Tag: Iran

GPS circle spoofing discovered in Iran

In March, the U.S. government received an unusual inquiry about GPS disruptions. It was from a user in Iran reporting what appeared to be “circle spoofing” — a phenomenon that had only previously been observed in China.

“Some of GPS devices received fake signal and show the fake valid location. Yesterday I test a device, it can get signal and give real position. After 10 minutes the device show moving around a big circle in tehran by 35 km/h speed. I can’t fix this problem by restarting the device.

“The GPS module time is correct but the location is not. I attach Excel file of data and map of the track. I can’t get any response from Communications Regulatory Authority (CRA) of The I.R. of Iran. Do you know about this?”

Here is one of the images provided by the reporting source:

GPS spoofing device in operation at Iran’s Army Command and Staff College. (Screenshot courtesy of Dana Goward)

A little internet research showed that the spoofing was taking place at or near Iran’s “AJA University of Command and Staff,” formerly called the “War University.” It is the staff college for Iran’s Army.

Reports to the U.S. government about GPS disruption are normally listed on the U.S. Coast Guard’s Navigation Center website. This one has not been posted. Coast Guard officials said that it is because the report was received by another agency and did not contain sufficient information. Attempts by Coast Guard personnel to contact the reporting source for more information to enable the report to be posted were unsuccessful.

GPS spoofing is often easiest to detect in maritime areas. Ship automatic identification system (AIS) transmissions include location data and are detected by satellite. The data is then aggregated and used by various companies for a number of applications. Viewing ship location reports over time has revealed thousands of ship receivers spoofed to airports in Russia, and hundreds spoofed into circles (presumably around the spoofing device) in China.

Clearly, though, any system that aggregates and displays GPS location data can help detect wide area spoofing activity.

Strava is a mobile app for runners and cyclists. The company aggregates location data and displays it on a heat map to highlight athletes’ favorite routes.

The Strava heat map for Tehran shows that circle spoofing has also been employed in at least one other location. The below screenshot shows GPS-enabled fitness trackers circling a government complex that houses offices for several defense and technology-related organizations.

This heat map shows GPS spoofing at a government complex in Tehran,which houses the Ministry of Defense, Communication Regulatory Authority, Telecommunications Infrastructure Company, and Ministry of Telecommunications and Technology. (Screenshot: courtesy of Dana Goward)

Iran was the first nation to publicly announce it had the ability to spoof GPS signals and seems to have used it to great advantage.

In 2011, a CIA drone that had been operating across the border in Afghanistan landed at an Iranian airfield. Iran’s government claimed that its forces had sent false signals to the drone’s GPS receiver in order to capture it.

At first, U.S. government officials said that this kind of spoofing was not possible. Several months later, Prof. Todd Humphreys demonstrated how it could be done to a drone at the University of Texas football stadium.

U.S. officials then admitted that spoofing was possible, but said it wasn’t what happened to the CIA drone. At the same time, they offered no alternate explanation of how the drone was captured.

In 2016 Iranian forces captured two U.S. Navy boats that had strayed into Iran’s territorial waters. This was just after President Obama had succeeded in pressing that nation to give up nuclear weapons research, and was on the same day as Obama’s last State of the Union address. There was little reason for the U.S. Navy boats to have veered so far off course, and it was clear that the Iranian Navy was waiting for them.

Many speculated that Iran had spoofed GPS signals to lure the U.S. Navy boats into Iranian waters. U.S. officials have denied that this was the cause of the incident, but have not publicly offered an alternate explanation other than “mis-navigation.”

During heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf in 2019, Iran shot down a U.S. surveillance drone and President Trump seemed ready to launch a retaliatory strike. This was called off at the last minute. According to some reports, the strike was canceled because of the likelihood the drone was in Iranian airspace at the time.

At about the same time British intelligence was warning merchant vessels in the area that Iran was attempting to use GPS spoofing to lure them into Iranian waters as a pretext for seizing the ships.

While the Middle East has been a hotbed of jamming and conventional spoofing for years, these recent circle-spoofing incidents are the first of the kind we know of in the region. It may well be that Iranian forces have recently received equipment from China and are experimenting with it. They could also be using it to deter GPS guided drones and disrupt other surveillance systems in the vicinity of sensitive government facilities.

Dana A. Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. The non-profits C4ADS and Skytruth contributed to this article.

April 21, 2020
US prepares for drone strikes against Middle East targets

A Patriot missile launch.
(Photo: U.S. Army)

U.S. forces and air-defense missile batteries across the Middle East were placed on high alert Jan. 7 in preparation for possible Iranian drone attacks, reports CNN, including all Patriot batteries and forces in the area.

U.S. officials told CNN that intelligence mounted about a threat of an imminent attack against U.S. targets in the wake of the U.S. drone strike that killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani. U.S. intelligence also observed Iran moving military equipment, including drones and ballistic missiles, over the last several days.

The movement may be an Iranian effort to secure its weapons from a potential U.S. strike, or put them in positions to launch their own attacks.

Iran has put missiles on its drones that have been used in other attacks, including a significant attack on Saudi oil installations last year (see below).

Targets of concern are U.S. locations in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.

2019 Drone Tensions

Drones forces from both sides targeted assets in 2019. In June, Iran shot down a U.S. military drone that it claimed was an intruding American spy drone entering its territory. The U.S. said the drone was shot down in international airspace over the Strait of Hormuz.

In July, U.S. Marines jammed and destroyed an Iranian drone in the Strait of Hormuz from aboard the USS Boxer, an amphibious assault ship, because the drone has closed too close, to approximately 1,000 yards. Iran denied losing any of its drones.

In September, Iran was blamed for an attack on the Saudi oil industry, with drones and cruise missiles assumed launched from an Iranian base in Iran close to the border with Iraq. The Abqaiq oil plant was struck by more than a dozen projectiles.

Maritime Alert

On Monday, the U.S. Maritime Administration issued an alert to commercial vessels operating in the Middle East, citing multiple maritime threats and stating “there remains the possibility of Iranian action against U.S. maritime interests in the region.”

According to the alert, “The U.S. government is continually assessing the maritime security situation in the region to safeguard freedom of navigation, ensure the free flow of commerce, and protect U.S. vessels, personnel, and interests.

“U.S. Fifth Fleet Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) has the latest information on the dynamic maritime security threats and operational environment in this region. U.S. commercial vessels are advised to exercise caution and coordinate vessel voyage planning for transits of the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea with NCAGS and follow NCAGS’s recommendations and guidance whenever possible.”

January 7, 2020
Chinese GPS spoofing circles could hide Iran oil shipments

“GPS spoofing circles” have been discovered at 20 locations along the Chinese coast, according to the non-profit environmental group Skytruth. Of the locations observed, 16 were oil terminals; the others were corporate and government offices.

GPS spoofing in Shanghai that resulted in reported positions from ships, fitness trackers and other GPS enabled devices forming circles some distance from the shore was first observed by the non-profit C4ADS. Subsequently, Professor Todd Humphreys briefed the phenomena at an Institute of Navigation conference in September. The MIT Technology Review published an article about it in November.

This caught the interest of an analyst at the environmental non-profit Skytruth.

Evaluating a larger data set of ship AIS (Automatic Identification System) data, analyst Bjorn Bergman discovered at least 20 locations near the Chinese coast where similar spoofing had taken place in the last two years.

Sixteen of these “spoofing circle” locations were oil terminals. The most frequent occurrences by far were at the port of Dalian in northern China, close to the border with North Korea. Based upon the timing of the spoofing, imposition of sanctions on purchase of Iranian oil by the United States, and observations by others of Iranian oil being received by China, Bergman suggests that much of the spoofing is designed to help conceal these transactions.

Of the four locations not associated with oil terminals, three were government offices and one was the headquarters of the Qingjian industrial group, a huge engineering and construction conglomerate. These infrequent and irregular events may be related to visits by important government officials. A C4ADS report earlier this year demonstrated Russia uses GPS spoofing extensively for government VIP protection.

Bergman suggests that the actual spoofing device is located at the center of each of the rings formed by false GPS reports. He has also observed that not all AIS/GPS receivers in the impacted area are affected, the spoofing circles tend to be about 200 meters in diameter, many false vessel positions orbit the circle counterclockwise at 21 knots or 31 knots, and some receivers are spoofed to locations other than the circle.

Mass GPS spoofing is most easily detected and analyzed in coastal areas because of the availability of large data sets from AIS transmissions. AIS is a maritime safety system that uses GPS for location and movement information. This data is broadcast to other ships and shore stations to help prevent collisions and improve traffic management.

The U.S. Coast Guard first experimented with receiving AIS signals by satellite in 2008. Since that time, numerous governments and commercial entities have established AIS data services using both space-based and terrestrial receivers.

It is likely that the kinds of disruptions seen in Russian and Chinese maritime regions are occurring elsewhere. The lack of easily accessible data from non-maritime areas, though, makes this more difficult to detect.

Confounding this problem is an apparent reluctance of many users to report disruptions. The U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center has had only one official report a GPS problem from a user in Russian waters and one from Chinese waters, for example. Yet it is clear that thousands of vessels have been impacted in ways that must have been quite evident to their captains and crews.

Image: Skytruth

December 17, 2019
AgilLOC antenna element combats GNSS jamming at sea

With the proliferation of jamming devices readily available, maritime vessels need to be situationally aware of GNSS interference and disruption. The threat of GNSS jamming is made even more critical in situations that require navigation through narrow straits under poor visibility, with no sea lane markers in sight.

Case in point being the British-flagged oil tanker Stena Impero, which was seized by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards while sailing through the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stated that Stena Impero had taken a wrong route when entering the Strait of Hormuz.

This happened during a time when an advisory warning by the U.S Maritime Administration had already been released, stating that vessels operating in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman may encounter GPS interference, bridge-to-bridge communications spoofing or other communications jamming with little to no warning.

This episode could have been avoided if better awareness of the navigation system was employed.

Jamming protection at sea. ST Engineering has developed AgilLOC Antenna Element Compact (AEC), which provides GNSS protection against three simultaneous jamming/interference sources with its adaptive nulling algorithm for the maritime sector, ensuring continuous GNSS protection to connected systems.

AgilLOC AEC was designed for easy integration with new or existing legacy systems that required uninterrupted GNSS reception. Despite its lightweight and compact design, AgilLOC AEC provides a robust response to narrow and wideband interference, the company said.

When disruption happens. In a disruption, the crew onboard can only rely on radar or cross bearings using compass, terrestrial radio navigation or even sextants.

The loss of GNSS input to the ship’s surface search radar, gyro units and electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) will result in a lack of GNSS data for position fixing, radar over ground speed inputs, gyro speed input as well as the loss of collision avoidance capabilities on the ECDIS radar display. It is imperative that all ship’s crew are aware of the status of their GNSS reception.

Many GNSS receivers currently installed onboard vessels do not provide for jamming monitoring or mitigation. Deliberate or unintentional GNSS inference are becoming more prevalent, increasing the risk of receivers being overwhelmed by elevated levels of interferences.

Satellite navigation is essential for all maritime applications under all weather conditions. The AgilLOC AEC protects the GNSS signals for a smooth navigation and precision landing alongside with other navigational systems.

November 12, 2019
Iran jams GPS on ships in Strait of Hormuz
Ships sailing through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf have been experiencing GPS interference that U.S. officials suspect is the work of the Iranians, according to CNN.

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration issued an advisory on Aug. 7 to ships traveling in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea and Red Sea. Ships have reported GPS interference, bridge-to-bridge communications spoofing and jamming, and other problems.

Iran’s goal is for ships and aircraft to wander into Iranian waters or airspace, justifying a seizure, a U.S. defense official told CNN. He said Iran has placed GPS jammers on Iran-controlled Abu Musa Island, which lies in the Persian Gulf close to the entrance of the Strait of Hormuz.

“Heightened military activity and increased political tensions in this region continue to pose serious threats to commercial vessels,” reads the advisory. “Associated with these threats is a potential for miscalculation or misidentification that could lead to aggressive actions. Vessels operating in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman may also encounter GPS interference, bridge-to-bridge communications spoofing, and/or other communications jamming with little to no warning.”

In at least two incidents, vessels reported GPS interference. One vessel reportedly shut off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) before it was seized, complicating response efforts.

Vessels have also reported spoofed bridge-to-bridge communications from unknown entities falsely claiming to be U.S. or coalition warships.

Since May 2019, the following maritime incidents have occurred in this region:
- Six attacks against commercial vessels.
- Shoot-down of U.S. Navy remotely piloted aircraft over international waters
- Attempted at-sea interdiction of Isle of Man-flagged M/V British Heritage (oil tanker)
- Seizure of ex-Panama-flagged M/V Riah (oil tanker)
- Seizure of U.K.-flagged M/V Stena Impero (oil/chemical tanker)
- Detention and subsequent release of Liberian-flagged M/V Mesdar (oil tanker).
Photo: Igor Grochev/Shutterstock.com
August 9, 2019
PNT Roundup: Remote and autonomous ships coming to high seas

Remote and Autonomous Ships

Coming Soon to the High Seas Near You

Image courtesy of Rolls-Royce.

The Advanced Autonomous Waterborne Applications Initiative (AAWA) published a white paper in June as part of presentations at the Autonomous Ship Technology Symposium 2016 in Amsterdam. The white paper outlines the Project’s vision of how remote and autonomous shipping will become a reality.

Oskar Levander, Rolls-Royce vice president of Innovation – Marine, said, “This is happening. It’s not if, it’s when. The technologies needed to make remote and autonomous ships a reality exist. The AAWA project is testing sensor arrays in a range of operating and climatic conditions in Finland and has created a simulated autonomous ship control system which allows the behaviour of the complete communication system to be explored. We will see a remote controlled ship in commercial use by the end of the decade.”

The AAWA white paper explores the research carried out to date on the business case for autonomous applications, the safety and security implications of designing and operating remotely operated ships, the legal and regulatory dimensions and the existence and readiness of a supplier network to deliver commercially applicable products in the short to medium term.

Positioning Technologies. The proposed system draws on a range of sensors (see Figure 1) including GPS, inertial, lidar, cameras, short-range radars, and electronic charts. “When combined witha global or local positioning reference such as GNSS, and with wind sensors and inertial measurement units, the ship is able to keep its position even in rough weather conditions,” states the report. “The main question is therefore not whether the implementation of autonomous ship navigation is technically possible, but what is the combination of technologies and methods that provides the level of performance and reliability that is required for practical operation of large vessels, and at a reasonable cost.”

The white paper draws on a wide range of expertise from academic researchers at some of Finland’s leading universities. Industry input has been provided by leading members of the maritime cluster including Rolls-Royce, Brighthouse NAPA, Deltamarin, DNV GL and Inmarsat.

The project also has the support of shipowners and operators. The tests of sensor arrays are being carried out aboard Finferries 65-metrer double ended ferry, the Stella, which operates between Korpo and Houtskär. ESL Shipping Ltd is helping explore the implications of remote and autonomous ships for the short sea cargo sector.

Iran Reiterates Loran Effort

Researchers at Iran’s Malek-Ashtar University have developed a 1-megawatt transmitter with half-cycle technology for a national project announced as a replacement for GPS, which is currently employed for all positioning, navigation and timing services across the country. Given the lack of control on the GPS’s accuracy and quality and a possible outage of the system in critical conditions, the country’s defense ministry has set out to develop a local positioning system (LPS) for positioning and timing.

Experts at the U.S.-based Resilient PNT Foundation say the description of the system make it appear to be a variant of Loran, probably similar to those operated in Russia and China. If it is such a Loran variant and if it complies with international standards, it should complement Saudi Arabia’s Loran signals in the Persian Gulf, they said.

Iran will establish five stations with powerful transmitters in appropriate locations to provide navigation, positioning and timing services in compliance with international standards, according to the country’s defense minister.

Iran made a similar announcement about a land-based navigation system in December 2013. The country’s military experts and technicians have reportedly logged significant progress in manufacturing a broad range of indigenous equipment.

U.S. eLoran August demonstration

The Wildwood, New Jersey, eLoran transmitter will continuously broadcast from July 29 through 12 p.m. Eastern time on Aug.15. Wildwood will broadcast as 8970 Master and Secondary most of the time but occasionally may operate at other rates.

August 1, 2016