Viavi’s Secure µPNT STL-1000 is a compact software-defined receiver designed to operate with the Viavi SecureTime altGNSS LEO services. Delivering precise timing with holdover capability, it enables tracking, authentication and assured navigation in denied, degraded and disrupted space operational environment, also known as D3SOE.
“With jamming and spoofing now a core element of cyber warfare, resilient PNT solutions are no longer optional,” said Doug Russell, senior vice president and general manager, Aerospace and Defense, Viavi. “The Secure µPNT STL-1000 enables assured, uninterrupted operations, especially in contested environments. Its compact size and low power consumption makes it ideal for applications that require an extremely small, low-power, secure, resilient embedded PNT receiver.”
“As the frequency of jamming and spoofing continues to rise, reliance on GPS/GNSS signals alone increasingly exposes both commercial and military operations to risk,” said Alastair MacLeod, CEO of Ground Control. “Integrating Viavi’s Secure µPNT STL-1000 into RockFLEET Assured delivers a trusted secondary position source, strengthening resilience for mission‑critical operations across defense, maritime and critical infrastructure environments.”
RockFLEET Assured is a marine-grade assured position, navigation and timing (A-PNT) solution designed to support maritime vessel navigation and oversight in GNSS-denied environments.
Raytheon Company’s GPS Next-Generation Operational Control System program, known as GPS OCX, completed final qualification testing of the system’s modernized monitor station receivers, which are now ready to be installed around the world starting in August.
GPS OCX is the enhanced ground control segment of a U.S. Air Force-led effort to modernize America’s GPS system.
“The modernized receivers give GPS OCX the ability to receive and decrypt all GPS III military and civil signals, a critical capability the current system doesn’t have,” said Dave Wajsgras, president of Raytheon Intelligence, Information and Services. “Monitor station receiver installation keeps us on track for full system delivery by our June 2021 contractual deadline.”
The modernized receivers will measure and monitor legacy military and civilian signals sent by the current GPS satellite constellation plus the new signals sent by the next-generation GPS III.
The receivers will also feed correction models at the master control station, giving U.S. Air Force satellite controllers the information necessary to make key adjustments to maximize accuracy.
Feature photo: GPS ground antenna at Schriever Air Force Base, home of the 50th Space Wing. (Photo: Raytheon)
Protective radome housing for the Galileo ground station on desolate Jan Mayen Island in the Norwegian Arctic. The site is housing a Galileo Sensor Station plus satellite link to pass data back to the Galileo ground system. (Photo: ESA/Fermin Alvarez Lopez)
CGI has signed an agreement with Thales Alenia Space France to enhance and maintain security software for the Galileo satellite navigation system.
Valued at approximately 14 million euros, the contract will last until the end of 2020. CGI experts are working on this strategic project from Rotterdam and Toulouse.
CGI will improve the functionality, robustness and reliability of Galileo’s ground infrastructure, as well as enhance and maintain software for its Public Regulated Service Key Management Facility (PKMF).
The Public Regulated Service (PRS) is one of the key features that distinguishes Galileo from other satellite navigation systems. It ensures that only government-authorized entities have access to Galileo’s secure PRS signal that meets strict security standards in areas such as defense, law enforcement and customs.
“We look forward to working with CGI to ensure the highest level of security for Galileo, along with an efficient, high performance infrastructure,” said Guillermo Salgado, Galileo ground mission and EGNOS programs director, Thales Alenia Space France. “CGI’s significant space and security experience, combined with its local presence and global resources, gives us access to the experts we need to launch and operate one of the world’s most advanced satellite navigation systems.”
“CGI has strong legacy in space, and we continue to support space clients across the globe, actively managing their business and national interests while positioning CGI as a trusted space leader,” said Dirk de Groot, who leads CGI’s business unit in the Netherlands.
CGI has more than 40 years of experience in the space domain and delivers complex, mission-critical space software systems across Europe, Asia and North America, supporting programs from satellite navigation, communications and operations, to space-enabled applications.
Photo: U.S. Air Force / Staff Sgt. Scott H. Spitzer
Much development has been necessary to enable the new M-code capability on more than 700 weapon systems that require it. This article overviews M-code, the updates to antenna and receiver technology to make these varied platforms M-code ready, and perspectives from key stakeholders in the M-code community.
December 23, 2018, marked an important milestone for GPS. The successful launch of satellite USA-289 represented a key success in what has been a monumentally expensive government program, beset by delays and overspends.
The launch of the first GPS Block III satellite, the first that can provide the full military M-code capability, effectively commenced the physical roll-out of modern M-code hardware.
Ground Control. As far as the space segment is concerned, M-code is finally underway. What about the ground segment? The next-generation GPS operational control system, GPS OCX, is essential for use of the full capabilities of the new Block III satellites. It has been under development for some time.
OCX has drawn Congressional criticism and correlative media attention, but recent reports have been more positive. Since the Nunn-McCurdy breach of 2016, when the project’s future hung in the balance, accounts have grown gradually optimistic. Budget and schedule were re-baselined, and contractor Raytheon’s corrective actions generated results. In the fall of 2017 the Air Force took delivery of OCX Block 0, marking a significant milestone. Block 0, also known as the Launch and Checkout System (LCS), demonstrated compliance with contractual requirements and was accepted by the Air Force.
In spring 2018, Block 0 underwent a series of cybersecurity tests and passed, validating the security architecture of the system. All this puts Raytheon on track to deliver OCX Block 1 in 2021, providing full operational capability. Block 1 and Block 2 are intended to be delivered together, adding operational control of the modernized satellites and signals, including L1C and the modernized M-code.
“There have been no schedule slips with the GPS OCX program since 2017, and the GPS III launch last December was clear proof of our progress,” stated Dave Wajsgras, president of Raytheon’s Intelligence, Information and Services business. “We will continue to meet all of our commitments, and importantly, we will meet our June 2021 contractual deadline.”
Col. Steve Whitney of the GPS Directorate wrote in this magazine in December 2018 that “The journey over the past few years has been challenging, but we have emerged stronger, armed with better metrics, and a culture of integrated development (often called DevOps) which puts us on a path to success. There will be challenges and risks in the path ahead but rather than mountains to climb, I see these more as standard blocking and tackling of a software-intensive program.”
Meanwhile. The Air Force plans to deploy M-code capability in 2020, and OCX seems unlikely to be ready. For this reason, Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract to modernize the existing ground infrastructure as a “gap filler.”
The GPS Control Segment Sustainment II (GCS II) contract was awarded on Dec. 21, 2018, and is worth $462 million. GCS II will support operational capability of M-code in 2020, and continues until 2025, and so there will be a period of overlap between GCS II and OCX, essentially providing two options for controlling the new GPS III constellation. In one view, the Air Force is backing two horses to improve chance of winning: OCX the preferred solution, with GCS II almost like an insurance policy.
With the GPS III ground and space segments looking relatively healthy, attention turns again to the user segment.
WHY M-CODE?
Until now, the military has used the classic P(Y) signal: a binary phase shift keying (BPSK)-modulated encrypted wideband signal. It offers both greater accuracy and increased jamming resistance when compared to the civilian C/A code still employed by the vast majority of GPS receivers.
But the P(Y) code has its drawbacks in the modern world: its wide main lobe sits directly over the top of the C/A code signal (see Figure 1), essentially occupying the same spectrum. When the civilian C/A signal is jammed, the military P(Y) signal is at the very least degraded, if not also jammed itself. It also uses a relatively simple encryption scheme that does not meet today’s cyber security requirements.
Figure 1. C/A, P(Y), and M-Code signal power spectra. (Graphics: Mike Jones)
The M-code signal, on the other hand, is the first military GPS signal to use the BOC modulation scheme. BOC modulation gives signals their distinctive two-lobe appearance, spreading the signal’s energy away from the band center.
The wide spacing of the two sidebands separates the M-code signal from the civilian signals (the legacy C/A signal or the new L1C signal on the L1 frequency, and the L2C signal on the L2 frequency).
Amongst other things, this allows the military to jam the civilian codes without noticeably degrading the M-code signal. Often referred to as blue force electronic attack (BFEA), this is essentially a new facet to navigation warfare (NAVWAR), where enemy use of GPS can be denied whilst allowing friendly forces to continue using it.
The wider occupied bandwidth and increased signal power also help to make M-code more resistant to jamming. M-code also makes use of more modern and flexible encryption methods, ensuring it will be secure and safer from threats such as spoofing attacks.
Scepticism. Defense programs are known for their long procurement cycles, but even by these standards, M-code has taken an extremely long time to get where it is today. Given the enormous cost of the program, and the fact that there is still, as yet, no operational benefit to show from it, many people have questioned its worth. At the time it was conceived it represented a dramatic step forward in military capability but, because it has been so long in development, its operational benefit is becoming diluted.
When M-code was conceived, GPS was still the only operational GNSS in town: everybody had to use GPS — or nothing. Today, the picture differs greatly. During M-code’s insanely slow progress, other GNSS systems have come along, offering their own encrypted signals of a similar ilk. Looking at Figure 2, M-code no longer appears as special as it once was. Its BOC(10,5) signal sits inside the main lobes of Europe’s Galileo PRS signal, which uses a BOC(15,2.5) scheme, and China’s Beidou B1A signal using BOC(14,2).
Figure 2. GNSS encrypted signals around the L1 frequency. (Graphics: Mike Jones)
If you were China, you might consider jamming the central 24 MHz of the L1 band, taking out M-code, whilst still having an operational military service for yourself. Or if you were Russia, you might jam 34 MHz of bandwidth, taking out the US, Chinese, and European systems, whilst still having your GLONASS L1SC military service to use. The situation is more complex than that, of course: each service has the potential to increase signal power in times of conflict, and there is more than one frequency that can be used. But it does demonstrate the essence of the problem: The modern battlespace has moved on, and M-code hasn’t.
CHALLENGES OF RECEIVER DESIGN
Figure 3. C/A code ACF.
With complex signals come complex receivers, and there several headaches when it comes to M-code receiver design. The first is the nature of the BOC signal itself, which has a complex correlation function. Consider Figure 3, which shows the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the traditional civilian C/A code signal. The single peak of the function makes acquisition and tracking a simple process; traditionally early, prompt and late (E,P,L) correlator arms can be used in the tracking process.
Figure 4. L1Cd ACF.
The newer BOC-type signals have a more complex ACF. Figure 4 shows the ACF of the new L1Cd civilian GPS signal, which uses a form of BOS(1,1) modulation. In addition to the main lobe, there are now two side lobes. Receivers must be careful not to lock on to one of the side lobes instead of the main lobe: the receiver architecture starts to become a little more complex.
Figure 5. M-code ACF.
Now consider the ACF of the M-code signal, shown in Figure 5. Like other high-order BOC-type signals, M-code exhibits multiple lobes in the ACF, making robust acquisition and tracking a far more troublesome process. Furthermore, the high bandwidths require high sample rates, which lead to higher power consumption in the hardware.
Another major headache associated with M-code receivers is, of course, the encryption process. Not because encryption is difficult, but again because of the power consumption implications. Consider that each GPS receiver needs to run an encryption engine instance, for each satellite it might wish to receive. Running a high-grade encryption algorithm at a high chipping rate, for a dozen satellites, is a power-consuming process. For dismounted soldiers with limited battery capacity, this is a big deal.
Some people argue that the high-grade encryption process for M-code is too complex. Consider why we want to encrypt a GNSS signal in the first place: firstly to prevent someone from spoofing our signal, and secondly to prevent unauthorised users from using the service. Given that the encryption keys are rolled regularly, how much does it matter if an adversary manages to compromise the encryption? This isn’t a communications security problem: we are not talking about loss of classified information, so there’s an argument that a simpler, less power-hungry form of encryption might have been used instead.
ANTI-JAM ANTENNA COMPATIBILITY
Although M-code offers a certain level of jamming resistance, it is still vulnerable to attacks. As a signal it might have a bit more power, and a bit more bandwidth, than some other signals. But it is, after all, still a GNSS signal, and it can be jammed by an adversary. Where an operational threat analysis indicates that an increased level of jamming resistance is required, then M-code receivers need to be integrated with anti-jam antennas.
Anti-jam antennas, usually referred to in the GNSS community as controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPAs), have been the anti-jam tool of choice for several decades now. I overviewed these in an April 2017 newsletter column. CRPA manufacturers have had to ensure that their products are “M-code ready,” such that they can be seamlessly attached to M-code receivers as and when they appear.
This hasn’t been a recent process: as far back as 2002, the GAS-1 antenna (Raytheon) underwent a series of qualification tests to ensure compliance with M-code. Around 2005, the ADAP antenna (also Raytheon) was launched with a host of M-code features — again an illustration of just how slow the M-code program has moved, given that other technology has been “M-code ready” for 10 or 15 years already.
What’s involved in making a CRPA M-code compatible? Firstly the increased bandwidth: the antenna electronics must digitize the wider bandwidths. Along with the wider bandwidth comes new filtering shapes to ensure optimum performance.
Space-time adaptive processing (STAP) and space-frequency adaptive processing (SFAP) techniques potentially require more taps to ensure high null depths can be maintained across the full bandwidth. The increased power of the M-code signal, particularly if features like spot beam are used, presents another complication to CRPAs: they must not treat the high-power satellite signals as jammers, and try to remove them.
Testing CRPAs presents a challenge to manufacturers: how do you prove that your antenna doesn’t corrupt the M-code signal, when there’s no M-code signal to test it with? To work around this issue, pseudo M-code signals have been used for testing, where representative BOC(10,5) signals without the real encryption are passed through the CRPA and examined for distortion.
RECEIVER DEVELOPMENT STATUS
Due to the security considerations surrounding M-code, only three US organizations are authorized to produce modules: Collins Aerospace, Raytheon and L3. Here are the answers from Collins Aerospace and L3, the answers from Raytheon will appear in later issue.
What are the technical challenges associated with developing an M-code receiver?
Collins Aerospace. The Collins Aerospace Modernized GPS User Equipment (MGUE) Increment 1 development like the SAASM PPS receiver developments faced very challenging technical requirements to support our war fighter needs in an ever-evolving threat environment. Like other complex developments the challenges are initially technical and then transition to integration/test and certification. On the technical front optimizing receiver performance balanced against power consumption are always at the forefront. In addition, it is important to maximize backwards compatibility so as to minimize downstream integration costs while adding an entirely new signal that runs in parallel to the existing system. Collins Aerospace is pleased with the technical development and are actively supporting the integration with both receivers and technical support.
To date, we have delivered more than 770 MGUE receivers to the Air Force to support Air Force, lead platform and DoD-wide Integration and test. Soon the total will grow to nearly 1,100 receivers to support expanded integration and test following the completion of Collins Aerospace security certification.
L3. M-code GPS User Equipment (MGUE) technologies exist today.L3’s Ground Based GPS Receiver Application Module – Modernized (GB-GRAM-M) is a fully-functioning unit that is currently baselined and undergoing an independent Technical Requirements Verification (TRV) by the GPS Directorate.During TRV, each requirement from the Technical Requirements Document (TRD) is independently evaluated for compliance. Upon completion of the TRV, the design is baselined with complete documentation enabling platforms and prime equipment to integrate from a known baseline with low risk. Following integration, operational testing can start immediately to support fielding when M-Code Early Use (MCEU) becomes operational. The TRV of L3’s GB-GRAM-M is planned to be completed by the second quarter of 2019.
L3 resolved numerous technical challenges in developing M-code GPS technologies. The first and ever-present challenge is changing and evolving requirements. Most of these requirement changes are in response to evolving threats that have driven changes into the GPS receiver and/or to higher-level systems. Asan example, the U.S. Army’s Assured PNT (A-PNT) is implementing M- code GPS along with external sensors to establish and maintain an assured solution even in GPS-challenged environments. Other challenging requirements include meeting the security requirements, implementing and testing anti-spoofing algorithms, and ensuring backward compatibility with legacy receivers.
What are the intended platforms for your MGUE?
Collins Aerospace. The Collins Aerospace MGUE receivers are intended to support all warfighter domains: ground, airborne, maritime and munitions to support compliance with Public Law 111-383 SEC. 913 issued in Fiscal Year 2011. Per this directive, M-code is intended for all DoD applications with the exception of passenger vehicles or commercial vehicles with GPS installed. Now that the satellite and control segments of the capability are coming on line, we are working diligently to ensure that user equipment is available for all domains.
L3. L3 has products to meet current market demand. Under the MGUE program, L3 developed a GB-GRAM-M, which is a standard Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) design. The GB-GRAM-M is designed to fulfill retrofit replacements of SAASM receivers, as well as being a primary component of A-PNT systems. L3’s M2GRAM ASIC is the core of our receiver, a GPS module that incorporates signal processing, cryptography, and positioning, velocity, and timing (PVT) processing. The M2GRAM ASIC is capable of being implemented in other form factors for applications beyond ground-based applications. As an example, the M2GRAM is implemented in a GPS receiver specifically designed for Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) applications and was used in a gun launched, guide-to-target demonstration operating as a PGM receiver.
L3 is also augmenting the GPS receiver through the integration of several other technologies, including controlled reception pattern antennas with digital antenna electronics, inertial systems and external sensors, and GPS-denied capabilities. M-code technologies are being implemented in Mounted A-PNT Systems (MAPS), Dismounted A-PNT Systems (DAPS), and handheld systems to bring capabilities to the warfighter.
What is the expected timeline for your MGUE development, acceptance testing, and delivery?
Defense Advanced GPs Receiver (DAGR) from Collins Aerospace, equipping infantry and other warfighters. (Photo: Collins Aerospace)
Collins Aerospace. The Collins Aerospace receivers are supporting ongoing DoD integration and test and our MGUE Increment 1 program is aligned with the Air Force GPS Enterprise roadmap. Ultimately, the Department of Defense (DoD) M-code programs will set the production delivery schedules.
We anticipate that the M-code production ramp-up and continued SAASM PPS receiver production will have a production overlap. Our Collins Aerospace in-house PPS GPS receiver manufacturing capability is ready to support the DoD demand for both M-code and SAASM. Collins Aerospace is fully committed to manufacturing Increment 1 M-code receivers to meet the warfighter’s needs across Airborne, Weapons and Ground, we know the transition from SAASM to M-code will take years. Therefore, Collins Aerospace will continue to manufacture SAASM receivers for years to come as the International MOD Policy for M-code use is still being formulated.
L3. L3’s GB-GRAM-M is now available. L3 received security certification and approval in 2016 and TRV is planned for completion in the second quarter of 2019. With TRV, L3 is receiving a new security certification and approval of the latest receiver update. Government agencies, prime contractors and laboratories can order GB-GRAM-M now with delivery in the fourth quarter of 2019.
What does testing and verification process involve?
Collins Aerospace. As with any Precise Positioning Service (PPS) GPS development, the testing involves functional verification of the receiver in a wide variety challenging of environmental, thermal, electromagnetic interference/ high-intensity radiated field (EMI/HIRF) environments. Collins Aerospace is leveraging proven test and verification approaches founded upon our long history of successful product introductions and field performance. As this is a PPS receiver it is also essential the receiver design comply with the government’s required Security Approval process.
L3. The testing and verification of L3’s GB-GRAM-M included internal testing and independent testing through the GPS Directorate’s TRV process. Further risk reduction testing within the MGUE program is planned as Phase IV testing where the GB-GRAM-M is integrated into a lead platform for the U.S. Army and a lead platform for the U. S. Marine Corps. An operational assessment is performed on both lead platforms to assure common problems associated with integration and operational testing are addressed prior to implementing M-Code GPS Receivers across all of the platforms.
Will the MGUE be compatible with CRPA anti-jam antennas; are there any special considerations for this?
Collins Aerospace. The Collins Aerospace product family includes our Digital Integrated Anti Jam Receiver (DIGAR) product family that leverages CRPA anti-jam antennas for enhanced anti-jam (AJ) performance. Our DIGAR AJ technology enhances the performance with fixed reception pattern antenna (FRPA), CRPA and is compatible with all PPS waveforms. Regarding the interfaces between the receiver and the anti-jam antenna electronics, a GPS receiver with a standard RF interface is compatible with a CRPA in nulling mode and FRPA antennas. Advanced capabilities such as beamforming/beamsteering require tight coordination and additional interface with the GPS receiver.
L3. The GB-GRAM-M is designed to operate with a fixed reception pattern antenna (FRPA). A CRPA antenna using digital antenna electronics to generate signals matching the characteristics of a FRPA is fully compatible with the GB-GRAM-M. With a higher level of integration of a GPS receiver and a CRPA, the system capabilities are greatly enhanced. L3 has performed this integration and can perform advanced capabilities such as angle of arrival and beamforming using M2GRAM, digital antenna electronics, and CRPA technologies. These capabilities can be found in L3’s Mounted Assured PNT System (MAPS) and Anti-Jam Antenna System (AJAS) products.
Army Stryker ground combat vehicle. (Photo: Karolis Kavolelis / Shutterstock.com)
OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT
The U.S. Air Force GPS Directorate provided answers to the following questions regarding MGUE.
Which platforms will be equipped with M-code-capable MGUE, and how many of each?
GPS Directorate. The Air Force is developing M-code-capable GPS receivers under the MGUE Increment 1 program. The receivers in development will be provided to four service-specific lead platforms for integration, developmental, and operational testing. Lead platforms are:
the Army Stryker ground combat vehicle,
the Air Force B-2 Spirit bomber,
the Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV),
and the Navy Arleigh-Burke class destroyer (DDG).
Following the lead platform efforts, procurement of M-code-capable GPS receivers will be decided by the Services and executed by individual platforms and programs.
What are the timelines for rolling out M-code on these platforms?
GPS Directorate. Early integration and test activities have already begun for each MGUE lead platform. Operational testing is expected to begin in 2020 and complete in 2021, which is a key activity to enable the fielding of M-code-capable systems.
B-2 Spirit multi-role bomber capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear munitions. In December 2017, the Air Force completed a series of successful flight tests of M-code GPS using a Raytheon Company receiver on board a B-2 Spirit at Edwards Air Force Base, California. (Photo: U.S. Air Force/Bobby Garcia)
What advantages will M-code bring, over existing military GPS receivers?
GPS Directorate. Modernized GPS receiver cards under development with the Air Force MGUE Increment 1 program will enable the use of M-code and provide U.S. forces with enhanced position, navigation, and timing capabilities, in addition to improving resistance to threats, such as jamming efforts by adversaries.
How will keys and key distribution be managed?
GPS Directorate. None of this is publically releasable.
Will M-code be made available to other friendly nations? If so, how is this managed?
GPS Directorate. The current policy allows for the sale of M-code equipment to all 57 authorized GPS PPS nations. The M-code technology will be made available to these nations through the Foreign Military Sales process.
USER PERSPECTIVE
The Department of Defense supplied answers to the following questions for users and warfighters.
What are the benefits you perceive will come from new M-code GPS equipment?
DoD. Provides U.S. forces with enhanced position, navigation, and timing capabilities, in addition to improving resistance to threats, such as jamming efforts by adversaries.
Will it change how you perform military operations, or enable any new ones?
DoD. Modernized GPS receivers provide the next-generation GPS capabilities to the warfighter. Operational testing will enable the services to determine operational utility of MGUE. It will ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have the ability to get in, accomplish their mission, and get home accurately.
How will M-code-based GPS receivers be brought into operational service? Will there be a mass upgrade of assets, or a phased introduction?
DoD. Procurement of M-code-capable GPS receivers will be decided by the Services and executed by individual platforms and programs.
When managed by a new ground control system, GPS III satellites will offer triple the accuracy and eight times the anti-jamming capabilities of the satellites currently comprising the U.S. Air Force’s GPS constellation. Users military and civilian will reap ample benefits.
Everything changed for space-based positioning, navigation and timing around the world on Dec. 23, 2018. Or maybe it didn’t. The innovations heralded by the launch of the first GPS III satellite will take years more to occur. We tabulate here the advances that Generation Three will bring over GPS-to-date, and review the timeline for their actual arrival.
While these new capabilities exist — in concept — in space, they can’t be leveraged on the ground (or in the air, or at sea) until a sufficient number of additional GPS III satellites have joined the constellation, and until a new ground control system comes online. This will occur — perhaps — in 2023. At that time the satellites’ talents will be unleashed.
“As more GPS III satellites join the constellation, it will bring better service at a lower cost to a technology that is now fully woven into the fabric of any modern civilization,” stated Lt. Gen. John Thompson, commander of the U.S. Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center and the Air Force’s program executive officer for space.
The many GPS III upgrades should make the service more reliable and accurate for civilians, more secure against those who want to jam military users, and more cyber-secure for everyone.
TALKIN’ ‘BOUT OUR GENERATION
GPS constellations have grown through six major iterations since 1978. The sixth, GPS IIF, rose during the years 2010 to 2016. Those 12 satellites are all designed to last 12 years. Some of their notable features include the ability to receive software uploads, better jamming resistance and increased accuracy.
GPS III, the seventh generation, will launch nine more satellites to join SV01 already in space. GPS III SV02 is scheduled to launch in July of this year, SV03 in late 2019, and SV04 in 2020. The final III payload should rise in 2023. From that point on, the follow-on era of GPS IIIF takes over.
How Long, How Long? “Projections for how long the current constellation will [continue to] be fully capable have increased by nearly two years to June 2021, affording some buffer to offset any additional satellite delays,” reported the Government Accounting Office at the end of 2017. This provided some schedule buffer for launching the first GPS III satellite, but it did not reduce the desire to launch as soon as the booster rocket became available.
The new birds will introduce new capabilities to meet higher demands of both military and civilian users: once filled out, the GPS III constellation will bring three times better accuracy and up to eight times improved anti-jamming capabilities. Spacecraft life requirement will extend to 15 years, 25 percent longer than the latest GPS satellites and twice the original design life of the oldest satellites on orbit today.
The new L1C civil signal broadcast by GPS III is an interoperable signal with other international global navigation satellite systems, like Galileo, improving connectivity for civilian users.
GPS III will eventually actualize full M-code capability — carried aboard the IIR-Ms and IIFs but not yet completely implemented — in support of warfighter operations. GPS III M-code capability exceeds that of GPS IIR-M and GPS IIF.
GPS III will complete the deployment of the L2C civil signal and the L5 safety-of-life signal capabilities that began with \GPS IIR-M and GPS IIF satellites.
Finally, GPS III will enact improved integrity: the ability of the satellite to detect and issue alerts on its own reduced accuracy, should that phenomenon ever occur.
Military Signal Power Up. Encrypted M-code signals will be up to eight times more powerful than currently. This makes them more reliable. but also enables the sats to overcome efforts to jam their signals.
Other signals also offer increased signal power at the Earth’s surface. L1 and L2: −158.5 dBW for aC/A code signal and −161.5 dBW for the P(Y) code signal. L5 will be −154 dBW.
Family Features. The most recent generations of the GPS constellation. IIR, IIR-M and III were produced by Lockheed Martin, while IIF was built by Boeing. One GPS IIA satellite is still in operation, at 25 years young (design life was 7.5 years). All satellites carry Harris Corporation payloads. (Graphic sourced from: Lockheed Martin and Boeing Co.)
L SIGNALS
L2C, the second open GPS signal, after L1 C/A, has been available from every new GPS satellite since the first IIR-M launch in 2005. L5, the third open GPS signal, became available with the first IIF launch in 2010. Now L1C, the fourth open GPS signal, joins the band, broadcasting from every new GPS satellite, starting with the recent GPS III launch (see First Light).
The first GPS III satellite is in checkout and testing that could last up to 18 months before it enters service. “After its Dec. 23 launch, GPS III SV01 successfully completed its orbit raising and deployment of all of its antennas and solar arrays. On Jan. 8, the satellite’s navigation payload began broadcasting navigation signals,” said Johnathon Caldwell, Lockheed Martin vice president for navigation systems. “On-orbit testing continues, but the navigation payload’s capabilities have exceeded expectations and the satellite is operating completely healthy.”
Testing, Testing. Using the Air Force’s Back-to-Basics program, which involved early prototyping and simulations, Lockheed Martin developed GPS III with an approach that involved rigorous quality-build certificates, component testing and system-level testing. The comprehensive requirements verification and validation process ensured more than 30,000 requirements were achieved. The system functional qualification includes the performance verification in multiple environmental tests, including the acoustic, thermal vacuum (TVAC) and electromagnetic spectrum.
“We consider thermal vacuum the gold standard for testing any satellite before it goes into operations,” Col. Steve Whitney, director, GPS Directorate, wrote in GPS World in December. “It really is putting the craft through the paces. When it goes through the testing, the satellite is on. It is working. It is exposing it to the heat and the cold and the zero pressure while the satellite is functional. The entire thermal vac testing from start to end is about 70 days. Test like you fly. From the time it launches and deployment sequence, we test it like it is real. Minus the shaking, the satellite thinks it is getting launched. Meanwhile, our people are looking at the data and its health. TVAC is a huge milestone for a satellite to go through and come out no issues.”
To date, more than 90 percent of parts and materials for all 10 GPS III satellites have been received from more than 250 aerospace companies in 29 states.
BRAIN OF THE BUNCH
THE FIRST GPS III satellite was fully assembled and entered into SV single-line flow when Lockheed Martin technicians integrated its system module, propulsion core and antenna deck. (Photo: Lockheed Martin)
Harris Corporation is a subcontractor to Lockheed Martin for development and production of GPS III Mission Data Units (MDUs) and transmitters for the GPS space section. Six have been delivered.
The Harris MDU, together with the Atomic Frequency Standards and the L-band transmitter equipment, make up the Navigation Payload Element. The MDU performs the primary mission of the GPS satellite: generation of the navigation signals and data on a continuous basis. The MDU controls the generation of the precise timing signals used for navigation signals while distributing the timing signals to other satellite components.
This MDU is 70 percent digital. The next to come, aboard GPS IIIF satellites, will be fully digital.
When asked about the advantages of an all-digital payload, Harris Corporation’s Jason Hendrix, PNT program director, told GPS World in April 2018, “The advantages and the 30 percent difference are the timekeeping system portion. We’re moving from manual, analog timing to digital to deliver to the Air Force more flexibility. It’s a nice option to have to be able to reprogram in orbit and maybe enhance capabilities desired in the future.”
LIVING BETTER, LIVING LONGER
Greater mission longevity is one of the key improvements GPS III delivers over those currently in service. Space Vehicles 1–10 have a planned mission life of 15 years, 25 percent longer than their predecessors. That begs the question, “How long should a satellite live in space, with technology innovation occurring almost annually?”
Advanced payload technology provides a partial answer. Lockheed Martin and Harris point to new payload capabilities with built-in flexibility to adapt satellites in orbit to technology advances, as well as changes in missions. According to Harris, the fully digital navigation payload will provide the ability to change and upgrade the satellites incrementally over mission life.
In late 2017, Lockheed announced a partnership with NEC Corporation to introduce artificial intelligence for computer learning in orbit. The company touted significant advances in processors and a move toward next-generation antennas, arrays and transmitters to drive more satellite flexibility, capability and resilience.
FROM THE GROUND UP
GPS IIIF’s M-Code can be broadcast from a high-gain directional antenna in a concentrated, high-powered spot beam, in addition to a wide-angle, full-Earth antenna. (Artist rendering: Lockheed Martin)
GPS III’s military upgrades require new ground control stations, a replacement effort called OCX that has suffered repeated delays and cost increases, due to the complexity of the programming and requirements modifications. The new jamming-resistant military signal will not be available until the new, highly complex ground control system is available, and that is not expected until 2022 or 2023. Delay and cost considerations were driven in part by full implementation of all Department of Defense 8500.2 “Defense in Depth” information assurance standards without waivers, giving it the highest level of cybersecurity protections of any DoD space system.
Deliverables for GPS OCX are divided into three blocks. Block 0 delivery took place in fall 2017, enabling it to support the December launch. Block 1 delivery will take place in 2021, providing full operational capability to control both legacy and modernized satellites and signals. Block 2, delivered concurrently with Block 1, adds operational control of L1C and modernized M-code.
In 2018, wrote Col. Whitney of the GPS Directorate, “We have actively utilized the [Block 0] system in a variety of exercises, training events, compatibility tests and launch readiness events. We also completed a comprehensive security review of the system to demonstrate our readiness to start operations. The system is ready to go. We continue to work the development of the OCX Block 1 system and are wrapping up the initial coding of the system early in 2019, leading into our integration and test campaign.”
Given delays in OCX, “the Directorate is actively working two major upgrades to bridge the gap,” Whitney continued. “The first is GPS III Contingency Operations (COps) modification which will allow the 2nd Space Operations Squadron (2SOPS) to command and control the GPS III family of vehicles in a mission state matching today’s legacy signals for all users world-wide. The second modification is M-code early use (MCUE), which enables 2 SOPS to operationalize the Modernized GPS military (M-code) navigation signals for the warfighter.”
Before December’s launch, OCX underwent rigorous cybersecurity vulnerability assessments that tested the system’s ability to defend against both internal and external cyber threats. GPS OCX prevented the broadcast of corrupt navigation and timing data in all tests, bolstering the program’s readiness for GPS III.
“We’ve built a layered defense and implemented all information assurance requirements for the program into this system,” said Dave Wajsgras, president of Raytheon Intelligence, Information and Services. “The cyber threat will always change, so we’ve built OCX to evolve and to make sure it’s always operating at this level of protection.”
The new Harris navigation payload offers a smooth transition to use of OCX. The payload for the first 10 GPS III satellites has been verified for OCX compatibility so the same OCX commands will seamlessly port to the Harris fully digital design, minimizing integration risks and associated costs.
According the the GAO, “Full M-code capability —which includes both the ability to broadcast a signal via satellites and a ground system and user equipment to receive the signal — will take at least a decade once the services are able to deploy military GPS user equipment (MGUE) receivers in sufficient numbers.” The April 2019 issue of GPS World will review M-code implementation across U.S. DoD platforms.
THE FUTURE’S NOT OVER YET
In spring 2018, Lockheed Martin submitted a proposal for the GPS III Follow On (GPS IIIF) program, which will add enhanced capabilities to the satellites. New hardware — a high-gain directional antenna — aims signals in a spot beam at a limited area, but blasts the signal at high power for strategic use by the military.
Inter-Satellite Links. Block IIIF satellites will carry laser retro-reflectors to enable orbit tracking independently of the satellites’ radio signals, which in turn will allow satellite clock errors to be disentangled from ephemeris errors. A standard feature of GLONASS, this is included in the Galileo positioning system, and was flown as an experiment on two older GPS satellites, 35 and 36.
In September 2018, the Air Force selected Lockheed Martin to build up to 22 additional satellites under the GPS IIIF program.
Galileo’s initial services have been running for more than 15 months now, and signals from the satellites in space are routinely serving users all across the world. The functioning of Galileo is dependent on a global network of ground stations, its current extent shown in the map here.
The constellation in orbit is only one element of the overall satellite navigation system – the tip of the Galileo iceberg. At the same time as satellites were being built, tested and launched, a global ground segment has been put in place, extending to some of the world’s loneliest places, from Svalbard in the High Arctic to storm-engulfed Jan Mayen Island, Ascension Island in the Mid Atlantic to Noumea in the South Pacific, Kerguelen in the southern Indian Ocean to Troll base in the Antarctic interior.
Galileo’s global ground segment. (Image: ESA)
Among the latest developments are updated control and mission software for the two Galileo control centres that sit at the heart of this global web: Fucino in Italy generates the accurate navigation messages that are then broadcast through the navigation payloads, and Oberpfaffenhofen in Germany controls the constellation of satellites. A new telemetry, tracking and command station last year arose in Papeete on Tahiti, in the South Pacific.
Establishing Galileo’s ground segment was among the most complex developments ever undertaken by ESA, having to fulfill strict levels of performance, security and safety. Formal responsibility for the operations of this Galileo ground segment was last year passed to ESA’s partner organization, the European Global Navigation Satellite System Agency, or GSA, but ESA continues to be in charge of its maintenance and growth.
Galileo’s Nouméa ground station’s Sensor Station and Uplink Station. (Photo: ESA)
Users don’t have to worry about this ground segment, but it is essential to keeping Galileo services running reliably. The atomic clocks aboard the satellites are accurate to a few nanoseconds, delivering metre-scale positioning precision, but they are prone to drift over time.
Similarly, the orbits of the satellites can be slightly nudged by the gravitational tug of Earth’s slight equatorial bulge and by the Moon and Sun. Even the slight but continuous push of sunlight itself can affect satellites in their orbital paths. The quality of signals received on the ground can be affected by their transit through the ever-changing ionosphere, the electrically active outer layer of Earth’s atmosphere.
Galileo sensor stations, with small omnidirectional receiving antennas around just 50 cm high, are on place around the globe to check the accuracy and signal quality of individual satellites in real time, and work together to pinpoint the current satellite orbits.
These measurements are transmitted via secure satellite communications to Fucino, where they serve as the basis of a set of corrections — accounting for timing or orbital slips — to be uplinked to the satellites via a network of 3-metre-diameter uplink stations for rebroadcast within navigation messages to users, currently updated every 50 minutes.
Considering Galileo is Europe’s largest satellite constellation, timely control of the satellites is essential, enabled by 13 m-diameter telemetry, tracking and command stations in Kiruna, Sweden and Redu, Belgium as well as the equator-hugging Kourou, French Guiana, Reunion, Noumea in New Caledonia and now Papeete sites.
Galileo Station on Gran Canaria. (Photo: ESA)
The ground segment also comprises a set of four Medium-Earth Orbit Local User Terminals serving Galileo’s search and rescue service, at the corners of Europe and facilities for testing Galileo service quality and security — the Timing and Geodetic Validation Facility and two Galileo Security Monitoring Centres.
The Launch and Early Operations Control Centres have the task of bringing new satellites to life, to be handed over to the main Satellite Control Centre in Oberpfaffenhofen within typically a week after launch. Redu in Belgium, set up as Galileo’s In-Orbit Test Centre, then puts these satellites through a complex set of testing and checkouts ahead of them joining the working constellation.
Raytheon Company’s GPS OCX program is ready for the U.S. Air Force’s launch of the first modernized GPS satellite later this year.
Raytheon’s GPS Next-Generation Operational Control System, known as GPS OCX, is in its final software development phase. This phase focuses on increasing automation and building controls for both L1C, a civilian GPS signal aimed at increasing international access, and M-code, a military GPS signal with better anti-jam capability.
Once complete, the team will begin integration and testing to keep the program on track for full system delivery in June 2021.
The GPS Operational Control System’s launch and checkout system will control launch and early orbit operations and the on-orbit checkout of all GPS III satellites. (Image: Raytheon)
“Our team has two primary goals this year,” said Dave Wajsgras, president of Raytheon intelligence, information and services. “We will support the U.S. Air Force’s GPS III launch this fall and complete the software build for the full operational system by year’s end.”
GPS OCX is the enhanced ground control segment of a U.S. Air Force-led effort to modernize America’s GPS system. The program is implementing 100 percent of DODI 8500.2 “Defense in Depth” information assurance standards without waivers, giving it the highest level of cybersecurity protections of any DoD space system, Raytheon said.
For protection against future cyber threats, the system’s open architecture allows it to integrate new capabilities and signals as they become available.
Because GPS OCX can manage nearly twice the satellites of the current system, it will increase signal strength in hard-to-reach areas like dense cities and mountainous terrain.
Also, advanced automation will free crews to focus on mission-critical tasks such as updating satellite positions more often.
China launched two BeiDou-3 navigation satellites into space on Jan. 12 as part of efforts to enable its BeiDou system to provide navigation and positioning services to countries along the Belt and Road by the end of 2018. The Belt and Road Initiative aims to create the world’s largest platform for economic cooperation, encompassing China, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central and Western Asia, Middle East and Africa, and Central and Eastern Europe.
The twin satellites are coded MEO-7 and MEO-8, the 26th and 27th satellites in the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. They are based on a newly developed dedicated satellite bus that features a phased-array antenna for navigation signals and a laser retro-reflector. They each weigh about one metric ton, and both have two deployable solar arrays; their design life is 12 years. This was the first BeiDou launch in 2018, which will see an intensive further launch schedule throughout the year.
In his December 2017 “Directions” article in GPS World, Changfeng Yang, chief BeiDou system architect, wrote that “Eighteen BD-3 MEO satellites and one BD-3 GEO satellite will be launched by around the end of 2018. Upon the deployment of those 19 satellites, BD-3 will possess the initial operational capability and serve the countries along the Belt and Road.”
This would bring the constellation to an initial operational capability before the end of this year. China targets completion of the fully operational global system in 2020.
More interference potential from another tower set
Satellite operator Iridium asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in April 2017 to modify its license to add a new class of ground stations called Certus for expanded terrestrial, maritime and aeronautical operations.
Iridium’s 66-satellite constellation provides, in addition to mobile communications signals, the Satelles time and location service: microsecond timing accuracy and 20- to 50-meter unaided position accuracy worldwide (see the “Innovation” column, July 2017 GPS World).
GPSIA. The GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) commented in September, “GPSIA seeks to ensure that radio navigation satellite service (RNSS) receivers operating in the 1559–1610 MHz band are adequately protected from out-of-band emissions (OOBE) generated from the new Certus mobile Earth station (MES) terminals that will operate on the second-generation Iridium satellite system.
“GPSIA and Iridium are actively engaged in constructive discussions regarding the adequacy of that protection, but no final resolution has yet been reached. [….]
“In the unlikely event that GPSIA is unable to reach an agreement with Iridium, it asks the commission to impose limitations on the operation of Certus terminal devices to protect GPS/RNSS operations in the 1559–1610 MHz band at a level equivalent to what terrestrial terminals in the same and other frequency ranges provide at –95 dBW/MHz.”
Hexagon. Hexagon, the parent company of GPS manufacturer NovAtel, commented on Jan. 8, “Certain statements in the modification application regarding output power and amount of terminals to be deployed cause great concern regarding the unimpeded operation of radio navigation satellite service (RNSS) receivers. The application does not include enough information to simulate the impact properly.
“Hexagon politely requests that the FCC will exercise the same due diligence [as] during previous modification applications close to the RNSS bands (for example docket 11-109) and establish a technical working group or a similar testing process that ensures unimpeded coexistence of the modified Iridium terminals with the established RNSS systems.”
Documents related to the case can be found here, on the FCC International Bureau website.
Galileo security center moves to Spain
The Galileo Security Monitoring Centre (GSMC) for the European Union’s Galileo satellite system will move from the United Kingdom to Madrid, Spain, as a result of Brexit.
The center, not yet fully operational, is expected to grow to a staff of as many as 30. It controls access to the satellite system and provides around-the-clock monitoring when the main security center near Paris is offline.
The GSMC is operated by the European GNSS Agency. It is one of a number of EU institutions leaving the UK as a result of the 2016 referendum vote.
Spain has another of the fundamental centers of the program, the Loyola de Palacio GNSS Service Center, also in Madrid.
The GPS Operational Control System’s launch and checkout system will control launch and early orbit operations and the on-orbit checkout of all GPS III satellites. (Image: Raytheon)
The Space and Missile Systems Center announced that the United States Air Force has accepted delivery of the GPS Next Generation Operational Control System (GPS OCX) Launch and Checkout System (LCS) baseline from Raytheon Intelligence and Information Systems.
Also known as Block 0, LCS demonstrated conformance through test and analysis with all contractual requirements. OCX Block 0 is the foundation for Raytheon’s future Block 1 and 2 delivery, slated for delivery in 2022.
LCS is a fully modernized cyber-secure ground system complete with the computing hardware, operations center workstations, and mission application software necessary to launch the first GPS III satellite into orbit and perform initial on-orbit testing.
LCS forms the basis for the full system delivery, referred to as Block 1, which will provide higher accuracy and globally deployed modernized receivers, to ensure anti-jam capability for military users. It will also provide control of both legacy and modernized satellites and signals, including the new international L1C and modernized Military Code.
Currently, mission operators are utilizing LCS as part of the GPS III Mission Readiness Campaign. The ground system is performing as expected during the rehearsals and space vehicle checkout, giving the Air Force confidence in its readiness to support launch and on-orbit operations.
OCX has had numerous challenges delaying the delivery of this critical capability, and this delivery marks a significant program milestone providing the Air Force with a cyber-hardened ground system to support the launch and on-orbit checkout of the GPS III satellites.
“This is a major milestone for the program, and it keeps the U.S. Air Force on track to launch the first modernized GPS satellite into space next year,” said Dave Wajsgras, president of Raytheon Intelligence, Information and Services. “We have strong forward momentum on the program, and we will deliver the full capability in 2021.”
The first launch of a GPS III satellite is scheduled for 2018.
Three of six new Lockheed Martin-developed state-of-the-art receivers are now deployed to help the U.S. Air Force maintain the accuracy of GPS satellite signals.
In June, the first new Monitor Station Technology Improvement Capability (MSTIC) receiver became operational at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. The upgrades continued at U.S. Air Force monitoring stations on the Kwajalein Atoll and Hawaii.
These critical upgrades of the GPS Monitoring Stations from early 1990s technology are part of an overall effort to modernize and maintain the current GPS ground control system, known as the Architecture Evolution Plan Operational Control Segment.
GPS monitoring stations are globally dispersed, fixed-position sites that monitor GPS satellite signals and help maintain their navigation and positioning accuracy for users around the world.
Under Lockheed Martin’s GPS Control Segment (GCS) Sustainment contract, the company used an agile development methodology to develop and deploy the first MSTIC receiver on schedule in under 36 months. The three remaining Air Force GPS Monitoring Stations will be upgraded with MSTIC receivers by the end of 2017.
“Taking advantage of current commercial technology trends has allowed us to provide the Air Force with a monitoring capability that can support the Air Force’s GPS mission for years to come,” said Vinny Sica, vice president and general manager of Mission Solutions for Lockheed Martin. “The MSTIC receiver addresses today’s obsolescence problem while providing the opportunity for the monitoring of modernized navigation signals in the future.”
The new MSTIC receiver’s software-defined radio (SDR) technology will replace the legacy monitor station receiver element (MSRE)’s hardware-based ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit) platform originally deployed almost two decades ago, Sica said.
MSTIC leverages commercial off-the-shelf hardware without the need for custom firmware. Standard interfaces and the inherent configurability of the architecture simplifies sustainment and enables MSTIC software to migrate to new hardware platforms as commercial vendors increase processing power, improve reliability and enhance cybersecurity, Sica said.
“MSTIC’s new SDR technology enables the remote application of mission specific software updates which will improve performance and enable reception of modernized GPS signals,” added Sica.
The GPS Directorate at the U.S. Air Force Space and Missiles Systems Center contracted the MSTIC upgrade. Air Force Space Command’s 2nd Space Operations Squadron (2SOPS), based at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, manages and operates the GPS constellation for both civil and military users.
Gen. David L. Goldfein, chief of staff of the Air Force, listens to 1st Lt. Mark Skinner, 2SOPS GPS mission commander, explain current 2SOPS activities during his visit to Schriever AFB Dec. 20, 2016. (U.S. Air Force photo/Christopher DeWitt)
At a Dec. 15 ceremony in Brussels titled “Galileo Goes Live,” two high officials of the European Commission issued the Galileo Initial Services Declaration.
The declaration means that the Galileo satellites and ground infrastructure are now operationally ready. These signals will be highly accurate but not available all the time, since the constellation is not yet complete and users cannot always count on four satellites being visible at one time at all points on the Earth.
Galileo Goes Live! ceremony in Brussels: European Commission Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič, responsible for the Energy Union, and Commissioner Elżbieta Bieńkowska, responsible for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, count down to hit the “Go” button. Photo: Galileo
Simultaneously, the European GNSS Agency (GSA) awarded the Galileo Service Operator (GSOp) contract, with a value of up to 1.5 billion euros, to Spaceopal, a joint venture between Telespazio and the German Space Agency (DLR).
The Galileo constellation currently consists of 18 satellites in orbit. However, two of these are in an orbit not totally useful for positioning and navigation. Four more, launched in November, may or may not have completed their on-orbit testing (a series of notice advisory to Galileo users or NAGUs has appeared relating to the flag status of each satellite; see details at the end of this story) but have not yet been integrated to the operational constellation. This is expected to take place in spring 2017.
During the initial phase, the first Galileo signals will be used in combination with other satellite navigation systems, like GPS. In coming years, new satellites will be launched to enlarge the constellation, gradually improving Galileo availability worldwide. The constellation is expected to be complete by 2020 when Galileo will reach full operational capacity (FOC) of 30 satellites: 24 satellites plus six orbital spares, intended to prevent any interruption in service.
Paul Verhoef, the European Space Agency’s (ESA’s) director of the Galileo Programme and Navigation-related Activities, stated, “Today’s announcement marks the transition from a test system to one that is operational. Still, much work remains to be done. The entire constellation needs to be deployed, the ground infrastructure needs to be completed, and the overall system needs to be tested and verified.
“In addition, together with the commission we have started work on the second generation, and this is likely to be a long but rewarding adventure.”
Galileo Initial Services are managed by the GSA. The overall Galileo programme is run by the European Commission, which has handed over responsibility for the deployment of the system and technical support to operational tasks to the ESA.
Operator Contract. The GSOp contract runs for 10 years and covers operation and maintenance of the Galileo satellite system and its committed performance level: in particular, the operations and control of the system, the logistics and maintenance of the systems, and infrastructure as well as the user support services.
“With its emphasis on service performance, this contract will shape the future of Galileo. We look forward to building a strong partnership with Spaceopal as Galileo moves towards full operational capability under the responsibility of the GSA from January 2017,” said GSA Executive Director Carlo des Dorides.
Under GSA management, the contract awarded to Spaceopal specifically includes:
Secure operations of Galileo from two mission control centres (GCC), located in Germany and Italy, and the European GNSS Service Centre (GSC) for user support services in Spain;
Management of the Galileo Data Distribution Network (GDDN);
Integrated logistics support and maintenance for the entire space and ground infrastructure;
Monitoring of the system performance;
Support for the completion of the Galileo infrastructure and associated launches.
Spaceopal has served as the contractor for Galileo operations since 2010 under the Galileo Full Operational Capability (FOC) Operations Framework Contract.
Products and Services. The first Galileo smartphone by Spanish company BQ is now available on the market, and other manufacturers are expected to follow suit. Application developers can now test their ideas on the basis of a real signal.
With the declaration, Galileo will start to deliver, in conjunction with GPS, the following three types of services free of charge. Their availability will improve as more satellites are launched.
The Open Service is a free mass-market service for users with enabled chipsets in, for instance, smartphones and car navigation systems. Fully interoperable with GPS, combined coverage will deliver more accurate and reliable positioning for users.
Public Regulated Service is an encrypted, robust service for government-authorized users such as civil protection, fire brigades and the police.
Search and Rescue Service is Europe’s contribution to the long-running Cospas–Sarsat international emergency beacon location. The time between someone locating a distress beacon when lost at sea or in the wilderness will be reduced from up to three hours to just 10 minutes, with its location determined to within 5 kilometers, rather than the previous 10 kilometers.
Advisory Updates. USABINIT NAGUs were issued for 11 satellites: 0101, 0102, 0103, 0203, 0204, 0205, 0206, 0208, 0209, 0210 and 0211.
USABINIT, or Initially Usable, notifies users that a satellite is set healthy for the first time. 0104 had a power problem and is operating on E1 only. 0201 and 0202 were launched into lower orbits.
0207 and 0212–0214 are still undergoing commissioning and drifting to their designated orbital slots.
Ground control upgrade for GPS III approved
The U.S. Air Force approved Lockheed Martin’s design to upgrade the current GPS satellite ground control system with new capabilities that will enable it to operate more powerful and accurate GPS III satellites.
The successful Critical Design Review (CDR) for the Contingency Operations (COps) contract, completed on Nov. 17, gives Lockheed Martin a green light to proceed with software development and systems engineering to modify the existing GPS ground control system, called the Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP) Operational Control Segment.
The AEP is currently maintained by Lockheed Martin and controls the 31 GPS IIR, IIR-M and IIF satellites in orbit today.
The COps modifications will allow the AEP to support the more powerful, next-generation GPS Block III satellites, enabling them to perform their positioning, navigation and timing mission, once they are launched. COps is envisioned as a temporary gap filler prior to the entire GPS constellation’s transition to operations onto the next generation Operational Control System (OCX)Block 1, currently in development.
On Oct. 15, under a separate contract, Lockheed Martin completed the Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Upgrade #2 (CUP2) project — part of a multi-year plan to refresh the AEP’s technology and enhance the system’s ability to protect data and infrastructure from internal and external cyber threats, as well as improve its overall sustainability and operability. CUP2 is now fully operational and managing the current GPS constellation.
Lockheed Martin also is under contract to develop and build the Air Force’s first 10 GPS III satellites, which will deliver three times better accuracy, provide up to eight times improved anti-jamming capabilities, and extend spacecraft life to 15 years, 25 percent longer than the newest GPS satellites on-orbit today.
GPS III’s new L1C civil signal will make it the first GPS satellite to be interoperable with other international global navigation satellite systems.
GPS funded at $847 million for FY 2017
On Dec. 23, 2016, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017. The act includes policy and funding guidance for the GPS program of $847.362 million. This total excludes $13.171 million requested for the GPS IIF program, which requires FY 2017 funding for on-orbit support and contract closeout.
Procurement of GPS III satellites is budgeted at $34 million, development of GPS III satellites is at almost $142 million and the next-generation ground control system (OCX) is budgeted at $393 million, which comes with certification and congressional briefing requirements. The amount includes funding for the GPS Enterprise Integrator.
The GPS Enterprise Integrator project includes efforts necessary to accomplish the critical integrating function with the entire GPS user community. The Enterprise Integrator maintains the GPS architecture and system definition, controls and validates interfaces, ensures compatibility of Generation II and III systems, and develops and manages plans for execution and fielding of the GPS enterprise.
The final defense budget item is $278 million for development of new military GPS user equipment.
Besides the NDAA, other areas that include funding for GPS and related programs are Transportation (including WAAS), to support designated civil elements of the Air Force GPS program, along with civil GPS augmentations and related activities.
The Department of Transportation this year requested civil funding for GPS through the Office of the Secretary instead of through the FAA. Also, the request does not include funds for the Nationwide Differential GPS (NDGPS) program in FY 2017.
Lockheed Martin has completed a major upgrade to modernize the current ground control system of the U.S. Air Force’s GPS constellation.
The Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Upgrade #2 (CUP2) project is the latest step in the Air Force’s multi-year plan to refresh technology and transform the legacy Operational Control Segment — known as the Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP) — into a modern, high-performance command and control system.
On Oct. 15, CUP2 became fully operational and began managing the 31 GPS IIR, IIR-M and IIF satellites that make up today’s GPS constellation.
Capt. Adam Moody, 2SOPS GPS Operations Support flight commander, and Staff Sgt. Carl Ellinger, 2 SOPS GPS mission chief, review a checklist of procedures for a transfer operation at Schriever Air Force Base. (U.S. Air Force photo/Dennis Rogers)
The Air Force awarded Lockheed Martin the CUP2 project in November 2013 under its GPS Control Segment (GCS) contract, and the system is now fully deployed into the AEP’s GPS Master Control Station and the Alternate Master Control Station.
This is the third major technology refresh of the GPS command and control system since the GCS contract began in January 2013.
This upgrade to the existing ground control system provides the Air Force with flexibility. In May, as part of Contingency Operations (COps) under the GPS III contract, Lockheed Martin demonstrated a preliminary design to build off CUP2 and further upgrade the AEP to support next-generation GPS III satellites as they perform their positioning, navigation and timing mission. COps is a temporary gap filler prior to the entire GPS constellation’s transition onto the next-generation Operational Control System (OCX) Block 1, which is currently in development.
“Under CUP2, Lockheed Martin and the Air Force installed modern commercial hardware and a major software upgrade that enhances the system’s ability to protect data and infrastructure from cyber threats, as well as improves its overall sustainability and operability,” said Vinny Sica, vice president and general manager of Mission Solutions for Lockheed Martin. “Continued modernization and cyber-hardening of the GPS control system is vitally important to the sustainment of navigation services for our military and all global GPS users.”
The GPS Directorate at the U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center contracted the CUP2 upgrade. Air Force Space Command’s 2nd Space Operations Squadron (2SOPS), based at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, manages and operates the GPS constellation for both civil and military users.
