Tag: Iran

Converging on the jammer: Dual-satellite GPS interference localization from space
On a January morning in 2026, a GPS jammer powered up near Shiraz, Iran. It was not the first, and it would not be the last. The Strait of Hormuz corridor has become one of the most persistently jammed airspaces on Earth. But this time, two satellites were watching from very different vantage points, and together they would demonstrate something new: that spaceborne sensors can localize a terrestrial GPS jammer to within a few kilometers, using physics alone.

This article presents the first direct comparison of Cyclone Global Navigation Satellite System (CYGNSS) — a NASA GNSS reflectometry constellation — and NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) — an L-band synthetic aperture radar for GPS jammer localization. The results challenge assumptions about which modality performs better and reveal that the answer depends on a question most analysts forget to ask.

The setup: Known jammer, known position

Validation requires ground truth. With help from the PNT community, we identified a GPS jammer operating near 27.32°N, 52.87°E (approximately 50 km southwest of Shiraz) that was active on Jan. 8 and Jan. 20, 2026, with confirmed quiet periods on Dec. 15 and Dec. 27, 2025. The jammer’s position was established through independent signals intelligence.

This gave us a controlled experiment: two “jammer ON” dates and two “jammer OFF” baseline dates, with satellite coverage from both CYGNSS and NISAR spanning the full period.

Two satellites, two physics

CYGNSS is a constellation of eight microsatellites that measure GPS signals reflected off Earth’s surface. Each spacecraft carries a delay-Doppler receiver that maps reflected signal power across a grid of delay and Doppler bins, known as the delay-Doppler map, or DDM. When a terrestrial jammer is active, it floods the GPS band with noise, elevating the DDM noise floor and suppressing the coherent surface reflection. The effect is detectable hundreds of kilometers from the jammer, creating a wide-area footprint in the reflected signal data.

FIGURE 1 Jammer localization tracks from both CYGNSS and NISAR satellite
constellations. (All figures by Sean Gorman)

NISAR operates an L-band SAR at 1.257 GHz, just 30 MHz from the GPS L2 frequency at 1.2276 GHz. When a GPS jammer’s broadband emissions leak into NISAR’s receive band, they create characteristic streaks in the SAR imagery. The streaks are elongated in the cross-track (range) direction, not along-track, a counterintuitive result that follows directly from SAR signal processing. In azimuth (along-track), the jammer is a fixed-point source with a valid Doppler history, so the SAR azimuth processor focuses it correctly, similar to any ground target. But in range (cross-track), the jammer’s broadband noise does not match the SAR’s chirp waveform, so range compression smears the energy across many range bins rather than compressing to a point. The result is a streak perpendicular to the flight direction, whose along-track centroid encodes the jammer’s latitude and whose cross-track extent encodes a range arc, which is the distance from the orbit ground track (FIGURE 1). The bearing of each streak encodes the jammer’s direction relative to the satellite’s ground track.

FIGURE 2 Crosstrack visualization for NISAR RFI streaks.

The two sensors could hardly be more different. CYGNSS sees the jammer’s effect on reflected GPS signals, offering an indirect measurement spread across hundreds of specular reflection points. NISAR sees the jammer’s emissions directly in its own receiver, which is a more precise measurement, but only along the satellite’s narrow ground track. FIGURE 2 shows both detection sets converging on the jammer location.

CYGNSS: 785 Detections, 4.33 km Error

We processed all CYGNSS Level 1 data within 200 km of the jammer location on both ON and OFF dates. Four detection methods contributed observations:

■ DDM noise floor (419 detections): The pre-computed ddm_noise_floor variable, calibrated against the thermal noise reference, proved the strongest discriminator. Near-jammer values exceeded 15,000 counts against a ~10,000 mean background.

■ Spatial noise grid (299):A 10 km gridded analysis identified cells with anomalously elevated noise relative to adjacent cells.

■ SNR hole detection (66): Coherent surface reflections were suppressed near the jammer, creating spatial “holes” in the SNR field.

■ NBRCS drop (1): Surface reflectivity dropped approximately 16% near the jammer, though this method produced few threshold exceedances.

Across four DDM channels per spacecraft and multiple passes, this yielded 785 total anomalous observations on the jammer-ON dates.

FIGURE 3 Scatterplot of interference insensity versus distance for CYGNSS.

Localizing using a simple centroid of all 785 detection positions placed the jammer 32.1 km from truth, with too many distant, low-SNR detections diluting the estimate.

Instead, we fit a parametric 1/r² inverse-distance model:

I(r)=Ar2

where A is a free amplitude parameter and r is the distance from a candidate jammer position. We jointly optimized the jammer position and amplitude using SciPy’s Nelder-Mead optimizer across all 785 observations, weighted by intensity. The optimizer converged on a position 4.33 km from ground truth, providing a 27.7 km improvement over the centroid (FIGURE 3).

The baseline: Zero false positives

On the jammer-OFF dates (Dec. 15 and Dec. 27, 2025), the pipeline produced exactly zero detections using the same thresholds, geographic area and satellites: a completely clean result. This suggests that the 785 detections are unlikely to be sensor artifacts or geographic anomalies. They disappear when the jammer turns off.

NISAR: 17 Detections, 6.26 km Error

NISAR’s approach is fundamentally different. Rather than measuring hundreds of reflected signals across a wide area, it captures direct emissions in a narrow swath, but with far greater geometric precision.

We processed NISAR L2 GCOV (geocoded covariance) products from Track 157, Frame 15 (ascending) for three dates: the Dec. 27 baseline and the Jan. 8 and Jan. 20 jammer-ON passes. The detection pipeline used eigenvalue decomposition of the polarimetric covariance matrix:
1. λ₁ ratio thresholding: In jammer-contaminated pixels, the dominant eigenvalue λ₁ of the 2×2 [HH, HV] covariance matrix rises sharply relative to the scene mean, indicating an unpolarized additive source.
2. Cross-polarization ratio (HV/HH): GPS jammer emissions are unpolarized, disproportionately elevating the HV channel. Anomalous HV/HH ratios flag contaminated azimuth lines.
3. Iterative outlier trimming: Three rounds of 1.5σ clipping removed scattered false detections, leaving 17 high-confidence streak centroids.
FIGURE 4 Error and CEP Metrics Comparison for CYGNSS and NISAR.

With detections from two passes on different dates, we had two independent bearing lines. Each pass’s streak centroids defined an azimuth aligned cluster whose major axis pointed toward the jammer. A PCA fit to the two clusters extracted the bearing: 308.1° from the Jan. 8 pass and 316.2° from Jan. 20. Their intersection — computed via scipy optimization of the angular residual — landed 6.26 km from ground truth (FIGURE 4).

The along-track/cross-track decomposition reveals why the 6.26 km error is a geometric ceiling for this dataset, not a processing limitation. Both passes come from the same Track 157 ascending orbit on a 12-day repeat cycle. The intensity-weighted along-track centroids land at +3.0 km and +3.1 km north of the jammer, a direct stable latitude measurement. The cross-track centroids land at +5.4 km and +5.6 km east of the orbit ground track, a range measurement. But because both passes share identical orbit geometry, the two range arcs are nearly parallel. The bearing difference between passes (308.1° vs 316.2°) is only 8.1°, producing a shallow intersection angle and poor cross-range resolution. A single descending pass, which would cross the ascending track at approximately 60-70°, would transform the geometry from two near-parallel lines to a genuine triangulation, potentially reducing the localization error to sub-2 km. Unfortunately, no descending NISAR pass covering this jammer site was available in the beta archive, which ends on Jan. 20, 2026.

The CEP (circular error probable, the radius containing 50% of repeated estimates) was 6.88 km, meaning if we ran this analysis on many similar jammers, half our estimates would fall within ~7 km.

Who wins?

CYGNSS wins, and not just on accuracy.

A naive confidence metric for the 1/r² fit would be the scatter of the 785 input detections (CEP = 127 km). But the detections are not the estimate; they are the inputs to a model fit. The relevant confidence question is: How stable is the fitted position?

We answered this with a 500-iteration bootstrap: resample the 785 detections with replacement, re-run the 1/r² optimizer each time and measure the spread of the resulting position estimates. The bootstrap CEP, the median radial distance across 500 fitted positions, was 3.48 km. The optimizer converges stably to within a few kilometers of the same location regardless of which detections are included.

This means CYGNSS achieves 4.33 km error with 3.48 km confidence, both better than NISAR’s 6.26 km error and 6.88 km confidence.

The bootstrap CEP also reveals what the raw scatter obscures: the 1/r² fit is constrained primarily by the ~80 high-intensity detections within 30 km of the jammer. The remaining 700 distant, low-intensity detections contribute little to the position estimate — they are correctly downweighted by the intensity-weighted least squares. The fit’s stability comes from the physics: a 1/r² signal has steep gradients near the source, providing strong positional constraints where it matters most.

Bayesian fusion: Can we get both?

The obvious next question: Can we combine CYGNSS’s wide-area sensitivity with NISAR’s geometric precision? We implemented four fusion strategies, all designed to work without ground truth:

■ Bayesian Gaussian posterior: Model each sensor’s estimate as a 2D isotropic Gaussian with σ = CEP/1.1774. The posterior is the product of the two Gaussians: an analytical precision-weighted mean.

■ NISAR-prior constrained 1/r²: Re-run the CYGNSS optimizer with a Gaussian regularization term pulling toward the NISAR estimate, sweeping the regularization weight λ from 0.01 to 10.

■ NISAR-proximity re-weighted 1/r²: Apply a Gaussian kernel centered on the NISAR estimate to the CYGNSS detections before fitting, effectively upweighting observations consistent with the SAR result.

■ Joint CEP-balanced: Combine the CYGNSS gradient signal with NISAR cluster proximity, weighted by (σ_CYGNSS/σ_NISAR)².

FIGURE 5 Summary statistics for jammer localization with CYGNSS, NISAR and fused approach.

With the bootstrap CEP, the precision ratio flips. The CYGNSS Gaussian (σ = 2.95 km) is now 2× tighter than NISAR (σ = 5.84 km). The Bayesian posterior, the precision-weighted mean, lands at 4.69 km, pulling toward CYGNSS’s better estimate while incorporating NISAR’s independent geometric constraint. FIGURE 5 shows the fusion: two comparable Gaussians whose product is tighter than either alone.

The fused result (4.69 km error, 7.85 km CEP) is not quite as accurate as CYGNSS alone (4.33 km), because NISAR’s 6.26 km estimate pulls it slightly away from truth. But operationally, the fusion provides a cross-validated answer: two independent physics arriving at similar locations builds confidence that neither sensor is producing an artifact.

The key insight is that the bootstrap CEP unlocked meaningful fusion. When the raw scatter CEP (127 km) was used, NISAR dominated the posterior 343:1 and fusion added nothing. With the fit-based CEP (3.48 km), both sensors contribute, and the posterior reflects genuine multi-modal evidence.

Operational implications

For CYGNSS: CYGNSS excels at both detection and localization. Its 785 detections across a 200 km radius, with zero false positives on baseline dates, provide unambiguous jammer detection. The 1/r² fit achieves 4.33 km accuracy with a bootstrap-verified 3.48 km CEP, meaning an analyst can trust the result to single-digit kilometer precision without ground truth. CYGNSS’s eight-satellite constellation also provides sub-daily revisit, enabling near-real-time monitoring.

For NISAR: NISAR provides independent geometric confirmation. With just two passes over an active jammer, the bearing intersection achieved 6.26 km accuracy with a 6.88 km CEP. The 6.26 km result is constrained by orbit geometry, not by detection sensitivity. Our two ascending passes from Track 157 produced nearly parallel range arcs with only 8.1° of bearing separation. Adding a single descending pass would provide a crossing angle of 60° to 70° and could reduce localization error to sub-2 km — transforming NISAR from a confirming sensor into a precision localization tool in its own right. The limitation in this study was data availability: The NISAR beta archive contained only ascending Track 157 passes over the jammer site. NISAR’s 12-day repeat cycle and fixed ground track also mean the jammer must be active when the satellite passes overhead. NISAR’s current value is as a confirming sensor — when both modalities converge on the same location, confidence increases beyond what either achieves alone.

For Fusion: With comparable CEPs (3.48 km vs 6.88 km), fusion now produces genuinely blended estimates. The Bayesian posterior at 4.69 km reflects real multi-sensor information. Future improvements, such as more NISAR passes with diverse bearings or CYGNSS multi-week accumulation, would tighten both estimates further.

For the Adversary: These results demonstrate that GPS jammers operating in contested airspace are observable and localizable from orbit using openly available civilian satellite data. The 4.33 km CYGNSS result is approximately 2× better than the published state of the art for GNSS-R jammer localization (~9 km grid resolution, Chew et al., 2023) and the NISAR bearing intersection approach has not been previously demonstrated for jammer geolocation.

Still broadcasting: Jammer persistence through conflict

The validation analysis used January 2026 data. But on Feb. 28, armed conflict erupted in the region. Did the jammer survive?

We ran the CYGNSS noise floor detection pipeline for each day from Feb. 28 through April 6, comparing against the December 2025 baseline. The answer is unambiguous: The jammer is not only still active — it is operating at dramatically higher power.

FIGURE 6 A timeline of jammer activity for Shiraz, Iran, from December 2025 to
April 2026.

In January, the jammer elevated the CYGNSS noise floor by approximately 15% above baseline. By early March, days after the conflict began, noise elevation had jumped to 50% to 60%. By mid-March, it reached 70% to 84%, where it remained through early April. Detection counts tell the same story: 89 to 192 per day in January, rising to 1,000 to 2,000 per day during the conflict (FIGURE 6).

The escalation was immediate. On Feb. 28, noise elevation was +34.5%, already double the January level. By March 3, it had reached +62.7%, and by April 6, it peaked at +79.1%. The signal has remained at 5× the January intensity through the most recent available data (April 6, 2026).

Several interpretations are consistent with this pattern:

■ Power increase: The operator increased jammer output power, perhaps in response to the conflict or as a defensive posture against GPS-guided munitions.

■ Additional jammers: Multiple units may have been co-located or deployed nearby, creating an aggregate signature larger than any single device.

■ Duty cycle change: The jammer may have shifted from intermittent to continuous operation.

What is clear is that the jammer we localized in January was not incapacitated by the conflict. It was amplified. CYGNSS’s sub-daily revisit capability makes this kind of persistent monitoring possible using entirely passive, civilian satellite data — no tasking, no cooperation with the target state and no risk to reconnaissance assets.

Context and prior work

CYGNSS-based RFI detection builds on work by Chew et al., 2023, who demonstrated grid-level jammer detection at approximately 9 km resolution using DDM noise floor anomalies. Our 1/r² parametric fit extends this from detection to localization, achieving sub-5 km accuracy by exploiting the physics of signal power decay.

At the other end of the precision spectrum, Murrian et al., 2021, demonstrated ~220 m jammer localization using ISS-mounted Doppler measurements of raw intermediate-frequency (IF) data. This approach achieves an order of magnitude better precision than our methods but requires specialized hardware and raw signal access not available on current operational satellites.

The NISAR bearing intersection approach demonstrated here is, to our knowledge, the first published use of L-band SAR RFI streaks for jammer triangulation. The key insight is that NISAR’s proximity to GPS L2 (just 30 MHz separation) makes it an unintentional but effective GPS interference sensor.

Summary

Two satellites, two physics, one jammer. CYGNSS sees the interference footprint across hundreds of kilometers and localizes the source through inverse-distance physics. NISAR sees the emissions directly in its SAR receiver and triangulates through bearing intersection. Both achieve sub-7 km accuracy independently; together, they cross-validate and build the confidence that operational use demands.

The jammer near Shiraz is still there — louder than ever. The satellites are still watching.

Chew, C., Shah, R., Zuffada, C., et al. (2023). “Demonstrating CYGNSS as
a Tool for Detecting GNSS Interference on a Global Scale.” IEEE Journal of
Selected Topics in Applied Earth Observations and Remote Sensing.

Murrian, M.J., Narula, L., Iannucci, P.A., et al. (2021). “GNSS Interference
Monitoring from Low Earth Orbit.” Navigation: Journal of the Institute of
Navigation, 68(1).

NASA JPL. (2024). “NISAR L-band SAR Technical Specifications.” NASA/
ISRO SAR Mission Documentation.
Closas, P., Fernández-Prades, C. (2023). “GNSS Interference Detection
and Mitigation: A Survey.” Signal Processing, 206.
May 18, 2026
UAV updates: Attack drones deployed in the Iran conflict and autonomous boats at RoboBoat 2026

The war between Israel, the United States and Iran has dominated headlines since it began with surprise attacks launched by Israel and the U.S. on the last day of February. Significant damage has since been inflicted on Iran as the allies seek to end the country’s nuclear capabilities and bring about regime change — removing those responsible for worldwide terrorism through its proxy groups, including Hezbollah, the Houthi movement in Yemen, various Iraqi Shiite militias, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, all of which have targeted Western countries and Israel.

Iran maintains a formidable military with more than 600,000 active-duty personnel, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 ballistic and shorter-range missiles, and a significant offensive drone capability. The Shahed series and Mohajer-6 drones have emerged as low-cost kamikaze weapons central to Iran’s arsenal. The Shahed-136 in particular has been supplied in large quantities to Russia for use in its ongoing war against Ukraine and is now also manufactured by Russia, or a version of it is. The Shahed drone has several variants, including the jet-powered, long-range Shahed-238.

Iranian Shahed-136 attack drones, read for launch. (Photo: IMA Media)

With a range of 800 miles to 1550 miles, the Shahed-136 carries an 88-pound warhead which can punch very large holes in buildings, disable oil tankers or warships, destroy equipment on the ground, and kill and injure lots of personnel. It’s possible that those six US servicemen killed and others injured during the early hours of the conflict in Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, were victims of a Shahed kamikaze drone attack.

This is not all bad news: the U.S. has analyzed captured downed Shahed-136 drones and has quickly replicated its own version, the Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS), admittedly with a shorter range but just as deadly. It’s reported that the Iranians can build and mass-produce thousands of drones for between $20 and $50,000 each. Nevertheless, the U.S. has now been producing large volumes of LUCAS, and has them to fight in Iran.

LUCAS is already in US volume production. (Photo: US Central Command)

Spektraworks, based in Phoenix, was awarded a $30 million contract, and within 18 months, a redesigned, hardened and autonomously coordinated attack drone — manufactured in the U.S. at a cost of approximately $43,000 per unit — became available in significant quantities and was fielded to U.S. Central Command’s newly formed drone task force, Task Force Scorpion Strike.

The unit was responsible for the Shahed-like drones seen flying over Baghdad in early television coverage as the U.S. offensive got underway.

It marks a notable achievement — delivering similarly designed attack drones, and the destruction they carry, back to Iran, a country that has exported terror to numerous nations for more than 50 years.

Meanwhile, the 2026 RoboBoat Competition took place at Nathan Benderson Park near Sarasota, Florida, drawing 37 high school and university teams. The event challenges students to demonstrate progress in developing autonomously operating marine systems installed on model boats. Benderson Park features a large rowing lake that has hosted Olympic rowing and canoe trials, making it a fitting venue for RoboBoat competitors and spectators.

Teams arrived with a wide variety of model boat designs and technical approaches, navigating through a series of in-water obstacle courses while gaining hands-on experience relevant to future careers. Volunteer support was plentiful, and each team brought cheering crews and technical assistance. Typical tasks included restoring simulated harbor operations, assessing underwater infrastructure and supporting exploration scenarios.

After watching more than 2 hours of posted videos, it is clear that the competition is run by a volunteer student organization. The final-round objectives were not clearly defined, and without commentary, it was difficult to determine whether any team successfully completed the obstacle course — though several boats did navigate between narrow red and green buoys after avoiding a series of posts in the water.

RoboBoat 2026

Nevertheless, it was great to see the whole gathering, many from overseas, and the level of enthusiasm. One guy told the story of how the team’s heavy equipment had survived a long-distance shipment from overseas and arrived almost intact. But during the competition, the quite heavy demo boat sank; it was just a minor setback for him — we’ll learn something and keep going! — was his mantra. As everyone in the industry knows, having your tested, verified, and 100% reliable set-up actually function at a trade show is a major hurdle we’ve all had to overcome. So, it’s good to see these young men and women learn firsthand what it takes to get a prototype to work when it becomes absolutely essential – and of course, to actually make progress and extend their reach towards autonomous robotics.

The U.S. military has been throwing Shahed-like kamikaze weaponized drones back at the country that had not only invented them, but also spread the technology to and through other antagonists, yet now feeling their impact on their own capital city — a significant success for the initial U.S. attack on Iran. And growing and supporting the latest wave of students and their autonomous aspirations at RoboBoat 2026 in Florida. One aspect of UAVs is warlike and deadly, while another is encouraging young engineering candidates towards their dreams of maritime robotic autonomy.

March 9, 2026
Iran develops its own software for GNSS corrections & processing

Researchers at the University of Tehran have developed indigenous software for providing real-time corrections for networks, precise positioning service and online processing of GNSS observations.

According to various news reports, the software is a modern, secure, and intelligent platform for processing observations from global positioning satellites, including GPS, Galileo, BeiDou and GLONASS.

Developed as a practical tool for surveyors, engineers, researchers and organizations in the field of satellite data monitoring, the software is intended to replace imported software and reduce dependence on foreign technologies. It has been tested by the network of permanent stations of the National Iranian South Oil Company.

The system processes observations using static, PPK, PPP and SPP methods, as well as observation quality control and enables the implementation of various positioning methods and real-time monitoring of ionospheric and tropospheric effects.

It supports all GNSS data types and can connect to reference stations in both client and server modes. It supports all existing and future GNSS signals and can handle at least 50 permanent stations and 200 users simultaneously. It also provides phase ambiguity resolution for baselines up to 70 kilometers.

Other technical features include providing a relative planimetric accuracy of 2 cm and a height accuracy of 3 cm using the static method with a maximum setup time of 15 minutes, a relative planimetric accuracy of 4 cm and a height accuracy of 5 cm using PPK and NRTK methods, and delivering corrections with a maximum permissible latency of 0.5 seconds.

The software has the capability to connect to reference stations through serial, TCP, and UDP ports, supports NTRIP protocol versions 1 and 2, displays an online map with a Google Map-like background, allows for viewing the location, status and information of CORS stations and active users, and enables generation of KML outputs.

January 26, 2026
When GPS is under attack, we need back-ups

On June 13, following reports of Israeli airstrikes on Iran, interference rates in the Strait of Hormuz spiked. GPSJam.org, a service that tracks satellite signal interference, now reports medium-level disruption (between 2% and 10%) across the Gulf region. This is no isolated blip, but part of a pattern: electronic warfare is increasing in global hotspots. It’s also a warning.

Modern warfare is no longer about guns and bombs. Jamming, spoofing and using ever-more sophisticated cybertricks to disrupt GNSS are now regular tactics used to sow disorder. They are cheap, deniable, and often highly effective. But they also expose a dangerous weakness in how we navigate, communicate, and coordinate. If GPS is the backbone of global positioning, we are learning just how brittle it can be.

Strait of Hormuz Under Threat

The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow channel through which around one-fifth of the world’s oil passes, and here, ships are now at risk not only from pirates and mines, but from corrupted satellite signals. Spoofers can broadcast false GPS positions to nearby vessels. In recent years, we have seen ships appear to sail across runways, airports, and deserts, thanks to malicious signal interference. In aviation, spoofed or jammed GNSS signals have led to aircraft turning around mid-air or being diverted. These are real and growing threats.

As someone who has worked in naval intelligence and the defense industry for decades, I have seen how quickly technology evolves, and how slow we can be to protect our own systems. But there are solutions to the problem I’ve described. One is laser-based optical communications.

The Need for Resilient PNT

Laser communication is very difficult to jam or spoof. Unlike the low-power radio frequencies used by GPS, a laser beam is narrow, focused, and nearly impossible to intercept without being detected. And because lasercom is optical, not radio, it isn’t vulnerable to the same types of interference. That makes laser communication ideal for high-security communications and low latency support in contested environments.

Optical ground station networks, when paired with optical satellite links, also offer vastly higher data transfer capacity than conventional RF systems. Optical links can now carry 1,000 times more data than their RF counterparts. At a time when threats are growing quickly and data needs are exploding, that kind of capacity is essential.

This will make you wonder why lasercom isn’t more widely used. The answer is that only in recent years has it become mature and able to be deployed rapidly. Systems that once seemed exotic or experimental are now proven, reliable, and ready to scale. Many space agencies and defense organizations, including the US Department of Defense and NATO, are investing in them.

To be clear, optical comms will not replace GPS or radio. But they can supplement and support it, especially in high-risk areas where GNSS is under attack. Just as militaries don’t rely on one radar or one radio channel, governments shouldn’t rely on a single source of truth for navigation and timing.

Escalating Threats to Critical Infrastructure

When you depend on precise location data for everything from logistics to drone strikes to the safe passage of oil tankers, the idea that one bad actor with a spoofer can throw you off course is a real concern. When the threat can be made a reality without firing a shot, you can be sure it will be used more and more often.

Just as satellites offer a way to monitor subsea cable sabotage, they also offer a chance to future-proof our navigation and communication networks. The same technology that is being used to track ships and sense underwater disruptions can be adapted to create robust, high-speed, interference-proof backup channels. Governments that invest in this infrastructure now will be in a far stronger position to deter attacks, respond quickly, and maintain operational clarity when others cannot. We wish it were otherwise, but the world is becoming more dangerous, and attacks will accordingly become more common.

If the last year has taught us anything, it’s that infrastructure is no longer neutral. It’s considered a legitimate target, particularly by those whose aim is to create confusion and disorder. GNSS isn’t immune to this trend. In fact, because of it’s importance, it’s a prime target. We have to stop assuming that what worked in peacetime will work at a time of conflict. That, sadly, is the reality of this moment.

July 8, 2025
GNSS jamming widespread in Strait of Hormuz, ships collide

GNSS jamming is causing confusion for ships traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, reports gCaptain. The regional threat levels are labeled “significant” because of air strikes between Iran and Israel, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC). Maritime threat levels are marked as “elevated”.

The JMIC highlighted GNSS jamming problems around the Port of Bandar Abbas and throughout the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf regions. Nevertheless, commercial shipping traffic has continued at normal rates.

Naivgational error is considered the cause of a collision June 17 between two tankers in the Gulf of Oman. The Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) Front Eagle, with 2 million barrels of Iraqi crude bound for China, hit the Suezmax tanker Adalynn 15 nautical miles off Fujairah. There was fire on both ships, but no injuries. The Front Eagle appeared to be onshore in Iran days before the collision.

Nearly 1,000 ships in the Gulf have been affected by mass interference since the start of the Iran-Israel conflict on June 12, according to shipping analysis firm Windward. Recent tracking data has shown unusual positioning errors, with vessels appearing to be in impossible locations.

June 18, 2025
Key updates in unmanned systems

Iran is in the process of initial field testing of a new drone aircraft carrier — the Shahid Bagheri — a converted container ship.

Featuring an angled flight deck and ski-jump ramp, the ship seems well-equipped to launch large drones. Two additional drone-carrier vessels, the Shahid Mahdavi and Shahid Roudaki, have also been spotted during sea trials alongside this latest member of the Iranian Shahed drone-carrier fleet.

The objective seems to enable Iran to extend its drone attack capabilities across the Gulf, which is likely to concern Israel, the United States, and their allies. Nevertheless, the drone-carrier vessels do not appear to possess advanced defense systems, nor are they accompanied by destroyers or equivalent support. As such, they may be highly vulnerable to drone attacks.

In 2004, the UK launched the Watchkeeper drone program, led by Thales UK and Elbit Systems through their joint venture, U-TacS. The program was contracted for £700 million ($852 million), with the first flight expected in 2006. It centered around the Elbit Hermes 450 drone with substantial modifications. The 2006 date slipped significantly as costs climbed through 2010, and authorization for military training only happened in 2014. However, the rollout for operational use was still delayed. During those initial tests, one in seven drones crashed in circumstances often associated with bad weather — not good for a drone designed and intended for all-weather operations. The trials were moved to locations with better weather conditions.

Initially featuring limited surveillance and target acquisition capabilities, the Watchkeeper WK450 drone has been enhanced with upgrades that include synthetic aperture radar and ground-moving target indication, in addition to its original electro-optical/infrared sensor.

Watchkeeper flight in April 2013. (Photo: UK MOD)

The drone was used for English Channel patrol and for some uncontested airspace surveillance and targeting missions in Afghanistan. It was most recently fielded in NATO exercises in Estonia, flying in different weather conditions to verify airspace deconfliction and interoperability with Estonian air traffic control.

Unfortunately, program delays, which have sometimes been associated with over 1000 additional UK requirements during the development cycle, difficulties in training, cost growth from the original £700 to an ultimate program cost of £1.35 billion ($1.64 billion), along with obsolescence brought on by the years of delays — these have all now doomed the Watchkeeper drone program to retirement, which the UK recently announced.

Watchkeeper drones were eventually priced at $5.2 million each for a quantity of 45 to 54, for a task which today’s drones, costing maybe $30 thousand, are much more capable. A fate also perhaps brought on by the fantastic rate of evolution for today’s commercial drones versus the well-trodden, somewhat lengthy path of mil-spec development programs.

The US Air Force has established an advanced technology test area at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) — the Autonomy, Data and AI Experimentation Proving Ground. Near Earth Autonomy (NEA) recently worked with Eglin to demonstrate the capabilities of its Griff 135 multicopter drone and its autonomous avoidance capability.

NEA has developed avoidance and autonomous navigation capability, which allows its drones to fly beyond visual lines of sight by knowing their location with respect to the environment around them. With optical and electronic sensors, the drone builds a point-cloud image of its surroundings on a separate computer from that which manages its autonomous behavior. The two systems interact to provide autonomous flight, including obstacle avoidance, take-off and landing, and, in several cases, the delivery of special cargo, such as blood and medical samples.

In the case of the Eglin tests, the objective was for the Griff 135 to interact with a Service-Malory TRV-150 cargo drone operated by the 413th Flight Test Squadron. Now, we have a four-rotor cargo drone capable of carrying 150 lb of cargo and an eight-foot quadcopter capable of destroying each other in a potential collision. First, they are independent; one is manually operated, and the other has an autonomous capability. But who knows if it can see, detect, and avoid another fast-moving drone in the same airspace? So, the flight test had the two crossing paths to verify, detect, and avoid by NEA drone. Two flight sessions and the Griff-135 did a good job seeing, computing and executing multiple avoidance maneuvers.

NAE UAV. (Photo: NAE)

NAE was awarded a NASA Small Business Innovation Research grant for its autonomous aircraft inspection technology. Before a flight departs, one of the crew members inspects the aircraft, checking flight controls, lift surfaces, and tires for any damage or issues that could impact the upcoming flight or need maintenance later. Engineering personnel also conduct visual inspections, though perhaps not for every flight, to frequently verify the aircraft’s integrity.

NAE has collaborated with NASA and Boeing to create autonomous software that allows their drone to conduct a thorough visual inspection of aircraft. The FAA mandates an inspection card outlining the requirements and the specific path around the aircraft for inspections. NAE has integrated these requirements into its drone, resulting in an automated inspection process that captures a high volume of detailed photographs from every part of the aircraft. This automated system completes inspections in approximately 30 minutes, in contrast to manual inspections, which can take up to four hours. The system is reportedly progressing toward the commercialization stage.

January 15, 2025
US investigates leaked intelligence on Israel’s planned Iran strike

The United States has begun investigating the unauthorized release of two highly classified intelligence documents detailing Israel’s preparations for a potential retaliatory strike against Iran. These documents, reportedly prepared by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, are marked as top secret and intended for distribution only among the U.S. and its “Five Eyes” intelligence partners: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

The leaked files, which first surfaced on the messaging app Telegram, were shared by an anonymous user known as “Middle East Spectator.” According to CNN reports, the leaked files include a satellite imagery analysis of Israeli military asset movements from Oct. 15-16, 2024, as well as defense plans made by the Israeli Air Force and Navy.

The first document is titled: “Israel: Air Force Continues Preparations for Strike on Iran and Conducts a Second Large-Force Employment Exercise.” The second is titled: “Israel: Defense Forces Continue Key Munitions Preparations and Covert UAV Activity Almost Certainly for a Strike on Iran.”

When asked about the leak during an interview with CNN, House Speaker Mike Johnson said an “investigation (is) underway, and I’ll get a briefing on that in a couple of hours. We are following it closely.” The New York Times reported that officials privately acknowledged that the documents were authentic but that they likely only represent a portion of the information the U.S. has on its close ally’s planning.

The FBI, Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies are collaborating on the investigation, focusing on determining who had access to the documents and assessing whether the leak was intentional or the result of a hack.

U.S. officials have acknowledged the documents’ authenticity but suggest they may represent only a portion of the information the U.S. possesses regarding its ally’s plans.

The incident has raised concerns about the security of classified information within the U.S. government.

Combatting electronic warfare and emerging threats

From swarms of lurking UAVs to breaches of federal privacy, we are witnessing a new era of electronic warfare and security challenges. As evidenced by a series of concerning incidents in recent years, the U.S. is actively seeking ways to defend against and secure its airspace from unauthorized UAV incursions and breaches of privacy.

In 2021, the U.S. experienced a record 1,862 data breaches, a 68% increase from previous years. In 2023, Langley Air Force Base in Virginia reported multiple sightings of unidentified UAVs flying above the facility. These incidents raised significant security concerns among military officials and lawmakers. The situation escalated in October 2024 when U.S. officials confirmed similar drone swarm observations near Edwards Air Force Base in Nevada. The Department of Defense (DOD) has not publicly identified the source behind these surveillance drones.

The DOD has launched Replicator 1 and Replicator 2 programs, allocating significant funding to enhance drone warfare capabilities. Replicator 1 focuses on increasing the production of attack UAVs, while Replicator 2 aims to improve defenses against enemy drone attacks.

Outside of the U.S., c-UAV systems and operations have become a critical component of modern warfare and security. While we typically focus on GPS jamming and spoofing as important aspects, they represent only a portion of this style of warfare.

The ongoing advancements in electronic warfare underscore the need for continued research, development, and policy adaptation to address the complex challenges posed by UAV technology in modern warfare and security operations worldwide.

October 22, 2024
GPS disruptions in Tel Aviv as Israel braces for possible Iranian attacks

Photo: Oren Kfir / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images

On April 4, residents of Tel Aviv, Israel, noticed that map applications on their phones such as Waze, Google Maps and the taxi pickup app Gett were placing them in Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, 130 miles to the north. Cab drivers could not navigate and food-delivery apps were temporarily out of service, reported The Wall Street Journal.

The spoofing was a result of the Israeli military tampering GPS signals to brace for possible retaliation by Iran or one of its allied militias after a suspected Israeli airstrike on an Iranian diplomatic building in Syria. The attack killed a senior Iranian general, Mohammad Reza Zahedi, and six other military officials. It has marked an escalation of the yearslong conflict between Israel and Iran.

According to WSJ, analysts say a direct Iranian strike on Israel is unlikely. However, one day after Israel drafted reservists to boost air defenses, the Israeli military said it would pause all leave for combat units “in accordance with the situational assessment.”

Israel has withdrawn some of its ambassadors and evacuated its embassies in multiple locations. With tensions and uncertainty rising, several Israeli municipalities near Tel Aviv put out announcements to calm residents and refresh guidance for emergencies.

According to the Israeli military, the GPS spoofing — which can be used to confuse targeting systems for military weapons — was part of an effort to protect the country. “Today we initiated GPS disruption in order to neutralize threats,” said Israeli military spokesman Daniel Hagari. “We are aware that this disruption causes discomfort, but this is an essential and necessary tool in our defense capabilities.”

Israel has ramped up GPS jamming and spoofing since the start of its war with Hamas in early October 2023, but mainly in the north of the country, where the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militia has rockets to strike Israeli towns and military bases, according to Reuters.

The military has scrambled signals in southern Israel, mainly around the city of Eilat, the target of missile and UAV attacks by Iranian-backed Yemeni and Iraqi militias, according to Yigal Unna, former director general of the Israel National Cyber Directorate.

The GPS disruptions have intensified since the most recent strike and have spread to central Israel where a local taxi driver shared that his map application had located him at the Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut. In the south of the country, and in Jerusalem and the occupied Palestinian West Bank, GPS devices placed users in Cairo, residents told WSJ.

Mohammad Abdelhalim, founder of the Palestinian navigation app Doroob, said that signal interruptions have occurred regularly on various platforms that rely on GPS since the Oct. 7 Hamas-led attacks on Israel, ranging from a few minutes to several hours at a time.

Spoofing can pose risks beyond being a nuisance for citizens. Distorting signals can create challenges for civilian and commercial planes that use GPS signals for navigation. Spoofing can also throw guided missiles off their trajectory, which poses unpredictable risks to civilians.

The ramifications of the widening GPS blackouts remain unclear. Beyond the hassles for civilian drivers, there are safety concerns for emergency responders and commercial transit unable to reliably track locations.

The recent spoofing in Tel Aviv is one of countless reminders that the country’s active military actions are only miles away and can have cascading effects on aspects of daily life.

April 10, 2024
Final grounding for Ingenuity?

NASA’s Ingenuity took this picture on Jan. 18, 2024. The sand-dune, rock-less area where Ingenuity last
showing the shadow of its damaged rotor blade. (Image: NASA)

It appears that the little extraterrestrial drone that could has come a cropper on Mars and now will not be flying again – it is permanently grounded. The Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) crew managing Ingenuity was running a regular scouting trip over a featureless sand-dune area on Dec. 22, 2023. Suddenly, the UAV’s visual navigation system malfunctioned, which led to a hard emergency landing.

When the autonomous navigation system did not have any landmarks to match its digital reference map, it reverted to an emergency landing. Maybe the poor guy should have had a few moments to gather its airborne wits and to come down softly, but alas at the same time the connection with the rover was lost, he dove for cover and broke a chunk off at least one of the counter-rotating blades. This now apparently prevents further take-offs. Mars’ atmosphere is only 1% as dense as Earth’s, so those rotors need all their designed lift capabilities to grab enough ‘air’ and get the 4 lb helicopter airborne. The flight control system may be unable to cope with the resulting compromised lift profile. Either way Ingenuity’s flying days are over, according to NASA.

Conceptual design for the Sample Recovery Helicopters
(Image: Aerovironment/ NASA/ JPL)

Ingenuity completed 72 flights over the course of three years, surpassing its original 30-day mission to prove the possibility of a miniature, autonomous helicopter flight on Mars. After its initial four flights, NASA and JPL chose the UAV to scout out safe paths for the Perseverance rover from an airborne perspective.

All is not lost for Ingenuity, however. AeroVironment, the UAV manufacturer that co-developed Ingenuity with NASA/JPL, has been awarded another contract to design and develop two prototype ‘sample-return’ helicopters for NASA’s next major Mars expedition.

Building on Ingenuity’s design, the new UAV will have wheels and a grappling contraption to pick up sample tubes, which could assist in the Mars sample recovery mission. Perseverance is currently expected to be the lead in transferring cached sample tubes to the new Sample Retrieval Lander for return to Earth, but the new helicopters provide a different backup option on Mars for pick-up and transport of the tubes.

Back here on Earth, the latest tragic news from the Middle East — the UAV attack on the US Tower 22 military outpost in Jordan which cost three soldiers their lives and injured at least 34 others — appears to have been due to a lack of defensive capability. Earlier news releases indicated that the kamikaze UAV had arrived at the same time as the expected return of a U.S. UAV from the base, implying that defenses may have been taken down temporarily. It now seems that there was little active defense to prevent the attack.

The attacking UAV reportedly came in very low, and the base was unable to track its approach. The base is said to have defensive signal jamming capabilities, but without radar visibility of the UAV and knowing an attack was in progress, the jammers may have been ineffective or inactive.

Tower 22 was thought of as a low-risk-of-attack U.S. base, perhaps supporting another U.S. base in Syria with logistics, so no active drone suppression system had been provisioned. This assessment, and those for similar bases in the area and around the world, may perhaps have to be revised and sufficient active defenses may need to be installed.

While U.S. and Ukrainian forces deal with attacking drones, Iran has unveiled its latest addition to its arsenal of one-way killer unmanned aircraft.

Image: Iranian Military Media

Iran displayed the Shahed-238 in public in November 2023, so there may have already been enough time to get some of these very fast-flying vehicles through the manufacturing process and begin deliveries to Russia and Iranian proxy agents. The advantage of jet-power is of course significant speed over propeller-driven variants, while the range may be significantly less for the same fuel capacity. The disadvantage for the United States and Ukraine is that most fielded conventional UAV detection radars have difficulty seeing fast targets in time to activate and aim defensive weapons.

The situation for Ukraine and the United States in the Middle East appears to be worsening as large numbers of Iranian-supplied and locally manufactured kamikaze UAVs are pumped into the war zone and ‘hot spots’ in the Middle East.

It is sad that Mars aerial views may be limited as Ingenuity seems to be permanently grounded, and the Middle East doesn’t sound too safe to be hanging around in either! Further escalation of prices might be expected, too, as a good part of the volume of cargo ships settle into sailing around Africa. Let’s look for better news in the coming months.

February 21, 2024
Iranian UAV downed in Ukraine contains western technology

A Ukrainian intelligence assessment obtained by CNN and CBS reported an Iranian UAV downed in Ukraine contained technology from companies in the United States and other western countries. The White House has since launched an investigation as to how the technology — including semiconductors, GPS modules and engines — were obtained by Iran.

Screenshot: CBS video

The components removed from an Iranian Shahed-136 UAV totaled 52, 40 of which were manufactured by 13 different U.S. companies. The remaining components were manufactured by other western companies and companies based in Japan, Taiwan and China.The United States monitors exports and imposed restrictions and sanctions to prevent Iran from obtaining components for UAVs. Officials are now looking to enhance enforcement of the sanctions and are encouraging companies to monitor their supply chain, as well as identify third-party distributors who may be re-selling the technology to Iran.

U.S. companies are not alone in having to closely monitor their supply chains. U-blox, a Swiss semiconductor company, made a statement reinforcing its company policy, which bans the use of its technology in weapons. This was after u-blox GNSS modules were reportedly found in Russian UAVs.

January 11, 2023
Geospatial imagery shows activity at Iranian nuclear facility

A team with Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) used BlackSky’s geospatial imagery and burst collection technology to track and monitor activity at a secretive Iranian nuclear facility in a new intelligence study. The study tracks and monitors activity at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran.

Screenshot: Janes.com video/BlueSky

“The BlackSky/CISAC research team demonstrated the power of combining rapid revisit satellite imagery, human domain expertise and AI/ML (artificial intelligence/machine learning) techniques to identify and understand activity at Natanz, which was previously unknown to much of the world,” said Patrick O’Neil, chief data scientist at BlackSky. “Observations that provide real-time, activities-based insights have the potential to change the world.”

BlackSky’s high-revisit satellite imagery enabled researchers at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) to monitor the pattern of life at the Natanz nuclear facility and gain a better understanding of activity and events at the site.

BlackSky’s satellites provide high, intraday revisit capabilities, allowing CISAC’s research team to receive multiple images a day, throughout the day, rather than just one image collected at roughly the same time each day.

BlackSky satellites are also capable of capturing a sequence of up to 20 images within a matter of minutes, known as a burst collection, and then splicing them together. Instead of a single picture, burst collections are geospatially normalized and joined together to generate a moving sequence of activity. With BlackSky’s assistance, the research team was able to witness trucks emerging from the facility’s underground tunnels.

Allison Puccioni, a renowned imagery analyst and BlackSky consultant, assembled a research team at Stanford University, with help from Rose Gottemoeller, diplomat, former NATO deputy secretary, and visiting professor at Stanford. The pair enlisted two principal research assistants in geospatial science to develop a sophisticated situational-intelligence program to monitor the Natanz nuclear facility.

Natanz is Iran’s primary facility for advanced uranium enrichment and is an active political and military location driven by concerns about the country’s nuclear operations.

July 7, 2021
BeiDou a threat to the West, but perhaps not individuals

Recent completion of China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system has rekindled privacy and security concerns among some in the West. China has incorporated a two-way messaging capability into BeiDou that many fear will be used to track individuals and install malware on user devices.

Most satellite navigation experts view such concerns as far overblown.

At the same time, though little discussed, BeiDou’s completion does signal a new phase for China’s status as a world power and its ability to challenge the West on many fronts.

Two-way communications

It is possible for specially equipped receivers to communicate back to the BeiDou constellation. But this is not true for the vast majority of receivers (including those in cell phones). Industry experts say that all mass market chips for every GNSS system, including BeiDou, are “receive only.” Only specially equipped devices will be able to take advantage of its two-way communications capability, and it should be quite apparent to users when it is in operation.

Users, they say, should be much more concerned about location privacy and security issues that have been around for decades. Mobile phones have long reported user locations through the cellular network based upon information derived from GPS, WiFi ranging and other position calculations. The ability to hack and compromise a cell phone or other receiver will not be affected by the addition of BeiDou as a receive-only location source.

It is also important to note that using specialized equipment for two-way communication with a Global Satellite Navigation System (GNSS) is not something new to BeiDou. While the Chinese system may have improved upon the capability, users with the right equipment can send messages using the Search and Rescue functions to the United States’ GPS, Europe’s Galileo, and Russia’s GLONASS.

China has risen

Completion of BeiDou, unquestionably a significant technical achievement, does signal a significant step up for Chin’s status as a world power and influencer. It is a declaration of technical independence from the West with wide ranging geo-political impacts.

These were anticipated and summarized in a 2017 report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. It listed China’s goals for BeiDou as:

“(1) address national security requirements by ending military reliance on GPS;
(2) build a commercial downstream satellite navigation industry to take advantage of the quickly expanding market; and
(3) achieve domestic and international prestige by fielding one of only four such global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) yet developed”

Military Power and National Security. The Chinese military has long sought its own GNSS. This was amplified during a crisis in 1996 when it fired three missiles toward Taiwan as a warning. One struck the sea about 11 miles from a Taiwanese military base, but the other two disappeared. China claims that the United States interfered with GPS signals and was to blame. The Chinese military was both horrified and humiliated.

Having a sovereign GNSS eliminates the problem of relying on the U.S., Russia, or Europe for satellite navigation. That it is the world’s newest system also certainly has its advantages. China has undoubtedly incorporated state of the art anti-jamming and anti-spoofing capabilities into the version of BeiDou used by the military. After decades of observing others interfering with GNSS signals, and doing a fair bit of it on their own, it would be hard to imagine Chinese engineers not including the latest resilience features.

An operational BeiDou also means that China’s military is much freer to interfere with GPS and other GNSS in pursuit of tactical and strategic advantage without endangering its own services and infrastructure. It is likely that the levels of jamming and spoofing seen near the Spratley Islands and mainland ports will increase. Even if they do not, the increased possibility of Chinese interference will add yet another degree of complexity and uncertainty for western military forces.

Economic Power. The technological and commercial benefits of BeiDou for China are unquestionably substantial as well. Direct benefit from the manufacture and sale of equipment, plus spinoff industries and technologies, add to an already impressive national technology and economic portfolio. This is especially true since positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services are a “silent utility” underpinning so many network and other technological systems. The huge domestic market and robust overseas sales continue to grow (by 20% per annum according to Chinese reports) providing huge returns.

Prestige and Soft Power. “BeiDou launch marks China’s rise to ‘major space power’” read a recent headline in the Asia Times. This is perhaps understated as, with BeiDou complete, there is, technologically, little the West has achieved that China has not equaled. This has greatly enhanced China’s global standing and made it, in the eyes of many in the developing world, an ally and provider as good or better than the U.S. or Europe.

And China is eager to share its new PNT utility with others to further, not just its economy, but more importantly its long-term strategic interests.

Forsaking GPS

Regionally, China has been encouraging neighbors to adopt BeiDou for national PNT and forsake GPS. As one example it provided Thailand with nearly $300M in foreign aid targeted to promoting BeiDou use by Thai government organizations.

Writing in July in The Diplomat, Dr. Namrata Goswami observed

“… BeiDou is located within China’s ‘Information Silk Road,’ a subset of its land and maritime silk routes under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is now able to extend influence in a multidomain environment (land, sea and space) via its BeiDou space system, which provides navigation to aircraft, submarines, missiles, as well as commercial services dependent on such navigation. China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology sells the Information Silk Road, to include BeiDou and 5G networks, to global audiences as a completely self-sufficient technology infrastructure that anticipates life in the 21st century.”

This extends China’s influence through BeiDou even farther and has led a number of nations to seek closer ties with China through BeiDou.

Mohamed Ben Amor, secretary general of the Tunisia-based Arab Information and Communication Technology Organization, an organization of the Arab League, told GPSDaily.com, “Cooperation on the BDS is of special significance for the Belt and Road construction…The next step of the China-Arab cooperation is to achieve further connectivity and both sides can apply the BDS to promote regional technological and economic development.”

Iran’s view

Iran has had a Memorandum of Understanding with China about BeiDou since 2015. It provides for BeiDou ground stations in Iran, access for Iran to high-precision services, and establishment of an Iranian center for space data collection.

And In a tweet last week Iran’s Ambassador to China cited BeiDou’s completion as the “…end to the monopoly of the U.S.’s GPS.” He said, “There is great potential for aerospace cooperation with China,” and went on to suggest that Iranian aerospace students could work as a bridge between the two countries.

Similar comments have been published from entities in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and throughout Southeast Asia.

China is indeed to be congratulated for a significant achievement with the completion of BeiDou. Even more noteworthy, though, is how it has integrated BeiDou seamlessly into its national plans for technology, economic, military and diplomatic efforts — a comprehensive, coordinated program to boost its standing in the world, especially relative to the United States and Europe.

Dana Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation. He is the proprietor at Maritime Governance LLC. In August 2013, he retired from the federal Senior Executive Service, having served as the maritime navigation authority for the United States. As director of Marine Transportation Systems for the U.S. Coast Guard, he led 12 different navigation-related business lines budgeted at more than $1.3 billion per year. He has represented the U.S. at IMO, IALA, the UN anti-piracy working group and other international forums. A licensed helicopter and fixed-wing pilot, he has also served as a navigator at sea and is a retired Coast Guard Captain.

Photo: XinhuaNet

August 11, 2020