The Royal Institute of Navigation is launching a new international conference series, tackling some of the biggest issues across the domains of modern navigation: land, sea, air and space.
The RIN is now accepting abstracts for the conference.
The International Navigation Conference 2015, set for February 24-26, 2-15, is planned as a first event in a new series of world-class conferences. The first conference will highlight the state of the art in fields such as GNSS and Galileo, indoor positioning, autonomous transport, security and resilience of navigation in the world of cyber attacks, and new quantum technologies. The event will be of special interest to the maritime, aviation, PNT, transport, research and development and security communities.
Speakers, and the topics they will discuss, include:
Privacy In Tracking (smartphones and indoor navigation) – Google
Security and resilience — Dana Goward, president and executive director, U.S .Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation
Multi-Constellation GNSS — Gian Gherado Calini, GSA
Multi-Sensor Integration — Professor Dorota Grejner-Brzezinska, The Ohio State University
Quantum Technologies — Sir Peter Knight, professor of Quantum Optics and Senior Research Investigator, Imperial College London
Emerging Trends and Current Challenges — Colin Beatty FRIN, CBiL
Autonomy in transport — BAE, ASTREA
Legal Aspects of Navigation — Professor Frans von der Dunk, Institute of Space Law, Leiden University
Two satnav superpowers battled it out aboard a superyacht in the Mediterranean this summer, as a spoofing detector designed to differentiate between real and fake GPS signals came to grips with a spoofing device previously responsible for hijacking a sophisticated drone helicopter, deceiving it into landing when it was trying to hover, and for misdirecting the same luxury yacht in tests last summer.
Mark Psiaki, Cornell University professor of mechanical and aerospace engineering, and graduate student Brady O’Hanlon spent a week aboard the White Rose of Drachs, a luxury superyacht, testing their second-generation spoofing detector as the boat cruised from Monaco around the boot of Italy to Venice at the head of the Adriatic Sea. Also on board was a researcher from assistant professor Todd Humphreys’ Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin. Humphreys tested his latest spoofer aboard the same yacht last year; this year, Psiaki and O’Hanlon embarked for a follow-up experiment to see if they could outsmart the spoofer.
The Cornell team’s spoofing detection system electronics quietly at work detecting evildoers on the bridge of the White Rose.
Both researchers have published earlier versions of their work in GPS World magazine, Psiaki in “GNSS Spoofing Detection,” the Innovation column in the June 2013 issue, and Humphreys in “Drone Hack” in the August 2012 issue.
The former story relates how Humphreys and Psiaki began their investigations as far back as 2008. “There was no intention to help bad actors deceive GNSS user equipment. Rather, our goal was to field a formidable ‘Red Team’ as part of a ‘Red Team/Blue Team’ (foe/friend) strategy for developing advanced ‘Blue Team’ spoofing defenses.”
In international waters this summer, the Cornell and Texas teams could conduct their research unhindered; on land, it’s very difficult to get permission to hack a GPS signal, even for research purposes, Psiaki said.
The Cornell two-antenna system installed on the roof of the White Rose bridge next to the superyacht’s GPS antenna.
Aboard the White Rose, Humphreys’ team initiated an attack of the boat’s GPS receiver, overlaying a disguised false signal on top of the real one, and attempting to send the boat off-course without generating any obvious warning signs. Stationed in a different area of the boat, Psiaki and O’Hanlon’s device set itself to detect the false signals through real-time analysis of their properties, and to provide protection against any attack by issuing a definitive warning whenever false signal characteristics were identified.
“We tested numerous spoofing scenarios,” recalled Psiaki. “We proved the efficacy of the new two-antenna version of one of our spoofing detection systems. It is the functional equivalent of our previous moving-antenna spoofing detection system. With two antennas we can simulate the effects of antenna motion without any need for moving parts. The only problems we encountered were with the initial spoofing drag-off, at which point the true and spoofed signals interfere with each other, and signal tracking can be tricky.
“We recorded wide-band data for all these cases. We think that we know how to enhance our defenses to hold on to the signals and recognizing spoofing during the initial drag-off. We also think that we know how to recover the true signals after an attack. The recorded wide-band data should enable us to develop and test these refinements in the lab, i.e., without the need to go back to sea — not that we would mind having to take another cruise on the White Rose of Drachs.”
In one test, the yacht’s GPS receiver was spoofed into believing that it was veering off its course, set northwards to Venice, and heading south to Libya at a very high speed. The Cornell detector was able to warn the White Rose’s bridge crew about the attack before the yacht was 20 meters off course.
The White Rose’s GPS-driven chart showing it off the coast of Libya (black line) when it was actually in the Adriatic, cruising from Montenegro to Venice (blue line). The spoofing detector knew all along that this was a false reading.“This photo shows the White Rose’ Litton GPS receiver with ridiculous speed and altitude readings — we were in a hurry to get from the Adriatic to Libya and therefore spoofed a straight line route that took us across, actually beneath, Italy and Sicily, at speeds exceeding 900 kts in order to get there in 50 minutes. “
“We want to progress to the point where not only can we tell it’s a false signal, but we can also say, ‘Here is the true signal; here is the true position,’” Psiaki added.
The owner of the White Rose of Drachs, an anonymous businessman, allows the boat to be used for scientific purposes during off seasons.
The Cornell and White Rose team: (from left) Brady O’Hanlon, Cornell ECE Ph.D. student, Andrew Schofield, master of the White Rose of Drachs, and Mark Psiaki, Cornell Prof. of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering.
Psiaki will present a paper on the superyacht experiments at the Institute of Navigation’s GNSS+ conference in September in Tampa, Florida, and GPS World will publish an article based on this paper in the November issue.
This story draws on initial reporting by Anne Ju in the July 28 Cornell Chronicle, with additional material and photos supplied by Mark Psiaki.
Mitre’s new Time Anomaly Detection Appliqué (TADA) protects modern digital systems from spoofing attacks that can corrupt time source signals.
Successful spoofing attacks could result in navigational systems going haywire and grounding airplanes, jumbling of buying and selling orders, a shutdown of the stock market, or power-grid failures. Infrastructure and defense systems often rely on GPS’s unencrypted position, navigation, and timing (PNT) signal as their source of accurate time, accurate to about 14 nanoseconds.
The TADA system detects and, for certain users, mitigates timing attacks. “Almost every system has a need for precise and accurate time,” said Darrow Leibner, the Mitre TADA project lead. “Because GPS is accurate and ubiquitous, users have gotten away from implementing other time-keeping methods. That’s where the potential vulnerability comes in.”
TADA is designed to provide a cost-effective, reliable, and easy-to-use method for protecting GPS receivers against spoofing attacks. The system defends against spoofing by continuously comparing a trusted input, such as a known frequency or location, with those provided by the GPS receiver. When a difference between these two inputs is detected, TADA alerts the user to the suspected PNT anomaly.
For a trusted input, TADA uses an atomic clock frequency. For each second measured by the incoming GPS timing signal, TADA counts the number of frequency cycles generated by a Cesium clock. If the incoming GPS signal is valid, TADA will count exactly the expected number of Cesium frequency cycles. If TADA measures a higher or lower number of timing signals than expected, it will display the difference. A difference outside the acceptable margin of error will prompt TADA to alert its users that the GPS timing signal is possibly being spoofed.
In the same way it uses a trusted time source, TADA can also use a known location to detect a spoofing attack. To do this, the user inputs the location of a GPS receiver antenna into TADA. TADA monitors the reported position for any changes. Any reported change of the stationary location would most likely be due to spoofing attack and prompt an alert to the user. Once alerted by TADA to a spoofing attack, users can quickly switch to existing backup systems.
“This is not the invention of the lightbulb,” Leibner said. “Rather, it’s a clever use of existing technologies packaged in such a way that users obtain a greatly increased level of protection for a minimum of investment. None of the TADA components on their own are brilliant. But as one manufacturer said after seeing a detailed description of TADA, ‘It’s brilliantly simplistic.’”
The next stage in TADA’s development is to provide it with the capability to not only detect spoofing attacks, but to mitigate its effects and pinpoint their origin. Mitre will also continue to advocate that to bolster the nation’s infrastructure defenses against spoofing, TADA-like monitoring techniques be included within commercial product design.
The Federal Communications Commission plans to issue the largest fine in its history against C.T.S. Technology Co., Limited, a Chinese electronics manufacturer and online retailer, for allegedly marketing 285 models of signal jamming devices to U.S. consumers for more than two years.
The FCC applied the maximum fine allowed to each jammer model allegedly marketed by C.T.S., resulting in a planned fine of $34,912,500.
“All companies, whether domestic or foreign, are banned from marketing illegal jammers in the U.S.,” said Travis LeBlanc, Acting Chief of the Enforcement Bureau. “Signal jammers present a direct danger to public safety, potentially blocking the communications of first responders. Operating a jammer is also illegal, and consumers who do so face significant civil and criminal penalties.”
C.T.S. operates a website that markets consumer electronics to individuals in the United States, where it allegedly misled U.S. consumers by falsely claiming that certain signal jammers were approved by the FCC. In fact, the use of such devices by U.S. consumers is illegal under any circumstance. C.T.S. also sold 10 high-powered signal jammers to undercover FCC personnel.
The FCC also is ordering C.T.S. to cease marketing illegal signal jammers to U.S. consumers and provide information to the FCC about any persons and entities in the United Sates that purchased its devices.
Signal jammers are radio frequency transmitters that intentionally block, jam, or interfere with authorized communications, such as cellphone calls, GPS systems, Wi-Fi networks, and first responder communications. It is a violation of federal law to market, sell, import, or use a signal jammer in the United States and its territories, except in very limited circumstances involving federal law enforcement.
The FCC is asking people to report the sale or use of an illegal jammer by contacting the FCC Enforcement Bureau through the FCC online complaint portal, or by calling 1-888-CALL-FCC (or 1-888-225-5322). To voluntarily relinquish a signal jammer, e-mail [email protected]. Additional information, including the FCC Consumer Alert on the jamming prohibitions and the FCC Enforcement Advisory to retailers regarding the marketing of illegal signal jammers, is available at www.fcc.gov/jammers.
Stesalit today announced the availability of the SXtreo range of rugged GPS handhelds for survey, industrial use, and field work under extreme conditions such as agriculture, forestry, roads, security and construction.
The SXtreo series of mobile devices are rated IP-68, meaning they are waterproof, dust proof, shockproof, and are coupled with built-in mobile GIS applications. Long battery life allows GPS data collection for a full work day, without the need for recharging. The GNSS devices come with full-size USB port for connecting devices.
Stesalit is based in India, and the SXtreo gives that country an affordable option to take geotagged photos and conduct waypoint surveys. The design and conceptualization of SXtreo is a result of the in-house R&D effort of Stesalit. The road towards the birth of SXtreo is presented in the video:
The GAGAN-enabled SXtreo GN series of rugged GNSS field computers and PDAs comes with a full keypad and large five-inch sunlight-readable screen for field data entry in large forms. These models are designed for GPS data collection and asset management, socioeconomic surveys, mapping, agriculture, logistics, forestry, public transportation, construction and security.
The SXtreo WP 60 and WP61 devices have all the features of a smartphone.
The SXtreo WP 61 rugged smartphone.
SXtreo handheld’s Android and embedded Linux-based open-source secured operating systems are compatible with a range of sector-specific applications designed by Stesalit.
SXgeo is specially designed for waypoint, routes, and track surveys. The added advantage from the similar existing applications is that one can capture geotagged photos and transfer the survey data through GPRS.
SXsurvey is a complete suite for comprehensive survey management. With the features of SXgeo, one can also create large forms dynamically in the devices for survey data collection.
SXfield is specifically built for the field workers and employees working away from office like road construction, oil, gas and other utility services, logistics and distribution chains, FMCG, consumer and white good companies with large sales networks, operations and maintenance organizations with large service networks, and security organizations including police.
The integrated application SXagro is a geospatial agriculture decision-support system in use by agriculture universities and state agriculture departments.
In addition, the SXtreo range of IP68 rugged smartphones is compatible with most of the off-the-shelf mobile software applications.
Applied EM’s anti-jam GPS antenna, AJGPS045, has achieved a four-channel Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna (CRPA) in a very small size, weight and power (SWAP) particularly suitable for airborne platforms. Its footprint is the same as a standard GPS Fixed Radiation Pattern Antenna (FRPA), the FRPA-3.
This is a key enabler to bringing greatly improved anti-jam performance to smaller platforms and to GPS-equipped platforms that have inadequate anti-jam capability.
When integrated with appropriate four-channel antenna electronics and a military GPS receiver, the AJGPS045 enables L1 and L2 anti-jam performance of typically >80 dB. This is achieved with a passive compact antenna (.7” x 4.6” x 4.6”) that weighs 9 oz.
Signal Sentry 1000, an Exelis product that detects and locates GPS interference sources in 3D by using longitude, latitude and altitude, was deployed during Super Bowl XLVIII at the MetLife Stadium in East Rutherford, New Jersey.
During the Super Bowl, GPS devices were used extensively to track and monitor the location of team members and officials. GPS was also used to ensure that event organizers and security knew the exact location of team vehicles en route to the stadium. If a vehicle were to break down delaying the arrival of a team or game staff to the event, logistics and scheduling could have been adjusted accordingly.
“Signal Sentry 1000 helped our law enforcement officials keep thousands of fans in attendance safe during one of the most exciting nights for millions of Americans,” said Mark Pisani, vice president and general manager of positioning, navigation and timing for Exelis Geospatial Systems. “Protecting critical GPS infrastructure is extremely important for public safety.”
Signal Sentry 1000 was designed to collect actionable intelligence for law enforcement and to protect GPS signal-dependent critical infrastructures. At the Super Bowl, Exelis deployed eight Signal Sentry sensors positioned in an array pattern to detect and locate the jamming source. Threats are detected through a network of sensors, which is part of a centralized server executing Exelis-developed proprietary location algorithms.
In addition to national special security events like the Super Bowl, sensors can also be used around different types of critical infrastructure, such as utilities and government facilities, to automatically sense and locate any intentional or unintentional source of GPS jamming. Once a threat is detected, users receive specific information regarding the location of the threat in order to stop or mitigate the interference.
Too Much Sensitivity, Not Enough Robustness, Says Parkinson
Brad Parkinson, the founding architect of GPS, told a UK conference that the system needs to be made more robust to ensure worldwide availability of services to users. His concerns over GPS availability relate to threats such as the loss of authorized frequency spectrum (implicitly creating licensed jammers), space weather due to hyperactive ionospheric conditions, and deliberate or inadvertent jamming of GPS signals.
He warned that GPS is more vulnerable to sabotage or disruption than ever before, and charged that politicians and security chiefs are ignoring the risk. Western governments are “in their infancy in recognizing the problem,” he remarked further in an interview with London’s Financial Times. “[In the United States] I don’t know anyone that is really in charge of it. The Department of Homeland Security should be [but] … they don’t have any people that understand it very well. They’ve got one person without any budget to speak of.”
He also warned that Europe’s €5 billion Galileo system is equally at risk.
Parkinson proposed a three-stage program to:
Protect (legally) the signal and physically eliminate jamming sources;
Toughen the GPS/Galileo receiver’s resistance to interference;
Augment the GPS signals with other satellites or with ground-based transmitters such as eLoran.
To support his proposal, Parkinson stated, “The number one need for all GPS or Galileo users is availability. Over the years, manufacturers of signal receiver technologies have focused too much on sensitivity and not enough on resilience or robustness. The maritime industry is a particular concern where users have taken GPS for granted. They must increase preparedness and backups as they do in aviation or other GNSS using industries.
“Even today, most ships have only GPS and the vision of their crew to guide them when approaching harbours. As you can see from today’s conference there are a wealth of solutions to toughen and backup GPS, many of which are not technologically difficult nor expensive, but still their adoption in sectors such as global shipping is certainly not adequate.”
As part of his protection program, Parkinson urged that penalties for jamming GPS networks be coordinated worldwide. “In Australia, if you cause interference likely to cause prejudice to the safe conduct of a vessel, it’s five years in the jug [jail] and $850,000.” Contrasting this with a U.S. case that may simply impose a forfeiture of the culprit’s jamming device, Parkinson added, “I’m calling for the community of nations to move to the Aussie-type penalties.”
In the toughening regard, Parkinson alluded to integration of GPS data with information derived from an inertial positioning system. “If you combine all of these things, a good set should be able to fly within 1 kilometer of a jammer with a 10-kilometer range,” said Parkinson. “That’s what I call toughening.”
Parkinson made his remarks as the keynote speech at GNSS Vulnerabilities and Resilient PNT 2014, hosted by the Royal Institute of Navigation. He will also deliver the keynote address, “Assured PNT: Assured World Economic Benefits,” for the European Navigation Conference on April 15 in the Netherlands.
Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) has selected NovAtel’s GAJT-700ML antenna for testing on Canadian Army armored vehicles. The GAJT-700ML, developed in Calgary at NovAtel’s global headquarters, is a single-unit GPS anti-jam antenna system for land vehicles.
The testing is being conducted through PWGSC’s Build in Canada Innovation Program (BCIP).
NovAtel was selected to participate under the BCIP’s “safety and security” priority area. PWGSC will procure a number of GAJT-700MLs on behalf of the Department of National Defense (DND). The Directorate of Land Requirements (DLR) — with the assistance of the Quality Engineering Test Establishment (QETE) and the Land Force Trials and Evaluation Unit (LFTEU) — will oversee all testing on DND’s behalf.
Field testing, centered on battlefield days, is expected to take place in early March of 2014 at 4th Canadian Division Support Garrison Petawawa. The battlefield days will analyze the performance of GAJT on the Artillery Observation Post Variants (OPV) of the Light Armored Vehicle III (LAV III) in operational conditions to confirm the suitability and robustness of GAJT-700ML for this role. The process is expected to be completed by the end of March.
“NovAtel has worked closely with Canadian and Allied defence agencies to test the resilience of the GAJT-700ML in challenging jamming environments,” said Jason Hamilton, vice president, Marketing and Product Management. “The BCIP program provides an opportunity to expand this testing to incorporate end user soldier feedback on the installation and operational effectiveness of GAJT during battlefield usage of the LAV OPV. This invaluable feedback will be used by NovAtel to further drive product innovation in support of Canada and its Allied partners.”
“The Canadian Army requires accurate, secure and reliable access to Global Positioning Systems to conduct operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict in all potential theatres of operation,” said Colonel Andrew Jayne, Director Land Requirements. “With the ever-increasing demands on the electromagnetic spectrum and threat of harmful interference, technologies which contribute to the assurance of position and timing information are a critical enabler of Army and Canadian Armed Forces operations in today and tomorrow’s operating environment.”
GAJT is a null-forming technology that negates jammers, ensuring the satellite signals necessary to compute position and time are always available. Three categories of GAJT are manufactured by NovAtel:
GAJT-700ML: for use with military land vehicles, networks and timing infrastructure
GAJT-700MS: for marine vessels, from small boats to capital ships
GAJT-AE: for use with an external antenna in size and weight constrained applications
The BCIP was created by the Government of Canada to strengthen Canadian innovation. The program offers procurement and testing of pre-commercialized products and services, at a late stage of development. The BCIP:
Bridges the “pre-commercialization gap”
Supports Canadian suppliers by connecting innovators and government users and by testing innovations
Provides real-world evaluation of pre-commercial goods and services
Improves the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations
Reportstack has announced a new report on The Global Military GPS/GNSS Market 2013-2023. This report offers the reader detailed analysis of the global military GPS/GNSS market over the next 10 years, alongside potential market opportunities to enter the industry, using detailed market size forecasts, Reportstack said.
A satellite navigation system provides GPS positioning from a global perspective, and is therefore of utmost importance for modern-day military operations, which rely on accurate real-time data on hostile forces in order to carry out precision attacks, Reportstack said. It is here that GPS/GNSS devices assume an important role, as they are imperative to transfer signals from these satellites back to earth.
The U.S. is the highest spender on military GPS/GNSS navigation, and is responsible for 42.9% of the global military GNSS devices market. Others major spenders in this sector include Russia, the UK, China and India. In July 2013, India launched the IRNSS-1A, the first of seven satellite constellation to be deployed under the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) program to be completed between 2015-2016. And China’s BeiDou is scheduled to be operational by 2020.
Another factor driving the market is the integration of satellite navigation technology with other navigation systems, such as the inertial navigation system (INS) and gyro, as GPS devices are to be used in order to decipher data correctly, Reportstack said.
The increasing demand for satellite navigation and communications is driven primarily by the desire of militaries to monitor more areas and derive accurate information by a range of GNSS receivers/sensors in the shortest time possible. Major military aircraft and helicopters are dependent on GPS embedded INS systems for effective navigation. Similarly, naval vessels and guided munitions are increasingly relying on the collaboration of laser, gyro, INS, and satellite navigation technologies to derive accurate real time data.
Furthermore, it has been observed that the usage of standard positioning services/open service receivers, which use unencrypted signal for non-combat purposes has increased, and is expected to drive demand and encourage expenditure, Reportstack said. The military GPS/GNSS technology is expanding its horizon beyond the basic characteristics of navigation and tracking. The use of GPS, in conjunction with a number of software applications, has expanded its use in military operations. A number of new technologies are now embedded with GPS receivers to produce a more sophisticated military tool.
Recently, a Swiss-based company developed a device called GPS Log Book based on u-blox technology. The new device has extended the scope of GPS technology to the administrative side of military operations. It provides an easy way for military drivers to automatically keep an accurate travel log book which can be securely accessed later from anywhere via a web interface. Information logged includes route, speed, and distance traveled. It also keeps a close record of fuel used by the vehicle, based on the distance traveled at various speed levels.
The advent of Differential GPS (DGPS), an enhancement to GPS, which provides improved location accuracy, from the 15-meter nominal GPS accuracy to approximately 10 cm, has further expanded the scope of GPS in missile technology. The intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are capable of hitting targets across thousands of miles navigation, use inertial navigation with DGPS receivers. The advent of DGPS is expected to be one of the most significant steps in accurate missile targeting for militaries across regions.
The companies mentioned in this report are Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Rockwell Collins , Lockheed Martin, ITT Exelis, Thales, and BAE Systems. More details and table of contents about this report can be found by visiting The Global Military GPS/GNSS Market 2013-2023 report.
Abstract submissions are now being accepted for the Institute of Navigation (ION) 2014 Joint Navigation Conference (JNC) to be held June 16-19, 2014.
For Official Use Only (FOUO) U.S.-only sessions will be held June 16-18 at the Renaissance Orlando at SeaWorld, Orlando, Florida; and the 4-EYES CLASSIFIED sessions will be held June 19 at Shades of Green Walt Disney World.
The conference, sponsored by the ION’s Military Division, is the largest U.S. military positioning, navigation and timing conference of the year with joint service and government participation. The event will focus on technical advances in guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) with emphasis on joint development, test and support of affordable GN&C systems, logistics and integration.
The 2013 Joint Navigation Conference was canceled, so this will be the first time the conference has been held in two years.
From an operational perspective, the conference will also focus on advances in battlefield applications of GPS; critical strengths or weaknesses of fielded navigation devices; warfighter PNT requirements and solutions; and navigation warfare.
The ION JNC features more than 200 operational presentations on a diverse array of topics including:
Advanced Security Technologies/SAASM
Alternate Navigation Technologies: I, II & III
Atomic Clocks and Timing Applications
Autonomous Navigation
Aviation Applications
Battlefield Smart Phone Applications
Celestial Navigation and Star-Tracker Technology
Collaborative Navigation Techniques
GPS Constellation Performance
GPS in Military Applications/NAVWAR
GPS Modernization
Land Applications
Marine Applications
MEMS Inertial Measurement Unit
Micro Navigation Applications
Military GPS Receivers and Military GPS Receiver Technology
Military GPS Use and Experiences
Military GPS/Antenna Technologies and Interference Mitigation
Missile Applications
Modeling and Simulation
Multi-GNSS Receivers for Military Applications
Multi-Sensor Solutions for Guidance, Navigation, and Control
Navigating in Challenged Environments (e.g. Urban, Indoor and
Sub-Surface Navigation)
Precision Azimuth Sensing
Precision Navigation Capabilities for Test and Training
Technical Exhibit and Operational Product Demonstrations. JNC also features a technical exhibit and showcase of Guidance, Navigation and Control technology products and services and Operational Product Demonstrations. For more information on exhibiting and product demonstrations at the ION Joint Navigation Conference, call ION at 703-366-2723 or go to www.ion.org/jnc.
Attendance Restricted. FOUO U.S. ONLY. JNC conference attendance (June 16-19) will be controlled by the Joint Navigation Warfare Center and will be restricted to U.S. ONLY. The classified sessions will have 4-Eyes access (June 19) for citizens of U.S.A., Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. All participants must establish a need to know and be approved by the Joint Navigation Warfare Center security office.
The Navy’s Communications and GPS Navigation Program Office (PMW/A 170) mounted a Small Antenna System on an Aerostar unmanned aircraft then placed it in a room lined with signal-absorbent material, where it was subjected to GPS jamming signals at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md. Part of an initiative to protect GPS technologies on small unmanned aerial vehicles, the Navy conducted the tests in July to demonstrate how miniaturized GPS protection devices can prevent interruption of the mission-critical global positioning data. (U.S. Navy photo)
Part of an initiative to protect GPS technologies on small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), the Navy recently conducted tests to demonstrate how miniaturized GPS protection devices can prevent interruption of this mission-critical global positioning data.
From July 10 to 24, the Communications and GPS Navigation Program Office, headquartered in San Diego, mounted a Small Antenna System (SAS) on an Aerostar unmanned aircraft, then placed the small UAV in a room lined with signal-absorbent material at the FARM (Facilities for Antenna and RCS Measurements), where it was subjected to GPS jamming signals.
Equipped with model jammers, the FARM facility was used as a stage for the “enemy” to jam the GPS signal and try to knock the UAV off course, said Eric Stevens, the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Communications and Navigation lead for PMW/A-170, which supplied the antenna system. Knocked off course, the UAV would not be able to relay critical intelligence back to the ground control station — disrupting communications among U.S. and allied forces’ ships, aircraft and submarines. In a worst-case scenario, GPS jamming could even cause UAVs to crash.
“If an enemy is trying to jam, or interfere, with the GPS frequency, this antenna allows us to be able to track and acquire the true GPS satellites even in the midst of this jamming and interference,” Stevens said. “What we are doing is demonstrating and quantifying the value of this antenna on small UAVs.”
Personnel involved in the testing were optimistic about the results.
“We are hoping to gain some ground and show there are smaller GPS protection solutions out there,” said Michelle Jackson, an electronics engineer with experience in testing SAS systems on other platforms.
Equipped with the SAS, the Aerostar will be also used to support a U.S. Army pre-deployment war-game scenario conducted at Fort Polk, La., in August, said Donn Rushing, the project lead for MUDO. Rushing participated in the Fort Polk exercises last year and said the addition of the GPS anti-jamming antenna will give the “good guys” an edge this year.
“This new anti-jam system decreases the footprint normally required of such a system, which is now ideal for UAV incorporation and service,” Rushing said. “What makes us smarter is knowing our enemies are smart and that we have to stay one step ahead of them. The SAS development is the latest GPS anti-jam capability to aid the war fighter in combating the bad guys.”
The Royal Institute of Navigation is launching a new international conference series, tackling some of the biggest issues across the domains of modern navigation: land, sea, air and space.
