership by taking fast action on it.”
According to the FCC’s estimates, at least 10,000 lives a year could be saved by improvements in response time through the FCC’s proposed rule. All of the comments submitted are online.
Find Me 911 is an effort supported by more than 200,000 individuals, as well as national and local organizations. The individuals and organizations represent a broad range of 911 operators and first responders — emergency medical services personnel, fire fighters and police. Find Me 911 seeks to ensure that the FCC moves forward quickly to establish a reasonable, measurable level of location accuracy for emergency calls made indoors, enabling first responders to locate emergency calls from wireless phones from all locations rapidly and efficiently.
Among the organizations filing joint or individual comments in support of the FCC’s proposed rule were:
Law Enforcement
International Association of Chiefs of Police
National Sheriffs’ Association
Fire Fighters
International Association of Fire Fighters
International Association of Fire Chiefs
Emergency Medical Professionals
National Association of State Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Officials
National Association of EMS Physicians
National Association of EMTs
National EMS Management Association
American College of Emergency Physicians
9-1-1 Professionals
National Association of State 911 Administrators
National Emergency Number Association
Association of Public Safety Communications Officials
CALNENA
Texas 9-1-1 Alliance
Texas Commission on State Emergency Communications
[Texas] Municipal Emergency Communication Districts Association
San Francisco Department of Emergency Management
Nebraska Public Safety Commission
Older Americans
AARP
Alliance for Retired Americans
Public Health
Alzheimer’s Association
American Heart Association
Public Safety
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
National Public Safety Telecommunications Council
Deaf and Hard of Hearing
Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing
National Association of the Deaf
Association of Late-Deafened Adults
Cerebral Palsy and Deaf Organization
California Coalition of Agencies Serving the Deaf and Hard of Hearing
Deaf and Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network
Highly precise and free for use by anyone with an inexpensive receiver, GPS and other GNSS are great. Their navigation and timing signals have been incorporated into nearly every aspect of modern life, from synchronizing power grids to financial systems, the Internet, telecommunications, and transportation. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security estimates that these signals are used by all 16 of U.S. critical national infrastructure sectors, and are essential to the functioning of 11.
Jamming Threat Growing. When these faint signals can’t be received, people start to feel the impact immediately. Usually outages have minimal impact because they are localized and short-lived. Often they occur because the user is temporarily in an area without a good view of the sky. More and more often, though, they are due to the presence of one of a growing number of people with jamming devices (many of which also block cell phone frequencies).
Inexpensive, easy to obtain, and illegal, jammers are spreading as people become more concerned about privacy and being tracked by their employer, spouse, the National Security Agency, and others. Although the government tries to collect information on jamming incidents, no widespread detection system has been established, and few verbal reports are received. For the calls that do come in, it is often impossible to determine which are because of user error and which are purposeful interference.
For those cases where jamming is discovered, locating and identifying the perpetrator is difficult and often impossible. As one example, in spite of near-daily disruption of GPS that caused the shutdown of a new landing system at Newark International Airport, it took the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Communications Commission more than two years of concerted effort to identify the single perpetrator.
If a navigation satellite outage became widespread and lasted more than a few hours because of a major solar flare, software problem, hacker or cyber-attack, most authorities agree that the impacts would be catastrophic. While much of the information is classified, we do know that transportation would immediately become much less efficient and more dangerous; even many traffic lights are coordinated using satellite timing. Telecommunications, financial, energy and other systems would soon begin to fail as their back-up timing systems lost synchronization with each other. Power grids would lose synchronizations and outages may occur as transmission points became overloaded.
More than speculation, these problems have been documented in academic papers, proven in government tests in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the early stages of such impacts have been observed in localized and short-term outages in the United States. Most dramatically, they have been demonstrated by North Korea’s intentional jamming of South Korea.
Spoofing. Of equal concern is the problem of spoofing. The world’s preeminent ethical spoofer of satellite navigation receivers, Todd Humphreys of the University of Texas, Austin, has demonstrated how easy it is to take control of unmanned aircraft and ships on autopilot by sending a slightly stronger navigation signal, making the receiver think it is somewhere other than where it is. Iran claims to have done something similar, capturing a U.S. military drone in 2010. Humphreys has also shown (on paper) how time-stamps on automated financial transactions could be altered through spoofing. This could do things like reverse the buy-sell equation at a stock exchange, allowing someone to sell at a higher price before buying at a lower one.
The Government Solution
What is to be done? The challenges have been extensively documented and discussed since at least the 1990s. In 2004, President Bush issued the National Space Policy (NSPD-39) that addressed the problem. Although portions of it are still classified, contained within the publically releasable section was direction for the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to, in coordination with the Department Homeland Security (DHS): “develop, acquire, operate, and maintain backup position, navigation, and timing capabilities that can support critical transportation, homeland security, and other critical civil and commercial infrastructure applications within the United States, in the event of a disruption of … space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services.”
eLoran Recommended. In response, the two departments consulted numerous experts and commissioned a study by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) to determine what system or systems should be procured. The IDA study team, which included Brad Parkinson, widely recognized as the father of GPS, unanimously recommended that an existing and outdated nation-wide navigation system called Loran-C be greatly updated and modernized to eLoran. Such a system would provide a navigation and timing signal comparable with and complementary to GPS. They concluded that:
“eLoran is the only cost-effective backup for national needs; it is completely interoperable with and independent of GPS, with different propagation and failure mechanisms, plus significantly superior robustness to radio frequency interference and jamming. It is a seamless backup, and its use will deter threats to US national and economic security by disrupting (jamming) GPS reception.”
What the IDA did not find, but that has since become evident, is that establishing an eLoran system could be an important part of a network to identify and locate jamming attempts. Since all eLoran transmitters would be synchronized with GPS, and many navigation receivers would have both GPS and eLoran sensors, differences between the two systems could be immediately detected and reported.
The body in charge of coordinating navigation and timing issues for the federal government is the National Space-Based Position Navigation and Timing Executive Committee (NPEC). It is chaired by the Deputy Secretaries of Transportation and Defense. Responding to early briefings on the IDA report (which was not formally published until 2009), the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security in 2007 told the NPEC that they had decided eLoran was the right answer. After further federal deliberations over how to create an eLoran system, 2008 saw:
A press release by DHS saying that the department would implement eLoran, using the old Loran-C infrastructure (February 7, 2008)
The DHS 2009 Budget in Brief (February 2008) propose transferring legacy Loran-C systems and $34.5 million/year from Coast Guard to the National Protection & Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS, stating:
“The FY 2009 budget transfers the budget authority for the LORAN C system from the United Sates Coast Guard to the NPPD. The Department, acting as Executive Agent, will begin development of enhanced eLORAN as a backup for GPS in the homeland.”
The National PNT Executive Committee endorse the above decisions (March 2008).
Failure to Launch
Unfortunately, DHS funding for 2009 came as part of a continuing resolution, and the Congress did not see fit to approve the transfer of funds from Coast Guard to NPPD.
This was because influential members of Congress wanted the nation to have eLoran, but were concerned about the lack of a plan for transition of this important capability from one agency to another. The administration was asked to develop and submit a plan with with the next budget cycle. A year later, though, no plan had been presented, and the President’s request (and enacted legislation) for 2010 contained no request to move and upgrade the system. In fact, it contained provisions for shutting down and defunding the old Loran-C system without providing funds for NPPD or any other agency to establish the new eLoran capability.
No Solution at All. What happened between one budget year and the next to take the nation from “solution-in-hand” to “no solution at all” is not a matter of public record. Internal administration budget deliberations are not generally released to the public. It does appear, though, that a new administration putting together its first real budget quite rightly wanted to shut down an antiquated system, but did not understand the importance of a new one. This, and many other factors, unquestionably played a role.
Movement Backward
Without any funding, DHS has since conducted several studies and experiments, but has done very little of substance to address this critical infrastructure issue. While Department of Defense (DOD) officials talk about the need for resilience, experts throughout government and industry decry the lack of action, and the Department of Transportation still has acquiring “backup position, navigation, and timing capabilities” on its to-do list, none have seen fit to move forward on their own.
Felling Towers. Worse, DHS is actually reducing the nation’s ability to create eLoran and a wide-area interference detection and mitigation system. An ongoing effort to fell towers and dispose of equipment from the legacy Loran-C system will significantly increase the cost and time-to-operation of the new system the nation needs.
The Way Forward
Fortunately, awareness and understanding of the problem within government, and the general public has continued to grow.
The U.S. National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board published a seminal white paper in 2010 on the topic, strongly recommending the establishment of an eLoran system. Todd Humphreys, the UK navigation authority, and others have provided numerous graphic demonstrations of the folly of relying upon just one electronic navigation system, and how things can go horribly wrong. Some of these have been well publicized. Other incidents are known only to a few.
There are also signs that the U.S. intelligence, cyber, and defense communities are becoming more and more concerned. North Korea’s repeated jamming of satellite navigation and timing signals has delivered a particularly powerful lesson. South Korea has reacted by committing to establishment of a robust eLoran system. The UK has established an eLoran system and is expanding it. Russia and China have retained their versions of Loran-C and are using it to augment satellite services. Russia has announced it will upgrade its system to eLoran in cooperation with the UK, and China may not be far behind. Saudi Arabia is upgrading its system to eLoran, and India has plans for an eLoran network in the near future. In December, Iran announced it has established a land-based system with “powerful transmitters” that is “completely different with GPS.”
Allies, adversaries, and economic competitors are augmenting satellite services with strong terrestrial ones. The United States will soon be one of only a small number of major economies that does not have a strong, difficult-to-disrupt terrestrial system protecting its critical infrastructure and providing value-added utilities. DOD’s chief information officer expressed interest in eLoran as part of DOD’s pivot to the Pacific. But providing a system at home is not in Defense’s job description, nor should it be.
Respected leaders at the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security still see this as an important issue that needs to be addressed. The question for them now is not one of technology. The technology decision made in 2008 has since been revalidated by a plethora of academic papers, risk estimates, and white papers. eLoran still appears to be the most effective and least expensive solution available. DOT and DHS must resolve questions of governance and how to fund the system in one of the most difficult federal budgetary climates in decades.
How? The answer could lie in a public-private partnership (P3). In such an arrangement, the government would bring its interests and the infrastructure it owns to the table. An entity in the non-profit sector or industry would provide investment to refurbish the infrastructure, stand up, and operate the system. Such a P3 enterprise could not only pay for itself, but be an on-going source of revenue for both the government and the private entity.
The Business Model: Demand
A well-configured eLoran system can provide navigation accuracy to within 8 to 10 meters and timing accuracy to within 30 nanoseconds. This meets the needs of an estimated 95 percent of users in the United States. While eLoran does not offer the sub-meter precision of a high end, augmented GPS/GNSS system, it has its own advantages. In addition to being very difficult to disrupt, its high-power (typically 400 kW transmitters), low-frequency (100 kHz) signal easily penetrates and is usable underground, inside buildings, and underwater — where satellite and cell phone signals on much higher frequencies cannot reach.
The UK experience with eLoran and private surveys in the United States have shown high commercial demand for a ubiquitous, wireless, precise, and resilient time and navigation service. Power companies want to synchronize grids with a signal that can’t be disrupted by a delivery driver trying to avoid being tracked by his boss. Cell phone companies would be happy to have alternative timing capability in their networks, provided through inexpensive eLoran receivers. Operators of autonomous vehicles want a robust navigation signal and guaranteed communications. And it would be welcomed by the many users who, research shows, rely upon GPS/GNSS time for mission-critical applications, and who have no secondary source on which to fall back in the event of a disruption.
Since eLoran easily penetrates inside buildings, underground, and underwater, it can be used for timing and navigation in many places where no other navigation and timing sources are available. For example, it has been used for underground and underwater navigation. When paired with an accurate satellite signal before going underground or submerging, eLoran could enable a navigation receiver to maintain a comparable level of precision for several hours. Even after that, it would provide the navigator an accurate underground/underwater compass, and a good position.
The eLoran navigation and timing system now in operation in the United Kingdom also generates revenue by transmitting data. While the full potential of this third-party data-channel capability is still being explored, the ability to assure data delivery to, and communicate with such areas is appealing to many commercial and government organizations. Potential first-responders and commercial benefits appear almost limitless.
The Business Model: Costs
The cost for the P3 to standup and operate an eLoran system in the United States would be exceptionally low. Most of the needed infrastructure is already owned by the federal government in the form of the sites for the shuttered Loran-C system. Many of these still have transmission towers and other equipment that could be repurposed. Re-using this infrastructure and equipment would greatly reduce both the time and expense needed, compared to standing up the new system from scratch.
Operating and maintenance costs would also be low. Solid-state equipment, remote monitoring, and other advances in technology make the process of re-establishing a transmission site fairly inexpensive. Today’s eLoran transmitting site consists of a tower, an equipment enclosure for the transmitter, a fence, and a backup generator. With only a modest investment to refurbish existing infrastructure, regular outlays to service capital debt would be minimal, at best.
Some estimates predict that a terrestrial precise navigation and timing system, such as the one established in the United Kingdom and the one up for contract by South Korea, could be established in the continental United States within three years and for approximately $40 million, if the existing infrastructure were repurposed. Operating costs are estimated at approximately $16 million per year.
Business Model: Revenues
Significant national and homeland security concerns, high demand, and low cost (especially compared to any government space program) — clearly, but for a series of unfortunate bureaucratic reasons, eLoran would have been established in the United States, probably as a government-owned and operated system, long ago.
But high demand and low cost are also excellent ingredients for a business enterprise, provided there are sources of revenue. An eLoran P3 could have multiple sources of revenue. Depending upon the type of partnership and business model(s) the government selected, surplus revenue could also be generated to help fund other programs or offset the deficit. Some of the possibilities include:
◾ Guaranteed Delivery Data Transmission. As mentioned earlier, eLoran’s high power and low frequency mean that the signal penetrates where few others will. In addition to navigation and timing information, which are inherent in the basic signal, low-rate data can also be included between the primary pulses. The highest demonstrated data transfer rate to date has been 1300 bps, which is fine for texting and issuing commands. Many believe that, with a modicum of research, that rate can be much higher. As the owner of the high-power transmitter network, the P3 would generate revenue the same as any telecommunications provider: by charging per message or for time on the network.
Applications could include:
• Assured wireless control of remote equipment and vehicles, including indoors, underground and underwater;
• Information delivery to first responders and other crews regardless of location — especially good for pre-programmed emergency and operational commands to evacuate, use another procedure, and so on.
• Immediate device updates and reprogramming. The ability to reach all of the enabled devices on a given network at the speed of light and virtually simultaneously has unlimited potential.
◾ PNT Interference Detection and Monitoring. One of the biggest challenges to countering jamming satellite navigation and timing signals is the lack of a detection network. The eLoran transmitter and receiver network will continuously synchronize with GPS/GNSS signals and instantly detect when differences between the two dissimilar systems occur. Instant reports could be generated to inform federal, state, and local authorities of the anomalies and their locations. Mobile disruptors could even be tracked as they drove down the highway, sailed through the port, or flew across the sky. The P3 could generate revenue by contracting to provide such information to private parties and government agencies concerned about interference incidents.
◾ Licensing Receivers. One of the simplest ways to generate revenue and endow the P3 would be for the government to assess a small fee on every eLoran and satellite navigation receiver sold in the United States. A one dollar fee per unit could generate more than $20 million per year and fund operation of the entire system. Such a fee could be discontinued as other sources of revenue from the system made it unnecessary.
◾ Broad-based User Fees. Since navigation and timing signals are essential to so much U.S. critical infrastructure, a case could be made that the cost to endow the P3 should be spread as broadly as possible across the technologies it supports. For example, a temporary 8-cent fee on every monthly U.S. cell phone and electric bill for just one year could provide enough funding to endow the P3 in perpetuity.
◾ Value-Added Services For High-End Users. More than 90 percent of the users of precise time in the United States require it at the microsecond (1,000 nanoseconds) level of accuracy. eLoran can provide a signal accurate to 30 nanoseconds. To achieve that level of precision, the eLoran network transmits data that compensates for low-frequency signal propagation over non-homogenous terrain. This correction data could be encrypted. Most users would access the signal at the microsecond level of accuracy for free. Revenue could be generated by charging those who desire the higher level of precision a fee for the encrypted portion of the signal.
eLoran is an essential national and homeland security capability. The above list of potential revenue sources is just a sampling of the many ways a P3 could be funded. The point is that financing the enterprise need not come from tax dollars, and should not be an obstacle to its creation.
The Public-Private-Partnership
The U.S. government has had some great successes solving previously intractable problems through public-private-partnerships. Probably the best known of these are the P3s formed for housing on military bases. Establishing a business model that has private partners constructing and managing on-base housing produced more and higher quality housing for our troops.
Such arragnements must be carefully managed, however. Both the Congressional Budge Office and the Office of Management and Budget are understandably concerned that P3s may get a project going, but soon the costs may fall entirely on the government.
Success in any endeavor often depends upon its execution. The type of partnership the government selects and creates will be key. While, at its heart, a P3 is just a contract, the nature and provisions of government contracts are endlessly varied. Issues to address will include how the infrastructure is provided, if it is to be retained in perpetuity by the government or will be conveyed to the private party, what length of contract will allow the private partner to recoup its initial investment, and the business model(s) to be pursued.
The type of governance will also be important. Models vary from establishment of a self-funded government corporation to oversee daily operations, to an agency-supervised, performance-based contract that only requires regular reports on system availability and performance.
Of course, the concerns of CBO and OMB must be met. Fortunately, the federal government is not without experience with P3s. Also, there are many supporting resources available, such as the National Council for Public Private Partnerships.
We Have to Do It
Establishing a public-private partnership will bring together the best of both the government and the private sector. For its part, the government will bring the legacy infrastructure and its interest in safeguarding the public good to the table. The private sector will bring financing, technical know-how and innovation. A better system for America will result than would have been possible if either were to act alone.
It is unquestionably in our urgent national interest to address the problem now, before jamming becomes more widespread, or we have a larger, more damaging event. The need is clear. The technology exists and works great. All that remains is for dedicated leaders within government and the private sector to work together and implement the solution.
Dana A. Goward is the president and executive Director of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, a non-profit organization devoted to educating people about the need for and encouraging resilient navigation and timing ecosystems with services that complement each other and have different failure modes. See www.RNTFnd.org.
The long awaited results from the independent field trial of indoor wireless location technologies are here. TheFCC-chartered Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) tested NextNav, Qualcomm and Polaris. NextNav bested the others.
Speakers from NextNav and Polaris, as well as test adminstrator Technocom, will take part in a GPS World webinar on April 18. Registration is free.
Also, there is a guessing game in town and stakes are high. Who will President Obama nominate to replace FCC Chief Julius Genachowski? Tom Wheeler, popular in the telecom community, has been a front runner, but the tide may be turning against him with some charging that he is too snug with our industry.
Developers will be even more enticed to utilize indoor location now that Apple has signaled its market intents with the purchase of indoor-GPS company WifiSLAM. Safety and security mandates around the world are spurring a wave of telematics offerings by automotive OEMs. For more, read on.
Who Will Be the New FCC Chief? A coalition of public interest groups sent a letter to Obama warning that Wheeler is too close to the industry that he would be regulating. “You can’t have an objective chairman of the FCC that’s got 20 years of his life invested in being the head lobbyist for industry,” Sascha Meinrath of the New America Foundation said in an interview. In his past life, Wheeler was an industry lobbyist and also served as head of both CTIA and the National Cable and Telecommunications Association.
Adding to Wheeler’s woes, 37 Democratic senators have signed a letter supporting FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel. Since she already sits on the commission, Rosenworcel would not need Senate confirmation to ascend to the chairmanship. That could be appealing to Obama, who has faced GOP opposition to many of his second-term nominees.
However, it could also put Obama in a sticky spot, as he would have to jump over the FCC senior Democrat, Commissioner Mignon Clyburn, the daughter of Rep. James Clyburn, a member of the House Democratic leadership who has strong African-American support. Obama has been criticized for low minority leadership appointments in his second term.
Genachowski’s term was a disappointment to people on many sides of the fence, but not the all-out disaster of his predecessor, Kevin Martin. Genachowski will be remember for the introduction of the National Broadband Plan, as well as plans for a complete overhaul of the Universal Service Fund. During his time as chairman, Genachowski took the lead on killing AT&T’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile. The next FCC chair will need to navigate hefty issues including media ownership, Internet rules, universal and affordable broadband, and locking of phones.
How Good Is It Indoors? The FCC chartered CSRIC to test the indoor performance of location systems across urban, suburban and rural areas in the San Francisco Bay Area. TechnoCom, an independent agent, conducted the trial with more than 13,000 test calls placed from different technologies in 75 unique indoor locations. Three vendors submitted technologies for evaluation: Qualcomm, NextNav and Polaris. They were scored for horizontal and vertical accuracy, speed of location, and reliability and consistency of results. NextNav stood out for its performance on height and horizontal accuracy. The full report is available from the FCC.
To hear from the experts involved, tune in to GPS World’s webinar, “Indoor Positioning & Navigation: Results of the FCC’s CSRIC Bay Area Trials,” on Thursday, April 18. Speakers include Khaled Dessouky (Technocom); Ganesh Pattabiraman (NextNav); Norm Shaw (Polaris Wireless); and Greg Turetzky (CSR). Registration is free.
Apple Goes Inside. Apple has acquired indoor-GPS company WifiSLAM, a sign that the indoor mobile location market will be heating up. Apple’s involvement is a significant move that will ignite the developer community to rush to create more innovative apps and solutions based on indoor location. WiFiSlam is a two-year-old start-up that detects a phone user’s indoor location by analyzing the strengths and IDs of Wi-Fi signals in its vicinity. WiFiSlam has been offering the technology to developers for indoor mapping and new types of retail and social networking apps. Retail has been the first adopter of indoor technology.
Interactive Voice Ads Leverage Location. Nuance Communications unveiled Voice Ads, a new mobile ad format that enables consumers to interact directly with ad campaigns by speaking (or perhaps, yelling) into their smartphones. Voice Ads expands on voice and natural language technologies and leverages capabilities like location to deliver ads that prompt the user to ask questions. In a YouTube video, Mike McSherry of Nuance demonstrates a virtual Magic 8-Ball campaign that answers users’ verbal queries to promote a fictional deodorant brand. “Mobile has a monetization challenge,” McSherry told AllThingsD. “By introducing voice you can transcend the small screen size.”
Telematics Boom. The telematics market is about to ride a wave of growth. Vehicle OEMS are rolling out safety telematics in advance of safety and security mandates throughout the world including Europe (eCall, 2015), Russia (ERA GLONASS, 2013) and Brazil (Contran, 2013). ABI predicts that the OEM and aftermarket safety/security telematics vendors will see the number of users rise from 72 million at year-end to more than 300 million in 2018.
GPS Ankle Monitors Not Working. In 2012 the state of California started conducting tests on the GPS ankle devices that monitor more than 4,000 high-risk sex offenders and gang members. Officials discovered that the batteries died early and reported locations were off by as much as three miles. Tampering alerts failed and offenders could cover the devices with foil or use GPS jammers to go undetected. Many of California’s ankle monitors were replaced with devices from a different vendor, but test results of the new system were not made public.
The FCC sees indoor location as a critical safety concern for E911 emergency response. The commission has tasked an advisory committee to evaluate indoor location positioning technologies. A public workshop on this testing is being held at the FCC on Wednesday, October 24, and can be watched online at www.fcc.gov/live.
TechnoCom has been chosen to conduct the independent testing as a neutral third party. The test bed is in about 20 structures of various types, in locations that range from highly dense urban to sparse landscape. The following companies are submitting technology for the testing: Qualcomm (AGPS/AFLT/Cell ID), NextNav (GPS-like terrestrial beacons), Boeing (LEO satellites using the Iridium constellation), and Polaris (RF fingerprinting). Additional companies submitted technology, but later withdrew. Test results should be made public in March of 2013.
With today’s action, consumers and industry in the United States will now be permitted to access the E1 and E5 Galileo signals to augment GPS.
