GPS World

Tag: PNT

  • High-Level Perspective on PNT Frontiers

    New Technology, New Applications, New Science from the Stanford Symposium

    LD-Litton
    Headshot: James D. Litton

    By James D. Litton

    The sixth annual Stanford PNT Symposium in November brought together a select group of experts to share insights from the latest research, developments, and proposals, GNSS and non-GNSS, that show promise for the international community. Among other noteworthy presentations, we heard Brad Parkinson’s suggested incremental system changes to significantly improve signal availability and accuracy, a comprehensive update on China’s Compass system, and the latest in spoofing and proposed proofs of location.

    GNSS in General

    The budget realities of U.S. GNSS development, and the need to maintain the systems at the high levels of performance upon which so many critical and commercially beneficial applications now depend, were analyzed by two men with industry-household names, Brad Parkinson and Gaylord Green.

    Nibbles. Professor Parkinson gave a very sophisticated, nuanced presentation entitled “Nibbles,” in which he outlined feasible and productive technical steps to ensure the preservation of what he described as “the three As:” availability, affordability, and accuracy. Rather than do radical surgery on accuracy or availability in order to preserve affordability, he identified so-called nibbles at requirements, incremental improvements enabled by use of current technology advances, for example, vector (Spilker) receivers, power-conversion efficiency improvements, antenna gain and steering modifications, weight reduction for multiple launch capability, and use of sensor fusion for more robust receivers with greater jam resistance.

    It was a high-level but quantitative system design approach aimed at improving affordability and interference resistance while maintaining and improving availability and accuracy. He made the salient point that affordability with a given level of performance is enhanced by availability, that is, maintaining 30+ satellites on orbit brings multiple benefits that improve affordability. The estimates of gain from the nibbles struck me as conservative, at least for those with which I had some quantitative feel.

    Alternative Architectures. Col. Gaylord Green addressed the same subject with a different approach, in a presentation entitled “GPS Alternative Architectures.” His motivation for alternative architectures was to provide the needed PNT capability at an affordable cost. He pointed out that GPS satellites have increased in dry weight from 334 to 2,100 pounds, and that the cost of the IIA, IIF, and III satellites have gone from $100 million on orbit to $400 million on orbit. Colonel Green indicated that starting a new development with the same signals cost more than continuing with GPSIII. (The Congressional Budget Office has recommended consideration of using IIF satellites to maintain the constellation and bypassing GPS III.)

    The reduced capability satellites are called NavSats. He suggested that a mixed constellation of NavSats (with minimal ancillary payloads and frequencies) such as 15 GPSIII and 15 NavSats would enable a constellation of 30 satellites; the minimum necessary to assure sky-challenged users of satisfactory coverage. He recommended that design of satellite power conversion to be set by start-of-life, not end-of-life goals. Colonel Green identified the signal priorities in terms of their functions (L-5, L-2, L1C, and four military signals requiring crypto). Like Parkinson, he identified technology changes in antennas and signal architecture to reduce costs, necessitating a demonstration program. He also indicated that advantage could be taken of other GNSS constellations for civil signal purposes, alleviating the demands on GPS satellites. Colonel Green identified satellite constellation arrangements which would be more cost effective (multiple launch) and provide adequate coverage. He pointed out that such a NavSat program would require a new start and would necessarily constrain GPS modernization funding. In short, such a “GPS Alternative Architecture approach” would combine continuation of GPS III as planned with the addition of simpler, lighter satellites with reduced diversity of signals to replace the aging GPS satellites now on orbit beyond their design life.

    Compass. Professor Jingnan Liu of the GNSS Research Center of Wuhan University gave what most observers thought was the first comprehensive and data-intensive description of Precise Positioning results with the COMPASS (Beidou) system. He showed that the Beidou regional system, from which he presented copious data, can currently provide standard positioning service with <10M horizontal and <20M vertical accuracies at 95% confidence level. He also showed that results with Beidou plus GPS are 10-20% better than GPS alone. He provided results for surveying, for ground-based augmentation, for RTK, PPP, clock stability, orbital statistics, wide area differential and many other metrics of PNT. Professor Parkinson noted, in appreciating the presentation, that it was the first detailed release of so much technical data on COMPASS performance. The results noted above were obtained with 4GEO+5 IGSO+2MEO satellites. The constellation is expected to grow to 5GEO+5IGSO+4MEOs by the end of 2012 and to 5GEOs+3IGSOs+27 MEOs by 2020 for a global service. The amount of data and the diversity (application and instrumentation) of the data were truly impressive.

    GPS Modernization. Dr. Keoki Jackson of Lockheed Martin presented a comprehensive review of GPS Modernization with charts which described the evolution of GPS from Block I to Block III. He depicted the program as on schedule for delivery of the first GPS III vehicle in May, 2014, with a 2015 launch. Most of this material was the same as reported from the AFCEA GC-12 program in GPS World earlier this year. A matrix comparing the attributes of GPS III with GPSII and beneficial outcomes from “Back-to-Basics Investments” were key takeaways.

    Ground Control. Ray Kolibaba of Raytheon presented a detailed overview of the OCX program, the next generation Operational Control System. This presentation also emphasized improvements in program management, simplification of development practices, extensive use of commercial development methods and predicted on-time delivery with all of the attributes needed for both GPS III and the existing constellation.

    Military User Equipment. Col. Bernie Gruber, Director of the GPS Directorate, gave an update on current activities with emphasis on progress in Military User Equipment (MGUE) development. This material was somewhat further advanced in schedule than the equivalent May 2012 time frame in which the same subject was presented in much detail at the AFCEA GC-12 meeting at the Directorate. The currently ‘hot’ topics of jamming and spoofing threats, countermeasures and affordability were prominent in the presentation. Some of the key achievements for 2012 listed were the release of BAAs (Broad Agency Announcements) for NavSat studies and the completion of a Congressional Report on ‘Cost Effective GPS). Launch of GPS IIF-3 and delivery of GPS IIF-4, 5,6 & 7 were also noted. Security Certification for MUE cards was a very noteworthy achievement, which will make future MGUE development and utilization much easier for the challenging jamming and spoofing environment which is expected. The themes of affordability and jamming and spoofing threats were dominant in this review, as well.

    General PNT

    Norvald Kjerstad is a professor of Nautical Science at Aalesund University College and a long-time professional navigator in academic, geophysical, and shipping communities. His paper vividly depicted the risks brought about by climate change, by increased commercial interest in shipping and mineral resource exploration in the Arctic region, and by the very limited navigation infrastructure and limited communications assets.

    Arctic Navigation. Both DGPS and SBAS systems are quite limited in the arctic, magnetic compass systems are less accurateat the very high latitudes ( and their errors propagate into navigation radar, collision avoidance and other systems). Auroral effects limit the availability of GNSS at times (Glonass improves GPS because of the higher orbital inclinations) and hydrographic charts of the arctic are frequently quite wrong, due to changes in water depth and to limited surveying frequency. Increased tourism, shipping and resource interest intensify the consequences of the increased risk to seafarers.

    The advent of Galileo and Compass, integrated with GPS-Glonass will greatly improve the reliability of GNSS signals. However, navigation through the ice, at places thin and navigable and at random places deep and massive (ice ridges) is much more than knowing where one is with respect to the center of the earth. Radar helps with detection and avoidance of ice ridges but the sinking and grounding of icebreakers and commercial vessels demonstrate that much better knowledge of the environment is needed to avoid future disasters. The thousand-kilometer shorter route over the Pole can be very expensive and not necessarily the fastest one. However the increased activity in the Arctic is going to continue, and it is mandatory that safety factors be given greater attention by the International Maritime Organization (satellite compasses are reliable where magnetic ones are not, but the IMO has not approved them) and by the hydrographic services of the affected areas.

    From Farm to Front Office. Jim Geringer, former governor of Wyoming, now a director of ESRI and a member of the GPS Excom gave, as usual, a very entertaining presentation (“GPS/GNSS From the Farm to the Front Office”) with highly interesting examples of the very broad and deep impact of GNSS on society, including financial statistics and object lessons in the misuse or inaccurate use of geospatial data. Geringer was an engineer before he went into politics and that came through clearly in the presentations, even though he was very self-effacing concerning his technical credentials. He gave amusing examples, not all from Apple, of the effects of combining current and historical geospatial data, such as airport runways shown in topography layers obtained before leveling the airport areas, and a road running across the valley filled by Hoover Dam.

    Geringer critiqued an attitude on the part of GNSS professionals in which their attention is more devoted to the how of obtaining the information than to the effects that future changes might have on the users. He discussed policy challenges presented by the FCC mandate to find 500MHz of spectrum for high speed wireless data, by affordability, by the potential for jamming and spoofing. It was good to be reminded of the awesome realized economic benefits of GNSS, the manifold applications which GNSS systems enable and the ease with which this potential can be limited or actually damaged by pursuit of other worthwhile objectives which are politically favored or which bring short term revenue into the treasury at the expense of GNSS system requirements in bandwidth. The less obvious but equally or more beneficial economic benefits of high accuracy GNSS and the impact of actual lives lost or resources untappedwere illustratedand quantified in Geringer’s broad presentation. One hopes that this presentation will be or has been seen at High GSA and policy levels in the FCC and NTIA.

    Geringer’s presentation provides a nice segue into a presentation by:

    LightSquared Lessons Learned. Rich Lee of Greenwood Telecommunications Consultants, LLC and iPosi.  Entitled Lessons Learned from the GPS-LightSquared Proceeding, it was an assessment of the opportunities missed and damage done in the drive to enable the use of spectrum adjacent to GNSS frequencies for 4G LTE wholesale services through high power Auxiliary Terrestrial Components (ATCs) using MSS spectrum reallocated (or repurposed) to the purpose under a conditional waiver by the Chairman of the FCC, Julius Genachowski, on a recommendation by the International Bureau of the FCC. According to Lee, Greenwood was called in to solve, “if solutions exist” the problem of the ‘spectrum collision’ between the LSQ design and GPS, after the collision occurred. He likened the role of Greenwood to that of a tow truck operator called in to clear up a collision after the impacts. Lee served on the TWG (Temporary Working Group) as head of the cellular subgroup and headed the NTIA/Excom cellular tests. The presentation was very good, technically, in both its detailed and more strategic aspects but both the history described and the lessons learned (see below) were, understandably, from the perspective of a party which was unable, in this particular instance, to achieve the goals desired by their sponsors. This failure was for reasons of basic spectrum policy conflicts between GNSS applications and those mooted to become transcendent- mobile high speed data for consumer and industrial applications.

    Lee depicted the lack of a requirement in history for regulation of receiver standards, as opposed to transmitter standards, to the inability to anticipate the crowded spectrum (for example, his statement that spectrum was regarded as “free” and minimizing interference was the key objective, a burden placed on the transmitters). Now that spectrum is seen as scarce and underutilized in many U.S. government applications and inadequately conserved in many civil applications, the concept of receiver standards for avoiding interference and the use of advanced filterand antenna technology in receivers as well as in transmitterswould enable easier, less confrontational and more lucrative use of this 21st century El Dorado.

    Parenthetically, Pierre de Vries (University of Colorado, and a member of the FCC’s Technical Advisory Committee) and others recently testified to a House of Representatives panel, recommending that harm claim thresholds be established with which to manage the trade-offs between intrinsic receiver protection requirements and transmitter power distribution, so that instead of just adding the specification requirement to receivers, a flexible system approach be adopted. They noted that it was very difficult to anticipate the receiver design needs for all applications. The failure to understand the requirements of precision GNSS receivers and the simplistic concept of fences was a large driver in the collision between LightSquared and GNSS.

    Lee’s lessons learned summary is:

    • Upper 10: candidate for ground augmentation? The upper 10 MHz (1545-1555 MHz) of spectrum was originally allocated to LightSquared through its acquisition of TerraSat. During the 2012 conflict months, LightSquared publicly abandoned operating in the Upper 10.
    • Question: sound alternatives for this band? (Including as a good GNSS guard band)
    • Consider: sub-microwatt uses for short range augmentation, such as Department of Transportation Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS)-TWG findings. Given very low effective isotropically radiated power (EIRP), ample compatibility with precision GPS nearby.
    • Precision GPS: –82 dBm worst case Upper 10 susceptibility (–1 dB C/NO)
    • 1 uW EIRP transmitter is about 13 dB below at 1 meter
    • Seems suitable for high availability in urban areas; provides urban in-fill, redundancy such as ITS
    • At 100-mETER range: Signals ~-135 dBm incident power at an ITS receiver antenna
    • Band continues as a space-to-earth downlink, shared with geostationary Earth orbit-mobile satellite services, including carriage of GPS/GNSS corrections (OmniSTAR, StarFire)

    Lee contested the FCC chairman’s assertion that the LightSquared-GPS matter was an anomaly, saying instead that it was “foreseeable.”
    However, foreseeable anomalies such as singularities exist in predictions of scientists. I believe that this anomaly was clearly foreseeable, but a hedge-fund mentality, financial engineering, and a long-held attitude toward GPS in the FCC were the drivers of these benighted decisions.

    The gold rush is still on for finding underutilized spectrum. Some systems, including GNSS, utilize bandwidth that needs protection for purposes other than the usual communications requirements. It is vital to honor the homesteads of GNSS and protect the noise floors. Receiver standards must be considered very carefully because communications receivers and high precision GNSS receivers are very different systems.

    Scientific Subjects

    Some presentations grouped under this topic are available in ION publications from GNSS 2012.

    Atom Interferometry. Mark Kasevich of Stanford presented his paper on precision navigation sensors based upon atom interferometry. While application of these sensors in general awaits many highly difficult engineering advancements, the outcome would be a great boon to navigation, were the outcome comparable to the evolution of chip-scale atomic clocks.

    Andrei Shkel reprised his paper entitled “Precision Navigation, Timing, and Targeting enabled by Microtechnology: Are we there yet?”

    Gravity. Tom Murphy of the University of California, San Diego, gave a fascinating paper of fundamental importance to understanding gravity by laser ranging to retroreflectors left on the moon by various Apollo and Russian missions. A highly contrived initialism for the project is APOLLO, for Apache Point Laser Observatory Lunar Laser-Ranging Operation. The work is a product of a seven-university/research center consortium.

    The system of APOLLO for measuring the range of the moon relative to the earth at Apache Point is a marvel of experimental ingenuity and advanced instrumentation in collecting the few photons that get back from the laser shots at the moon. Laser light is caught by the retroreflectors and returned to the telescope at Apache Point. A very sensitive gravimeter system at the observatory enables compensation for the Earth’s crustal motions, and orbital deviations are compensated. Precisions of a few millimeters in range to these devices on the moon are achieved, almost good enough to be useful in testing the “Strong” Equivalence Principle of General Relativity.

    From an engineering point of view, the timing, motion compensation, detection sensitivity (a few photons per shot), and several other features of the system are truly impressive, and the potential for improving our understanding of general relativity, so-called dark matter or energy, and more, are exciting aspects of this work. To have much better precision through placing laser transceivers on the moon to increase the number of reflected/transponder photons in the samples would appear to be quite valuable and relatively simple NASA missions for future work, even though the data may eventually be sufficient to enable theoretical advancements without such added signal-to-noise benefit. This paper was an example of excellent engineering in the service of important science.

    Vulnerabilities and Limitations

    Charles Schue of UrsaNav gave a very detailed and comprehensive paper on wide-area timing, navigation, and data using low-frequency technology. He provided data for timing, location, and data transmission over distances greater than 125 nautical Mmiles.

    eLoran. He made the point and showed examples to demonstrate that the technology for these systems exists today, is highly affordable, and can represent a major strengthening of the nation’s critical infrastructure. The systems and hardware he presented are very attractive and seemingly very mature.
    Schue was preaching to the choir, as far as I can tell; there is, in the PNT community, no controversy about the need for eLoran. Further, there is a sense of disappointment and wonder that so little money was saved at the expense of great risk to our critical PNT infrastructure, particularly in view of the vulnerability to jamming and spoofing of GPS and the other GNSS systems for civil use; a vulnerability analysis which informed the balance (two) of the papers in this summary report.

    Spoofing. Dennis Akos presented data on spoofing tests conducted at Lulea, Sweden, near a low-density commercial airport with limited road traffic and a restricted Swedish Air Force weapons test area, and in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, near a very busy airport with dense roadway traffic. The incidence of radio-frequency interference (RFI) in the latter case was great and in the former case negligible, until the team introduced their jamming and spoofing equipment.In both cases, a simple automatic gain control (AGC) monitoring design, which was computationally efficient, was able to detect and measure the RFI from the jammer-spoofer.

    Using all commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, the jammer was identified and located with time-of-arrival and power-difference-of-arrival. The researchers showed that using a controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA) like the Stanford four-element CRPA and all-COTS equipment, jammers could be indentified and located efficiently through AGC processing. A large amount of detailed data were presented with screen shots and plots of the effects of the jamming on the receivers.

    Proof of Location. Logan Scott of LS Consulting gave a paper on proof of location. He projected the need for location proof in several applications, ranging from system control and data acquisition intrusions that would affect industrial control systems to bogus Mayday calls, the response to which is very expensive, and he provided many examples of data security applications. He also provided several schemes, ranging from cryptographic GPS RF signal structures to the use of overlapping systems, like Galileo and GPS, to enable verification of location.

    Scott identified the massive security threat represented by millions of smart phone and tablet users who can store millions of bytes of information, such as maps of sensitive locations. An authorized user of such a map, GNSS-enabled, on a tablet or smart phone, should be able to access the restricted information if the user is in the right location. However, a user, authorized or not, outside of the restricted area would find that area of the map blank if he tries to access it externally, a kind of location need-to-know control.

    Scott anticipates the use of temporary keys for weapons usage; such keys would require that the user be in a location authorized for such use. He provides block diagram descriptions of systems that would be feasible to achieve these location proofs for high-value and dangerous operations. These block-diagram level descriptions are accompanied by quantitative assessments of the difficulties and benefits of such system modifications.

    It was a compelling tour de force on the subject. We do not have time or space to cover it well but the material has gradually been built up from earlier available publications by Scott at ION conferences and in GNSS journals and magazines. Both the need for such systems and the means by which they may be practically achieved are well worth studying by those responsible for policy and programmatic decisions, and by technologists seeking new product ideas and applications.

    And More

    A few interesting presentations do not fit into the above categories. Stan Honey, founder of the company Sportvision (the creator of the first-down yellow-line overlay in televised American football, and many other broadcast enhancements for sporting events) and considered sailing’s master navigator, gave a wonderful dinner talk about the PNT technology being utilized in the America’s Cup TV graphics, umpiring, and race management. Honey reflected upon how competitive sailing, unlike other professional sports, has fully adopted the use of advanced PNT technology in how the sport is umpired and managed.

    Jason Wither of Microsoft presented a paper on spatialized data for mixed reality, which was very informative in how various types and layers of data are combined to create mixed-reality systems.

    Ron Fugelseth of Oxygen productions showed his very entertaining video entitled “A Toy Train in Space.” The video was posted on YouTube a few months ago and immediately went viral. It is a fine example of the use of GPS technology.

    James D. Litton heads the Litton Consulting Group and previously played key executive roles at NavCom Technology and Magnavox.

  • RITA Seeks Experienced Electronics Engineer

    The Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) seeks an experienced Electronics Engineer interested in joining the Office of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT).  RITA coordinates the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) research programs and is charged with advancing rigorous analysis and the deployment of cross-cutting technologies to improve our Nation’s transportation system.  RITA serves as the lead Administration representing DOT on PNT matters, including development of departmental positions on PNT and spectrum policy and protection, and is responsible for representing and supporting the civil Departments and Agencies in PNT systems analysis and coordination, including PNT requirements and architectural development.

    In this challenging role, you will serve as the program manager for the inland (terrestrial) segment of the Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS) Program and serve as the lead for radio frequency spectrum management and analysis functions in support of DOT’s technical requirements and policy development.

    As the NDGPS Program Manager, you will be responsible for the technical, cost and schedule performance of the NDGPS, as managed currently through the United States Coast Guard under a Memorandum of Agreement, and serve as the chair of the NDGPS Policy and Implementation Team.

    You also will lead radio frequency spectrum management and analysis tasks in close coordination with other DOT Operating Administrations and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).  You will provide expert advice specifically on issues of harmful radio frequency interference and operational degradation to DOT operations and planned operations, and serve as DOT’s representative to the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC).

    If you or someone you know has the experience and a demonstrable record of proven results, I encourage you or them to apply to this Washington, D.C.-based position.  We are looking for a diverse pool of qualified candidates

    The announcement is posted to the Public and to Merit Promotion eligible applicants on www.usajobs.opm.gov.  Please know that Merit Promotion announcements are the vehicle through which Federal employees generally apply for Federal positions.

    View job details.

    Open Period –  Thursday, December 13, 2012 to Monday, December 24, 2012

  • PHGPST Resurrected: Seeking the Perfect Device

    Don Jewell

    By Don Jewell

    Cards and Letters

    It happens every year and it is an emotional rollercoaster.  It generally starts a couple of weeks before Thanksgiving and continues until just after New Years – and it is simply heartbreaking. The letters and emails start arriving just like clockwork before the holidays and they all ask the same question – where can I buy the PHGPST or the Perfect Handheld GPS Transceiver?

    As many of you know, who are faithful readers, I receive hundreds of letters and emails like this throughout the year from our warfighters and first responders, but the letters and emails over the holidays are special because they are from the wives, sisters, children, parents and grandparents of war fighters. They want nothing but the best for their loved ones. It breaks my heart to have to tell them that the PHGPST does not exist – yet.

    Without a doubt, our warfighters and first responders, who put their lives on the line so that we may continue to live and thrive in a free world, where innovation and response to customer needs are hopefully met with success both emotional and fiscal, deserve nothing but the best, and that is the goal I continue to pursue on their behalf.

    Dissatisfaction

    Paraphrasing Walter Kaufman, “Otherworldliness or ‘belief that there is a better world’ is the child of disenchantment with this world.” To say our warfighters are disenchanted with the antiquated legacy MUE or military user equipment they are forced by policy to utilize today is an understatement. DoD’s antediluvian MUE is a joke compared to what is available in the commercial marketplace today. Studies indicate our warfighters are aware of this dichotomy and have shown their disdain in the last ten years by using commercial and civil PNT equipment in theater 40/1 over the government’s archaic MUE handheld devices. Studies further show that MUE is utilized by our warfighters only as a last resort and as a matter of necessity due to the outdated policies and technologies that continue to prevail. However, I am happy to say these anachronistic restrictions are reportedly rapidly coming to an end.

    Consider that the USMC (US Marine Corps) decertified the PLGR in 2009 because “the PLGR or Precision GPS Lightweight Receiver is an obsolete GPS military receiver” [ed. PLGR was designed circa 1988] and almost all Services today use the DAGR or Defense Advanced GPS Receiver [ed. the DAGR was designed circa 2002]. The DAGR was a major capability improvement ten years ago but today is technologically obsolete and primarily used as an embedded solution only. As an embedded device the DAGR serves its purpose — providing an antiquated, unfriendly user interface to legacy government equipment. For example, rumor has it that one version of the Stryker, of which the Army has more than 4,200 in service, described as a technologically advanced combat fighting vehicle, uses nine, count them, nine individual DAGRs. Draw your own conclusions. I suspect this has more to do with the inadequacies of the DAGR vice the capabilities of the Stryker. The good news here is that my sources in the DoD tell me there will be no further DAGR purchases. Now if I were giving this as an oral presentation, I would pause here for thundering applause and a standing ovation. Can I have an Amen?

    Several years ago, I penned the following: “MUE is necessary because it is the only platform that currently provides SAASM (selective availability anti-spoofing module) protection, along with a second military frequency giving the military user an advantage over his civilian counterpart.” Today none of that statement is true from a purely intrinsic or commercial point of view. There are much more capable receivers with all these capabilities and more, to include real-time centimeter-level accuracy, available on the commercial market today.

    Marketplace Responds

    This year the PNT (position, navigation and timing) marketplace has finally responded, and I am able to reply to warfighter family enquiries with more positive information. In just the last 18-24 months, the path to an actual PHGPST has been blazed by several major GPS manufacturers, and well-informed pundits say DOD policy changes may be in the wind as well.

    The PHGPST

    I had a three-hour lunch several weeks ago with the chief PNT engineer from one of the companies pursuing the PHGPST. It was enlightening to hear him wax eloquent concerning their new PNT device and the capabilities it will provide the warfighter, first responders and commercial/civil users as well. Indeed, there is a real possibility, if DoD policy changes lag technology (can you imagine that ever happening?) that civil/ commercial users may be the first recipients of this technological manna from the gods. But not to worry — if the actions of our warfighters during the last ten years of warfare are any indication, the warfighters and first responders will merely purchase what they need, from whatever sources are available, regardless of antiquated policy and doctrine. As one Marine lieutenant colonel warfighter commander so eloquently phrased it, “So please tell me where I can purchase the PHGPST…because when your life and those of your fellow Marines is on the line, who gives a damn about policy … give me the best solution possible  … because the current #@*&% MUE is not even in the same ballpark as the best.”

    Unfortunately, the chief engineer declined to allow me to use the name of his company, but they have promised me a pre-production unit to test and write about. As to time frame, he assures me there will still be plenty of snow banks and icy mud puddles in Colorado for my exhaustive real-world tests. Ever since that lunch I have been like a kid at Christmas… I just can’t wait for the test unit to arrive.

    Trimble

    However, while I am waiting with bated breath, another major PNT company/manufacturer pursuing the PHGPST has gone public with its intentions, and that is Trimble. I had the pleasure of visiting with Ann Ciganer and other Trimble executives in San Jose for a day recently, and then in early November attended Trimble Dimensions for the first time. I was simply amazed. Talk about feeling like a kid in a candy store – and that feeling had nothing to do with the venue – the Mirage in Las Vegas. Seriously, Jim Sheldon, general manager of Trimble’s Mobile Computing Solutions (MCS) Division and his team in Corvallis, Oregon, have outdone themselves. Their rugged line of PNT devices is simply jaw dropping in appearance and capability. I was privileged to sit in on some MCS planning meetings and I was blown away by what I heard — none of which I can relate here because of NDAs (non-disclosure agreements) and such — but suffice it to say that Trimble has been listening to its customers (what a concept) including warfighters/first responders, and it shows in the devices hitting the market now and in the next few months.

    I was very impressed, and I guess it showed because one company PR/marketing pundit commented that I could probably write about nothing but Trimble rugged equipment for the next twelve months. Although he said it in jest, he was more correct than he knew. Indeed, another person in that group commented that I could write nothing but reviews for the next twelve months and become known as the Gunnery Sergeant Lee Emery military twin for GNSS. You may remember Emery hosted two History Channel programs: Mail Call, where he answered military questions, both modern and historic; and Lock N’ Load with R. Lee Ermey, which focused on the development of different types of military equipment, mostly weapons. I personally never missed an episode of either program and while I am flattered at the comparison, frankly I prefer the written word. But it does offer up the possibility of conducting even more PNT/GNNS equipment evaluations – the only issue being that it takes me about six weeks to properly evaluate a piece of PNT equipment, and it really helps if there is are lots of snow banks and deep icy puddles around. And remember, my rules of engagement are to never write a bad review, because why should you spend your time reading about something you can’t use, and, if at all possible, I won’t review equipment I have not personally used in the field under the most austere conditions available.

    So in the next twelve months we will be looking hard at candidates vying for the title of the PHGPST, and I will do my best to keep you abreast of all the technological advancements and policy changes that make that possible. And maybe next year as the holidays approach, I will be able to respond with a plethora of choices for the PHGPST.

    Until next year, semper fi and happy navigating.

  • Expert Advice: Soldiers and Civilian GPS: Dangerous (and Deadly?) Expediency

     

    Headshot: Jules McNeff
    Headshot: Jules McNeff

    By Jules McNeff

    An old adage says, “Be careful what you wish for, you might get it.” That is particularly relevant in today’s world of GPS and the positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) dependencies it has created. In business, it’s all about location, and in military circles, something called real-time situational awareness, driven by the ready availability of PNT from GPS. However, it has been reported (and validated by experience) that U.S. soldiers believe that the GPS equipment they are issued through official channels is too big, too heavy, uses too many batteries, and is old-looking and not sexy like the multi-color, multi-app personal electronics and smart phones they are accustomed to at home.

    Furthermore, they reportedly feel encumbered by Department of Defense (DoD) policies that require the use of encrypted military GPS signals when executing combat mission command-and-control or performing combat-related actions such as synchronizing tactical networks, designating targets, and calling for fire support when in contact with an adversary force. They wish they could just use their iPhone, or iPad, or similar smart device with its integral location-based apps and ready communication capabilities, and not have to deal with what many see as obsolescent gear and antiquated policies. Unfortunately, were that wish to really come true across the joint force and mission domain, it could have disastrous and deadly consequences.

    This is not intended to be a defense of the DoD requirements and acquisition processes, for there is much that could be improved within both. Adherence to those processes in the procurement of PNT equipment means that it will take longer to develop and produce the equipment than comparable commercial units, and that the equipment will probably be heavier and less user-friendly than commercial products.

    However, those processes exist and are rigorously followed, first because they are required by statute, but also for practical reasons of justifying investments of taxpayer resources and ensuring as much as possible that whatever is procured will withstand the rigors of service in its intended military application. For GPS equipment, this includes not only the rigors of the physical environment but also those of the electronic environment, including threats of both unintentional and hostile interference and signal imitation. It is precisely that threat environment that presents the greatest danger to reliance on commercial GPS products in military applications.

    The U.S. military and coalition forces have been fortunate from a PNT perspective over the last couple of decades in facing relatively unsophisticated adversaries with either limited access to or limited desire to routinely employ PNT countermeasure technology. Consequently, we have seemingly become complacent to the risks posed by overreliance on commercial-derivative PNT products. This complacency is apparent in the recent reporting from the Army’s forward-leaning Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) program, in which the Army assesses leading-edge commercial technologies and identifies those with great promise in order to fast-track them into operation, bypassing as much as possible the aforementioned DoD requirements and acquisition processes. 

    At the same time, the Army gives a wink and a nod to the GPS security policies requiring use of encrypted military GPS signals for combat operations. It is a virtual certainty that if GPS drives the location-based applications in the commercial-derivative technologies evaluated by NIE, those applications are all powered by civilian GPS and not the encrypted military GPS. As noted, civilian GPS is frequently seen by those not thoroughly familiar with PNT technology as the cheap, expedient choice because more secure or integrated PNT sources are too expensive, too heavy, too much bother, and so on. 

    It is also apparent, though not confirmed, that during NIE field testing, the opposing force toolkit does not include navigation warfare (NAVWAR) techniques for GPS jamming and spoofing. If it did, and if the test scenarios included active GPS jamming and spoofing, then the commercial location-based apps with civilian GPS as their input would not work or would derive erroneous solutions. In that case, the Army might have to reconsider its rapid deployment decisions for these vitally important devices. Clearly, it is not doing that.

    The highly touted Rifleman Radio, advertised by the Army as a success, uses civilian GPS as its source of PNT information. The Army is planning to deploy tens of thousands of these radios for operational use over the next several years. While soldiers may be told or even admonished not to use the position and timing solutions derived from these radios for other than situational awareness — in other words, not to use them for direct combat or combat-support tasks — the likelihood of that policy being followed in the real world is nil. Either of necessity or for convenience, soldiers will use what is made available to them for whatever purposes they deem appropriate. That will be true whether the commercial-derivative PNT solution is in a smartphone or a Rifleman Radio. 

    For the near term, that may not be a problem. However, at some point, in a contested environment against a knowledgeable adversary, mission effectiveness will be compromised and soldiers’ lives will be endangered by such devices. Further, proliferation of these devices will constrain our own commanders in their ability to employ offensive NAVWAR techniques that might be necessary to disrupt adversary use of open civilian GPS signals against our forces in the combat theater.

    These statements are not mere speculation. The vulnerability of civilian GPS signals to unintentional interference and intentional jamming is well known. Reports of personal privacy devices interfering with reception of civilian GPS signals at Newark Airport provide a recent example (see “Personal Privacy Jammers,” page 28 in this issue). What is less well understood, but even more sinister in a combat environment, is civil GPS susceptibility to spoofing: the intentional creation of false, but believable, signals. 

    In a recent interview with Fox News, Todd Humphreys, a well-regarded GPS researcher from the University of Texas, stated, “The civil GPS signal is completely open and vulnerable to a spoofing attack, because they have no authentication and no encryption. It’s almost trivial to mimic those signals to imitate them and fool a GPS receiver into tracking your signals instead of the authentic ones.” In a combat environment, such deception could result in mission failure or loss of life through loss of command-and-control communications in high tempo lethal actions, erroneous target designations, or misdirected fires.

    All those who recommend providing soldiers in combat situations with PNT capabilities derived from civilian GPS, whether via smart phone, iPad, or Rifleman Radio, in lieu of or even in addition to their less convenient but more reliable military GPS devices, should reconsider that recommendation in light of the above. 

    There is no argument to the statement that the DoD owes the warfighter more modern, integrated, compact, battery-efficient PNT devices incorporating military GPS. Those will come through the acquisition process, though not as fast as we all would like. In reality, a proliferation of civil PNT devices in military operations will likely delay further the availability of more suitable integrated military equipment. 

    In the meantime, we should not be misled because of our experience in today’s war. Instead, we must plan for future actions in anti-access/area denial situations against knowledgeable adversaries. We cannot afford to undermine the warfighters’ cause in advance by advocating reliance on vulnerable and exploitable commercial GPS equipment that can get them killed.

    Jules McNeff is vice president for strategy and programs for Overlook Systems Technologies. He served 20 years in the U.S. Air Force, and then was responsible for Defense Department management and oversight of the GPS program. He is a charter member of GPS World’s Editorial Advisory Board.

  • Out in Front: Feds Playing Footsie

    I’ll be the first to say that I don’t know how Washington works.

    I don’t know if Washington works, but that’s another story.

    Lacking that knowledge, and a competent lawyer to pepper my filings with the requisite “Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1972) . . . claims of nonsegregability must be made with the same degree of detail” language, all my Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for agency communications to the National Telecommunications Administration (NTIA) failed. My FOIA won-lost record stands at 0–7.

    The reason cited by the Department of Transportation for withholding 11 documents and blacking out in their entirety the two pages that it thoughtfully provided was that being any more forthcoming might “cause harm to the government’s deliberative process.” If government told the people what it was up to behind closed doors, the people might object. Shades of Tammany Hall. “I’ll decide what is in the best interest of the electorate.”

    Several government agencies, responding to a tasking by the National PNT Executive Committee, sent their thoughts on LightSquared and GPS to the NTIA, which shares responsibility for spectrum with the Federal Communications Commission. At last notice, the NTIA had not forwarded these communiques to the FCC, and it sure does not want to share them with anyone on the outside. The NTIA was first to rebuff my FOIA, followed by others. Only Interior and NASA provided substance, but in both cases the documents had already been released by a House committee.

    The Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) knows the system a lot better than I do. Its well (or at least copiously) worded FOIA to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy for documents related to LightSquared elicited several boxloads of same.

    A nonprofit organization, CREW uses research, media outreach, and litigation to force officials to act ethically and lawfully, and to bring unethical conduct to public attention.

    CREW is combing through the voluminous documents, as you may now also do. So far, I’ve seen effusive emails from White House staffers to corporate folks they may or may not already know, fawning all over themselves about economic benefits and job creation that a new generation of wireless technology might bring.

    Not a word yet about downside or job loss that undermining an infrastructure cornerstone will produce. In an election year, point to new or hypothetical blooms and hide the detritus.

    This just in: LightSquared formally notified the FCC that any determination must not be based on “the subjective views of the federal agencies involved.”

    Now I wonder what kind of thrall the company thinks it holds the FCC in, to instruct it so?

  • The Good, the Bad, and the Really Ugly

    The Good, the Bad, and the Really Ugly

    The Good

    This month there is good news — great news, actually — where GPS and PNT (Position, Navigation and Timing) systems are concerned. On October 22, a Russian Soyuz rocket placed in orbit the first two validation satellites, built by EADS Astrium Germany, in the Galileo PNT constellation after making its maiden launch from Kourou. Don’t confuse these recent satellites with the earlier experimental satellites, GIOVE-A launched in 2005 followed by GIOVE-B launched in 2008. These initial satellites served to preserve the Galileo ITU frequency filings and test the first-ever space borne Hydrogen Maser atomic clock, which by all accounts is proving to be extremely accurate.

    21102011-_SCO3184-W-1
    The Soyuz launch of two Galileo IOV satellites.

    While it is interesting the Europeans decided on a Russian vehicle for the first Galileo dual launch, the U.S. recently pinned its hopes on a European Ariane Five (pictured at right) to launch a commercially hosted U.S. government payload known, appropriately enough, as the “Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload” or CHIRP sensor, which was specifically developed by the U.S. government as a test payload to test both the payload sensor capability and the commercially hosted options for sensor payloads in GEO. The CHIRP sensor features a fixed telescope that can view one quarter of the Earth from geosynchronous orbit. So it appears that hosted payloads and international launch cooperation efforts are growing and are apparently working successfully.

    The two newest Galileo satellites deployed four hours after the Soyuz rocket lifted off from Kourou, in French Guiana.

    The Soyuz launched the first two of four validation Galileo satellites designed to validate the Galileo concept by testing both space and ground operations. Two additional validation satellites are scheduled to follow in the summer of 2012. Once the In-Orbit Validation (IOV) phase is completed, an additional 12 satellites will be launched to reach an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of 16 satellites sometime in 2014, and that date looks extremely doubtful.

    According to our own Richard Langley, “During initial operations, the [Galileo] satellites will be controlled by a joint ESA and CNES French space agency team in Toulouse, France. Once that week-long phase ends, the satellites will be handed over to the Oberpfaffenhofen Galileo Control Centre near Munich, [Germany], operated by the DLR German Aerospace Center, which will be responsible for routine operations. Operating the satellite payloads to provide navigation services will be the task of the Fucino Control Centre, near Rome, operated by Telespazio.”

    Now, does that sound like a confusing and expensive ground support system? Everybody and every country insist on their piece of the pie, regardless of efficiency and continuity of operations. Who knows this might work; only time will tell.

    The approximately $7.5 billion Galileo constellation will eventually, hopefully, comprise a retinue of 27 operational satellites with three on orbit spares by 2020.

    The PNT business is obviously good for the Russian launch business. Russia successfully launched a GLONASS-K1 test satellite back in February, followed by three GLONASS-M satellites this month into a constellation that finally, after 29 years, accounts for 23 operational and three hopefully soon-to-be operational satellites. The first operational GLONASS-K1 is not scheduled to be launched until sometime early in 2012. GLONASS satellites have historically proven to be fragile affairs with extremely short lifespans; it remains to see how long this number and capability will be maintained. Hopefully the new K1 and M generation GLONASS satellites have resolved many of the longevity issues. Only time will tell when and if the Russian GLONASS will ever regain Full Operational Capability (FOC), which requires 24 simultaneously operating satellites. The Russians were briefly FOC in December 1995, but unfortunately only for a few months. The word “simultaneous” is important as Russian scientisst frequently state they have 25 or 27 GLONASS satellites in orbit, but unfortunately only 22 or 23 of them are operating. But it is possible, miracles still happen, that by the time you read this GLONASS may actually legitimately have achieved FOC once again.

    Now on the Boeing IIF side of the house, more good news as it was announced this week that the second IIF satellite (IIF-2), which has been operational with an elevated signal strength for several months, now has its signals back within the specified signal strength and is good to go. GPS IIF-3 was originally scheduled for launch this coming summer, but the latest launch schedules show the launch in September 2012, about 11 months from now. With 30+ operational GPS satellites on orbit plus residuals, hopefully this will be soon enough.

    Apple & GLONASS

    Always betting on the come, we now know that the late genius Steve Jobs directed his enterprising engineers to include GLONASS PNT software in the latest iPhone 4S; the latest version iPhone that sold 1.3 million units in one day. This effectively gives the iPhone 55 potential satellites to choose from for PNT information as well as the Wi-Fi, cellular tower, and SkyHook Wireless PNT information. With the addition of the GLONASS PNT resources, the iPhone may now well be the most versatile and capable general-purpose PNT platform that exists today. Is that a sad commentary for other GPS and mobile phone providers, a marketing challenge, or merely a positive sign of the technologically advanced times in which we live? It may in fact simply be a true reflection of the capabilities of the most recognized and profitable corporation in the world today. Apple is doing many things right, and one of them is listening to the consumer and giving them more than they expect. Consequently, customers are loyal and Apple Inc. surpassed Microsoft in market capitalization in 2010, and in 2011 became the most valuable consumer-facing brand in the world. Apple is a company Fortune magazine has named the most admired company in the United States for the last three years running. Apple iPhones and numerous PNT applications are certainly in use by thousands of our warfighters in and out of theater. Interesting, to say the least, plus food for thought and a topic for a future column.

    The Bad

    The bad news not surprisingly comes via the U.S. government and no, it is not about LightSquared, because that situation continues to be worse than merely bad. No, the bad news comes in the form of a recently released but curiously out-of-date publication concerning GPS by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  In late October 2011, the CBO released a publication entitled The Global Positioning System for Military Users: Current Modernization Plans and Alternatives.

    I was unfortunate enough to receive both a soft and hard copy; and to make matters worse I don’t own a parakeet. The good news is we do have several fireplaces in our home and winter is rapidly approaching. Truthfully, the report is that bad and out of date, but at least it is boring and long. Fortunately hardly anyone is likely to actually endure the pain and suffering required to read through the entire document. However if you are a masochist and/or suffering from acute insomnia I highly recommend this CBO report as a possible cure. Some of you might justifiably complain I have no business giving medical advice because I am not a medical subject matter expert (SME) and I wholeheartedly agree, just as I agree that the CBO is definitely not a GPS SME and should stay with what they do know. Whatever that is.

    I can assure you when and if the military needs advice concerning future GPS operations and options the last place they will or should turn is to the CBO. For example, the preface of the document clearly states, “In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, this study makes no recommendations.” Contrary to what you may think this is actually good news, since now we don’t have to waste valuable time dealing with flawed recommendations; garbage in, garbage out. Now if only the analysis were impartial or objective, which it is decidedly not. I would even settle for accurate, which it is definitely not. The information in this document is in some cases, as in M-Code satellites, erroneous and confusing; it is out-of-date where the GPS III nomenclature and options are concerned, especially the spot-beam; and it is always misleading concerning objectivity that presents facts not in evidence. There is so much erroneous and misleading information in this report that I sincerely hope no one else reads it, especially our military users.

    Seriously, all kidding aside, if you must read this document, consider it to be retitled as: The Global Positioning System for Military Users: Outdated Modernization Plans and Alternatives Not Currently Being Considered by the DoD.

    Against my better judgment I am including a link to the CBO document for those of you who practice self-flagellation. I truly regret the number of tree lifespans cut short to produce this confusing, misleading, out-of-date, and totally unnecessary document. Sometime I will tell you how I really feel.

    The Really Ugly

    The “really ugly,” as you have probably surmised by now, refers to LightSquared and the clueless FCC. Can you believe we have been dealing with this fiasco for more than 12 months? You are probably tired of it all, I know I am, but I see that as a true danger signal. The situation is very clear technically, the LightSquared signals, both from the terrestrial transmitters and receivers, will significantly impair and jam GPS signals to the detriment of all GPS users. Of course the political and business ineptness continues apace so who knows how long we will be dealing with this issue, but we cannot afford to let down our guard. Although this is exactly what LightSquared, the FCC, and the current administration, in an upcoming Presidential election year, obviously hope will happen. They hope we will all just get tired of dealing or even hearing about this LightSquared mess and then they win by default. We all have more important matters demanding our attention, right? Of course we cannot and are not going to allow that to happen. We will continue to use LightSquared as a verb when necessary and keep the real facts front and center, right here in GPS World, until all aspects are resolved. You can count on it.

    Until next time, happy navigating.

     

  • Expert Advice: EPIC Happening — Europe’s PNT Industry Council

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    John Wilde

    By John Wilde

    We have the United States GPS Industry Council, the Japan GPS Council, and the Korean GNSS Technology Council.

    Anything missing?

    The challenges facing the performance, navigation, and timing (PNT) community, which relies on GNSS amongst other things, are getting more numerous and complex, and Europe is the only major territory without a unified industry nexus where such challenges can be engaged. However, this is about to change.

    From my background and current activity as CEO of DW International, an independent navigation consultancy with a strong interest in GNSS specifically, I have begun forming the European PNT Industry Council (EPIC) with other industry leaders to act as a focal point for the PNT community’s concerns and to help coordinate the effort for standardization and harmonization. Additionally, with issues such as the LightSquared debacle looming, it is key that European stakeholders have a voice on the global stage.

    A recent survey that the nascent EPIC conducted jointly with Marketing Analytics highlighted the need for an organization such as EPIC. We asked key PNT figures around the globe about the issues concerning them and how these concerns should be addressed by EPIC. For such a diverse group of respondents (including representatives from state transport agencies, academic institutions, OEMs, independent consultancies, land survey companies, maritime, and aviation) there was clear agreement on the need for a European focal point for PNT to better facilitate interoperability and harmonization of standards among the current PNT activities being undertaken around the world. Sixty-six percent of respondents wanted an international forum for information exchange (that is, ideas, best practices, and lessons learned) where such issues as interoperability and harmonization could be addressed.

    Sixty-three percent rated system-level PNT policy issues as a very important subject area for EPIC, while 56 percent rated standards for PNT in areas such as aviation, rail, and E112 as being very important. There is no shortage of issues to tackle, and EPIC will prove to be a key player in forming the coalitions required.

    As one respondent put it, when asked about his priorities regarding PNT policy:

    • Galileo launch schedule;
    • Compass CPII and CPIII signal details and operational plans;
    • Information about GLONASS L3 and GLONASS CDMA plans, particularly ICD and frequency of planned L1 CDMA signal;
    • SBAS plans, such as EGNOS and GAGAN;
    • European regulatory plans that relate to navigation and positioning; E112, road user charging, tracking and logistics;
    • Standards for navigation and positioning applications, plus applications that rely on a position.

    Whatever the appeal of a forum for the exchange of technical knowledge amongst professionals, it was also clear that respondents wanted EPIC to take action as well. One wrote:

    “EPIC needs to be outcome/results oriented and not turn into a talkfest. Therefore issues such as LightSquared need to be addressed head on so that bureaucrats start listening to the science behind decisions and policies rather than commercially driven for short-term political expediency.”

    Indeed, EPIC joined the chorus of organizations writing directly to the FCC calling for a rethink of the LightSquared issue.

    I personally believe that with the industry councils active in the United States and Asia, EPIC is the third leg of the stool. PNT is such a dynamic world, with so many moving parts, that even large international organizations risk being left behind unless their interests are represented and the information they need is available in a consistent and practical fashion.

    But more than that, PNT is a utility that needs to be protected, maintained, enhanced, and utilized. EPIC will ensure that those who want to, can.

    The need is there. The stakeholders are there. It’s happening.

  • The System: An L5 Surprise

    It has long been accepted that we may reasonably expect any new technical device to have some growing pains. If you examine the history of the space program you will discover evidence of this. In the case of the first GPS IIF vehicle on orbit we do not have a 12,552-mile screwdriver. but we do have dedicated software and systems engineers at Boeing and in the U.S. Air Force that will solve the issues that crop up and eventually present the world with a stable PNT platform.

    I bring this to your attention because researchers at the German Aerospace Center (DLR) say they have found a small variance in the L5 signal on IIF-1. The signal variation results in no more than a 5-centimeter error with a predictable periodicity of about six hours. While observing the IIF, DLR also reports that the signal appears to be “hot” or stronger than anticipated or advertised by about 1/2 db.

    Initial reaction from the GPS Wing and Air Force experts at Schriever AFB is that the signal fluctuation appears to be temperature-related, as the periodicity correlates directly to the temperature extremes the satellite is experiencing at this time of year in its MEO orbit. It is being investigated as a matter of course during the standard checkout of the satellite, which will continue for about another four weeks according to the original checkout schedule.

    The GPS Wing is confident that all the IIF signal specifications will be met by the time the satellite is set healthy in about a month’s time and they will be able to move forward with the IIF launch schedule as planned. Obviously this could be perturbated by having to make corrections or adjustments to the satellites still to be launched, but this is normal procedure, and some leeway to correct anomalies is built into the schedule for the first few launches of any new satellite system.

    Privately, one official commented, “It turns out that no one has ever made this measurement before. The Galileo SVs can only broadcast from 2 transmitters at a time so they are combining two E5 signals generated from the same transmitter.  Furthermore, their data was collected during max Beta meaning when they weren’t in eclipse (less thermal variance).”

    The press release from the GPS Wing reads as follows.

    SMC Update. July 19 — “Officials from the Air Force Space Command, Space and Missile Systems Center’s Global Positioning Systems Wing announced the “on-orbit checkout” of the first IIF satellite is progressing as scheduled. “Nearing the half way point of its 90-day checkout period, GPS IIF SV-1 also known as SVN 62/PRN 25, is currently broadcasting the same L1 and L2 signals as previous GPS satellites and the new safety of life signal known as L5. All three signals being broadcast from SVN 62 are set unhealthy while experts monitor the quality and characteristics of the signals and the performance of the satellite.

    “During the initial phase of testing, [DLR] combined L1, L2, and L5 signals in a technique used to characterize a number of known and modeled error sources from the signals. This three-frequency combining technique helps isolate “other” sources of location error, such as multi-path (when more than one path exists for signals to travel before reception), receiver errors, satellite induced errors and unmodeled phenomena. The L1, L2 and L5 signals from SVN-62 are operating nominally but DLR noticed higher residual errors than expected compared to previous somewhat similar measurements from Galileo’s GIOVE-A R&D satellite.

    “The GPS Wing at Los Angeles Air Force Base has corroborated DLR’s results and is investigating root cause to share a deeper understanding of this new signal’s behavior with the user community. The causes of the phase variation are still being investigated, but they are likely the result of sensitivities to changes in the satellite’s thermal environment. SVN 62/PRN 25 is currently experiencing periods of both sunlight and total darkness (known as eclipse season) as the satellite orbits the Earth and traverses through Earth’s shadow. Tests to characterize the satellite’s performance during continuous sunlight exposure will continue after the current eclipse season ends later this month.

    “Typical GPS receivers using stand-alone (single signal – L1, L2 or L5) or combinations of L1, L2 and L5 signals as part of their navigation solution will not be affected by this small phenomenon. The Air Force is committed to maintaining excellence in GPS navigation and timing services and to working with the user community to best use and exploit the new modernized GPS signals.

    “When tests of this new generation of GPS satellites have been completed and Air Force leadership gives approval, the satellite signals will be set healthy and will operate as specified in the Interface Control Documents (ICDs).”

  • Expert Advice: Remembering. And Resolving

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    By The Masked Engineer

    In a few weeks, we will again observe the tragic anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. This will mark nearly a full decade since that terrible day that changed the lives of people around the world, forever. Many will remember. Many will mourn. Many will work to ensure that such an event never again threatens any nation. That is a good thing.

    Few outside the position, navigation, and timing (PNT) community will also recall that the day before the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government released a landmark document that described the vulnerabilities of services provided by GPS to disruption, whether by attack or inadvertent interference. The Department of Transportation Volpe Center’s GPS vulnerability assessment recommended that services utilizing GPS-provided PNT seek alternative sources of these services. What decisions and actions have the findings and recommendations of this report promoted? The answer is most disturbing.

    The U.S. government has sealed the fate of Loran-C and kept the decision on an enhanced Loran system (eLoran) in limbo for more than 10 years. The government has spent hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of dollars studying the problem over and over again and either ignoring or classifying the results. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a direct outcome of the 9/11 attacks, has done nothing to address the need for a national backup other than study and re-study the problem and disregard the findings and warnings of world-class PNT experts.

    On the positive side, a recent paper from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) attempts to address the problem by proposing to investigate alternative PNT (APNT). While the FAA does this under its Title 49 responsibility and authority to ensure the safety, security, and efficiency of our National Airspace System (NAS), and the alternatives it is looking at are certainly aviation-centric, it is admirable that somewhere in this government someone is finally moving forward to define and implement a real, operational PNT alternative to GNSS and its augmentations. [An abridgement of the FAA paper appeared in the July GPS World; the full paper is available here.]

    I applaud the FAA’s actions and only hope that bureaucrats and bureaucratic processes don’t penalize it for its efforts.

    But the question remains: When will a decision on the U.S. national PNT backup be made? The urgency of this issue can be highlighted by posing some simple questions about another current threat to the U.S. infrastructure and economy.

    To what extent are GNSS-provided PNT services being used to identify the amount and movement of the oil in the Gulf of Mexico? What level of information exactness/integrity would be lost if GNSS-provided PNT services were not available?

    Remember, not only navigation, but communications and surveillance rely on GNSS. See UK/Ireland General Lighthouse Authority’s report on GPS jammers and effects on maritime operations.

    To what extent are GNSS-provided PNT services being utilized by cleanup crews and other impact-mitigation services? How would the efficiency of the cleanup/mitigation activities be impeded if GNSS-provided services were not available?

    Finally, what is the opportunity cost of not having a national PNT backup? Why has this decision been so hard to make? One would intuit that it has encountered political obstacles, not scientific ones. What are they, exactly?

    While the FAA is doing what it must to ensure a safe, secure, and efficient national airspace, what about the rest of us? The boaters, the truckers, the farmers, the power transmission people, the telecom providers, the cell-phone users? The list goes on and on.

    It has been nine years. Why is this so hard?

    As we take time on September 11 to remember where we were when we heard the news, to mourn those lost, and to do, each in our our way, something to ensure that such a thing never happens again, we should also take time on September 10 to thank the folks at the Volpe Center for their important efforts. And we should try, each in our own way, to do something to ensure that the effects of a loss of GNSS-provided services will be once and for all properly mitigated.

    The masked engineer harbors strong convictions, matched by a desire to hold onto a day job.

  • The System: Galileo Removes Manufacturing Barrier

    With final satellite construction bids pending as this magazine goes to press, the Galileo program clarified a recent round of launch postponements and announced that the European Union (EU) will rescind its requirement for a special license to manufacture and sell Galileo receivers.

    “We have an ambition to become, after GPS, the second system of choice,” stated Paul Verhoef, program manager of the EU satellite navigation programs, at the World Congress of the International Association of Institutes of Navigation (IAIN) on October 28. “In order to reach that, the user market is key. We are currently putting our hands to the last bits and pieces of the documentation [revising the previous Galileo Interface Control Document], to be published in a few weeks’ time. We will no longer require a licensing document in order to manufacture and sell devices. We had to do this bit of work to follow up on the initial [different] preparations made under the public-private partnership.”

    Contract by Christmas. The first two in-orbit validation (IOV) satellites will be launched in November 2010, and the next two in April 2011. Verhoef referred to the previous Galileo full operational capability (FOC) date of 2013. “You now know we are not going to meet that date,” said Verhoef.

    “We come to the procurement as it stands at this moment. We are procuring the capacity through six main work packages. We are on track to announce the satellite contracts before Christmas, as well as the system support contract. Perhaps the launch contract, but perhaps not until after Christmas. The other contracts are not time-critical at this point, therefore we have delayed them slightly; to be announced in first quarter 2010.

    “We have split the total of the 28 satellites we will order into two work orders. In the first, we will procure up to 22 satellites, and in the second the rest. Industry bidders are to submit their best and final offer for 8, 14, and 22 satellites. The most crucial decision in the whole procurement will then be for us to go single-source with one of them, or dual-source with both.”

    The final and “best” bids were due to the EU and ESA on November 13 from the two consortia competing to build out the constellation.The EADS Astrium-Thales Alenia Space partnership, larger of the two, has by conventional wisdom the inside track to win the contract. However, the competion, led by OHB of Germany, includes Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) of the UK, which has the better track record in Galileo satellite manufacture to date.

    “A double supplier would mean spending extra money,” said Verhoef in his IAIN remarks, “but it would bring some risk reduction. Will it be worth the extra money we will have to pay for it? By the end of the year we hope to have the answer for that. By the end of the year we will have under contract the delivery of 22 satellites, and the launch contract. Then we will be able to give a very clear schedule on deployment.

    “There remains uncertainty on where it will end. Budget questions depend on parliament and the EC, which will drive the final aspects of the work. We live in difficult economic times, and there are some things to be determined in 2014, when the next funding cycle will begin.

    “By the end of 2013, we will have an initial constellation of 16 satellites: four IOV and 12 FOC satellites. This is targeted to provide the open service, and parts of the other services: safety of life, PRS, and commercial. Completion of these will depend on funding questions.”

    See the Satellite. An online story on Britain’s BBC News channel contains a two-minute video clip (see PHOTO) showing close-ups of the antennae and other elements of the IOV satellite under manufacture at an EADS Astrium facility in Portsmouth, United Kingdom.

    Once completed, the payload will travel to Thales Alenia Space in Rome, Italy, for attachment to the main spacecraft bus, with a propulsion system, avionics, and solar panels, and then go to the European Space Agency (ESA) port in Kourou, French Guiana. Both intial satellites are intended to rise aboard a Russian Soyuz rocket, which has had its own problems recently, with delays due to changes necessary for the ESA launch pad.

    System Updates

    GPS to Fly Without Back-Up. U.S. President Obama and Congress have removed a key back-up system for GPS. The president signed the Department of Homeland Defense appropriations bill that allows termination of Loran-C in January 2010. Loran-C and modernized eLoran could prevent national and industrial infrastructure breakdown in the event of disruptions, interference, or intentional jamming. The House of Representatives passed a Coast Guard authorization bill calling for Loran termination, in line with the DHS appropriations bill. For details see www.pnt.gov; see also “Letters” in this issue, page 13. The Coast Guard Commandant and DHS are expected to sign off almost immediately that Loran-C can be terminated. Once they sign it, Loran signals could go off the air as early as January 4, 2010.

    GLONASS Signal Misbehavior. The planned September and October launches of three new GLONASS-M satellites were scrubbed, and the traditional Christmas launch appears doubtful at best. The Russians have commissioned a special task force to investigate a problem with the signal generator aboard an orbiting satellite, detected in late August. It is not known whether the same problem affects three satellites on the ground, destined for imminent launch.

    Beidou’s Second Bird. Beidou G2, launched last April, has drifted 10 degrees from its initial geostationary orbital slot. This may mean that it is uncontrollable and has been abandoned. Such a failure — if it is one — may delay launch of new satellites to begin filling out the Chinese GNSS. As previously reported, demonstration satellite Beidou 1D is also adrift.

  • Chronos Introduces GAARDIAN Project at ION GNSS 2009

    Chronos Technology is introducing the academic and business research consortium working on the GAARDIAN Project at its booth (#728) at the ION GNSS conference taking place this week in Savannah, Georgia. Chronos is leading the consortium, which over the course of 2009 – 2011 will be researching the data-gathering necessary to develop a system for mission and safety critical applications that will certify the accuracy, reliability, integrity, and continuity of Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) systems: GPS, the new enhanced LORAN (eLORAN), GALILEO and GLONASS.

    GAARDIAN is the acronym for “GNSS Availability, Accuracy, Reliability anD Integrity Assessment for Timing and Navigation” and the Consortium includes University of Bath, General Lighthouse Authorities, BT, Ordnance Survey, National Physical Laboratory, and Imperial College London.

    The project will create a mesh of remote PNT (Positioning, Navigation & Timing) interference detection & mitigation sensors (IDMs) which will be deployed in the vicinity of PNT dependent infrastructure & applications. These probes will monitor the integrity, reliability, continuity and accuracy of the locally received GPS (or other GNSS) and eLoran signals on a 24×7 basis and report back to a central server. The user will be alerted in real time to any anomalous behavior in either of the two PNT signals.

    IDM sensors, which can be configured by the user to be personalized to a specific deployed location, permanently monitor the PNT signals and on detection of an anomaly warn of a potentially critical situation.

    Users access the data over the internet from a secure server environment, enabling continuous monitoring from any internet enabled terminal – effectively providing access to detailed knowledge about local PNT health and pinpointing interference phenomena from anywhere in the world.

    Likely phenomena or threats to PNT services which would cause an alarm include jamming, general interference, multipath from local reflections, space environment or weather related events and satellite or transmitter malfunction.

    Traditionally it has been very difficult to analyze the specific nature of interference to a PNT signal, when monitoring one signal alone, e.g. GPS. By using the technically dissimilar eLoran signal and continually analyzing key data, the integrity, reliability, continuity and accuracy of either signal can be recorded with high confidence.

    Likely applications will include homeland security, transport users such as harbors, airports, roads and railways, emergency services, military, utilities, scientific community, telecom infrastructure and any safety or mission critical application leveraging PNT signals.

  • GAARDIAN Consortium Wins GPS/eLoran Integrity Research Project

    A business and academic consortium led by Chronos Technology has received a major grant from the U.K. government sponsored Technology Strategy Board for a £2.2 million (approximately $3.3 million) research project to improve the safety and security of location-based applications such as marine navigation and road transportation.

    The consortium has dubbed the project GAARDIAN, or GNSS Availability, Accuracy, Reliability and Integrity Assessment for Timing and Navigation. Over the next 30 months, the consortium will be developing a system for mission and safety critical applications that will certify the accuracy, reliability, and integrity of positioning, navigation and timing systems, namely GPS, enhanced Loran (eLoran), and GLONASS.

    “GPS is fast becoming an unseen, embedded and low cost commodity. The challenge to the user community is that it may not appreciate the fact that subtle failures of the GPS signal could have disastrous or expensive consequences in mission or safety critical applications,” said Charles Curry, managing director of Chronos Technology. “The impact on GPS from threats such as jamming, spoofing, space-weather, multipath and other types of interference is likely to increase over the coming years due for example to easier availability of jamming technology or more esoteric phenomena such as increased sun-spot activity. The GAARDIAN project aims to create a data gathering system that will enable any user to monitor the health of the GPS signal in the vicinity of use on a 24-7 basis in real time.”

    GAARDIAN will use the Universal Time Coordinate-traceable timing signal from the GLAs’ eLoran station at Anthorn in Cumbria, United Kingdom, along with analysis of the GPS signal data to authenticate GPS reception wherever it is needed for mission and safety critical applications. The challenge is to gather and filter large volumes of GPS and eLoran data continuously in multiple, complex and disparate environments without losing content, according to Chronos.

    “This is an exciting project that will exploit the complementary benefits of satellite and terrestrial systems to reduce risk and so improve safety and security at sea and protection of the marine environment,” said Sally Basker, director of research and radionavigation for the General Lighthouse Authorities.

    The consortium brings together seven private, public, and academic organizations: Chronos Technology, BT Design, the General Lighthouse Authorities of the United Kingdom and Ireland, the Imperial College London, the (U.K.) National Physical Laboratory, the Ordnance Survey of Great Britain, and the University of Bath