Specifically, Booz Allen’s work will aid in the development and modernization of GPS systems through major programs such as Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE), GPS III and Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX).
The NIWC Pacific Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Division is the Navy’s principal research and development center for navigation sensors and systems.
SMC is the center of technical excellence for developing, acquiring, fielding, and sustaining resilient and affordable military space systems.
With this contract, Booz Allen will continue to serve as a key mission partner for NIWC Pacific and SMC on the important endeavor of modernizing PNT systems for U.S. and Allied warfighters.
To execute this highly complex scope of work, Booz Allen will provide a range of essential services, including system definition, requirements synchronization, capability improvement, cybersecurity engineering, platform integration and testing, and acquisition program management.
“Booz Allen’s robust track record of work in both systems engineering and cybersecurity continues to inspire trust from our clients,” said Vice President Brian Zimmermann. “Our deep bench of leaders and technical experts reassures our clients that no project is too big or too complex. It’s our privilege to help the Navy and Air Force modernize GPS systems that are so vital to the security of our nation.”
Read more about Booz Allen’s work with PNT systems here.
Staff Sgt. Reag Wood of 1st Combined Arms Battalion, 5th Brigade, 1st Armored Division, illustrates how he uses an iphone to obtain a visual image of a mock with insurgent activity during a field training exercise at White Sands Missile Range, N.M. (Photo: U.S. Army/Lt. Col. Deanna Bague)
The Harris-supplied navigation payload before integration into the second GPS III SV. (Photo: Harris)
L3Harris Technologies announced the successful completion of the all-stock merger between Harris Corporation and L3 Technologies on June 29. Headquartered in Melbourne, Florida, L3Harris becomes the sixth largest defense company in the U.S., and a top 10 defense company worldwide, with approximately $17 billion in revenue and 50,000 employees, including 20,000 engineers and scientists.
Both companies have long been dominant presences in the U.S. GPS industry: Harris as a provider of the GPS satellite navigation payloads and geospatial intelligence software products, and L3 as a provider of military GPS user equipment and guided munitions. Both companies supply a wide range of other geospatially-related products as well.
L3Harris has organized its operating businesses into four segments to best meet customers’ mission requirements and leverage the combined company’s broad technical capabilities:
Integrated Mission Systems — headquartered in Palm Bay, Florida, with approximately $4.9 billion in revenue. Includes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; advanced electro optical and infrared solutions; and maritime power and navigation
Space and Airborne Systems — headquartered in Palm Bay, Florida, with approximately $4.0 billion in revenue. Includes space payloads, sensors and full-mission solutions; classified intelligence and cyber defense; avionics; and electronic warfare
Communication Systems — headquartered in Rochester, New York, with approximately $3.8 billion in revenue. Includes tactical communications; broadband communications; night vision; and public safety
Aviation Systems — headquartered in Arlington, Texas, with approximately $3.8 billion in revenue. Includes defense aviation products; security, detection and other commercial aviation products; air traffic management; and commercial and military pilot training
Shares of Harris common stock, which traded on the NYSE under the ticker symbol “HRS,” began trading on July 2 under the ticker symbol “LHX.” L3 Technologies shares ceased trading upon market close on June 28 and have converted into 1.3 L3Harris shares for each L3 share.
The merger comes at approximately the same time that two other leading GPS companies, Raytheon and United Technologies, itself a merger including the former Rockwell Collins, now Collins Aerospace, also merged.
The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) is readying for an ultra-precise atomic clock that could not only transform the navigation of deep space missions, it could also improve the accuracy of GPS timing and thus GPS positioning. It is expected to launch in June.
Drawing of the DSAC mercury-ion trap showing the traps and the titanium vacuum tube that confine the ions. The quadrupole trap is where the hyper-fine transition is optically measured and the multipole trap is where the ions are “interrogated” by a microwave signal via a waveguide from the quartz oscillator. (Image: NASA.)
The Deep Space Atomic Clock (DSAC) is a very small (the size of a toaster) mercury-ion atomic clock that is as stable as a highly precise ground atomic clock, yet small enough to fly aboard a spacecraft, and rugged enough to operate in deep space. Current ground-based atomic clocks that locate and navigate deep space missions are too massive to fly in space themselves.
Thus, tracking data from the far-flung spacecraft must be collected and processed on Earth, meaning a two-way tracking link. DSAC will enable NASA to improve tracking data precision by an order of magnitude for its deep space missions out to Jupiter, Saturn — and beyond.
It could also be used to improve the accuracy of GPS. DSAC is more stable and accurate than the atomic clocks currently aboard GPS satellites. As system modernization proceeds, use of a DSAC aboard future satellites holds out many promises. DSAC technology uses the property of mercury ions’ hyperfine transition frequency at 40.50 GHz to steer the frequency output of a quartz oscillator to a near-constant value.
The clock confines the mercury ions with electric fields in a trap and protects them by applying magnetic fields and shielding. It is anticipated that DSAC would produce only 1 microsecond of error over 10 years.
For further details on NASA’s Deep Space Atomic Clock project and detailed callouts on the diagram above, look here.
What technical and business challenges are getting your attention this year?
What are the most important benefits of, and the key challenges posed by, new modernized GNSS signals? How are you driving business in today’s economy?
What issues are you concerned about? What solutions hold the most promise for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) in challenged and indoor environments — regardless of which technology provides them?
We want to know, and so does the rest of the industry.
GPS World is asking PNT professionals about the developing technology frontiers, the state of their business, the economic climate for products and services, driving market factors, the effects of jamming, the Issue of the Year — and more! Please give us your opinions in the 2019 State of the Industry survey. It should take less than 10 minutes, and your responses are confidential.
A handful of lucky participants drawn at random will win TWO $100 gift cards good (virtually) anywhere.
Complete the survey by June 30. Then look for a complete report of our findings in the September issue of GPS World.
Thank you for taking the time to share your feedback and help us improve our magazine content, industry awareness — and your own business!
While asking questions that have appeared in past State of the Industry surveys, to reveal industry changes that have taken place over the last five years, the 2019 Survey presents these new issues for your consideration:
• With multiple constellations, signals and services now beginning to emerge, what are the challenges to keeping open and seamless access to these in the international marketplace ?
• Among the many benefits of modernized signals, which is the most important in your field of work?
• Among the key challenges in utilizing modernized signals, which gets most of your attention?
The question above offers such answer choices as: increases die size without ability to increase chip cost; longer code sequences are difficult to acquire; increases RAM/ROM; increases number of RF channels; increases number of digital channels; higher CPU processing required; and software complexity with many signal types.
What one word would you use to describe your company’s No. 1 opportunity to grow in 2020?
What one word would you use to describe your company’s No. 1 obstacle to growth in 2020?
Overall, the 2019 Survey covers such topics as:
Technology Trends. PNT is rapidly diversifying among a number of complementary technologies, as GNSS looks to inertial, lidar, laser, cellular, WiFi and other beacons, signals of opportunity, low-Earth orbit satellite constellations and more. Different market sectors have, naturally, different requirements, and these lead to different integration combinations. Where do you see the most promise?
The Global Economy and how it affects business in your sector. Customers’ availability of capital to invest is top-of-mind for most industry professionals, whether designers, manufacturers, integrators, suppliers/dealers, or end users.
Industry Confidence in the road ahead. Sound business navigation requires a fluid, responsive combination of technology, capital, investment, and often most important, human capital. .
Issues of Concern. To what extent do industry leaders take into account the following as well as further factors?
Pricing and competitive issues;
GNSS jamming, spoofing, other RF interference;
Developing compatibility and interoperability of GNSS: GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou, Galileo;
Advantages and drawbacks of other positioning and navigation technologies.
The survey report, complete with insightful articles and infographics, will appear in the September issue. Look for it!
The meeting will be open to the public up to the seating capacity of the room. Visitors will be requested to sign a visitor’s register.
The agenda for the meeting includes the following topics:
Examine methods to protect, toughen and augment (PTA) access to GPS/GNSS services in key domains for multiple user sectors.
Examine emerging trends and requirements for PNT services in U.S. and international fora through PNT Advisory Board technical assessments, including backup services for terrestrial, maritime, aviation and space users.
Update on U.S. Space-Based PNT Policy and GPS modernization.
Explore opportunities for enhancing the interoperability of GPS with other emerging international GNSS.
Prioritize current and planned GPS capabilities and services while assessing future PNT architecture alternatives with a focus on affordability.
Assess economic impacts of GPS/GNSS on the United States and in select international regions, with a consideration towards effects of potential PNT service disruptions if radio spectrum interference is introduced.
Review the potential benefits, perceived vulnerabilities, and any proposed regulatory constraints to accessing foreign Radio Navigation Satellite Service (RNSS) signals in the United States and subsequent impacts on multi-GNSS receiver markets.
Meeting times are 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Eastern Time on Thursday, June 6; and 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. ET on Friday, June 7.
Meeting address:
Westin Hotel Alexandria Old Town
400 Courthouse Square
Alexandria, VA 22314
Full details on the meeting can be found in the Federal Register Notice. For more information, contact James J. Miller, designated federal officer, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546, (202) 358-4417, fax (202) 358-4297, or [email protected].
Photo: U.S. Air Force / Staff Sgt. Scott H. Spitzer
Much development has been necessary to enable the new M-code capability on more than 700 weapon systems that require it. This article overviews M-code, the updates to antenna and receiver technology to make these varied platforms M-code ready, and perspectives from key stakeholders in the M-code community.
December 23, 2018, marked an important milestone for GPS. The successful launch of satellite USA-289 represented a key success in what has been a monumentally expensive government program, beset by delays and overspends.
The launch of the first GPS Block III satellite, the first that can provide the full military M-code capability, effectively commenced the physical roll-out of modern M-code hardware.
Ground Control. As far as the space segment is concerned, M-code is finally underway. What about the ground segment? The next-generation GPS operational control system, GPS OCX, is essential for use of the full capabilities of the new Block III satellites. It has been under development for some time.
OCX has drawn Congressional criticism and correlative media attention, but recent reports have been more positive. Since the Nunn-McCurdy breach of 2016, when the project’s future hung in the balance, accounts have grown gradually optimistic. Budget and schedule were re-baselined, and contractor Raytheon’s corrective actions generated results. In the fall of 2017 the Air Force took delivery of OCX Block 0, marking a significant milestone. Block 0, also known as the Launch and Checkout System (LCS), demonstrated compliance with contractual requirements and was accepted by the Air Force.
In spring 2018, Block 0 underwent a series of cybersecurity tests and passed, validating the security architecture of the system. All this puts Raytheon on track to deliver OCX Block 1 in 2021, providing full operational capability. Block 1 and Block 2 are intended to be delivered together, adding operational control of the modernized satellites and signals, including L1C and the modernized M-code.
“There have been no schedule slips with the GPS OCX program since 2017, and the GPS III launch last December was clear proof of our progress,” stated Dave Wajsgras, president of Raytheon’s Intelligence, Information and Services business. “We will continue to meet all of our commitments, and importantly, we will meet our June 2021 contractual deadline.”
Col. Steve Whitney of the GPS Directorate wrote in this magazine in December 2018 that “The journey over the past few years has been challenging, but we have emerged stronger, armed with better metrics, and a culture of integrated development (often called DevOps) which puts us on a path to success. There will be challenges and risks in the path ahead but rather than mountains to climb, I see these more as standard blocking and tackling of a software-intensive program.”
Meanwhile. The Air Force plans to deploy M-code capability in 2020, and OCX seems unlikely to be ready. For this reason, Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract to modernize the existing ground infrastructure as a “gap filler.”
The GPS Control Segment Sustainment II (GCS II) contract was awarded on Dec. 21, 2018, and is worth $462 million. GCS II will support operational capability of M-code in 2020, and continues until 2025, and so there will be a period of overlap between GCS II and OCX, essentially providing two options for controlling the new GPS III constellation. In one view, the Air Force is backing two horses to improve chance of winning: OCX the preferred solution, with GCS II almost like an insurance policy.
With the GPS III ground and space segments looking relatively healthy, attention turns again to the user segment.
WHY M-CODE?
Until now, the military has used the classic P(Y) signal: a binary phase shift keying (BPSK)-modulated encrypted wideband signal. It offers both greater accuracy and increased jamming resistance when compared to the civilian C/A code still employed by the vast majority of GPS receivers.
But the P(Y) code has its drawbacks in the modern world: its wide main lobe sits directly over the top of the C/A code signal (see Figure 1), essentially occupying the same spectrum. When the civilian C/A signal is jammed, the military P(Y) signal is at the very least degraded, if not also jammed itself. It also uses a relatively simple encryption scheme that does not meet today’s cyber security requirements.
Figure 1. C/A, P(Y), and M-Code signal power spectra. (Graphics: Mike Jones)
The M-code signal, on the other hand, is the first military GPS signal to use the BOC modulation scheme. BOC modulation gives signals their distinctive two-lobe appearance, spreading the signal’s energy away from the band center.
The wide spacing of the two sidebands separates the M-code signal from the civilian signals (the legacy C/A signal or the new L1C signal on the L1 frequency, and the L2C signal on the L2 frequency).
Amongst other things, this allows the military to jam the civilian codes without noticeably degrading the M-code signal. Often referred to as blue force electronic attack (BFEA), this is essentially a new facet to navigation warfare (NAVWAR), where enemy use of GPS can be denied whilst allowing friendly forces to continue using it.
The wider occupied bandwidth and increased signal power also help to make M-code more resistant to jamming. M-code also makes use of more modern and flexible encryption methods, ensuring it will be secure and safer from threats such as spoofing attacks.
Scepticism. Defense programs are known for their long procurement cycles, but even by these standards, M-code has taken an extremely long time to get where it is today. Given the enormous cost of the program, and the fact that there is still, as yet, no operational benefit to show from it, many people have questioned its worth. At the time it was conceived it represented a dramatic step forward in military capability but, because it has been so long in development, its operational benefit is becoming diluted.
When M-code was conceived, GPS was still the only operational GNSS in town: everybody had to use GPS — or nothing. Today, the picture differs greatly. During M-code’s insanely slow progress, other GNSS systems have come along, offering their own encrypted signals of a similar ilk. Looking at Figure 2, M-code no longer appears as special as it once was. Its BOC(10,5) signal sits inside the main lobes of Europe’s Galileo PRS signal, which uses a BOC(15,2.5) scheme, and China’s Beidou B1A signal using BOC(14,2).
Figure 2. GNSS encrypted signals around the L1 frequency. (Graphics: Mike Jones)
If you were China, you might consider jamming the central 24 MHz of the L1 band, taking out M-code, whilst still having an operational military service for yourself. Or if you were Russia, you might jam 34 MHz of bandwidth, taking out the US, Chinese, and European systems, whilst still having your GLONASS L1SC military service to use. The situation is more complex than that, of course: each service has the potential to increase signal power in times of conflict, and there is more than one frequency that can be used. But it does demonstrate the essence of the problem: The modern battlespace has moved on, and M-code hasn’t.
CHALLENGES OF RECEIVER DESIGN
Figure 3. C/A code ACF.
With complex signals come complex receivers, and there several headaches when it comes to M-code receiver design. The first is the nature of the BOC signal itself, which has a complex correlation function. Consider Figure 3, which shows the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the traditional civilian C/A code signal. The single peak of the function makes acquisition and tracking a simple process; traditionally early, prompt and late (E,P,L) correlator arms can be used in the tracking process.
Figure 4. L1Cd ACF.
The newer BOC-type signals have a more complex ACF. Figure 4 shows the ACF of the new L1Cd civilian GPS signal, which uses a form of BOS(1,1) modulation. In addition to the main lobe, there are now two side lobes. Receivers must be careful not to lock on to one of the side lobes instead of the main lobe: the receiver architecture starts to become a little more complex.
Figure 5. M-code ACF.
Now consider the ACF of the M-code signal, shown in Figure 5. Like other high-order BOC-type signals, M-code exhibits multiple lobes in the ACF, making robust acquisition and tracking a far more troublesome process. Furthermore, the high bandwidths require high sample rates, which lead to higher power consumption in the hardware.
Another major headache associated with M-code receivers is, of course, the encryption process. Not because encryption is difficult, but again because of the power consumption implications. Consider that each GPS receiver needs to run an encryption engine instance, for each satellite it might wish to receive. Running a high-grade encryption algorithm at a high chipping rate, for a dozen satellites, is a power-consuming process. For dismounted soldiers with limited battery capacity, this is a big deal.
Some people argue that the high-grade encryption process for M-code is too complex. Consider why we want to encrypt a GNSS signal in the first place: firstly to prevent someone from spoofing our signal, and secondly to prevent unauthorised users from using the service. Given that the encryption keys are rolled regularly, how much does it matter if an adversary manages to compromise the encryption? This isn’t a communications security problem: we are not talking about loss of classified information, so there’s an argument that a simpler, less power-hungry form of encryption might have been used instead.
ANTI-JAM ANTENNA COMPATIBILITY
Although M-code offers a certain level of jamming resistance, it is still vulnerable to attacks. As a signal it might have a bit more power, and a bit more bandwidth, than some other signals. But it is, after all, still a GNSS signal, and it can be jammed by an adversary. Where an operational threat analysis indicates that an increased level of jamming resistance is required, then M-code receivers need to be integrated with anti-jam antennas.
Anti-jam antennas, usually referred to in the GNSS community as controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPAs), have been the anti-jam tool of choice for several decades now. I overviewed these in an April 2017 newsletter column. CRPA manufacturers have had to ensure that their products are “M-code ready,” such that they can be seamlessly attached to M-code receivers as and when they appear.
This hasn’t been a recent process: as far back as 2002, the GAS-1 antenna (Raytheon) underwent a series of qualification tests to ensure compliance with M-code. Around 2005, the ADAP antenna (also Raytheon) was launched with a host of M-code features — again an illustration of just how slow the M-code program has moved, given that other technology has been “M-code ready” for 10 or 15 years already.
What’s involved in making a CRPA M-code compatible? Firstly the increased bandwidth: the antenna electronics must digitize the wider bandwidths. Along with the wider bandwidth comes new filtering shapes to ensure optimum performance.
Space-time adaptive processing (STAP) and space-frequency adaptive processing (SFAP) techniques potentially require more taps to ensure high null depths can be maintained across the full bandwidth. The increased power of the M-code signal, particularly if features like spot beam are used, presents another complication to CRPAs: they must not treat the high-power satellite signals as jammers, and try to remove them.
Testing CRPAs presents a challenge to manufacturers: how do you prove that your antenna doesn’t corrupt the M-code signal, when there’s no M-code signal to test it with? To work around this issue, pseudo M-code signals have been used for testing, where representative BOC(10,5) signals without the real encryption are passed through the CRPA and examined for distortion.
RECEIVER DEVELOPMENT STATUS
Due to the security considerations surrounding M-code, only three US organizations are authorized to produce modules: Collins Aerospace, Raytheon and L3. Here are the answers from Collins Aerospace and L3, the answers from Raytheon will appear in later issue.
What are the technical challenges associated with developing an M-code receiver?
Collins Aerospace. The Collins Aerospace Modernized GPS User Equipment (MGUE) Increment 1 development like the SAASM PPS receiver developments faced very challenging technical requirements to support our war fighter needs in an ever-evolving threat environment. Like other complex developments the challenges are initially technical and then transition to integration/test and certification. On the technical front optimizing receiver performance balanced against power consumption are always at the forefront. In addition, it is important to maximize backwards compatibility so as to minimize downstream integration costs while adding an entirely new signal that runs in parallel to the existing system. Collins Aerospace is pleased with the technical development and are actively supporting the integration with both receivers and technical support.
To date, we have delivered more than 770 MGUE receivers to the Air Force to support Air Force, lead platform and DoD-wide Integration and test. Soon the total will grow to nearly 1,100 receivers to support expanded integration and test following the completion of Collins Aerospace security certification.
L3. M-code GPS User Equipment (MGUE) technologies exist today.L3’s Ground Based GPS Receiver Application Module – Modernized (GB-GRAM-M) is a fully-functioning unit that is currently baselined and undergoing an independent Technical Requirements Verification (TRV) by the GPS Directorate.During TRV, each requirement from the Technical Requirements Document (TRD) is independently evaluated for compliance. Upon completion of the TRV, the design is baselined with complete documentation enabling platforms and prime equipment to integrate from a known baseline with low risk. Following integration, operational testing can start immediately to support fielding when M-Code Early Use (MCEU) becomes operational. The TRV of L3’s GB-GRAM-M is planned to be completed by the second quarter of 2019.
L3 resolved numerous technical challenges in developing M-code GPS technologies. The first and ever-present challenge is changing and evolving requirements. Most of these requirement changes are in response to evolving threats that have driven changes into the GPS receiver and/or to higher-level systems. Asan example, the U.S. Army’s Assured PNT (A-PNT) is implementing M- code GPS along with external sensors to establish and maintain an assured solution even in GPS-challenged environments. Other challenging requirements include meeting the security requirements, implementing and testing anti-spoofing algorithms, and ensuring backward compatibility with legacy receivers.
What are the intended platforms for your MGUE?
Collins Aerospace. The Collins Aerospace MGUE receivers are intended to support all warfighter domains: ground, airborne, maritime and munitions to support compliance with Public Law 111-383 SEC. 913 issued in Fiscal Year 2011. Per this directive, M-code is intended for all DoD applications with the exception of passenger vehicles or commercial vehicles with GPS installed. Now that the satellite and control segments of the capability are coming on line, we are working diligently to ensure that user equipment is available for all domains.
L3. L3 has products to meet current market demand. Under the MGUE program, L3 developed a GB-GRAM-M, which is a standard Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) design. The GB-GRAM-M is designed to fulfill retrofit replacements of SAASM receivers, as well as being a primary component of A-PNT systems. L3’s M2GRAM ASIC is the core of our receiver, a GPS module that incorporates signal processing, cryptography, and positioning, velocity, and timing (PVT) processing. The M2GRAM ASIC is capable of being implemented in other form factors for applications beyond ground-based applications. As an example, the M2GRAM is implemented in a GPS receiver specifically designed for Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) applications and was used in a gun launched, guide-to-target demonstration operating as a PGM receiver.
L3 is also augmenting the GPS receiver through the integration of several other technologies, including controlled reception pattern antennas with digital antenna electronics, inertial systems and external sensors, and GPS-denied capabilities. M-code technologies are being implemented in Mounted A-PNT Systems (MAPS), Dismounted A-PNT Systems (DAPS), and handheld systems to bring capabilities to the warfighter.
What is the expected timeline for your MGUE development, acceptance testing, and delivery?
Defense Advanced GPs Receiver (DAGR) from Collins Aerospace, equipping infantry and other warfighters. (Photo: Collins Aerospace)
Collins Aerospace. The Collins Aerospace receivers are supporting ongoing DoD integration and test and our MGUE Increment 1 program is aligned with the Air Force GPS Enterprise roadmap. Ultimately, the Department of Defense (DoD) M-code programs will set the production delivery schedules.
We anticipate that the M-code production ramp-up and continued SAASM PPS receiver production will have a production overlap. Our Collins Aerospace in-house PPS GPS receiver manufacturing capability is ready to support the DoD demand for both M-code and SAASM. Collins Aerospace is fully committed to manufacturing Increment 1 M-code receivers to meet the warfighter’s needs across Airborne, Weapons and Ground, we know the transition from SAASM to M-code will take years. Therefore, Collins Aerospace will continue to manufacture SAASM receivers for years to come as the International MOD Policy for M-code use is still being formulated.
L3. L3’s GB-GRAM-M is now available. L3 received security certification and approval in 2016 and TRV is planned for completion in the second quarter of 2019. With TRV, L3 is receiving a new security certification and approval of the latest receiver update. Government agencies, prime contractors and laboratories can order GB-GRAM-M now with delivery in the fourth quarter of 2019.
What does testing and verification process involve?
Collins Aerospace. As with any Precise Positioning Service (PPS) GPS development, the testing involves functional verification of the receiver in a wide variety challenging of environmental, thermal, electromagnetic interference/ high-intensity radiated field (EMI/HIRF) environments. Collins Aerospace is leveraging proven test and verification approaches founded upon our long history of successful product introductions and field performance. As this is a PPS receiver it is also essential the receiver design comply with the government’s required Security Approval process.
L3. The testing and verification of L3’s GB-GRAM-M included internal testing and independent testing through the GPS Directorate’s TRV process. Further risk reduction testing within the MGUE program is planned as Phase IV testing where the GB-GRAM-M is integrated into a lead platform for the U.S. Army and a lead platform for the U. S. Marine Corps. An operational assessment is performed on both lead platforms to assure common problems associated with integration and operational testing are addressed prior to implementing M-Code GPS Receivers across all of the platforms.
Will the MGUE be compatible with CRPA anti-jam antennas; are there any special considerations for this?
Collins Aerospace. The Collins Aerospace product family includes our Digital Integrated Anti Jam Receiver (DIGAR) product family that leverages CRPA anti-jam antennas for enhanced anti-jam (AJ) performance. Our DIGAR AJ technology enhances the performance with fixed reception pattern antenna (FRPA), CRPA and is compatible with all PPS waveforms. Regarding the interfaces between the receiver and the anti-jam antenna electronics, a GPS receiver with a standard RF interface is compatible with a CRPA in nulling mode and FRPA antennas. Advanced capabilities such as beamforming/beamsteering require tight coordination and additional interface with the GPS receiver.
L3. The GB-GRAM-M is designed to operate with a fixed reception pattern antenna (FRPA). A CRPA antenna using digital antenna electronics to generate signals matching the characteristics of a FRPA is fully compatible with the GB-GRAM-M. With a higher level of integration of a GPS receiver and a CRPA, the system capabilities are greatly enhanced. L3 has performed this integration and can perform advanced capabilities such as angle of arrival and beamforming using M2GRAM, digital antenna electronics, and CRPA technologies. These capabilities can be found in L3’s Mounted Assured PNT System (MAPS) and Anti-Jam Antenna System (AJAS) products.
Army Stryker ground combat vehicle. (Photo: Karolis Kavolelis / Shutterstock.com)
OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT
The U.S. Air Force GPS Directorate provided answers to the following questions regarding MGUE.
Which platforms will be equipped with M-code-capable MGUE, and how many of each?
GPS Directorate. The Air Force is developing M-code-capable GPS receivers under the MGUE Increment 1 program. The receivers in development will be provided to four service-specific lead platforms for integration, developmental, and operational testing. Lead platforms are:
the Army Stryker ground combat vehicle,
the Air Force B-2 Spirit bomber,
the Marine Corps Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV),
and the Navy Arleigh-Burke class destroyer (DDG).
Following the lead platform efforts, procurement of M-code-capable GPS receivers will be decided by the Services and executed by individual platforms and programs.
What are the timelines for rolling out M-code on these platforms?
GPS Directorate. Early integration and test activities have already begun for each MGUE lead platform. Operational testing is expected to begin in 2020 and complete in 2021, which is a key activity to enable the fielding of M-code-capable systems.
B-2 Spirit multi-role bomber capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear munitions. In December 2017, the Air Force completed a series of successful flight tests of M-code GPS using a Raytheon Company receiver on board a B-2 Spirit at Edwards Air Force Base, California. (Photo: U.S. Air Force/Bobby Garcia)
What advantages will M-code bring, over existing military GPS receivers?
GPS Directorate. Modernized GPS receiver cards under development with the Air Force MGUE Increment 1 program will enable the use of M-code and provide U.S. forces with enhanced position, navigation, and timing capabilities, in addition to improving resistance to threats, such as jamming efforts by adversaries.
How will keys and key distribution be managed?
GPS Directorate. None of this is publically releasable.
Will M-code be made available to other friendly nations? If so, how is this managed?
GPS Directorate. The current policy allows for the sale of M-code equipment to all 57 authorized GPS PPS nations. The M-code technology will be made available to these nations through the Foreign Military Sales process.
USER PERSPECTIVE
The Department of Defense supplied answers to the following questions for users and warfighters.
What are the benefits you perceive will come from new M-code GPS equipment?
DoD. Provides U.S. forces with enhanced position, navigation, and timing capabilities, in addition to improving resistance to threats, such as jamming efforts by adversaries.
Will it change how you perform military operations, or enable any new ones?
DoD. Modernized GPS receivers provide the next-generation GPS capabilities to the warfighter. Operational testing will enable the services to determine operational utility of MGUE. It will ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have the ability to get in, accomplish their mission, and get home accurately.
How will M-code-based GPS receivers be brought into operational service? Will there be a mass upgrade of assets, or a phased introduction?
DoD. Procurement of M-code-capable GPS receivers will be decided by the Services and executed by individual platforms and programs.
Spirent Federal Systems, a provider of GPS/GNSS test equipment, announced that Col. (retired) Bernard Gruber, former program director of what is now the U.S. Air Force GPS Directorate, has joined the company’s board of directors as government security committee chairman. Also joining as the chairman of the board is Robert Lollini.
Spirent Federal President/CEO Ellen Hall stated, “We are happy to have retired Col. Gruber and Bob Lollini joining our dynamic company. We are leading the industry in innovation and quality products for the U.S. government and these two new leaders will help us continue that momentum.”
Col. Bernie Gruber in 2012. (Photo: U.S. Air Force)
Bernard Gruber brings to the position the experience gained from a long and distinguished career in the government and military sector. Mr. Gruber has held several positions in important commands focused on navigation in space, including serving as the chief of Space and Global Integrated Intelligence at the Pentagon from 2009-2010, and director of the Global Positioning System (GPS) at the Los Angeles Air Force Base from 2010-2013. He is currently the director of Precision Guidance and Advanced Programs, Armament Systems at Northrop Grumman.
Robert Lollini is currently the chief executive officer and president of BioFire Defense LLC, a subsidiary and proxy company of bioMerieux. Lollini contributes to the board his broad understanding of strategic financial and executive management.
Spirent Federal Systems was formed in July 2001 by Spirent Communications as a wholly owned subsidiary and U.S. proxy company. Spirent Federal markets and sells Spirent Communications’ GNSS products in North America. The company also provides value-added features and ongoing customer support. Spirent Federal Systems is headquartered in Pleasant Grove, Utah, with support and sales offices throughout the U.S.
Less than three weeks after its launch, the first GPS III satellite, SVN74, started transmitting navigation signals. SVN74 uses the pseudorandom noise (PRN) code number G04 previously used by the almost 25-year-old Block IIA satellite SVN36. The L1 C/A, L1 P(Y), and L2 P(Y) signals of SVN74 have been tracked since Jan. 9 at 00:01 UTC. Activation of the L2C and L5 signals followed on the same day at 19:43 UTC. Transmission of the legacy navigation message (LNAV) started Jan. 9, but the satellite is still marked unhealthy for ongoing on-orbit check out and testing.
Also, SVN74 is the first GPS satellite to transmit a new civil signal on the L1 frequency (1575.42 MHz), namely L1C, which was initially activated on the same day as the other SVN74 signals. Incidentally, the L1C signal was already being transmitted by the four satellites of the Japanese Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS).
Compared to the L1 C/A PRN codes, the L1C codes are 10 times longer (10,230 chips), reducing interference when multiple satellites are tracked by a receiver on the same frequency. Like L2C and L5, the L1C signal consists of a dataless pilot component and the data component with navigation data. Dataless signals enable more robust tracking under difficult conditions. For the L1C signal, 75 percent of its power is put into the pilot component.
The theoretical spectra of the four signals transmitted on L1 by SVN74, namely the civil C/A-code and L1C, as well as the military P(Y)-code and M-code, are shown in FIGURE 1 along with the the total (summed) spectrum.
Figure 1. Theoretical spectra of the four signals transmitted by a GPS III satellite in the L1 frequency band. (Image: Authors)
BOC. To achieve compatibility with the L1 C/A-code signal at the same center frequency, a binary offset carrier (BOC) modulation is used for spectral separation of L1C from L1 C/A. A BOC(n,m) signal is characterized by the fundamental frequency of the square wave subcarrier expressed in multiples n of the basic frequency of 1.023 MHz and the chipping rate expressed in multiples m of 1.023 megachips per second. A BOC(1,1) modulation is used for the L1C data component. For the pilot component, a time-multiplexed binary offset carrier (TMBOC) is used. The spreading waveform, with a length of 33 symbols, consists of four BOC(6,1) and 29 BOC(1,1) symbols as illustrated in FIGURE 2 resulting in a TMBOC(6,1,4/33) signal. The additional BOC(6,1) component allows for improved multipath mitigation.
Figure 2. Spreading symbols for the L1C pilot component: time-multiplexed BOC consisting of BOC(6,1) for the 1st, 5th, 7th and 30th symbols and BOC(1,1) for the other symbols. (Image: Authors)
Similar to GPS L1C, the European Galileo and the Chinese BeiDou-3 systems employ multiplexed BOC signals with BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) components in the L1 frequency band. A composite BOC (CBOC) modulation has been adopted for the Galileo E1 open service signal, which uses a weighted sum of the BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) components in both the data and the pilot channels. For the BeiDou B1C signal, BOC(1,1) is used for the data channel, while a quadrature multiplexed BOC modulation, QMBOC(6,1,4/33), with BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) subcarriers in phase quadrature, is used for the pilot channel.
Interoperability. The new civil L1 signals of GPS, Galileo and BeiDou show a high level of commonality and are specifically designed for full interoperability. This means that receivers can easily track signals of all three constellations and use the measurements to compute a combined multi-GNSS position solution. Aside from the similar signal modulations, the interoperability is further supported by the transmission of inter-system timing biases (such as the GPS-Galileo Time Offset) in the navigation messages.
The binary phase shift keying (BPSK) modulation of the C/A-code with a 1.023-MHz chipping rate introduces a main lobe at the center frequency of 1575.42 MHz and numerous side lobes with decreasing amplitude. The 10.23-MHz BPSK signal of the P(Y)-code is visible in Figure 1 as a broad peak at the center frequency and first side lobes at about 1560 and 1590 MHz. The M-code is characterized by its main lobes ±10.23 MHz from the center frequency due to its BOC(10,5) modulation. Finally, the L1C signal can be recognized as two narrow peaks separated by ±1.023 MHz from the L1 center frequency related to the BOC(1,1) modulation and two peaks at ±6.138 MHz related to the BOC(6,1) modulation. Side lobes of the BOC(1,1) signal are visible next to the main lobes at integer multiples of 2 × 1.023 MHz.
Observations. The German Aerospace Center (DLR) operates a 30-meter dish antenna at its ground station in Weilheim, near Munich, Germany. FIGURE 3 shows the L1 spectrum of SVN74 measured on January 15, 2019. One can clearly see the L1C BOC(1,1) main lobes at 1574 and 1576 MHz as well as the BOC(6,1) main lobes at 1569 and 1581 MHz. Selected side lobes are also indicated.
Figure 3. SVN74 L1 spectral flux density measured with the Weilheim 30-meter antenna on January 15, 2019, at 08:04 UTC. Selected features of the L1C signal are indicated by arrows. (Image: Authors)
Initially, none of the International GNSS Service network receivers could track the L1C live signal of SVN74, but dedicated firmware versions supporting L1C tracking were soon made available by selected manufacturers. FIGURE 4 shows the multipath linear combination for the L1 C/A-code and the L1C signal tracked with a Javad TRE-G3TH receiver. Reduced measurement noise (multipath plus receiver measurement noise) of the L1C signal can be seen over all elevation angles ranging from about 3 to 83 degrees. (Tracking of the pass began at 4.3 degrees and ended at 3.0 degrees.)
Figure 4, Multipath linear combination (L1 pseudorange and L1 and L2 carrier phase) of the SVN74 L1 C/A-code (top) and L1C signal (bottom) from 1-Hz data of February 3, 2019, tracked with a Javad TRE-G3TH receiver at the Geodetic Observatory Wettzell. (Image: Authors)
The overall root-mean-square noise of the SVN74 pass shown in Figure 4 is 32 centimeters for the L1 C/A-code signal and 24 centimeters for L1C, that is, a reduction of 25 percent for L1C. Compared to the BPSK modulation of the legacy C/A-code signal, the increased steepness of the TMBOC correlation function offers lower measurement noise for the L1C tracking. In addition, the sensitivity to multipath is reduced.
CNAV-2. Together with L1C, the second version of the civil navigation message, namely CNAV-2, is being transmitted. CNAV-2 is composed of three subframes: subframe 1 contains information about the current epoch. Subframe 2 comprises clock and ephemeris data including inter-signal corrections (ISCs). ISCs provide clock corrections for single-frequency users and dual-frequency users utilizing signals other than L1 P(Y) and L2 P(Y). Whereas the essential broadcast ephemeris data in subframe 2 repeat continuously over the validity period of typically two hours, subframe 3 contains pages with alternating content as listed in TABLE 1 (page 41).
Table 1 Currently defined pages of the CNAV-2 subframe 3.
Despite a different message layout, most CNAV-2 parameters and their values match those transmitted in the CNAV message of the L2C and L5 signals. Additional parameters comprise the ISCs for the L1C signal. Compared to the LNAV legacy navigation message, CNAV and CNAV-2 utilize an extended set of ephemeris parameters that allow for a smoother orbit representation compared to LNAV. Multi-GNSS applications benefit from the GPS/GNSS time offset (GGTO) parameters included in page 2. In the same page, Earth orientation parameters are provided that are relevant for users of an inertial frame, such as for spaceborne navigation. The CNAV-2 repeat cycle of 18 seconds allows for a faster access to broadcast ephemerides included in subframe 2 compared to LNAV. Compared to CNAV, CNAV-2 furthermore provides a more sophisticated error detection and correction scheme.
As of the beginning of February 2019, only pages 1, 2 and 4 of CNAV-2 subframe 3 are being used. Within a cycle of 144 seconds, page 1, page 2 and six sets of page 4 midi almanac data (each for one individual satellite) are transmitted. The full almanac for 32 satellites is thus transferred in an average of about 13 minutes. The content in these subframes corresponds to that in L2 and L5 CNAV messages. Updates of CNAV-2 are performed in two-hour intervals starting at 01:30. This is the same update scheme as for CNAV but different from LNAV where the two-hour intervals start at 00:00.
Note that some time will pass before enough GPS III satellites are transmitting so that users can fully enjoy the benefits of the new L1C signal.
MANUFACTURERS
Spectral measurements at the Weilheim 30-meter antenna were made with a Rohde & Schwarz FSQ26 vector signal analyzer. Receiver measurements have been collected with a JAVAD GNSS TRE-G3TH receiver running an L1C-capable firmware version.
PETER STEIGENBERGER and OLIVER MONTENBRUCK are scientists at the German Space Operations Center of the German Aerospace Center (DLR). STEFFEN THOELERT is an electrical engineer at DLR’s Institute of Communications and Navigation. RICHARD B. LANGLEY is a professor at the University of New Brunswick and editor of the Innovation column for GPS World magazine.
Elsewhere in this (January) issue you’ll find the hard facts — basic, but hard — concerning the inaugural launch of the long-awaited GPS III constellation. On pages 10 and 12, with some seasoned leavening between, on page 11.
This column instead waxes briefly on the phenomenon of time, and humankind’s struggle to dominate it, to subject the fourth dimension to its own will.
For GPS III has been, yes, long awaited, long debated, long victim to multiple delays of many colors and causes, scrutable and inscrutable, of technological challenges and institutional barriers, and of that base determinant, money. The Government Accounting Office has issued its fair and due share of reports pointing alarmed fingers at constellation gaps and fulfillment shortfalls and the trials of OCX, the ground control system without which GPS III satellites may some day, soon or not-soon, be capable of broadcasting powerful new signals from space, yet not able to do so because of lagging accomplishment on Earth.
It’s often said that GPS is a victim of its own success, that older satellites living beyond their forecast lifetimes have allowed the Air Force to economize by not replenishing when unnecessary. There’s wisdom in this, of course.
Were my friend Don Jewell still with us, he would be justifiably proud of the Air Force for launching this new golden era of the gold standard in positioning — yet he would have seethed for years over the continued pushes to the right.
This reminds me a good deal of the drama and occasional comedy in the rise of Galileo, observed from afar. Next month I’ll give a talk at the European Space Agency, provisionally titled “An Outside History of Galileo,” the bemused viewpoint of one who only heard and interpreted the news, but did not participate in its forming.
For such complex endeavors do not happen easily or speedily or exactly as planned by mere mortals. Nor should they. Despite much gnashing of teeth, no one — in the civil sphere at least — has suffered unduly from the longish delays in either satnav system’s modernization. Perhaps a few lives could have been saved in the military, or greater strategic advantage gained, with the new capabilities that III will offer warfighters, had same been available on schedule, say, four to six years ago. But even this is mere conjecture.
There is a rhythm and a flow to life, and we are part of it. You can hurry neither sundown nor sunrise. Things happen in their own due course.
When full GPS III capabilities arrive — I don’t believe 2023 — then it will still be in good time. In its own best time, actually, to be here.
The scheduled launch of the first GPS III satellite on December 18 was scrubbed, reportedly due to first stage liquid oxygen thermal limit constraints aboard the SpaceX Falcon 9 Block 5 launch vehicle’s first stage reaching safety limits. A second attempt on December 19 was later ruled out due to ongoing evaluations into the sensor issue.
The launch window may open again on Dec. 20.
This was to have been the first GPS launch aboard a SpaceX rocket, as well as the first SpaceX contracted U.S. National Security mission.
A Falcon 9 rocket awaits launch. (Photo: SpaceX)
The first GPS III satellite was originally scheduled to ride aboard a United Launch Alliance (ULA) Delta IV M+ rocket. ULA and/or its prime partners, Lockheed-Martin and Boeing, have conducted every GPS satellite launch since the start of the program. However, due to an assortment of issues variously involving delayed technology development and lawsuits regarding competitive bidding, the Air Force re-opened bidding for the contract as part of its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program — “evolved” signifying that the rocket can be recovered and reused.
Recycling Rockets. ULA did not bid on the re-opened contract, citing concerns over the selection process and potential risks with the anticipated lower launch cost. In 2016, the Air Force selected SpaceX to take over most GPS III launches.
SpaceX’s Falcon 9 for this launch will use a new first stage core, the B1054. Although it has re-use capability, it will fly in an expendable configuration this time, with no landing legs and no grid fins. It will be disposed of into the Atlantic Ocean after separation from the second stage.
In other missions, after the satellite-bearing stage separates from the rest of the rocket, the remaining core launcher fires additional fuel to return intact to land or to sea aboard an Autonomous Spaceport Drone Ship (ASDS), a converted barge awaiting in the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean.
New Generation of GPS. As attentive readers already know, GPS III SV01 is the first of an entirely new design of GPS satellite that will help the Air Force modernize today’s GPS constellation with new technology and advanced capabilities.
GPS III has three times better accuracy and up to eight times improved anti-jamming capabilities. Spacecraft life will extend to 15 years, 25 percent longer than any of the GPS satellites on-orbit today. GPS III’s new L1C civil signal also will make it the first GPS satellite broadcasting a compatible signal with other international global navigation satellite systems, like Galileo, improving connectivity for civilian users.
Lockheed Martin developed GPS III and manufactured GPS III SV01 at its GPS III Processing Facility near Denver. In September 2017, the Air Force declared the satellite “Available for Launch” (AFL) and had the company place it into storage. In 2018, the Air Force called up the satellite for launch and Lockheed Martin delivered it to Florida on Aug. 20. The Air Force nicknamed the satellite “Vespucci” after Italian explorer, navigator and cartographer Amerigo Vespucci.
GPS III SV01 is the first of 10 GPS III satellites originally ordered by the Air Force. GPS III SV03-08 are now in various stages of assembly and test. In August, the Air Force declared the second GPS III AFL and in November called GPS III SV02 up for 2019 launch.
In a 50-page report to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, the government’s General Accounting Office (GAO) finds that U.S. weapons systems are, almost across the board, highly vulnerable to cyber-attack. Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DoD) has gotten off to “a late start” in prioritizing cybersecurity, and has only “a nascent understanding” of how to develop more protected weapons systems. The October 2018 report, “Weapons Systems Cybersecurity,” is subtitled “DoD Just Beginning to Grapple with Scale of Vulnerabilities.”
[Image above: Figure 2 from the GAO report: Embedded Software and Information Technology Systems Are Pervasive in Weapon Systems, represented via Fictitious Weapon System for Classification Reasons). Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense information, GAO-19-128.]
GPS can figure to be among these threatened systems, and GPS guidance aboard many munitions and almost all platforms vastly expands the danger. The satnav system is not mentioned by name in the report (“To present information in an unclassified format, we do not disclose details regarding weapon system vulnerabilities, which program offices we interviewed, or which cybersecurity assessments we reviewed.”), and the word navigation surfaces only once, but it’s an alarming appearance:
“Weapon systems are dependent on external systems, such as positioning and navigation systems and command and control systems in order to carry out their missions—and their missions can be compromised by attacks on those other systems. A successful attack on one of the systems the weapon depends on can potentially limit the weapon’s effectiveness, prevent it from achieving its mission, or even cause physical damage and loss of life.”
The latter scenario could occur if a GPS-guided armament were hacked and rerouted to a civilian target, for example.
The GAO states that it warned as far back as 2015, and in repeated instances since that date, that federal and contractor systems face an evolving array of cyber-based threats, including criminals, hackers, adversarial nations, and terrorists. “Threats can range from relatively unskilled “script kiddies” who only use existing computer scripts or code to hack into computers, to well-resourced and highly skilled advanced threats who not only have sophisticated hacking skills, but also normally gather detailed knowledge of the systems they attack.”
Networks, Computers Increase Vulnerabilty
The increasingly computerized and networked nature of the U.S. military’s weapons contributes to their vulnerability. As weapon systems become more software- and IT-dependent and more networked, they actually become more vulnerable to cyber-invasion. Networks can be used as a pathway from one accessed weapon to attack other systems.
“Nevertheless,” the report adds, “until recently, DOD did not prioritize cybersecurity in weapon systems acquisitions. . . . DOD is in the early stage of trying to understand how to apply cybersecurity to weapon systems.”
As the GPS constellation — the satellites themselves as well as the ground control system — become more software-reliant, including the ability to modify signals by remote software command, this has to be a growing concern for the U.S. Air Force. Difficulties with cyber-proofing the next-generation ground control system, OCX, have been suspected as a leading cause of extended delivery delay in that program.
DoD officials reportedly confided that it will take time — and possibly some missteps — to learn what does and does not work in combatting cyber-attacks on weapon systems.
Separately, a UK defense expert consultant stated that Russia had “stolen a march on using cyber-capabilities at a tactical level on the battlefield.” As reported last year in GPS World, Black Sea spoofing incidents aroused suspicion that Russia was testing a new counter-combat technique.
Another spoofing expert said at the time, “It’s long been assumed that Russia, China and other nations (including the U.S.) have the technology to carry out a spoofing attack. What’s surprising is Russia’s willingness to use it openly and somewhat indiscriminately. It does fit nicely into what has been called Russian disinformation technology.”
Figure 3 from the GAO report: Weapons Include Numerous Interfaces That Can Be Used as Pathways to Access the System (Represented via Fictitious Weapon System for Classification Reasons) Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense information, GAO-19-128.
The amount of software embedded in weapon systems and subsystems has increased exponentially, expanding the respective weapons’ vulnerable surfaces. According to the military’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, “any exchange of information is a potential access point for an adversary. Even “air gapped” systems that do not directly connect to the Internet for security reasons could potentially be accessed by other means, such as USB devices and compact discs. Weapon systems have a wide variety of interfaces, some of which are not obvious, that could be used as pathways for adversaries to access the systems, as is shown in Figure 3.”
If attackers can access one of those systems, they may be able to reach any of the others through connecting networks.
Figure 4 from the GAO report: Weapon Systems Are Connected to Networks That May Connect to Many Other Systems (Notional Depiction for Classification Reasons)
Further, the DOT&E found that some networks were not survivable — that is, able to maintain critical capabilities under applicable threat — in a cyber-contested environment. The Defense Science Board concluded in 2013 that “the adversary is in our networks.”
The GAO adds that it and other organizations have been sounding off about such threats since the early 1990s — around the time that GPS itself became operational.
Tests of major military programs conducted between 2012 and 2017 revealed mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities that adversaries could compromise. “Test teams were able to gain unauthorized access and take full or partial control of these weapon systems in a short amount of time using relatively simple tools and techniques. . . . Once they gained initial access, test teams were often able to move throughout a system, escalating their privileges until they had taken full or partial control of a system.”
Figure 5: Vulnerabilities that the Department of Defense Is Aware of Likely Represent a Small Amount of Actual Vulnerabilities Due to Limitations in Cybersecurity Testing. Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense information, GAO-19-128.
Beginning Steps
The Department of Defense is “still learning” how to address weapon system security and “still determining” what steps it may take. Implementation, once identified, will surely occupy an extended period. Complicating the picture, if DOD is able to make its newer systems more secure, yet connects them to older, vulnerable systems, the newer systems come into jeopardy.
Pass the Hash
A report appendix lists several different types of attacks with such pictorial names as: Man-in-the middle, Pass-the-hash, War driving, and Zero day exploit.
Respectively, these types of attacks connote:
• An eavesdropping attack in which the attacker intercepts to read or modify data communications to masquerade as one or more of the entities involved.
• Capturing an encrypted version of a username and password in order to authenticate to a server or service. The attacker does not have to decrypt the username and password (i.e., they do not actually know what they are), yet can still use them to log in to a system.
• Driving through cities and neighborhoods with a wireless-equipped computer — sometimes with a powerful antenna — searching for wireless networks potentially to exploit.
• Taking advantage of a security vulnerability previously unknown to the general public. In many cases, the exploit code is written by the same person who discovered the vulnerability. By writing an exploit for the previously unknown vulnerability, the attacker creates a potent threat since the compressed timeframe between public discoveries of both makes it difficult to defend against.
An Air Force professor was honored for years of work exploring every PNT technology imaginable in conjunction with GPS; Rockwell Collins launched a new MicroSTRIKE multi-GNSS chip for military and professional applications, available globally on a non-ITAR basis; and Spirent Federal previewed its SimMNSA, a new M-code simulation option delivering to authorized customers by the end of the year.
John Raquet, AFIT, accepts 2018 Leadership Award for Services from Justin Eldredge, Spirent Federal. (Photo: Melanie Beus)
John Raquet, a professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology, received the 2018 Leadership Award for Services. Raquet was recognized for work he and his team at the Autonomy & Navigation Technology (ANT) Center developed on PNT sensors and systems utilizing almost every available source, including GPS, GNSS, inertial, vision, lidar, magnetic field, pseudolites, radar, terrain mapping, signals of opportunity, star trackers, radio ranging, 3D audio, X-ray pulsars, clocks, and more.
Raquet has co-authored many defense-oriented technical papers over the past three decades. See the list at the end of this article for some of the most recent ones.
Justin Eldredge from Spirent Federal introduced Raquet and bestowed the award, after updating the audience on Spirent’s most recent advance: “This year we maintain our position of being first to market with new signals, with the launch of SimMNSA. We’re currently in the final test phase of this new M-code option and it will delivering to several authorized customers by the end of the year. If M-code signals aren’t in the spectrum of testing for you, we offer products that simulate all other GNSS signals, plus a variety of other sensors.”
SimMNSA was demo’d at the Spirent Federal Systems booth at the neighboring ION GNSS+ conference. A video presentation of SimMNSA (for Modernized Navstar Security Algorithm) is available here. Spirent’s new software will support M-code using MNSA. M-code is an updated GPS military signal that is being rolled out as part of the modernization of the current GPS constellation. Until now, AES and SDS have been the only methods authorized to be used within a GNSS simulator to produce M-code. As the long-awaited MNSA M-code signals become available, Spirent Federal Systems will make this capability available to authorized users on the GSS9000 series simulator.
ANT
After receiving the 2018 Leadership Award, Raquet spoke about his work at theAutonomy & Navigation Technology Center. “Sometimes I called the ANT the Crazy Idea Factory. We’ve tried lots and lots of things. I think I have the best job in the world, because I get to experiment with many, many things, and work with amazing people.”
John Raquet, U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology (Photo: Melanie Beus)
“This is not the kind of community where you build something once and you’re done, you put it away. This is a growing worldwide enterprise that takes new talent to come in and fill the spots that many of the people in this room have occupied. I’m privileged to see some of the students that we’ve worked with to then go on and fill some of the gaps, really do some amazing things.”
MicroSTRIKE, a non-ITAR GPS chip
Two awards prior to Raquet’s Services award, Phil Froom from Rockwell Collins, UK, spoke about an innovative venture from Rockwell and partners QinetiQ UK as he bestowed the Satellites award.
“For many years most of you here this evening will have known Rockwell Collins as a reliable partner in the delivery of Secure (encrypted) GPS receiver, and indeed, we are still the largest producer of encrypted military GPS solutions in the world. Our partners QinetiQ also have great expertise in the design and delivery of high assurance low SWAP GPS receivers, bringing together many years of expertise of our two companies in this new venture.
Phil Froom, business development lead for Rockwell Collins, Europe, Middle East and Asia (Photo: Melanie Beus)
“However, over the past few years we have seen our military and professional (government) users looking to greater flexibility in their use of GNSS, as new capabilities and constellations come on line. But with that flexibility, a retention of assurance and where possible, mitigation of threats. For this reason, last May, Rockwell Collins and QinetiQ signed an Alliance Agreement in London, to produce a new family of high-assurance, multi-constellation GNSS receivers for professional and military use.
“This new family of receivers is aimed to be complementary to the current encrypted family of Rockwell Collins receivers in service across the globe, but allow the customer to select his level of capability and protection based upon his operational, political or even financial needs. The new “MICRO” family of GNSS receivers will offer a multi-constellation open service (MCOS) GNSS capability, which will initially provide two receivers; the first, to be known as the Q40-MicroPNT, will address dismounted low dynamics requirements, and the second, the Q40-MicroSTRIKE, will be a gun hard, high dynamics receiver.
“You will note I said they are MCOS receivers. Therefore, they will not include an encryption device, will be Non-ITAR and will actually be produced in Europe, under the control of Rockwell Collins UK. QinetiQ are today working on the Q40 ASIC and, once available, this will be incorporated into these first two Micro Family receivers.
“These receivers will be of a common format to our existing and highly successful SAASM based MicroGRAM receivers and will offer users and OEMs the ability to select an MCOS receiver, or a SAASM (or ultimately M-Code) receiver, of a common form – factor, to meet their mission or platform needs. Thus allowing OEMs to reduce costs in integrating different form-factors, and to allow users to hold common hardware, but mounting mission specific receivers.
“We are of course extremely excited about this Alliance with QinetiQ and equally by the prospect of what it will bring to our existing and future users as we all move forward into this new era of GNSS capability.”
Check out videos from the event below. Click on the icon in the top left hand corner to choose which video you’d like to watch.
Recent technical papers co-authored by John Raquet.
• “Magnetic field navigation in an indoor environment,” Ubiquitous Positioning Indoor Navigation and Location Based Service, (Aiding an inertial navigation system when GNSS signals are not available, by taking advantage of the uniqueness of magnetic field variations);
• “Comparison of two image and inertial sensor fusion techniques for navigation in unmapped environments,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, (navigation of miniature aerial vehicles (MAVs) couplimng information from an IMU with visual information from an electro-optical camera);
• “Real-time UWB-OFDM radar-based navigation in unknown terrain,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems (a signal processing algorithm and simulation study for aerial navigation with an ultrawideband orthogonal frequency division multiplexed (UWB-OFDM) radar in GPS-denied environments;
• “Navigation in GPS denied environments: Feature-aided inertial systems,” Air Force Research Lab, Eglin AFB FL Munitions Directorate (latest alt-nav trends for navigating in difficult urban, indoor, and underground environments where typical GPS receivers do not function;
• “Coded aperture aided navigation and geolocation systems,” US Patent office #8577539 (A micro air vehicle having a navigation system with a single camera to determine position and attitude of the vehicle using changes the direction to the observed features);
• “Multisensor navigation systems: A remedy for GNSS vulnerabilities?” Proceedings of the IEEE (A multisensor navigation approach to GNSS-challenged environments using inertial measurement units (IMUs), barometers, magnetometers, odometers, and digital compasses);
• “Large scale image aided navigation,” IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems (images from an airborne camera match features against a reference image to compute global position);
• and many more.
