InfiniDome has conducted testing and measurements in the Golan Heights along the Israel-Syria border. The goal of the tests was to hunt down jamming events, record them, see how they affect both protected and unprotected receivers, and then compare the results.
Two identical u-blox M8N receivers aboard a UAV were tested side by side, with one protected by GPSdome technology.
The GPSdome anti-jammer is a retrofit module that can be easily integrated to protect any GNSS-based system. It combines patterns from two omnidirectional antennas to create a null in the direction of the jamming signal, thus attenuating its power, making any GPS receiver about 50 times more resilient to jamming.
In a video of the tests, the GNSS receiver protected by GPSdome can be seen maintaining the GPS signal along the border, enabling uninterrupted navigation.
In contrast, the unprotected GNSS receiver loses the GPS signal during the attack, which can easily result in the drone becoming completely jammed, aggressively drifting and eventually crashing.
The Israel-Syria border experiences frequent jamming from Russian forces positioned in Syria, affecting critical border surveillance operations in the Golan Heights. Other global hotspots for jamming include the U.S.-Mexico border, where drug cartels use jammers on U.S. border surveillance drones, and the Shanghai port in China, where pirates may be the cause of ship and plane navigation confusion through use of jammers.
Jamming in Ukraine has also been well documented, with attacks from Russian forces taking down any plane, drone and even critical infrastructure asset in proximity, according to infiniDome.
Two screenshots of recordings during the event: The top image is of the GNSS receiver (u-blox M8N) protected with the GPSdome, ensuring continuous navigation. The bottom is unprotected and shows how the M8N was completely blocked for the entire route. (Images: InfiniDome)
The jamming attack was analyzed and appears not to have been a brute force attack, but rather a slightly more sophisticated signal, causing the receivers to “see” satellites but not be able to sync their signals and track them. The receiver protected by the GPSdome was able to distinguish between the real GNSS signals and the jamming signals.
In addition, GPSdome was able to attenuate the jamming signals sufficiently to be able to continue tracking the real GNSS signals while at the same time reporting the attack via its dedicated alert output.
Because GPSdome is both lightweight and easy to integrate (see integration diagram below), it can effectively provide much-needed resilience to drones and UAVs from widely available jammers, enabling drone operators to carry out missions safely and reliably.
GNSS jamming and possible spoofing has intensified in areas surrounding Ukraine, according to the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
The agency issued a bulletin on March 17 warning of a GNSS outage leading to navigation and surveillance degradation. According to the bulletin, which was directed at national aviation authorities and airlines, reports analyzed by EASA indicate that, since Feb. 24, GNSS spoofing and jamming has intensified in four key geographical areas:
the Kaliningrad region, surrounding Baltic Sea and neighboring states
Eastern Finland
the Black Sea
the Eastern Mediterranean area near Cyprus, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and Israel, as well as Northern Iraq.
“The effects of GNSS jamming and/ or possible spoofing were observed by aircraft in various phases of their flights,” the bulletin stated, “in certain cases leading to rerouting or even to change the destination due to the inability to perform a safe landing procedure.”
Potential issues include:
loss of ability to use GNSS for waypoint navigation
loss of area navigation (RNAV) approach capability
triggering of terrain warnings
inconsistent aircraft position on the navigation display
loss of ADS-B, wind shear, terrain and surface functionalities
failure or degradation of ATM/ANS/ CNS and aircraft systems that use GNSS as a time reference
airspace infringements and/or route deviations due to GNSS degradation.
The open-source release of FGI-GSRx software receiver widens its user base and offers researchers, students and developers a chance to utilize the research platform for innovations.
The GSRx software receiver, developed by the Finnish Geospatial Research Institute (FGI), is now being released as open source for use by the GNSS community.
FGI-GSRx has been extensively used as a research platform for the last decade in different national and international research projects to develop, test and validate novel receiver processing algorithms for robust, resilient and precise positioning, navigation and timing (PNT).
FGI-GSRx has been used to develop algorithms for detecting GNSS jamming and spoofing events in several past R&D projects. It is also used to develop mitigation algorithms to offer a resilient PNT solution to the user.
The FGI-GSRx software receiver will be discussed in the next edition of the textbook GNSS Software Receivers by Borre, Fernández-Hernández, Lopez-Salcedo and Bhuiyan. The book will be published by Cambridge University Press in August.
Uses of the software receiver
The software receiver can be used in universities and other research institutes to provide graduate-level students and early-stage researchers with hands-on training in GNSS receiver development. It can also be used in the GNSS industry as a benchmark software-defined receiver implementation.
The software receiver is already being used in the “GNSS Technologies” course offered widely in Finland at the University of Vaasa, Tampere University, Aalto University and the Finnish Institute of Technology.
The open-source release of FGI-GSRx will enable any third-party developer, researcher or student to use the platform to develop, test and validate innovative algorithms. It offers a flexible interface and configuration files, so that researchers can further implement their own codes or algorithms at different receiver processing stages. This allows the user to go much deeper into the coding without addressing all the implementation details, explained Research Professor Zahidul Bhuiyan, FGI, National Land Survey of Finland.
Meeting evolving industry needs
The GNSS market has faced a transformation in the past two decades, with new features and signal properties being added to the modernized satellite navigation systems at an increasing pace. A software-defined receiver enables algorithm optimization and testing in this rapidly changing industry.
The multi-constellation FGI-GSRx receiver has evolved to provide diversity and improved accuracy. When the FGI-GSRx was first developed, it was able to track the Galileo test satellites GIOVE A and GIOVE B. Since then, FGI researchers have been continuously developing new capabilities to the software receiver with the inclusion of Galileo in 2013, the Chinese satellite navigation system BeiDou in early 2014, the Indian regional satellite navigation System NavIC in late 2014, and the Russian satellite navigation system GLONASS in 2015.
The U.S. Department of Defense wants help making sense of commercially and publicly available information that could be used to detect GNSS disruptors, especially over large areas.
Obtaining the ability to detect and geolocate GNSS disruptions has been cited as an unmet need in a number of U.S. national policies and plans dealing with positioning, navigation and timing.
The recently posted solicitation calls the project “HARMONIOUS ROOK – Situational Awareness for Intentional Disruption of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Users.” The solicitation says:
“The Department of Defense (DoD) seeks commercial solutions leveraging machine-driven analytics and datasets derived from publicly/commercially available information (PAI/CAI) to provide a situational awareness capability for intentional global navigation satellite system (GNSS) disruptions. This solicitation is particularly focused on persistent, large-area coverage of falsified GNSS emitters that result in localized spoofing phenomenology.”
Studies and analyses by non-profit organizations and commercial entities have demonstrated the ability of non-governmental organizations to do this kind of work and produce remarkable results. In 2017, our Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation detected and reported on widespread GPS spoofing in the Black Sea.
This acquisition is being led by the Defense Innovation Unit, or DIU. The unit was specifically created to accelerate the adoption of commercial technology and services by the defense and national security establishments. While letting a traditional DoD contract for a prototype can often take up to 18 months, DIU aims to award contracts within 60 to 90 days of identifying the problem.
To do this, DIU uses the government’s “commercial solutions opening” process, which is designed to be simple and quick.
Companies who provide analytic services and those who have unique data sets are both encouraged to apply. The deadline is August 23.
Dana A. Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation
An Interim Armored Vehicle “Stryker” and AH-64 Apache helicopters with Battle Group Poland move to secure an area during a lethality demonstration as part of Saber Strike 18 in June 2018. (Photo: U.S. Army/Spc. Hubert D. Delany III, 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)
A surveillance system is demonstrated during a Naval Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR) exercise. (Photo: Rick Naystatt/U.S. Navy)
The U.S. Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) is asking for commercial solutions to fight GNSS disruptions, including jamming and spoofing.
DIU is particularly asking for “solutions leveraging machine-driven analytics and datasets derived from publicly/commercially available information to provide a situational awareness capability” against intentional disruptions.
Responses to “HARMONIOUS ROOK — Situational Awareness for Intentional Disruption of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Users” are due by Aug. 22.
DIU is a Department of Defense organization focused exclusively on fielding and scaling commercial technology across the U.S. military to help solve critical problems.
The solicitation is focused on “persistent, large-area coverage of falsified GNSS emitters that result in localized spoofing phenomenology.”
It cites intentional manipulation of GNSS signals as enabling “nefarious activities, to include narcotics trafficking, unapproved operation of autonomous vehicles, illegal fishing and sea-borne piracy.”
“Additionally, nation-state use of GNSS jamming or spoofing systems may extend beyond the area of conflict, causing deleterious effects on civilian populations,” the solicitation states. “Such activities degrade or deny critical geolocation capabilities and further introduce hazards to safety-of-life-navigation, critical infrastructure, and emergency response services. “
“In some specific cases, e.g., for critical infrastructures and applications requiring both continuous availability and fail-safe operations, GNSS cannot be the sole means of positioning and timing information.” European Radionavigation Plan, 2018
The Joint Research Center in Ispra, Italy, is the preferred demonstration site. (Photo: European Commission)
The European Commission is undertaking a GNSS backup technology demonstration, much like the one completed by the U.S. Department of Transportation earlier this year. Companies from many countries outside the European Union, including the United States, are eligible to participate. Responses are due by Jan. 13, 2021.
A tender issued on Oct. 26 says that the goal is for the commission to better understand available non-GNSS PNT technologies. Also, they are interested in services that can provide positioning and navigation, and/or time.
Completely Independent from GNSS
Since the intent is to provide a backup for GNSS during an outage, all offered technologies must be completely independent. Specifically, they must have “no common points of failure with GNSS.”
Some industry observers have opined that this eliminates any space-based capabilities from consideration. Coronal mass ejections from the sun have long been considered a threat to satellites. Others have wondered if networked-based solutions could be also excluded because of frequent use of GNSS for synchronization, billing and other applications.
Another requirement is that offered technologies be capable of covering the entire EU territory, including inland waters. While this might seem to rule out fiber-based timing systems, advocates say that is not necessarily the case. They contend a fiber network supporting dispersed transmitters would serve both fixed and mobile applications, and reach users for whom connecting to a fiber node is not feasible.
Other requirements listed in the tender for offered technologies include:
Resilience to GNSS jamming, spoofing, and unintentional interference
Technical readiness levels of 5 or more for positioning and navigation, 6 or more for timing
Able to perform for at least a day during a loss of GNSS
Positioning accuracy < 100 m horizontal, or timing accuracy < 1 microsecond relative to UTC
If timing is included, it must be traceable to UTC
The Demonstration
A webinar for potential offerors was held on Nov. 4. Although it was not recorded, the slides shown are available at the RNT Foundation website. One update to the slides is a new email replacing the one of the first slide. All inquiries should be sent to the project leader at [email protected].
Up to seven companies, presumably each demonstrating different technologies, will be accepted into the program.
The preferred demonstration site is the European Commission’s Joint Research Center in Ispra, Italy. Recognizing that transporting equipment and traveling to Italy might be a challenge for many companies, the tender states’ commission personnel are willing to travel to other locations to see systems demonstrated.
The JRC Ispra campus covers 170 hectares with 100 buildings and 36 km of roads. It provides state-of-the-art laboratories, smart city infrastructure (grids, homes, mobility), and varied topography with urban, semi-urban, rural and woodland areas. (Image: EC)
Information on All Technologies Sought
Unlike the European Space Agency’s Navigation Innovation and Support Programme (NAVISP), companies from outside of the EU are invited to respond to the tender and could be selected. This reflects the commission’s desire to include as many technologies and collect as much information as possible.
Limited funding for the demonstration, pandemic travel restrictions, the need for infrastructure to support wide-area signals, and other obstacles may prevent some companies from participating in this effort. The commission’s overall goal, though, is to get information about as many technology options as possible.
So, while not stated in the tender, the commission is eager to hear from technology companies, even if they do not want to be considered as a part of demonstration project. All are invited to contact project leader Ignacio Alcantrailla-Medina. All information is welcome, though most important are a technology’s performance, technical readiness level (TRL), and if it can be deployed in the European Union.
We understand that, as is the case in the United States, solutions delivering timing are of particular interest.
Combining the data from the demonstration project with other information gathered, the commission hopes to be able to identify a way forward with alternative PNT in Europe by the end of 2021.
A GNSS jamming trial will take place from Sept. 8 through Dec. 4 in and around Luce Bay, at Wigtownshire in southern Scotland, conducted by the United Kingdom’s Civil Aviation Authority.
The trial will affect electronic situational awareness devices, UAS command systems and GNSS receivers.
The activity may affect GNSS receivers along with UAS and cockpit devices operating on 433, 868, 915, 2400, 5800 MHz operating up to 40,000FT AMSL within 55NM of 545020N 045548W (West Freugh).
During the trials, impacted systems may suffer intermittent or total failure. Individual events will not exceed two minutes in duration with no more than five events per hour. Activity will take place in the daytime hours between 0830 and 1600.
Septentrio’s mosaic-T is built specifically for resilient and precise time and frequency synchronization under challenging conditions. (Photo: Septentrio)
Septentrio has launched the mosaic-T GPS/GNSS receiver module, built specifically for resilient and precise time and frequency synchronization under challenging conditions.
According to the company, its multi-frequency, multi-constellation GNSS technology — together with AIM+ Advanced Interference Mitigation algorithms — allows mosaic-T to achieve maximal availability even in the presence of GNSS jamming or spoofing. This compact surface-mount module is designed for automated assembly and high-volume production.
“We are excited to expand our mosaic GNSS module family with mosaic-T, which will provide critical infrastructure and mission-critical PNT applications with accurate, reliable and resilient timing solutions,” said Francois Freulon, head of product management at Septentrio.
Septentrio mosaic-T delivers timing with nanosecond-level accuracy and has additional inputs for an external high-accuracy clock, the company added.
Septentrio, headquartered in Leuven, Belgium, designs and manufactures multi-frequency multi-constellation GPS/GNSS positioning technology for demanding applications.
Using Wavelets for a Robust Vector-Tracking-Based GPS Software Receiver
Innovation Insights with Richard Langley
ALFRÉD HAAR. Who is he, you might ask? Alfréd Haar was a Hungarian mathematician who introduced the concept of wavelets during his Ph.D. work on orthogonal functional systems under David Hilbert of Hilbert transform fame. And what is a wavelet? Generally speaking, a wavelet, as its name suggests, is a brief oscillation in time with an amplitude that begins at zero, goes through one or more variations, and returns to zero. It’s a bit like the cardiac cycle of each heartbeat shown on an electrocardiogram. But wavelets, unlike heartbeats, are mathematical functions with well-defined properties.
Although Haar initiated the use of wavelets back in 1909, it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the study of the use of wavelets — wavelet analysis — was undertaken to help solve a variety of problems in science and engineering with new application areas springing up all the time. We’ll get to one of these new areas — GNSS jamming mitigation — in just a bit, but let’s discuss a more mundane application first.
Let’s say we have a digitized audio recording of Maynard Ferguson’s rendition of “MacArthur Park” in our computer. We could do a Fourier transform (related to the Hilbert transform mentioned earlier) of the entire recording, which would show us all of the specific audio frequencies making up the song. But what if we wanted to determine where in the song Ferguson played a particular high note, such as double high C (not his highest)? We could create a wavelet with that frequency and a short duration such as that of a 32nd note and use the mathematical operation of convolution (involving shifting, multiplication and integration) to find one or more spots in the recording with a similar frequency. We could extend the procedure and use a set or bank of wavelets to fully study the song in both frequency and time.
Wavelet analysis will work on many kinds of data, not just audio signals. With an appropriate set of wavelets, we could decompose the data without gaps or overlap, store the resulting product for further analyses and, if necessary, reconstitute the original data with minimal distortion. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation uses wavelet analysis to store compressed digital versions of fingerprint images. A heavily damaged recording of Brahms playing one of his own compositions on an Edison wax cylinder was partially restored using wavelet analysis despite the music being immersed in noise. And the small effect of El Niños on the Earth’s rotation has been studied using wavelet analysis.
And, yes, wavelet analysis is helping to improve the use of GNSS. The tasks being undertaken include de-noising of pseudorange measurements, cycle-slip detection and elimination in carrier-phase measurements, and separating biases such as multipath from high-frequency receiver noise. In this month’s column (which, by the way, now appears four times per year), we learn about another GNSS application of wavelet analysis — specifically the use of the wavelet packet transform — to efficiently identify and separate a jamming signal from the combined signal in a GPS receiver. In a narrowband jamming test using a hardware simulator system, no positioning was possible with conventional receiver operation. But with the proposed approach, the jamming signal was readily suppressed, allowing the satellite signals to be acquired and a positioning solution to be computed. Thank you, Alfréd Haar.
GPS technology has been integrated into many aspects of our daily lives. Hence, there is a growing demand for a robust GPS receiver that can operate efficiently without external aiding to provide continuous, reliable and accurate positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) solutions. However, this is not always possible due to frequent loss or attenuation of signals, multipath or interference. In such challenging conditions, a system malfunction can cause safety problems, especially in health-critical applications.
Receiver architecture plays a major role in defining a receiver’s robustness against the challenges just mentioned. Scalar-tracking-based GPS receivers can achieve high navigation accuracy under line-of-sight (LOS) conditions. However, they always fail to provide adequate accuracy in signal-degraded environments such as urban, suburban and dense foliage environments. On the contrary, vector-tracking-based GPS receivers provide better performance in such challenging environments. In vector-tracking-based receivers, both the tracking loops and the navigation processor are combined to solve a single estimation problem. Hence, there are many advantages of this architecture over that of scalar-tracking-based receivers. First, information from strong signals from healthy satellites is used to track weak signals, when signals are highly attenuated or even totally blocked. Thus, vector-tracking-based receivers have better immunity to jamming and interference. Second, they can rapidly reacquire signals after a satellite outage. Third, they have an improved navigation solution accuracy compared to that of scalar-tracking-based receivers, even under normal LOS conditions. All of these advantages make vector-tracking-based receivers the best platform for our research on receiver robustness. However, vector-tracking-based receivers still suffer from degraded performance in the presence of strong jamming signals. Therefore, we are proposing a new anti-jamming technique to be employed for interference mitigation in vector-tracking-based GPS receivers.
The spread-spectrum nature of GPS signals provides resistance to narrowband interference due to the spreading and despreading processes that take place at the transmitter and receiver respectively. However, a GPS signal reaches the receiver with very low power on the order of –158 dBW, which makes it vulnerable to jamming. A jammer with enough power and suitable time and frequency properties can degrade the positioning solution accuracy and may cause a total blockage of the GPS signals. Besides, the presence of a jamming signal increases the challenge of acquisition of the desired GPS signal.
Therefore, many anti-jamming techniques have been employed for interference mitigation in GPS receivers. There are various anti-jamming methods for GPS receiving systems, which are mainly classified into four groups:
Antenna-level techniques, which are based on the use of antenna arrays to generate a radiation (reception) pattern that attenuates the interference signal based on the direction of arrival.
Automatic gain control (AGC), where interference can be detected by the saturation of the AGC.
Post-correlation techniques, which process the signals after passing through the correlators.
Pre-correlation techniques, which are based on processing the signals after passing through the analog-to-digital converter but before they get to the correlators.
This article introduces a novel interference mitigation technique based on the wavelet packet transform (WPT), which belongs to the pre-correlation techniques category. The WPT enables the received interfered combined GPS signal to be represented in a transformed domain in which an interference signal can be better identified and separated, without significant degradation of the useful GPS signal. The WPT has been extensively discussed in the literature in the framework of GPS and other GNSS. For example, wavelet multi-resolution analysis has been used in one study to remove the multipath error and leave the useful signal untouched. In another study, multi-resolution analysis using wavelets was applied to pseudorange and carrier-phase GPS double differences to reduce multipath effects. And in another, researchers developed a technique to detect and remove cycle slips based on wavelet multiresolution analysis.
The WPT has been widely used in the context of jamming to mitigate pulsed and narrowband interference. Although the WPT showed outstanding performance in jamming mitigation, the main drawback of this technique is the computational complexity. In this article, we introduce a novel wavelet packet-based technique for narrowband jamming mitigation with significantly reduced computational complexity.
Signal and Interference Models
The GPS signal employs a direct sequence spread spectrum communication technique, in which the signal is multiplied by a spreading or pseudorandom noise (PRN) code. As mentioned earlier, this spreading technique gives GPS some immunity to narrowband jamming. The received digitized spread spectrum signal at the output of the receiver’s analog to digital converter (ADC) can be represented by:
(1)
where, for signal s, ym(nTs) is the useful GPS signal received from mth LOS satellite, j(nTs) is the jamming signal, w(nTs) is additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), M is the number of visible satellites, n is the sample number and Ts is the sampling rate.
The useful received GPS signal can be described as follows:
(2)
where P is the signal power, d(nTs) is the navigation data, c(nTs) is the spreading pseudorandom noise code, fIF is the intermediate frequency, no is the code delay, fd is the Doppler shift, and θo is the carrier phase.
Interference signals are classified based on their spectrum characteristics: narrowband or wideband depending on the signal’s bandwidth relative to the bandwidth of the desired GPS signal.
Our focus in this article is on the mitigation of narrowband interference, specifically a linear chirp signal. A chirp signal can be expressed as:
(3)
where a is the chirp signal amplitude, fo is the starting frequency, k is the sweeping frequency, and Tsw is the sweeping frequency period. The chirp is continuously repeated.
Wavelet Packet Transform
The wavelet packet transform or WPT is a class of transformed domain techniques that has been widely used in the context of jamming mitigation in GPS signal reception. It allows for the study of a signal in both time and frequency domains simultaneously. In the WPT, the signal is decomposed into approximations (the low-pass component) and details (the high-pass component) with respect to a group of local basis functions. These functions can be obtained through dyadic scaling and shifting of the so-called mother wavelet. The discrete wavelet basis functions are given by:
(4)
where j and k are integers, so is the dilation step, and τo is the scaling coefficient. The decomposition of the signal with respect to a scaling function acts as low-pass filtering of the signal, while the decomposition with respect to a wavelet function acts as high-pass filtering of the signal. The signal is then down-sampled, and this procedure is further iterated on all the sub-bands using scaled and dilated versions of the wavelet and scaling functions. This filtering process allows the decomposition of the GPS signal with respect to a local basis function, in which each of these sub-bands identifies a limited frequency band of the received signal, and the frequency resolution is dependent on the level of decomposition. The wavelet packet decomposition can be realized as a filter-bank as depicted in FIGURE 1.
As mentioned earlier, the main drawback of WPT is the time complexity. Due to the decomposition of both approximation and detail components, if the signal is decomposed into L levels, the resultant number of coefficients is 2L. For instance, if we used 10 decomposition levels, the resultant number of wavelet coefficients is 210 (1,024). However, as each wavelet coefficient component represents a limited portion of the frequency of the received signal, the jamming signal will only affect a few coefficients. Thus, the main idea of the proposed algorithm is to identify those coefficients that are affected by the jamming signal and reconstruct the jamming signal after denoising them. Then, the estimated jamming signal is subtracted from the received signal to obtain the jamming-free useful GPS signal.
Identifying the wavelet coefficients affected by interference is achieved by computing the median absolute deviation (MAD). As those coefficients that are affected by interference have a higher MAD value than those that are not affected, the decision of whether the wavelet coefficients are affected by interference is based on comparing their MAD values with a certain predefined threshold. This threshold is determined based on the desired detection and false alarm probabilities according to the distribution of the received signal samples in an interference-free environment. Only the sub-bands whose MAD values exceed the threshold are considered to be affected by interference and are further decomposed.
Therefore, only the sub-bands affected by interference are isolated and iterated. This technique allows for a considerable reduction in complexity, as both detection and mitigation can be applied in a limited number of sub-bands. FIGURES 2 and 3 show the tree decomposition of the received signal of two jamming scenarios based on the proposed algorithm. The frequency offset of the jamming signal from the GPS signal is 200 kHz in the first scenario and 600 kHz in the second one. The figures clearly illustrate the huge reduction in computational complexity as for 10 levels of decomposition; we ended up having only eight wavelet coefficients instead of 1,024.
FIGURE 2. Tree decomposition for scenario I. (Image: Authors)FIGURE 3. Tree decomposition for scenario II. (Image: Authors)
The proposed wavelet packet-based detection and mitigation algorithm is explained in three steps.
Decomposition Step. The incoming GPS signal is decomposed through a uniform filter bank by only one level. Then, MAD is computed for all the decomposed sub-bands. Only sub-bands with a MAD value greater than the predefined threshold will be further decomposed. This step is repeated until the maximum predefined decomposition level is reached.
Detection Step. The MAD value is computed for all sub-bands from the last decomposition level. Only sub-bands whose MAD value exceeds the predefined threshold are considered affected by interference and are used to reconstruct the jamming signal using the inverse wavelet transform.
Reconstruction Step. In this step, the useful GPS signal is reconstructed free of interference by subtracting the estimated jamming signal from the received signal.
Experimental Work
In our investigation, a GNSS simulation system was used to create a fully controlled environment to examine and validate the performance of the proposed method using semi-real simulation scenarios. The simulator was controlled by simulation software that enables the simulation of multipath reflections through an advanced multipath model as well as atmospheric degradation to signals and the effects of antenna patterns and terrain obscuration. Moreover, it can generate simulated land, air, space and sea trajectories. Furthermore, the simulator when connected to an interference simulation system can provide various controlled jamming environments using an interference signal generator. The full setup is shown in FIGURE 4.
The receiver used in this research is a prototype of a digital front end. The front end collects the output radio frequency (RF) signal from the simulator. Then, the RF signal is down-converted to baseband through several down-conversion stages, generating the in-phase (I) and quadrature-phase (Q) data. Then, the data is sampled and quantized through the ADC. The front end collects GPS L1 signals at different bandwidths ranging from 2.5 MHz to 20 MHz with quantization levels ranging from 1-bit to 8-bit. After that, the sampled digitized signal is sent to the computer via an Ethernet connection.
The raw I/Q GPS samples are then processed by a GPS software receiver. Our proposed algorithms have been implemented using Matlab by modifying the open-source GPS software-defined radio (SDR) receiver composed by Borre and Akos, which is widely used in research.
To verify the performance of the new proposed algorithm, a full GPS C/A-code signal was simulated using the previously mentioned simulation system. A static simulated scenario was generated for this purpose. This static scenario was run twice, once in an interference-free environment for reference, and one where the jamming signal was enabled. The simulation, front end and SDR receiver parameters are shown in TABLE 1.
Table 1. Data collection and processing parameters. (Data: Authors)
FIGURES 5 and 6 show the power spectral density (PSD)of the received signal before and after applying the proposed jamming mitigation technique. The figures demonstrate that the interference components have been highly attenuated. To confirm the benefits of the proposed technique, the reconstructed useful GPS signal has been acquired using the SDR receiver.
FIGURE 5. PSD before jamming mitigation. (Image: Authors)FIGURE 6. PSD after jamming mitigation. (Image: Authors)
FIGURE 7 shows that the receiver is in a total blockage as it failed to acquire any satellite before applying the jamming mitigation technique. However, FIGURE 8 shows that the proposed algorithm allowed the retrieval of seven satellites.
FIGURE 7. Acquisition results before jamming mitigation. (Image: Authors)FIGURE 8. Acquisition results after jamming mitigation. (Image: Authors)
FIGURE 9 shows the cross-ambiguity function (CAF) of PRN31 before jamming mitigation. It is obvious from the figure that the search space is quite noisy, and the receiver fails to acquire the GPS signal due to the difficulty of isolating the peak from the noise. However, FIGURE 10 shows that the peak clearly emerges from the noise floor and can be easily detected by the receiver after applying the jamming mitigation algorithm.
FIGURE 9. CAF of PRN31 before jamming mitigation. (Image: Authors)FIGURE 10. CAF of PRN31 after jamming mitigation. (Image: Authors)
These figures demonstrate the power of the proposed algorithm and confirms that the useful signal is not lost during the filtering process. Before applying the jamming mitigation algorithm, the receiver lost lock on all satellites and failed to provide a navigation solution. However, after applying the proposed algorithm, the navigation solution is available with an accuracy of about 10 meters in the east and north components and around 20 meters in the up component, as shown in FIGURE 11.
FIGURE 11. Navigation solution. (Image: Authors)
Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed a new method for mitigating a linear chirp narrowband jamming signal based on the WPT. Although the WPT has been widely used in the literature in the context of mitigating narrowband jamming, this technique is characterized by a significant computational complexity that is not only proportional to the length of the signal, but also proportional to the wavelet decomposition level.
The results show that our proposed algorithm is able to maintain excellent performance in the suppression of the jamming signal with a significant reduction in complexity. In the proposed technique, the sub-bands affected by interference are identified and are further decomposed to be used to reconstruct the jamming signal. Then, the useful GPS signal is obtained by subtracting the estimated jamming signal from the received signal. The performance of the algorithm has been assessed with respect to acquisition and navigation performance. The results show that the proposed algorithm successfully suppressed narrowband jamming without significantly degrading the useful GPS signal.
Acknowledgments
This article is based on the paper “A Novel Wavelet Packet-based Jamming Mitigation Technique for Vector Tracking-based GPS Software Receiver” presented at ION GNSS+ 2018, the 31st International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation, Miami, Florida, Sept. 24–28, 2018. The research was supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
Manufacturers
The simulation system used a Spirent Communications Inc. GSS6700 Multi-GNSS Constellation Simulator, a Spirent GSS8366 Interference Combiner Unit and a Keysight Technologies N5172B-503 Interference Signal Generator. The receiver front end used was a NovAtel Inc. FireHose D17088 prototype digital GNSS front end.
HAIDY Y. ELGHAMRAWY is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. She received her M.Sc. degree in engineering physics and mathematics from the Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University, Egypt.
MOHAMED YOUSSEF is leading GPS/GNSS product development activities for Sony North America. He holds an interdisciplinary Ph.D. degree from the Department of Geomatics Engineering and the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Calgary, Canada.
ABOELMAGD M. NOURELDIN is a cross-appointment associate professor in the Departments of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Queen’s University and the Royal Military College (RMC) of Canada in Kingston. He is the director of RMC’s Navigation and Instrumentation Research Laboratory.
DroneShield has launched DroneNode in response to end-user requirements.
DroneNode is an evolution of the company’s DroneCannon product. It is a portable, compact and inconspicuous counter-drone jamming device that law enforcement can use at large outdoor events without raising public concern.
DroneNode comes in a portable case approximately 50 x 50 centimeters square. It can be set up in seconds and requires very little training to operate, the company said.
It can simultaneously jam 2.4 GHz, 5.8 GHz and GNSS L1 and L2 bands up to one kilometer, causing drones to return to their point of origin or land. DroneNode is also effective against swarm attacks. Emergency broadcasts, cellphone communication and other dedicated channels will not be affected.
According to the company, DroneNode’s covert design makes it a suitable counter-drone solution for public events where protection from drone threats is a priority. Designed within a rugged carry case, DroneNode is easy to transport and is protected from the elements.
DroneNode is powered by a NATO-approved self contained battery with room for a second battery stored in the accessories tray.
“The release of DroneNode continues DroneShield’s leadership in drone security for public events,” said Oleg Vornik, DroneShield’s CEO. “DroneShield’s recent credentials in the area include the 2018 Olympics, the 2018 Commonwealth Games, 2018 ASEAN-Australia Special Summit, the 2017 Hawaii Ironman World Championship, and the 2015 to 2017 Boston Marathons. The company’s products are well positioned to protect large public gatherings globally.”
According to DroneShield, the product is particularly relevant given the recent drone attack on the Venezuelan president and the high-profile mail bomb terrorist attacks in the United States, heightening the awareness of law enforcement globally to potential threats to high-profile political targets.
A Venezuela soldier received head injuries in a the drone attack against the president. (Photo: Released by Xinhua News Agency)
FCC Authorization Pending. DroneNode and DroneCannon have not been authorized as required by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The devices are not, and may not be, offered for sale or lease, or sold or leased, in the United States, other than to the U.S. government and its agencies, until authorization is obtained.
The use of such devices in the United States by other persons or entities, including state or local government agencies, is prohibited by federal law. Laws limiting the availability of such devices of certain types of users may apply in other jurisdictions, and any sales will be conducted only in compliance with the applicable laws.
Growing awareness of the vulnerabilities of GNSS signals — weak, unencrypted and easily jammed or spoofed — have made GNSS less important to steering the driverless vehicle. What’s up with that?
Extensive visual map databases are being created that, when coupled with cameras, radars and lidars on the vehicle and processed by artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, enable the driverless car to be steered much the way humans drive. Pattern recognition processing in the vehicle allows it to “read” street signs and recognize landmarks, registering its position on the map.
This is the way a person drives in his or her home town, where they always know their orientation and don’t need GNSS. The AI processing “brain,” with access to huge map databases, either through local storage or a network connection, will always be in its familiar home environment: continuously knowing its own position and properly oriented for navigation.
So, will GNSS become unnecessary in the car of the future? Probably not.
First, no one method of navigation is foolproof, and today, GNSS is our primary method of navigating our cars. It is a cost-effective, accurate way of determining position in real time, and with the integration of inertial navigation sensors to handle cases when GNSS is intermittently unavailable, it is improving.
Second, it is not just the car itself that needs to know its location for navigation, but also others outside the car. Ride-sharing apps like Uber and Lyft, car-sharing, usage-based insurance apps, dynamic toll charging, and parking apps all depend on knowing where the car is at all times. GNSS offers sufficient accuracy for all these apps by providing location coordinates. Therefore, a GNSS receiver will most likely remain in the car.
The case for jamming and spoofing
Recall, however, that one of the weaknesses of GNSS is its open, unencrypted format. It is becoming increasingly easier to spoof these signals. Car-sharing, usage-based insurance and dynamic toll charging apps all create a monetary incentive for fraud that can be implemented with a spoofer. For example, a car in a car-sharing network can report a fake position indicating that it is safely parked in a secure area — while in reality, a thief is busy driving it away.
(Image: Orolia)
Let’s assume that all wireless connections to and from the car are secure. This is a reasonable assumption, although recently there have been demonstrations of carjacking via unsecure remote links. Standard SSL encryption, similar to what is used to enter credit card information on the internet, works well here. We have both the awareness and the technology now to prevent such carjackings from ever reoccurring.
However, even if communication links are secure, a GNSS spoofer in the car can fool the GNSS receiver into reporting a fake “safe” position right as it is being stolen. The same is true for insurance or toll apps. And the fraud does not have to be sophisticated. A simple, low-cost jammer can deny proper position just long enough to skirt payment. A secure location method is needed.
Other signals for localization
What would an ideal signal for localizing a driverless car look like?
It needs to be much stronger than GNSS so it is not easily jammed.
It needs to be encrypted so it cannot be spoofed.
It must be ubiquitous, available worldwide.
It must be reliable and robust — with 99.999% availability or better.
It must be practical and priced for the mass-market automotive application.
Though accuracy is always important, the signal used for localization does not have to be as accurate as GNSS is today. Accuracy to 10s of meters is sufficient for all these applications needing fraud protection since it would not be used for steering the car, but rather, only localization. It can also be used in tandem with GNSS to authenticate a reported position when a GNSS signal is available.
Such a signal is available today, worldwide: STL (Satellite Time and Location). Carried on the Iridium satellites, it is a special purpose signal that is more than 30 dB stronger than GNSS and encrypted for anti-spoof protection. Decoding of this signal is available via a subscription model to users.
Here’s how it would work using a car-sharing example. A group of people subscribe to a car-sharing service that provides X number of cars to serve Y number of people, where X is less than Y. The service optimally schedules people when and where a car will be available. The service provider needs to know the whereabouts of the cars at all times to maximize utilization of the fleet, so every car has a GNSS receiver in it.
But to ensure the authenticity of these reports, they also have a secure localization receiver. This receiver is assigned a unique ID that is authorized to decode the encrypted signal. (Eventually, we expect this receiver and GNSS to converge into one device much the way multi-GNSS receivers operate today).
If a position report does not agree with the authentic localization report, the fleet manager can act to recover the car immediately. Insurance providers who cover secure localization-equipped cars would also give preferential rates as an anti-theft device.
(Image: Pavel Vinnik/Shutterstock.com)
Could PRS do it?
The new Public Regulated Service (PRS) from Galileo is encrypted and could provide a similar level of authentication protection, if made available. However, it is still a weak GNSS signal that can easily be jammed. Of course, any signal can be jammed, even one that is a thousand times stronger than GNSS.
However, given the robust nature of a very strong signal, the managing system that is monitoring the cars — the insurance, toll or car-sharing system, for example — can alarm upon the loss of positioning information. Such alarms on a GNSS-only car would be frequent and often erroneous due to simple fades, yielding so many false alarms that it would render the monitoring system useless. But a loss of both the strong localization signal and GNSS would likely be considered suspicious and result in a valid alarm.
GNSS navigation is truly one of the great advances of the modern era, giving us precise time and location for any place in the world. Its two major weaknesses — that it is easy to jam and spoof — can be overcome by augmenting it with other stronger encrypted signals, such as STL, providing robust jam-resistance and positive authentication.