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  • The System: Galileo IOV-3, Russian SBAS, Road Tolling

    Galileo IOV-3 Broadcasts E1, E5, E6 Signals; Russian SBAS Luch-5B in Orbital Slot; EGNOS and Galileo in Emergency Call, Road Tolling; Compass ICD Rumored

    Galileo IOV-3 Broadcasts E1, E5, E6 Signals

     By Oliver Montenbruck, German Space Operations Center and Richard B. Langley, University of New Brunswick

    After reaching its final position, the Galileo IOV-3 satellite started transmitting its first ranging signals on December 1. Within three days, the various carriers (E1, E5, E6) and associated modulations were activated, and full in-orbit testing is now in progress. Anyone with commonly available GNSS receivers can presently access the open signals in the E1, E5a, and E5b frequency bands as well as the wide-band E5 AltBOC signal.

    According to statements made at the recent 6th ESA Workshop on Satellite Navigation Technologies (Navitec 2012) in Noordwijk, The Netherlands, the IOV-3 satellite, which is also identified as Flight Model 3 (FM3) and E19 after its pseudorandom noise code, will continue to use binary offset carrier modulation — specifically BOC(1,1) — on the E1 Open Service signals for the time being. In contrast to this, the first pair of IOV satellites has already started to use composite binary offset carrier modulation, which offers better multipath suppression in the received signal.

    Right after its activation, IOV-3 could be tracked immediately by the global network of stations participating in the Multi-GNSS Experiment (MGEX; http://www.igs.org/mgex) initiated by the International GNSS Service (IGS).

    Fig1 Source: Oliver Montenbruck, German Space Operations Center and Richard B. Langley, University of New Brunswick
    Figure 1. Pseudorange errors of IOV-3 tracking at Tanegashima, Japan, using the E1 BOC(1,1) signal (top) and the E5 AltBOC signal (center). The elevation angle over time is shown in the bottom panel.

    The high quality of the IOV-3 signals is illustrated by measurements collected by the Tanegashima station during a 10-hour pass of the satellite over Japan (see Figure 1). The E5 AltBOC pseudorange measurements in particular exhibit an exceptionally low noise and multipath level of better than 10 centimeters at mid- and high-elevation angles.

    An attractive feature of the Galileo system is the availability of multiple signal frequencies, which opens up numerous prospects for precise positioning and scientific investigations.

    Carrier-Phase Measurements

    While the E6 signals foreseen for a future Commercial Service are not presently supported by geodetic receivers due to the lack of information on the transmitted codes and possible licensing issues, users can already benefit from the E5a and E5b signals in addition to E1. By way of example, the ionosphere-free and geometry-free linear combination can be formed from carrier-phase measurements on these frequencies. Results of some first tests using this combination for IOV-3 are shown in Figure 2, based on measurements made at four MGEX stations: CUT0 (Perth, Australia), GMSD (Tanegashima, Japan), KZN2 (Kazan, Russia), and SIN1 (Singapore).

    The results provide an indication of carrier-phase noise and multipath effects but are free of long-term variations that have earlier been found in GPS L1/L2/L5 signal combinations.

    It is anticipated that similar measurement quality will be obtained with the E1 and E5 signals of IOV-4, which were activated on December 12 and 13.
    This level of performance highlights the potential benefit of Galileo signals in advanced triple-frequency techniques such as undifferenced ambiguity resolution and ionospheric monitoring.

    Figure 2 The difference between the ionosphere-free carrier-phase combinations formed from E1/E5a and E1/E5b signals received at four MGEX stations: CUT0 (Perth, Australia), GMSD (Tanegashima, Japan), KZN2 (Kazan, Russia), and SIN1 (Singapore). Source: Oliver Montenbruck, German Space Operations Center and Richard B. Langley, University of New Brunswick
    Figure 2 The difference between the ionosphere-free carrier-phase combinations formed from E1/E5a and E1/E5b signals received at four MGEX stations: CUT0 (Perth, Australia), GMSD (Tanegashima, Japan), KZN2 (Kazan, Russia), and SIN1 (Singapore).

    Russian SBAS Luch-5B in Orbital Slot

    The second Russian satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) satellite, Luch-5B, has now been positioned at its designated orbital slot of 16 degrees west longitude. The satellite had been in a drift orbit since its launch on November 2 at 21:04:00 UTC along with the domestic communications satellite Yamal-300K.

    NORAD/JSpOC tracking data showed Luch-5B arriving at its geostationary position by about December 13. Figure 3 shows the footprint of the satellite with the elevation-angle contours at 30-degree intervals.
    Luch-5B, the second of a set of three geostationary satellites being  launched to reactivate Roscosmos’s Luch Multifunctional Space Relay System, is expected to use PRN code 125.

    The Luch system will relay communications and telemetry between low-Earth-orbiting spacecraft, such as the the Russian segment of International Space Station, and Russian ground facilities. The system’s satellites also carry transponders for the System for Differential Correction and Monitoring (SDCM), Russia’s SBAS. The transponders will broadcast GNSS corrections on the standard GPS L1 frequency.

    Luch-5A, launched in December 2011, resides in an orbital slot at 95 degrees east longitude. It began transmitting corrections on July 12, 2012 using PRN code 140.

    Figure 3 Geostationary position of Luch-5B, carrying a transponder for the Russian System for Differential Correction and Monitoring. Source: Oliver Montenbruck, German Space Operations Center and Richard B. Langley, University of New Brunswick
    Figure 3. Geostationary position of Luch-5B, carrying a transponder for the Russian System for Differential Correction and Monitoring.

    EGNOS and Galileo in Emergency Call, Road Tolling

    The Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) World Congress in Vienna this fall drew attention to the multi-constellation advantages provided by Galileo during a session on eCall, the European initiative for safer mobility. “Galileo will provide accuracy and reliability in all the transport markets, but in the case of emergency rapid assistance, the positioning need is even more critical,” said Fiammetta Diani, market development officer at the European GNSS Agency (GSA).

    A multiconstellation approach for eCall and similar initiatives will deliver better performance without additional costs. Yaroslav Domaratsky from NIS-GLONASS, the Russian national navigation services provider, confirmed that ERA-GLONASS, the Russian version of eCall, will benefit from multiconstellation. “Solutions including also Galileo are welcome in the Russian initiative.”

    Satellite ITS applications in road transport cover much more than in-car navigation. They include road-user charging with satellite-based toll collection systems; in-vehicle dynamic route guidance for drivers; intelligent speed adaptation to control the speed of vehicles externally; traveller information systems; and fleet-tracking systems for better management of freight movements and goods delivery.

     its_t3_476 Source: Oliver Montenbruck, German Space Operations Center and Richard B. Langley, University of New Brunswick

    Road Tolling

    European road-toll operators outlined how they plan to emply the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) and Galileo to provide new tolling solutions.

    Luigi Giacalone, managing director of Autostrade Tech, which provides the technology for the French Ecomouv project, said EGNOS will contribute to reliably collect taxes on the heavy trucks using the road charging scheme. “This is a tax, not a toll. It aims to collect a new tax reliably and fairly according to distance travelled, while dissuading fraud,” he said. “Thanks to GNSS multi-constellation, only 10 locations out of the 15,000-kilometer network need support beacons.”

    Ecomouv, which Includes anti-jamming and anti-spoofing mechanisms, covers 600,000 French lorries and 200,000 foreign ones, and will run from July 2013 for 11.5 years. Giacalone said its performance target was 99.75 percent accuracy of the entire collection chain, and its trials had already 99.8 percent accuracy.

    Miroslav Bobošík from SkyToll, which operates Slovakia’s electronic tolling operations, explained how the system was able to cover not only 570 kilometers of motorways, but also 1,800 kilometers of first class roads in the country. “We needed a flexible system to cover different roads in different circumstances. And also to be fair to drivers, so they pay only for what they use,” said Bobošík. “We cover all services, not just toll collection, but enforcement, and technological maintenance and repair.”

    GNSS tolling means flexibility as well as feasibility for SkyToll: since  its launch in mid-2010, many changes have been made to the operation of the network, but thanks to the technology, they were easy to make. And they were cheap, he said. “While it is difficult to compare costs with other country, SkyToll has the lowest cost per kilometer to operate,” he said. “GNSS is the best possible solution for electronic tolling system in Slovakia, and GNSS is the most suitable for ITS.”

    Changing the Game

    Volker Vierroth from T-Systems, the German IT services subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom, explained GNSS’s game-changing role: the availability of a huge variety of additional data linked to actual positions; more computing power, notably mobile and cloud-based; fast and reliable networks available now with broad coverage, most recently with the shift from 3G to 4G; and smartphones, powerful and versatile, surging to the fore.

    “GNSS [in the form of EGNOS] has proved to be a reliable technology for large-scale road charging on complex networks,” he said. “Galileo will bring further improvements, and may become the cornerstone of future road applications.”

    Compass ICD Rumored

    As this magazine goes to press, unconfirmed reports from Shanghai state that the Compass Interface Control Document (ICD) will be released on December 27.

    Such rumors surfaced in late 2010 and again in late 2011. An October 2011 GPS World newsletter reported “The long-awaited signal ICD for China’s growing GNSS will appear this month, according to representatives of the system who spoke in a “Compass: Progress, Status, and Future Outlook” workshop in September [2011].

    “The ICD has been rumored to be available previously to receiver manufacturers within China, creating some disgruntlement among companies outside the country. A workshop panelist affirmed that GPS/Compass chips and receivers are being actively developed by many Chinese manufacturers and research institutes.”

     

     

  • High-Level Perspective on PNT Frontiers

    New Technology, New Applications, New Science from the Stanford Symposium

    LD-Litton
    Headshot: James D. Litton

    By James D. Litton

    The sixth annual Stanford PNT Symposium in November brought together a select group of experts to share insights from the latest research, developments, and proposals, GNSS and non-GNSS, that show promise for the international community. Among other noteworthy presentations, we heard Brad Parkinson’s suggested incremental system changes to significantly improve signal availability and accuracy, a comprehensive update on China’s Compass system, and the latest in spoofing and proposed proofs of location.

    GNSS in General

    The budget realities of U.S. GNSS development, and the need to maintain the systems at the high levels of performance upon which so many critical and commercially beneficial applications now depend, were analyzed by two men with industry-household names, Brad Parkinson and Gaylord Green.

    Nibbles. Professor Parkinson gave a very sophisticated, nuanced presentation entitled “Nibbles,” in which he outlined feasible and productive technical steps to ensure the preservation of what he described as “the three As:” availability, affordability, and accuracy. Rather than do radical surgery on accuracy or availability in order to preserve affordability, he identified so-called nibbles at requirements, incremental improvements enabled by use of current technology advances, for example, vector (Spilker) receivers, power-conversion efficiency improvements, antenna gain and steering modifications, weight reduction for multiple launch capability, and use of sensor fusion for more robust receivers with greater jam resistance.

    It was a high-level but quantitative system design approach aimed at improving affordability and interference resistance while maintaining and improving availability and accuracy. He made the salient point that affordability with a given level of performance is enhanced by availability, that is, maintaining 30+ satellites on orbit brings multiple benefits that improve affordability. The estimates of gain from the nibbles struck me as conservative, at least for those with which I had some quantitative feel.

    Alternative Architectures. Col. Gaylord Green addressed the same subject with a different approach, in a presentation entitled “GPS Alternative Architectures.” His motivation for alternative architectures was to provide the needed PNT capability at an affordable cost. He pointed out that GPS satellites have increased in dry weight from 334 to 2,100 pounds, and that the cost of the IIA, IIF, and III satellites have gone from $100 million on orbit to $400 million on orbit. Colonel Green indicated that starting a new development with the same signals cost more than continuing with GPSIII. (The Congressional Budget Office has recommended consideration of using IIF satellites to maintain the constellation and bypassing GPS III.)

    The reduced capability satellites are called NavSats. He suggested that a mixed constellation of NavSats (with minimal ancillary payloads and frequencies) such as 15 GPSIII and 15 NavSats would enable a constellation of 30 satellites; the minimum necessary to assure sky-challenged users of satisfactory coverage. He recommended that design of satellite power conversion to be set by start-of-life, not end-of-life goals. Colonel Green identified the signal priorities in terms of their functions (L-5, L-2, L1C, and four military signals requiring crypto). Like Parkinson, he identified technology changes in antennas and signal architecture to reduce costs, necessitating a demonstration program. He also indicated that advantage could be taken of other GNSS constellations for civil signal purposes, alleviating the demands on GPS satellites. Colonel Green identified satellite constellation arrangements which would be more cost effective (multiple launch) and provide adequate coverage. He pointed out that such a NavSat program would require a new start and would necessarily constrain GPS modernization funding. In short, such a “GPS Alternative Architecture approach” would combine continuation of GPS III as planned with the addition of simpler, lighter satellites with reduced diversity of signals to replace the aging GPS satellites now on orbit beyond their design life.

    Compass. Professor Jingnan Liu of the GNSS Research Center of Wuhan University gave what most observers thought was the first comprehensive and data-intensive description of Precise Positioning results with the COMPASS (Beidou) system. He showed that the Beidou regional system, from which he presented copious data, can currently provide standard positioning service with <10M horizontal and <20M vertical accuracies at 95% confidence level. He also showed that results with Beidou plus GPS are 10-20% better than GPS alone. He provided results for surveying, for ground-based augmentation, for RTK, PPP, clock stability, orbital statistics, wide area differential and many other metrics of PNT. Professor Parkinson noted, in appreciating the presentation, that it was the first detailed release of so much technical data on COMPASS performance. The results noted above were obtained with 4GEO+5 IGSO+2MEO satellites. The constellation is expected to grow to 5GEO+5IGSO+4MEOs by the end of 2012 and to 5GEOs+3IGSOs+27 MEOs by 2020 for a global service. The amount of data and the diversity (application and instrumentation) of the data were truly impressive.

    GPS Modernization. Dr. Keoki Jackson of Lockheed Martin presented a comprehensive review of GPS Modernization with charts which described the evolution of GPS from Block I to Block III. He depicted the program as on schedule for delivery of the first GPS III vehicle in May, 2014, with a 2015 launch. Most of this material was the same as reported from the AFCEA GC-12 program in GPS World earlier this year. A matrix comparing the attributes of GPS III with GPSII and beneficial outcomes from “Back-to-Basics Investments” were key takeaways.

    Ground Control. Ray Kolibaba of Raytheon presented a detailed overview of the OCX program, the next generation Operational Control System. This presentation also emphasized improvements in program management, simplification of development practices, extensive use of commercial development methods and predicted on-time delivery with all of the attributes needed for both GPS III and the existing constellation.

    Military User Equipment. Col. Bernie Gruber, Director of the GPS Directorate, gave an update on current activities with emphasis on progress in Military User Equipment (MGUE) development. This material was somewhat further advanced in schedule than the equivalent May 2012 time frame in which the same subject was presented in much detail at the AFCEA GC-12 meeting at the Directorate. The currently ‘hot’ topics of jamming and spoofing threats, countermeasures and affordability were prominent in the presentation. Some of the key achievements for 2012 listed were the release of BAAs (Broad Agency Announcements) for NavSat studies and the completion of a Congressional Report on ‘Cost Effective GPS). Launch of GPS IIF-3 and delivery of GPS IIF-4, 5,6 & 7 were also noted. Security Certification for MUE cards was a very noteworthy achievement, which will make future MGUE development and utilization much easier for the challenging jamming and spoofing environment which is expected. The themes of affordability and jamming and spoofing threats were dominant in this review, as well.

    General PNT

    Norvald Kjerstad is a professor of Nautical Science at Aalesund University College and a long-time professional navigator in academic, geophysical, and shipping communities. His paper vividly depicted the risks brought about by climate change, by increased commercial interest in shipping and mineral resource exploration in the Arctic region, and by the very limited navigation infrastructure and limited communications assets.

    Arctic Navigation. Both DGPS and SBAS systems are quite limited in the arctic, magnetic compass systems are less accurateat the very high latitudes ( and their errors propagate into navigation radar, collision avoidance and other systems). Auroral effects limit the availability of GNSS at times (Glonass improves GPS because of the higher orbital inclinations) and hydrographic charts of the arctic are frequently quite wrong, due to changes in water depth and to limited surveying frequency. Increased tourism, shipping and resource interest intensify the consequences of the increased risk to seafarers.

    The advent of Galileo and Compass, integrated with GPS-Glonass will greatly improve the reliability of GNSS signals. However, navigation through the ice, at places thin and navigable and at random places deep and massive (ice ridges) is much more than knowing where one is with respect to the center of the earth. Radar helps with detection and avoidance of ice ridges but the sinking and grounding of icebreakers and commercial vessels demonstrate that much better knowledge of the environment is needed to avoid future disasters. The thousand-kilometer shorter route over the Pole can be very expensive and not necessarily the fastest one. However the increased activity in the Arctic is going to continue, and it is mandatory that safety factors be given greater attention by the International Maritime Organization (satellite compasses are reliable where magnetic ones are not, but the IMO has not approved them) and by the hydrographic services of the affected areas.

    From Farm to Front Office. Jim Geringer, former governor of Wyoming, now a director of ESRI and a member of the GPS Excom gave, as usual, a very entertaining presentation (“GPS/GNSS From the Farm to the Front Office”) with highly interesting examples of the very broad and deep impact of GNSS on society, including financial statistics and object lessons in the misuse or inaccurate use of geospatial data. Geringer was an engineer before he went into politics and that came through clearly in the presentations, even though he was very self-effacing concerning his technical credentials. He gave amusing examples, not all from Apple, of the effects of combining current and historical geospatial data, such as airport runways shown in topography layers obtained before leveling the airport areas, and a road running across the valley filled by Hoover Dam.

    Geringer critiqued an attitude on the part of GNSS professionals in which their attention is more devoted to the how of obtaining the information than to the effects that future changes might have on the users. He discussed policy challenges presented by the FCC mandate to find 500MHz of spectrum for high speed wireless data, by affordability, by the potential for jamming and spoofing. It was good to be reminded of the awesome realized economic benefits of GNSS, the manifold applications which GNSS systems enable and the ease with which this potential can be limited or actually damaged by pursuit of other worthwhile objectives which are politically favored or which bring short term revenue into the treasury at the expense of GNSS system requirements in bandwidth. The less obvious but equally or more beneficial economic benefits of high accuracy GNSS and the impact of actual lives lost or resources untappedwere illustratedand quantified in Geringer’s broad presentation. One hopes that this presentation will be or has been seen at High GSA and policy levels in the FCC and NTIA.

    Geringer’s presentation provides a nice segue into a presentation by:

    LightSquared Lessons Learned. Rich Lee of Greenwood Telecommunications Consultants, LLC and iPosi.  Entitled Lessons Learned from the GPS-LightSquared Proceeding, it was an assessment of the opportunities missed and damage done in the drive to enable the use of spectrum adjacent to GNSS frequencies for 4G LTE wholesale services through high power Auxiliary Terrestrial Components (ATCs) using MSS spectrum reallocated (or repurposed) to the purpose under a conditional waiver by the Chairman of the FCC, Julius Genachowski, on a recommendation by the International Bureau of the FCC. According to Lee, Greenwood was called in to solve, “if solutions exist” the problem of the ‘spectrum collision’ between the LSQ design and GPS, after the collision occurred. He likened the role of Greenwood to that of a tow truck operator called in to clear up a collision after the impacts. Lee served on the TWG (Temporary Working Group) as head of the cellular subgroup and headed the NTIA/Excom cellular tests. The presentation was very good, technically, in both its detailed and more strategic aspects but both the history described and the lessons learned (see below) were, understandably, from the perspective of a party which was unable, in this particular instance, to achieve the goals desired by their sponsors. This failure was for reasons of basic spectrum policy conflicts between GNSS applications and those mooted to become transcendent- mobile high speed data for consumer and industrial applications.

    Lee depicted the lack of a requirement in history for regulation of receiver standards, as opposed to transmitter standards, to the inability to anticipate the crowded spectrum (for example, his statement that spectrum was regarded as “free” and minimizing interference was the key objective, a burden placed on the transmitters). Now that spectrum is seen as scarce and underutilized in many U.S. government applications and inadequately conserved in many civil applications, the concept of receiver standards for avoiding interference and the use of advanced filterand antenna technology in receivers as well as in transmitterswould enable easier, less confrontational and more lucrative use of this 21st century El Dorado.

    Parenthetically, Pierre de Vries (University of Colorado, and a member of the FCC’s Technical Advisory Committee) and others recently testified to a House of Representatives panel, recommending that harm claim thresholds be established with which to manage the trade-offs between intrinsic receiver protection requirements and transmitter power distribution, so that instead of just adding the specification requirement to receivers, a flexible system approach be adopted. They noted that it was very difficult to anticipate the receiver design needs for all applications. The failure to understand the requirements of precision GNSS receivers and the simplistic concept of fences was a large driver in the collision between LightSquared and GNSS.

    Lee’s lessons learned summary is:

    • Upper 10: candidate for ground augmentation? The upper 10 MHz (1545-1555 MHz) of spectrum was originally allocated to LightSquared through its acquisition of TerraSat. During the 2012 conflict months, LightSquared publicly abandoned operating in the Upper 10.
    • Question: sound alternatives for this band? (Including as a good GNSS guard band)
    • Consider: sub-microwatt uses for short range augmentation, such as Department of Transportation Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS)-TWG findings. Given very low effective isotropically radiated power (EIRP), ample compatibility with precision GPS nearby.
    • Precision GPS: –82 dBm worst case Upper 10 susceptibility (–1 dB C/NO)
    • 1 uW EIRP transmitter is about 13 dB below at 1 meter
    • Seems suitable for high availability in urban areas; provides urban in-fill, redundancy such as ITS
    • At 100-mETER range: Signals ~-135 dBm incident power at an ITS receiver antenna
    • Band continues as a space-to-earth downlink, shared with geostationary Earth orbit-mobile satellite services, including carriage of GPS/GNSS corrections (OmniSTAR, StarFire)

    Lee contested the FCC chairman’s assertion that the LightSquared-GPS matter was an anomaly, saying instead that it was “foreseeable.”
    However, foreseeable anomalies such as singularities exist in predictions of scientists. I believe that this anomaly was clearly foreseeable, but a hedge-fund mentality, financial engineering, and a long-held attitude toward GPS in the FCC were the drivers of these benighted decisions.

    The gold rush is still on for finding underutilized spectrum. Some systems, including GNSS, utilize bandwidth that needs protection for purposes other than the usual communications requirements. It is vital to honor the homesteads of GNSS and protect the noise floors. Receiver standards must be considered very carefully because communications receivers and high precision GNSS receivers are very different systems.

    Scientific Subjects

    Some presentations grouped under this topic are available in ION publications from GNSS 2012.

    Atom Interferometry. Mark Kasevich of Stanford presented his paper on precision navigation sensors based upon atom interferometry. While application of these sensors in general awaits many highly difficult engineering advancements, the outcome would be a great boon to navigation, were the outcome comparable to the evolution of chip-scale atomic clocks.

    Andrei Shkel reprised his paper entitled “Precision Navigation, Timing, and Targeting enabled by Microtechnology: Are we there yet?”

    Gravity. Tom Murphy of the University of California, San Diego, gave a fascinating paper of fundamental importance to understanding gravity by laser ranging to retroreflectors left on the moon by various Apollo and Russian missions. A highly contrived initialism for the project is APOLLO, for Apache Point Laser Observatory Lunar Laser-Ranging Operation. The work is a product of a seven-university/research center consortium.

    The system of APOLLO for measuring the range of the moon relative to the earth at Apache Point is a marvel of experimental ingenuity and advanced instrumentation in collecting the few photons that get back from the laser shots at the moon. Laser light is caught by the retroreflectors and returned to the telescope at Apache Point. A very sensitive gravimeter system at the observatory enables compensation for the Earth’s crustal motions, and orbital deviations are compensated. Precisions of a few millimeters in range to these devices on the moon are achieved, almost good enough to be useful in testing the “Strong” Equivalence Principle of General Relativity.

    From an engineering point of view, the timing, motion compensation, detection sensitivity (a few photons per shot), and several other features of the system are truly impressive, and the potential for improving our understanding of general relativity, so-called dark matter or energy, and more, are exciting aspects of this work. To have much better precision through placing laser transceivers on the moon to increase the number of reflected/transponder photons in the samples would appear to be quite valuable and relatively simple NASA missions for future work, even though the data may eventually be sufficient to enable theoretical advancements without such added signal-to-noise benefit. This paper was an example of excellent engineering in the service of important science.

    Vulnerabilities and Limitations

    Charles Schue of UrsaNav gave a very detailed and comprehensive paper on wide-area timing, navigation, and data using low-frequency technology. He provided data for timing, location, and data transmission over distances greater than 125 nautical Mmiles.

    eLoran. He made the point and showed examples to demonstrate that the technology for these systems exists today, is highly affordable, and can represent a major strengthening of the nation’s critical infrastructure. The systems and hardware he presented are very attractive and seemingly very mature.
    Schue was preaching to the choir, as far as I can tell; there is, in the PNT community, no controversy about the need for eLoran. Further, there is a sense of disappointment and wonder that so little money was saved at the expense of great risk to our critical PNT infrastructure, particularly in view of the vulnerability to jamming and spoofing of GPS and the other GNSS systems for civil use; a vulnerability analysis which informed the balance (two) of the papers in this summary report.

    Spoofing. Dennis Akos presented data on spoofing tests conducted at Lulea, Sweden, near a low-density commercial airport with limited road traffic and a restricted Swedish Air Force weapons test area, and in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, near a very busy airport with dense roadway traffic. The incidence of radio-frequency interference (RFI) in the latter case was great and in the former case negligible, until the team introduced their jamming and spoofing equipment.In both cases, a simple automatic gain control (AGC) monitoring design, which was computationally efficient, was able to detect and measure the RFI from the jammer-spoofer.

    Using all commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, the jammer was identified and located with time-of-arrival and power-difference-of-arrival. The researchers showed that using a controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA) like the Stanford four-element CRPA and all-COTS equipment, jammers could be indentified and located efficiently through AGC processing. A large amount of detailed data were presented with screen shots and plots of the effects of the jamming on the receivers.

    Proof of Location. Logan Scott of LS Consulting gave a paper on proof of location. He projected the need for location proof in several applications, ranging from system control and data acquisition intrusions that would affect industrial control systems to bogus Mayday calls, the response to which is very expensive, and he provided many examples of data security applications. He also provided several schemes, ranging from cryptographic GPS RF signal structures to the use of overlapping systems, like Galileo and GPS, to enable verification of location.

    Scott identified the massive security threat represented by millions of smart phone and tablet users who can store millions of bytes of information, such as maps of sensitive locations. An authorized user of such a map, GNSS-enabled, on a tablet or smart phone, should be able to access the restricted information if the user is in the right location. However, a user, authorized or not, outside of the restricted area would find that area of the map blank if he tries to access it externally, a kind of location need-to-know control.

    Scott anticipates the use of temporary keys for weapons usage; such keys would require that the user be in a location authorized for such use. He provides block diagram descriptions of systems that would be feasible to achieve these location proofs for high-value and dangerous operations. These block-diagram level descriptions are accompanied by quantitative assessments of the difficulties and benefits of such system modifications.

    It was a compelling tour de force on the subject. We do not have time or space to cover it well but the material has gradually been built up from earlier available publications by Scott at ION conferences and in GNSS journals and magazines. Both the need for such systems and the means by which they may be practically achieved are well worth studying by those responsible for policy and programmatic decisions, and by technologists seeking new product ideas and applications.

    And More

    A few interesting presentations do not fit into the above categories. Stan Honey, founder of the company Sportvision (the creator of the first-down yellow-line overlay in televised American football, and many other broadcast enhancements for sporting events) and considered sailing’s master navigator, gave a wonderful dinner talk about the PNT technology being utilized in the America’s Cup TV graphics, umpiring, and race management. Honey reflected upon how competitive sailing, unlike other professional sports, has fully adopted the use of advanced PNT technology in how the sport is umpired and managed.

    Jason Wither of Microsoft presented a paper on spatialized data for mixed reality, which was very informative in how various types and layers of data are combined to create mixed-reality systems.

    Ron Fugelseth of Oxygen productions showed his very entertaining video entitled “A Toy Train in Space.” The video was posted on YouTube a few months ago and immediately went viral. It is a fine example of the use of GPS technology.


    James D. Litton heads the Litton Consulting Group and previously played key executive roles at NavCom Technology and Magnavox.

  • Out in Front: Let the Chips Fall

    We either continue to totter at the brink of a global financial precipice, or we sit crumpled on the canyon floor far below, peering skyward, wondering what might have been, and resolving to pick up what pieces we can and carry on.

    It is impossible to tell as this magazine goes to press in December just where we may find ourselves, and in what shape, come the early days of January 2013. Those elected parties with responsibility for the state of our fiscal affairs, who in the best of all possible worlds would  possess some sort of vision for the future, continue to posture, prevaricate, pander, and generally excuse themselves from worrying about what may happen to the rest of us. After all, they will still be in office and drawing good salaries come the New Year, come what may.

    The GNSS industry has pulled through the last half-decade of worldwide recession as well as most, better than many. There have been some casualties along the way, and almost universal belt-tightening. But we keep moving onward and upward, blessed with a technology that continues to find new and profit-bearing applications, and encouraged by researchers further out in front of us, who discover and develop yet newer possibilities at an astonishing rate.

    Now we face new uncertainty. The domino-paths of the global economy wend this way and that, curving, intertwining, doubling back, snaking everywhere. A toppled piece here can lead to a cascaded pile-up way over on the other side of the board, and vice versa.

    It all comes down to end-user ability to buy, to upgrade, to invest in the future — as opposed to holding tight to whatever can be preserved in the present.
    If characterizing GNSS end-users could be done by naming off surveyors, farmers, fishermen, and other outdoor enthusiasts, then determining the economic outlook for this industry would be easier to do, though the picture might not necessarily be any more optimistic. But the GNSS end-user community has swelled almost immeasurably to include the automotive industry, the telecommunications industry (in both its infrastructure and its own end-user equipment), utilities, airlines and the aircraft industry, militaries around the world, and even governments themselves — municipal, state, and national. Every one of these entities has a budget and acutely feels the chills — and in more delayed fashion, the warnings — of national and global economies.

    Should the United States Congress, in full possession of all its political wisdom, drive the country over the fiscal precipice, reverberations of the crash in the chasm below will propagate far and wide — and into the very marrow of our bones.

    We have overcome before. With science and technology as our co-pilots (or are they our engines?), we shall overcome again. We may and should speak out, attempting to influence the political process, but we cannot control its outcomes.

    We can do our own jobs, and we will.  Accept change, keep calm, carry on.

  • Spectrum Interference Standards: Seeking a Win-Win Rebound from Lose-Lose

     

    By Christopher J. Hegarty

    Based upon lessons learned from the LightSquared situation, the author identifies important considerations for GPS spectrum interference standards, recommended by the PNT EXCOM for future commercial proposals in bands adjacent to the RNSS band to avoid interference to GNSS.

    On January 13, 2012, the U.S. National Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Executive Committee (PNT EXCOM) met in Washington, D.C., to discuss the latest round of testing of the radiofrequency compatibility between GPS and a terrestrial mobile broadband network proposed by LightSquared. The proposed network included base stations transmitting in the 1525 – 1559 MHz band and handsets transmitting in the 1626.5 – 1660.5 MHz band. These bands are adjacent to the 1559 – 1610 MHz radionavigation satellite service (RNSS) band used by GPS and other satellite navigation systems. Based upon the test results, the EXCOM unanimously concluded that “both LightSquared’s original and modified plans for its proposed mobile network would cause harmful interference to many GPS receivers,” and that further “there appear to be no practical solutions or mitigations” to allow the network to operate in the near-term without resulting in significant interference.

    The LightSquared outcome was a lose-lose in the sense that billions were spent by the investors in LightSquared and, as noted by the EXCOM, “substantial federal resources have been expended and diverted from other programs in testing and analyzing LightSquared’s proposals.” To avoid a similar situation in the future, the EXCOM proposed the development of “GPS Spectrum interference standards that will help inform future proposals for non-space, commercial uses in the bands adjacent to the GPS signals and ensure that any such proposals are implemented without affecting existing and evolving uses of space-based PNT services.”

    This article identifies and describes several important considerations in the development of GPS spectrum interference standards towards achieving the stated EXCOM goals. These include the identification of characteristics of adjacent band systems and an assessment of the susceptibility of all GPS receiver types towards interference in adjacent bands. Also of vital importance to protecting GPS receivers is an understanding of the user base, applications, and where the receivers for each application may be located while in use. This information, along with the selection of proper propagation models, allows one to establish transmission limits on new adjacent-band systems that will protect currently fielded GPS receivers. The article further comments on the implications of the evolution of GPS and foreign satellite navigation systems upon the development of efficacious spectrum interference standards.

    Adjacent Band Characteristics

    The type of adjacent-band system for which there is currently the greatest level of interest is a nationwide wireless fourth-generation (4G) terrestrial network to support the rapidly growing throughput demands of personal mobile devices. Such a nationwide network would likely consist of tens of thousands of base stations distributed throughout the United States and millions of mobile devices. The prevalent standard at the present time is Long Term Evolution (LTE), which is being deployed by all of the major U.S. carriers. LTE and Advanced LTE provide an efficient physical layer for mobile wireless services. Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is a competing wireless communication standard for 4G wireless that is a far-distant second in popularity.

    For the purposes of the discussion within this article, an LTE network is assumed with characteristics similar to that proposed by LightSquared but perhaps with base stations and mobile devices that transmit upon different center frequencies and bandwidths. The primary characteristics include:

    • Tens of thousands of base stations nationwide, reusing frequencies in a cellular architecture, with the density of base stations peaking in urban areas.
    • Base-station antennas at heights from sub-meter to 150 meters above ground level (AGL), with a typical height of 20–30 meters AGL. Each base station site has 1–3 sector antennas mounted on a tower such that peak power is transmitted at a downtilt of 2–6 degrees below the local horizon, with a 60–70 degree horizontal 3-dB beamwidth and 8–9 degree vertical 3-dB beamwidth.
    • Peak effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP) in the vicinity of 20–40 dBW (100–10,000 W) per sector.
    • Mobile devices transmit at a peak EIRP of around 23 dBm (0.2 W), but substantially lower most of the time when lower power levels suffice to achieve a desired quality of service as determined using real-time power control techniques.
    • As LTE uses efficient transmission protocols, emissions can be accurately modeled as brickwall, that is, confined to a finite bandwidth around the carrier.

    Throughout this article it will be presumed that LTE emissions in the bands authorized for RNSS systems such as GPS will be kept sufficiently low through regulatory means.

    The opening photo shows a typical base-station tower, with three sectors per cellular service provider and with multiple service providers sharing space on the tower, including non-cellular fixed point microwave providers. As a cellular network is being built out, coverage is at first most important, and many base-station sites will use minimum downtilt and peak EIRPs within the ranges described above. As the network matures, capacity becomes more important. High-traffic cells are split through the introduction of more base stations, and this is commonly accompanied by increased downtilts and lower EIRPs.

    The assumed characteristics for adjacent band systems plays a paramount role in determining compatibility with GPS, and obviously lower-power adjacent-band systems would be more compatible. If compatibility with GPS precludes 4G network implementation on certain underutilized frequencies adjacent to RNSS bands, then it may be prudent to refocus attention for these bands on alternative lower-power systems.

    GPS Receiver Susceptibility

    Over the past two years, millions of dollars have been expended to measure or analyze the susceptibility of GPS receivers to adjacent band interference as part of U.S. regulatory proceedings for LightSquared. Measurements were conducted through both radiated (see photo) and conducted tests at multiple facilities, as well as in a live-sky demonstration in Las Vegas. This section summarizes the findings for seven categories of GPS receivers. These categories, which were originally identified in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)-mandated GPS-LightSquared Technical Working Group (TWG) formed in February 2011, are: aviation, cellular, general location/navigation, high-precision, timing, networks, and space-based receivers.

    Aviation. Certified aviation GPS receivers are one of the few receiver types for which interference requirements exist. These requirements take the form of an interference mask (see Figure 1) that is included in both domestic and international standards. Certified aviation GPS receivers must meet all applicable performance requirements in the presence of interference levels up to those indicated in the mask as a function of center frequency. In Figure 1 and throughout this article, all interference levels are referred to the output of the GPS receiver passive-antenna element. Although the mask only spans 1500–1640 MHz, within applicable domestic and international standards the curves are defined to extend over the much wider range of frequencies from 1315 to 2000 MHz.

    Figure 1. Certified aviation receiver interference mask. Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 1. Certified aviation receiver interference mask.

    A handful of aviation GPS receivers were tested against LightSquared emissions in both conducted and radiated campaigns. The results indicated that these receivers are compliant with the mask with potentially some margin. However, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) noted the following significant limitations of the testing:

    • Not all receiver performance requirements were tested.
    • Only a limited number of certified receivers were tested, and even those tested were not tested with every combination of approved equipment (for example, receiver/antenna pairings).
    • Tests were not conducted in the environmental conditions that the equipment was certified to tolerate (for example, across the wide range of temperatures that an airborne active antenna experiences, and the extreme vibration profile that is experienced by avionics upon some aircraft).

    Due to these limitations, the FAA focused attention upon the standards rather than the test results for LightSquared compatibility analyses, and these standards are also recommended for use in the development of national GPS interference standards. One finding from the measurements of aviation receivers that may be useful, however, is that the devices tested exhibited susceptibilities to out-of-band interference that were nearly constant as a function of interference bandwidth. This fact is useful since the out-of-band interference mask within aviation standards is only defined for continuous-wave (pure tone) interference, whereas LightSquared and other potential adjacent-band systems use signals with bandwidths of 5 MHz or greater.

    Cellular. The TWG tested 41 cellular devices supplied by four U.S. carriers (AT&T, Sprint, US Cellular, and Verizon) against LightSquared emissions in the late spring/early summer of 2011. At least one of the 41 devices failed industry standards in the presence of a 5- or 10-MHz LTE signal centered at 1550 MHz at levels as low as –55 dBm, and at least one failed for a 10-MHz LTE signal centered at 1531 MHz at levels as low as –45 dBm. The worst performing cellular devices were either not production models or very old devices, and if the results for these devices are excluded, then the most susceptible device could tolerate a 10-MHz LTE signal centered at 1531 MHz at power levels of up to –30 dBm. Careful retesting took place in the fall of 2011, yielding a lower maximum susceptibility value of –27 dBm under the same conditions.

    General Location/Navigation. The TWG effort tested 29 general location/navigation devices. In the presence of a pair of 10-MHz LTE signals centered at 1531 MHz and 1550 MHz, the most susceptible device experienced a 1-dB signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) degradation when each LTE signal was received at –58.9 dBm. In the presence of a single 10-MHz LTE signal centered at 1531 MHz, the most susceptible device experienced a 1-dB SNR degradation when the interfering signal was received at –33 dBm.

    Much more extensive testing of the effects of a single LTE signal centered at 1531 MHz on general location/ navigation devices was conducted in the fall of 2011, evaluating 92 devices. The final report on this campaign noted that 69 of the 92 devices experienced a 1-dB SNR decrease or greater when “at an equivalent distance of greater than 100 meters from the LightSquared simulated tower.” Since the tower was modeled as transmitting an EIRP of 62 dBm, the 100-meter separation is equivalent to a received power level of around –14 dBm. The two most susceptible devices experienced 1-dB SNR degradations at received power levels less than –45 dBm.

    High Precision, Timing, Networks. The early 2011 TWG campaign tested 44 high-precision and 13 timing receivers. 10 percent of the high-precision (timing) devices experienced a 1-dB or more SNR degradation in the presence of a 10-MHz LTE signal centered at 1550 MHz at a received power level of –81 dBm (–72 dBm). With the 10-MHz LTE signal centered at 1531 MHz, this level increased to –67 dBm (–39 dBm).

    The reason that some high-precision GPS receivers are so sensitive to interference in the 1525–1559 MHz band is that they were built with wideband radiofrequency front-ends to intentionally process both GPS and mobile satellite service (MSS) signals. The latter signals provide differential GPS corrections supplied by commercial service providers that lease MSS satellite transponders, from companies including LightSquared.

    Space. Two space-based receivers were tested for the TWG study. The first was a current-generation receiver, and the second a next-generation receiver under development. The two receivers experienced 1-dB C/A-code SNR degradation with total interference power levels of –59 dBm and –82 dBm in the presence of two 5-MHz LTE signals centered at 1528.5 MHz and 1552.7 MHz. For a single 10-MHz LTE signal centered at 1531 MHz, the levels corresponding to a 1-dB C/A-code SNR degradation increased to –13 dBm and –63 dBm. The next-generation receiver was more susceptible to adjacent-band interference because it was developed to “be reprogrammed in flight to different frequencies over the full range of GNSS and augmentation signals.”

    Discussion. Although extensive amounts of data were produced, the LightSquared studies are insufficient by themselves for the development of GPS interference standards, since they only assessed the susceptibility of GPS receivers to interference at the specific carrier frequencies and with the specific bandwidths proposed by LightSquared. If GPS interference standards are to be developed for additional bands, then much more comprehensive measurements will be necessary.

    Interestingly, NTIA in 1998 initiated a GPS receiver interference susceptibility study, funded by the Department of Defense (DoD) and conducted by DoD’s Joint Spectrum Center. One set of curves produced by the study is shown in Figure 2. This format would be a useful output of a further measurement campaign. The curves depict the interference levels needed to produce a 1-dB SNR degradation to one GPS device as the bandwidth and center frequency of the interference is varied. The NTIA curves only extended from GPS L1 (1575.42 MHz) ± 20 MHz. A much wider range would be needed to develop GPS interference standards as envisioned by the PNT EXCOM. It may be possible, to minimize testing, to exclude certain ranges of frequencies corresponding to bands that stakeholders agree are unlikely to be repurposed for new (for example, mobile broadband) systems.

    Figure 2 Example of NTIA-initiated receiver susceptibility measurements from 1998. Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 2. Example of NTIA-initiated receiver susceptibility measurements from 1998.

    Receiver-Transmitter Proximity

    The LightSquared studies, with the exception of those focused on aviation and space applications, spent far less attention to receiver-transmitter proximity. Minimum separation distances and the associated geometry are obviously very important towards determining the maximum interference level that might be expected for a given LTE network (or other adjacent band system) laydown.

    Within the TWG, the assumption generally made for other (non-aviation, non-space) GPS receiver categories was that they could see power levels that were measured in Las Vegas a couple of meters above the ground from a live LightSquared tower. Figure 3 shows one set of received power measurements from Las Vegas. In the figure, the dots are measured received power levels made by a test van. The top curve is a prediction of received power based upon the free-space path-loss model. The bottom curve is a prediction based upon the Walfisch-Ikegami line-of-sight (WILOS) propagation model. The NPEF studies presumed that the user could be within the boresight of a sector antenna even within small distances of the antenna (where the user would need to be at a significant height above ground).

    Figure-5 . Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 3 Measurements of received power levels from one experimental LightSquared base station sector in Las Vegas live-sky testing.

    The difference between the above received LTE signal power assumptions has been hotly debated, especially after LightSquared proposed limiting received power levels from the aggregate of all transmitting base stations as measured a couple of meters above the ground in areas accessible to a test vehicle. After summarizing the aviation scenarios developed by the FAA, this section highlights scenarios where so-called terrestrial GPS receivers can be at above-ground heights well over 2 meters. The importance of accurately understanding transmitter-receiver proximity is illustrated by Figure 4. This shows predicted received power levels for one LTE base station sector transmitting with an EIRP of 30 dBW and with an antenna height of 20 meters (65.6 feet). The figure was produced assuming the free-space path-loss model and a typical GPS patch-antenna gain pattern for the user. Note that maximum received power levels are very sensitive to the victim GPS receiver antenna height.

    Figure 4 Received power in dBm at the output of a GPS patch antenna from one 30 dBW EIRP LTE base station sector at 20 meters. Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 4. Received power in dBm at the output of a GPS patch antenna from one 30 dBW EIRP LTE base station sector at 20 meters.

    Aviation. The first LightSquared-GPS study conducted for civil aviation was completed by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautic (RTCA) upon a request from the FAA. Due to the extremely short requested turnaround time (3 months), RTCA consciously decided not to devote any of the available time developing operational scenarios, but rather re-used scenarios that it had developed for earlier interference studies. It was later realized that the combination of five re-used scenarios and assumed LightSquared network characteristics did not result in an accurate identification of the most stressing real-world scenarios. For instance, within the RTCA report, base stations’ towers were all assumed to be 30 meters in height. At this height, towers could not be close to runway thresholds where aircraft are flying very low to the ground, because this situation would be precluded by obstacle clearance surfaces. Later studies used actual base-station locations, from which the aviation community became aware that cellular service providers do place base stations close to airports by utilizing lower base-station heights as necessary to keep the antenna structure just below obstacle clearance surfaces.

    The FAA completed an assessment of LightSquared-GPS compatibility in January 2012 that identified scenarios where certified aviation receivers could experience much higher levels of interference than was assessed in the RTCA report. The areas where fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft rely on GPS are depicted in Figures 5 and 6 (above the connected line segments), respectively.

    Figure-7 . Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 5. Area where GPS use must be sssured for fixed-wing aircraft.
    Figure-8 . Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 6. Area where GPS use must be assured for rotary-wing aircraft.

    Aircraft rely upon GPS for navigation and Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS). Helicopter low-level en-route navigation and TAWS for fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft are perhaps the most challenging scenarios for ensuring GPS compatibility with adjacent-band cellular networks. In these scenarios, the aircraft can be within the boresight of cellular sector antennas and in very close proximity, resulting in very high received-power levels. The FAA attempted to provide some leeway for LightSquared while maintaining safe functionality of TAWS through the concept of exclusion zones (see Figure 7). The idea of an exclusion zone is that, at least for cellular base-station transmitters on towers that are included within TAWS databases, that it would be permitted for the GPS function to not be available for very small zones around the LTE base-station tower. This concept is currently notional only; the FAA plans to more carefully evaluate the feasibility of this concept and appropriate exclusion-zone size with the assistance of other aviation industry stakeholders.

    Figure-9 . Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 7. Example exclusion area around base station to protect TAWS.

    High-precision and Networks: Reference Stations. To gain insight into typical reference-station heights for differential GPS networks, the AGL heights of sites comprising the Continuously Operating Reference Station (CORS) network organized by the National Geodetic Survey (NGS) were determined. The assessment procedure is detailed in the Appendix.

    Figure 8 portrays a histogram of estimated AGL heights for the 1543 operational sites within the continental United States (CONUS) as of February 2012. The accuracy of the estimated AGL heights is on the order of 16 meters, 90 percent, limited primarily by the quality of the terrain data that was utilized. The mean and median site heights are 5.7 and 5.2 meters, respectively.

    Figure 8. Distribution of heights for CORS sites. Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 8. Distribution of heights for CORS sites.

    RALR, atop the Archdale Building in Raleigh, North Carolina, was the tallest identified site at 64.1 meters. This site, however, was decommissioned in January 2012 (although it was identified as operational in a February 2012 NGS listing of sites). The second tallest site identified is WVHU in Huntington, West Virginia at 39.6 meters, which is still operational atop of a Marshall University building. 223 of the 1543 CORS sites within CONUS have AGL heights greater than 10 meters, and furthermore the taller sites tend to be in urban areas where cellular networks tend to have the greatest base-station density.

    High Precision and Networks: End Users. Many high-precision end users employ GPS receivers at considerable heights above ground. For instance, high-precision receivers are relied upon within modern construction methods. The adjacent photos show GPS receivers used for the construction of a 58-story skyscraper called The Bow in Calgary, Canada. For this project, a rooftop control network was established on top of neighboring buildings using both GPS receivers and other surveying equipment (for example, 360-degree prisms for total stations), and GPS receivers were moved up with each successive stage of the building to keep structural components plumb and properly aligned. Similar techniques are being used for the Freedom Tower, the new World Trade Center, in New York City, and many other current construction projects.

    Other terrestrial applications that rely on high-precision GPS receivers at high altitudes include structural monitoring and control of mechanical equipment such as gantry cranes. At times, even ground-based survey receivers can be substantially elevated. Although a conventional surveying pole or tripod typically places the GPS antenna 1.5 – 2 meters above the ground, much longer poles are available and occasionally used in areas where obstructions are present. 4-meter GPS poles are often utilized, and poles of up to 40 ft (12.2 meters) are available from survey supply companies.

    General Location/Navigation. Although controlling received power from a cellular network at 2 meters AGL may be suitable to protect many general navigation/location users, it is not adequate by itself. For example, GPS receivers are used for tracking trucks and for positive train control (the latter mandated in the United States per the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008). GPS antennas for trucks and trains are often situated on top of these vehicles. Large trucks in the United States for use on public roads can be up to 13 ft, 6 in (~4.1 meters), and a typical U.S. locomotive height is 15 ft, 5 in (~4.7 meters). Especially in a mature network that is using high downtilts, received power at these AGL heights can be substantially higher than at 2 meters.

    Within the TWG and NPEF studies, the general location/navigation GPS receiver category is defined to include non-certified aviation receivers. One notable application is the use of GPS to navigate unmanned aerial vehicles. UAVs are increasingly being used for law enforcement, border control, and many other applications where the UAV can be expected to occasionally pass within the boresight of cellular antennas at short ranges.

    Cellular. The majority of Americans own cell phones, and a growing number are using cell phones as a replacement for landlines within their home. Already, 70 percent of 911 calls are made on mobile phones. Although pedestrians and car passengers are often within 2 meters of the ground, this is not always the case. Figure 9 shows three cellular sector antennas situated atop a building filled with residential condominiums. The rooftop is accessible and frequently used by the building inhabitants. According to an online real estate advertisement, “The Garden Roof was voted the Best Green Roof in Town and provides amazing 360 degree views of downtown Nashville as well as four separate sitting areas and fabulous landscaping.” One of the sector antennas is pointing towards the opposite corner of the building. If the downtilt is in the vicinity of 2–6 degrees, then it is quite likely that a person making a 911 call from the rooftop could see a received power level of –10 dBm to 0 dBm, high enough to disrupt GPS within most cellular devices if the antennas were transmitting in the 1525–1559 MHz band.

    Figure 9. Cellular antennas atop Westview Condominium Building in downtown Nashville. Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Figure 9. Cellular antennas atop Westview Condominium Building in downtown Nashville.

    This situation is not unusual. Many cellular base stations are situated on rooftops in urban areas, and many illuminate living areas in adjacent buildings. In recent years, New York City even considered legislation to protect citizens from potential harmful effects of the more than 2,600 cell sites in the city, since many sites are in very close proximity to residential areas.

    Propagation Models

    Within the LightSquared proceedings, there was a tremendous amount of debate regarding propagation models. Communication-system service providers typically use propagation models that are conservative in their estimates of received power levels in the sense that they overestimate propagation losses. This conservatism is necessary so that the service can be provided to end users with high availability. From the standpoint of potential victims of interference, however, it is seen as far more desirable to underestimate propagation losses so that interference can be kept below an acceptable level a very high percentage of time. As shown in Figure 3, some received power measurements from the Las Vegas live-sky test indicate values even greater than would be predicted using free-space propagation model. Statistical models that allow for this possible were used in the FAA Status Report. The general topic of propagation models is worthy of future additional study if GPS interference standards are to be developed.

    Future Considerations

    GPS is being modernized. Additionally, satellite navigation users now enjoy the fact that the Russian GLONASS system has recently returned to full strength with the repopulation of its constellation. In the next decade, satellite navigation users also eagerly anticipate the completion of two other global GNSS constellations: Europe’s Galileo and China’s Compass. Notably, between the GPS modernization program and the deployment of these other systems, satellite navigation users are expected to soon be relying upon equipment that is multi-frequency and that needs to process many more signals with varied characteristics. New equipment offers an opportunity to insert new technologies such as improved filtering, but of course the need to process additional signals and carrier frequencies may make GNSS equipment more susceptible to interference as well. Clearly, these developments will need to be carefully assessed to support the establishment of GPS spectrum interference standards.

    Summary

    This article has identified a number of considerations for the development of GPS interference standards, which have been proposed by the PNT EXCOM. If the United States proceeds with the development of such standards, it is hoped that the information within this article will prove useful to those involved.

    Bow highrise under construction in Calgary, showing GPS receivers in use ( . photos courtesy Rocky Annett, MMM Group Ltd.) .Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    Bow highrise under construction in Calgary, showing GPS receivers in use (photos courtesy Rocky Annett, MMM Group Ltd.)
    Bow highrise under construction in Calgary, showing GPS receivers in use (photos courtesy Rocky Annett, MMM Group Ltd.) . Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    (Photo courtesy of Rocky Annett, MMM Group Ltd.)
    Bow highrise under construction in Calgary, showing GPS receivers in use (photos courtesy Rocky Annett, MMM Group Ltd.) . Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty
    (Photo courtesy of Rocky Annett, MMM Group Ltd.)

     

    Appendix: AGL Heights of CORS Network Sites

    The National Geodetic Survey Continuously Operating Reference Station (CORS) website provides lists of CORS site locations in a number of different reference frames. To determine the height above ground level (Screen shot 2013-01-07 at 12.35.25 PM . Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty) for each site within this study, two of these files (igs08_xyz_comp.txt and igs08_xyz_htdp.txt) were used. These two files provide the (x,y,z) coordinates of the antenna reference point (ARP) for each site in the International GNSS Service 2008 (IGS08) reference frame, which is consistent with the International Terrestrial Reference Frame (ITRF) of 2008. These coordinates are divided into two files by NGS, since the site listings also provide site velocities and velocities are either computed (for sites that have produced data for at least 2.5 years) or estimated (for newer sites). The comp file includes sites with computed velocities and the htdp file includes sites with estimated velocities (using a NGS program known as HTDP).

    The data files can be used to readily produce height above the ellipsoid, Screen shot 2013-01-07 at 12.35.17 PM .  Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty, for each site. This height can be found using well-known equations to convert from (x, y, z) to (latitude, longitude, height). Obtaining estimates of Screen shot 2013-01-07 at 12.35.25 PM . Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty requires information on the geoid height and terrain data, per the relationship:

    Screen shot 2013-01-07 at 12.35.31 PM .Credit: Christopher J. Hegarty  (A-1)

    For the results presented in this article, terrain data was obtained from http://earthexplorer.usgs.gov in the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Level 2 format. For this terrain data, the horizontal datum is the World Geodetic System (WGS 84). The vertical datum is Mean Sea Level (MSL) as determined by the Earth Gravitational Model (EGM) 1996. Each data file covers a 1º by 1º degree cell in latitude/longitude, and individual points are spaced 1 arcsec in both latitude and longitude. The SRTM DTED Level 2 has a system design 16 meter absolute vertical height accuracy, 10 meters relative vertical height accuracy, and 20 meter absolute horizontal circular accuracy. All accuracies are at the 90 percent level. Considering the accuracies of the DTED data, the differences between WGS-84 and IGS08 as well as between the ARP and antenna phase center were considered negligible. Geoid heights were interpolated from 15-arcmin data available in the MATLAB Mapping Toolbox using the egm96geoid function.

    Lower AGL heights are preferred for CORS sites to minimize motion between the antenna and the Earth’s crust. However, many sites are at significant heights above the ground by necessity, particularly in urban areas due to the competing desire for good sky visibility.


    Christopher J. Hegarty is the director for communications, navigation, and surveillance engineering and spectrum with The MITRE Corporation. He received a D.Sc. degree in electrical engineering from George Washington University. He is currently the chair of the Program Management Committee of the RTCA, Inc., and co-chairs RTCA Special Committee 159 (GNSS). He is the co-editor/co-author of the textbook Understanding GPS: Principles and Applications, 2nd Edition.

     

  • Innovation: Getting at the Truth

    Innovation: Getting at the Truth

    A Civilian GPS Position Authentication System

    By Zhefeng Li and Demoz Gebre-Egziabher

    GPS World photo
    INNOVATION INSIGHTS by Richard Langley

    MY UNIVERSITY, the University of New Brunswick, is one of the few institutes of higher learning still using Latin at its graduation exercises. The president and vice-chancellor of the university asks the members of the senate and board of governors present “Placetne vobis Senatores, placetne, Gubernatores, ut hi supplicatores admittantur?” (Is it your pleasure, Senators, is it your pleasure, Governors, that these supplicants be admitted?). In the Oxford tradition, a supplicant is a student who has qualified for their degree but who has not yet been admitted to it. Being a UNB senator, I was familiar with this usage of the word supplicant. But I was a little surprised when I first read a draft of the article in this month’s Innovation column with its use of the word supplicant to describe the status of a GPS receiver.

    If we look up the definition of supplicant in a dictionary, we find that it is “a person who makes a humble or earnest plea to another, especially to a person in power or authority.” Clearly, that describes our graduating students. But what has it got to do with a GPS receiver? Well, it seems that the word supplicant has been taken up by engineers developing protocols for computer communication networks and with a similar meaning. In this case, a supplicant (a computer or rather some part of its operating system) at one end of a secure local area network seeks authentication to join the network by submitting credentials to the authenticator on the other end. If authentication is successful, the computer is allowed to join the network. The concept of supplicant and authenticator is used, for example, in the IEEE 802.1X standard for port-based network access control.

    Which brings us to GPS. When a GPS receiver reports its position to a monitoring center using a radio signal of some kind, how do we know that the receiver or its associated communications unit is telling the truth? It’s not that difficult to generate false position reports and mislead the monitoring center into believing the receiver is located elsewhere — unless an authentication procedure is used. In this month’s column, we look at the development of a clever system that uses the concept of supplicant and authenticator to assess the truthfulness of position reports.


    “Innovation” is a regular feature that discusses advances in GPS technology andits applications as well as the fundamentals of GPS positioning. The column is coordinated by Richard Langley of the Department of Geodesy and Geomatics Engineering, University of New Brunswick. He welcomes comments and topic ideas. Contact him at lang @ unb.ca.


    This article deals with the problem of position authentication. The term “position authentication” as discussed in this article is taken to mean the process of checking whether position reports made by a remote user are truthful (Is the user where they say they are?) and accurate (In reality, how close is a remote user to the position they are reporting?). Position authentication will be indispensable to many envisioned civilian applications. For example, in the national airspace of the future, some traffic control services will be based on self-reported positions broadcast via ADS-B by each aircraft. Non-aviation applications where authentication will be required include tamper-free shipment tracking and smart-border systems to enhance cargo inspection procedures at commercial ports of entry. The discussions that follow are the outgrowth of an idea first presented by Sherman Lo and colleagues at Stanford University (see Further Reading).

    For illustrative purposes, we will focus on the terrestrial application of cargo tracking. Most of the commercial fleet and asset tracking systems available in the market today depend on a GPS receiver installed on the cargo or asset. The GPS receiver provides real-time location (and, optionally, velocity) information. The location and the time when the asset was at a particular location form the tracking message, which is sent back to a monitoring center to verify if the asset is traveling in an expected manner. This method of tracking is depicted graphically in FIGURE 1.

    FIGURE 1. A typical asset tracking system. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 1. A typical asset tracking system.

    The approach shown in Figure 1 has at least two potential scenarios or fault modes, which can lead to erroneous tracking of the asset. The first scenario occurs when an incorrect position solution is calculated as a result of GPS RF signal abnormalities (such as GPS signal spoofing). The second scenario occurs when the correct position solution is calculated but the tracking message is tampered with during the transmission from the asset being tracked to the monitoring center. The first scenario is a falsification of the sensor and the second scenario is a falsification of the transmitted position report.

    The purpose of this article is to examine the problem of detecting sensor or report falsification at the monitoring center. We discuss an authentication system utilizing the white-noise-like spreading codes of GPS to calculate an authentic position based on a snapshot of raw IF signal from the receiver.

    Using White Noise as a Watermark

    The features for GPS position authentication should be very hard to reproduce and unique to different locations and time. In this case, the authentication process is reduced to detecting these features and checking if these features satisfy some time and space constraints. The features are similar to the well-designed watermarks used to detect counterfeit currency.

    A white-noise process that is superimposed on the GPS signal would be a perfect watermark signal in the sense that it is impossible reproduce and predict. FIGURE 2 is an abstraction that shows how the above idea of a superimposed white-noise process would work in the signal authentication problem. The system has one transmitter, Tx , and two receivers, Rs and Ra. Rs is the supplicant and Ra is the authenticator. The task of the authenticator is to determine whether the supplicant is using a signal from Tx or is being spoofed by a malicious transmitter, Tm. Ra is the trusted source, which gets a copy of the authentic signal, Vx(t) (that is, the signal transmitted by Tx). The snapshot signal, Vs(t), received at Rs is sent to the trusted agent to compare with the signal, Va(t), received at Ra. Every time a verification is performed, the snapshot signal from Rs is compared with a piece of the signal from Ra. If these two pieces of signal match, we can say the snapshot signal from Rs was truly transmitted from Tx. For the white-noise signal, match detection is accomplished via a cross-correlation operation (see Further Reading). The cross-correlation between one white-noise signal and any other signal is always zero. Only when the correlation is between the signal and its copy will the correlation have a non-zero value. So a non-zero correlation means a match. The time when the correlation peak occurs provides additional information about the distance between Ra and Rs.

    Unfortunately, generation of a white-noise watermark template based on a mathematical model is impossible. But, as we will see, there is an easy-to-use alternative.

    FIGURE 2. Architecture to detect a snapshot of a white-noise signal. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 2. Architecture to detect a snapshot of a white-noise signal.

    An Intrinsic GPS Watermark

    The RF carrier broadcast by each GPS satellite is modulated by the coarse/acquisition (C/A) code, which is known and which can be processed by all users, and the encrypted P(Y) code, which can be decoded and used by Department of Defense (DoD) authorized users only. Both civilians and DoD-authorized users see the same signal. To commercial GPS receivers, the P(Y) code appears as uncorrelated noise. Thus, as discussed above, this noise can be used as a watermark, which uniquely encodes locations and times. In a typical civilian GPS receiver’s tracking loop, this watermark signal can be found inside the tracking loop quadrature signal.

    The position authentication approach discussed here is based on using the P(Y) signal to determine whether a user is utilizing an authentic GPS signal. This method uses a segment of noisy P(Y) signal collected by a trusted user (the authenticator) as a watermark template. Another user’s (the supplicant’s) GPS signal can be compared with the template signal to judge if the user’s position and time reports are authentic. Correlating the supplicant’s signal with the authenticator’s copy of the signal recorded yields a correlation peak, which serves as a watermark. An absent correlation peak means the GPS signal provided by the supplicant is not genuine. A correlation peak that occurs earlier or later than predicted (based on the supplicant’s reported position) indicates a false position report.

    System Architecture

    FIGURE 3 is a high-level architecture of our proposed position authentication system. In practice, we need a short snapshot of the raw GPS IF signal from the supplicant. This piece of the signal is the digitalized, down-converted, IF signal before the tracking loops of a generic GPS receiver. Another piece of information needed from the supplicant is the position solution and GPS Time calculated using only the C/A signal. The raw IF signal and the position message are transmitted to the authentication center by any data link (using a cell-phone data network, Wi-Fi, or other means).

    FIGURE 3. Architecture of position authentication system. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 3. Architecture of position authentication system.

    The authentication station keeps track of all the common satellites seen by both the authenticator and the supplicant. Every common satellite’s watermark signal is then obtained from the authenticator’s tracking loop. These watermark signals are stored in a signal database. Meanwhile, the pseudorange between the authenticator and every satellite is also calculated and is stored in the same database.

    When the authentication station receives the data from the supplicant, it converts the raw IF signal into the quadrature (Q) channel signals. Then the supplicant’s Q channel signal is used to perform the cross-correlation with the watermark signal in the database. If the correlation peak is found at the expected time, the supplicant’s signal passes the signal-authentication test. By measuring the relative peak time of every common satellite, a position can be computed. The position authentication involves comparing the reported position of the supplicant to this calculated position. If the difference between two positions is within a pre-determined range, the reported position passes the position authentication.

    While in principle it is straightforward to do authentication as described above, in practice there are some challenges that need to be addressed. For example, when there is only one common satellite, the only common signal in the Q channel signals is this common satellite’s P(Y) signal. So the cross-correlation only has one peak. If there are two or more common satellites, the common signals in the Q channel signals include not only the P(Y) signals but also C/A signals. Then the cross-correlation result will have multiple peaks. We call this problem the C/A leakage problem, which will be addressed below.

    C/A Residual Filter

    The C/A signal energy in the GPS signal is about double the P(Y) signal energy. So the C/A false peaks are higher than the true peak. The C/A false peaks repeat every 1 millisecond. If the C/A false peaks occur, they are greater than the true peak in both number and strength. Because of background noise, it is hard to identify the true peak from the correlation result corrupted by the C/A residuals.

    To deal with this problem, a high-pass filter can be used. Alternatively, because the C/A code is known, a match filter can be designed to filter out any given GPS satellite’s C/A signal from the Q channel signal used for detection. However, this implies that one match filter is needed for every common satellite simultaneously in view of the authenticator and supplicant. This can be cumbersome and, thus, the filtering approach is pursued here.

    In the frequency domain, the energy of the base-band C/A signal is mainly (56 percent) within a ±1.023 MHz band, while the energy of the base-band P(Y) signal is spread over a wider band of ±10.23 MHz. A high-pass filter can be applied to Q channel signals to filter out the signal energy in the ±1.023 MHz band. In this way, all satellites’ C/A signal energy can be attenuated by one filter rather than using separate match filters for different satellites.

    FIGURE 4 is the frequency response of a high-pass filter designed to filter out the C/A signal energy. The spectrum of the C/A signal is also plotted in the figure. The high-pass filter only removes the main lobe of the C/A signals. Unfortunately, the high-pass filter also attenuates part of the P(Y) signal energy. This degrades the auto-correlation peak of the P(Y) signal. Even though the gain of the high-pass filter is the same for both the C/A and the P(Y) signals, this effect on their auto-correlation is different. That is because the percentage of the low-frequency energy of the C/A signal is much higher than that of the P(Y) signal. This, however, is not a significant drawback as it may appear initially. To see why this is so, note that the objective of the high-pass filter is to obtain the greatest false-peak rejection ratio defined to be the ratio between the peak value of P(Y) auto-correlation and that of the C/A auto-correlation. The false-peak rejection ratio of the non-filtered signals is 0.5. Therefore, all one has to do is adjust the cut-off frequency of the high-pass filter to achieve a desired false-peak rejection ratio.

    FIGURE 4. Frequency response of the notch filter. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 4. Frequency response of the notch filter.

    The simulation results in FIGURE 5 show that one simple high-pass filter rather than multiple match filters can be designed to achieve an acceptable false-peak rejection ratio. The auto-correlation peak value of the filtered C/A signal and that of the filtered P(Y) signal is plotted in the figure. While the P(Y) signal is attenuated by about 25 percent, the C/A code signal is attenuated by 91.5 percent (the non-filtered C/A auto-correlation peak is 2). The false-peak rejection ratio is boosted from 0.5 to 4.36 by using the appropriate high-pass filter.

    FIGURE 5. Auto-correlation of the filtered C/A and P(Y) signals. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 5. Auto-correlation of the filtered C/A and P(Y) signals.

    Position Calculation

    Consider the situation depicted in FIGURE 6 where the authenticator and the supplicant have multiple common satellites in view. In this case, not only can we perform the signal authentication but also obtain an estimate of the pseudorange information from the authentication. Thus, the authenticated pseudorange information can be further used to calculate the supplicant’s position if we have at least three estimates of pseudoranges between the supplicant and GPS satellites. Since this position solution of the supplicant is based on the P(Y) watermark signal rather than the supplicant’s C/A signal, it is an independent and authentic solution of the supplicant’s position. By comparing this authentic position with the reported position of the supplicant, we can authenticate the veracity of the supplicant’s reported GPS position.

    FIGURE 6. Positioning using a watermark signal. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 6. Positioning using a watermark signal.

    The situation shown in Figure 6 is very similar to double-difference differential GPS. The major difference between what is shown in the figure and the traditional double difference is how the differential ranges are calculated. Figure 6 shows how the range information can be obtained during the signal authentication process. Let us assume that the authenticator and the supplicant have four common GPS satellites in view: SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and SAT4. The signals transmitted from the satellites at time t are S1(t), S2(t), S3(t), and S4(t), respectively. Suppose a signal broadcast by SAT1 at time t0 arrives at the supplicant at t0 + ν1s where ν1s is the travel time of the signal. At the same time, signals from SAT2, SAT3, and SAT4 are received by the supplicant. Let us denote the travel time of these signals as ν2s, ν3s, and ν4s, respectively. These same signals will be also received at the authenticator. We will denote the travel times for the signals from satellite to authenticator as ν1a, ν2a, ν3a, and ν4a. The signal at a receiver’s antenna is the superposition of the signals from all the satellites. This is shown in FIGURE 7 where a snapshot of the signal received at the supplicant’s antenna at time t0 + ν1s includes GPS signals from SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and SAT4. Note that even though the arrival times of these signals are the same, their transmit times (that is, the times they were broadcast from the satellites) are different because the ranges are different. The signals received at the supplicant will be S1(t0), S2(t0 + ν1sν2s), S3(t0 + ν1sν3s), and S4(t0 + ν1sν4s). This same snapshot of the signals at the supplicant is used to detect the matched watermark signals from SAT1, SAT2, SAT3, and SAT4 at the authenticator. Thus the correlation peaks between the supplicant’s and the authenticator’s signal should occur at t0 + ν1a, t0 + ν1sν2s + ν2a, t0 + ν1sν3s + ν3a, and t0 + ν1sν4s + ν4a.

    Referring to Figure 6 again, suppose the authenticator’s position (xa, ya, za) is known but the supplicant’s position (xs, ys, zs) is unknown and needs to be determined. Because the actual ith common satellite (xi , yi , zi ) is also known to the authenticator, each of the ρia, the pseudorange between the ith satellite and the authenticator, is known. If ρis is the pseudorange to the ith satellite measured at the supplicant, the pseudoranges and the time difference satisfies equation (1):

    ρ2s ρ1s= ρ2aρ1act21 + 21      (1)

    where χ21 is the differential range error primarily due to tropospheric and ionospheric delays. In addition, c is the speed of light, and t21 is the measured time difference as shown in Figure 7. Finally, ρis for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is given by:

    I-Eq-2 Source: Richard Langley  (2)

    FIGURE 7. Relative time delays constrained by positions. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 7. Relative time delays constrained by positions.

    If more than four common satellites are in view between the supplicant and authenticator, equation (1) can be used to form a system of equations in three unknowns. The unknowns are the components of the supplicant’s position vector rs = [xs, ys, zs]T. This equation can be linearized and then solved using least-squares techniques. When linearized, the equations have the following form:

    Aδrs= δm       (3)

    where δrs = [δxs,δys,δzs]T, which is the estimation error of the supplicant’s position. The matrix A is given by

    I-MatrixA Source: Richard Langley

    where I-ei is the line of sight vector from the supplicant to the ith satellite. Finally, the vector δm is given by:

    I-Eq-4 Source: Richard Langley(4)

    where δri is the ith satellite’s position error, δρia is the measurement error of pseudorange ρia or pseudorange noise. In addition, δtij is the time difference error. Finally, δχij is the error of χij defined earlier.

    Equation (3) is in a standard form that can be solved by a weighted least-squares method. The solution is

    δrs = ( AT R-1 A)-1 AT R-1δm     (5)

    where R is the covariance matrix of the measurement error vector δm. From equations (3) and (5), we can see that the supplicant’s position accuracy depends on both the geometry and the measurement errors.

    Hardware and Software

    In what follows, we describe an authenticator which is designed to capture the GPS raw signals and to test the performance of the authentication method described above. Since we are relying on the P(Y) signal for authentication, the GPS receivers used must have an RF front end with at least a 20-MHz bandwidth. Furthermore, they must be coupled with a GPS antenna with a similar bandwidth. The RF front end must also have low noise. This is because the authentication method uses a noisy piece of the P(Y) signal at the authenticator as a template to detect if that P(Y) piece exists in the supplicant’s raw IF signal. Thus, the detection is very sensitive to the noise in both the authenticator and the supplicant signals. Finally, the sampling of the down-converted and digitized RF signal must be done at a high rate because the positioning accuracy depends on the accuracy of the pseudorange reconstructed by the authenticator. The pseudorange is calculated from the time-difference measurement. The accuracy of this time difference depends on the sampling frequency to digitize the IF signal. The high sampling frequency means high data bandwidth after the sampling.

    The authenticator designed for this work and shown in FIGURE 8 satisfies the above requirements. A block diagram of the authenticator is shown in Figure 8a and the constructed unit in Figure 8b. The IF signal processing unit in the authenticator is based on the USRP N210 software-defined radio. It offers the function of down converting, digitalization, and data transmission. The firmware and field-programmable-gate-array configuration in the USRP N210 are modified to integrate a software automatic gain control and to increase the data transmission efficiency. The sampling frequency is 100 MHz and the effective resolution of the analog-to-digital conversion is 6 bits. The authenticator is battery powered and can operate for up to four hours at full load.

    FIGURE 8a. Block diagram of GPS position authenticator. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 8a. Block diagram of GPS position authenticator.

    Performance Validation

    Next, we present results demonstrating the performance of the authenticator described above. First, we present results that show we can successfully deal with the C/A leakage problem using the simple high-pass filter. We do this by performing a correlation between snapshots of signal collected from the authenticator and a second USRP N210 software-defined radio. FIGURE 9a is the correlation result without the high-pass filter. The periodic peaks in the result have a period of 1 millisecond and are a graphic representation of the C/A leakage problem. Because of noise, these peaks do not have the same amplitude. FIGURE 9b shows the correlation result using the same data snapshot as in Figure 9a. The difference is that Figure 9b uses the high-pass filter to attenuate the false peaks caused by the C/A signal residual. Only one peak appears in this result as expected and, thus, confirms the analysis given earlier.

    FIGURE 9a. Example of cross-correlation detection results without high-pass filter. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 9a. Example of cross-correlation detection results without high-pass filter.
    FIGURE 9b. Example of cross-correlation with high-pass filter. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 9b. Example of cross-correlation with high-pass filter.

    We performed an experiment to validate the authentication performance. In this experiment, the authenticator and the supplicant were separated by about 1 mile (about 1.6 kilometers). The location of the authenticator was fixed. The supplicant was then sequentially placed at five points along a straight line. The distance between two adjacent points is about 15 meters. The supplicant was in an open area with no tall buildings or structures. Therefore, a sufficient number of satellites were in view and multipath, if any, was minimal. The locations of the five test points are shown in FIGURE 10.

    FIGURE 10. Five-point field test. Image courtesy of Google. Source: Richard Langley
    FIGURE 10. Five-point field test. Image courtesy of Google.

    The first step of this test was to place the supplicant at point A and collect a 40-millisecond snippet of data. This data was then processed by the authenticator to determine if:

    • The signal contained the watermark. We call this the “signal authentication test.” It determines whether a genuine GPS signal is being used to form the supplicant’s position report.
    • The supplicant is actually at the position coordinates that they say they are. We call this the “position authentication test.” It determines whether or not falsification of the position report is being attempted.

    Next, the supplicant was moved to point B. However, in this instance, the supplicant reports that it is still located at point A. That is, it makes a false position report. This is repeated for the remaining positions (C through E) where at each point the supplicant reports that it is located at point A. That is, the supplicant continues to make false position reports.

    In this experiment, we have five common satellites between the supplicant (at all of the test points A to E) and the authenticator. The results of the experiment are summarized in TABLE 1. If we can detect a strong peak for every common satellite, we say this point passes the signal authentication test (and note “Yes” in second column of Table 1). That means the supplicant’s raw IF signal has the watermark signal from every common satellite. Next, we perform the position authentication test. This test tries to determine whether the supplicant is at the position it claims to be. If we determine that the position of the supplicant is inconsistent with its reported position, we say that the supplicant has failed the position authentication test. In this case we put a “No” in the third column of Table 1. As we can see from Table 1, the performance of the authenticator is consistent with the test setup. That is, even though the wrong positions of points (B, C, D, E) are reported, the authenticator can detect the inconsistency between the reported position and the raw IF data. Furthermore, since the distance between two adjacent points is 15 meters, this implies that resolution of the position authentication is at or better than 15 meters. While we have not tested it, based on the timing resolution used in the system, we believe resolutions better than 12 meters are achievable.

    Table 1. Five-point position authentication results. Source: Richard Langley
    Table 1. Five-point position authentication results.

    Conclusion

    In this article, we have described a GPS position authentication system. The authentication system has many potential applications where high credibility of a position report is required, such as cargo and asset tracking. The system detects a specific watermark signal in the broadcast GPS signal to judge if a receiver is using the authentic GPS signal. The differences between the watermark signal travel times are constrained by the positions of the GPS satellites and the receiver. A method to calculate an authentic position using this constraint is discussed and is the basis for the position authentication function of the system. A hardware platform that accomplishes this was developed using a software-defined radio. Experimental results demonstrate that this authentication methodology is sound and has a resolution of better than 15 meters. This method can also be used with other GNSS systems provided that watermark signals can be found. For example, in the Galileo system, the encrypted Public Regulated Service signal is a candidate for a watermark signal.

    In closing, we note that before any system such as ours is fielded, its performance with respect to metrics such as false alarm rates (How often do we flag an authentic position report as false?) and missed detection probabilities (How often do we fail to detect false position reports?) must be quantified. Thus, more analysis and experimental validation is required.

    Acknowledgments

    The authors acknowledge the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for supporting the work reported in this article through the National Center for Border Security and Immigration under grant number 2008-ST-061-BS0002. However, any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect views of the DHS. This article is based on the paper “Performance Analysis of a Civilian GPS Position Authentication System” presented at PLANS 2012, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers / Institute of Navigation Position, Location and Navigation Symposium held in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, April 23–26, 2012.

    Manufacturers

    The GPS position authenticator uses an Ettus Research LLC model USRP N210 software-defined radio with a DBSRX2 RF daughterboard.


    Zhefeng Li is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Aerospace Engineering and Mechanics at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. His research interests include GPS signal processing, real-time implementation of signal processing algorithms, and the authentication methods for civilian GNSS systems.

    Demoz Gebre-Egziabher is an associate professor in the Department of Aerospace Engineering and Mechanics at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. His research deals with the design of multi-sensor navigation and attitude determination systems for aerospace vehicles ranging from small unmanned aerial vehicles to Earth-orbiting satellites.


    FURTHER READING

    • Authors’ Proceedings Paper

    “Performance Analysis of a Civilian GPS Position Authentication System” by Z. Li and D. Gebre-Egziabher in Proceedings of PLANS 2012, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers / Institute of Navigation Position, Location and Navigation Symposium, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, April 23–26, 2012, pp. 1028–1041.

    • Previous Work on GNSS Signal and Position Authentication

    Signal Authentication in Trusted Satellite Navigation Receivers” by M.G. Kuhn in Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security edited by A.-R. Sadeghi and D. Naccache, Springer, Heidelberg, 2010.

    Signal Authentication: A Secure Civil GNSS for Today” by S. Lo, D. D. Lorenzo, P. Enge, D. Akos, and P. Bradley in Inside GNSS, Vol. 4, No. 5, September/October 2009, pp. 30–39.

    “Location Assurance” by L. Scott in GPS World, Vol. 18, No. 7, July 2007, pp. 14–18.

    “Location Assistance Commentary” by T.A. Stansell in GPS World, Vol. 18, No. 7, July 2007, p. 19.

    • Autocorrelation and Cross-correlation of Periodic Sequences

    “Crosscorrelation Properties of Pseudorandom and Related Sequences” by D.V. Sarwate and M.B. Pursley in Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 68, No. 5, May 1980, pp. 593–619, doi: 10.1109/PROC.1980.11697. Corrigendum: “Correction to ‘Crosscorrelation Properties of Pseudorandom and Related  Sequences’” by D.V. Sarwate and M.B. Pursley in Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 68, No. 12, December 1980, p. 1554, doi: 10.1109/PROC.1980.11910.

    • Software-Defined Radio for GNSS

    Software GNSS Receiver: An Answer for Precise Positioning Research” by T. Pany, N. Falk, B. Riedl, T. Hartmann, G. Stangle, and C. Stöber in GPS World, Vol. 23, No. 9, September 2012, pp. 60–66.

    Digital Satellite Navigation and Geophysics: A Practical Guide with GNSS Signal Simulator and Receiver Laboratory by I.G. Petrovski and T. Tsujii with foreword by R.B. Langley, published by Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2012.

    Simulating GPS Signals: It Doesn’t Have to Be Expensive” by A. Brown, J. Redd, and M.-A. Hutton in GPS World, Vol. 23, No. 5, May 2012, pp. 44–50.

    A Software-Defined GPS and Galileo Receiver: A Single-Frequency Approach by K. Borre, D.M. Akos, N. Bertelsen, P. Rinder, and S.H. Jensen, published by Birkhäuser, Boston, 2007.

  • Galileo and Compass: A Tale of Also-Runnings

    Beating up the backstretch neck and neck, tied for third in the GNSS race, Galileo and Compass today offer some signals and some satellites to GNSS users — as long as those users are researchers. Galileo has more going for it in the way of signals, while Compass holds an edge in the number of satellites. Without an interface control document (ICD) to guide user/researchers and most importantly manufacturers in the employment of its signals, Compass satellites, however they may increase, are practically useless to anyone outside China. A Compass ICD has been rumored before and is now rumored again. Wait and see before placing your bets.

    The fourth Galileo in-orbit validation (IOV) satellite, Flight Model 4 (FM4), began transmitting signals on December 12, joining its co-launched confrère FM3, which began airing navigation signals on December 1. The FM4 spacecraft uses PRN code E20. As of this writing, FM3 is broadcasting E1, E5, and E6 signals, and FM4 is  broadcasting E1 and E5 signals; we don’t know if and when FM4 E6 signals start(ed) until ESA tells us.

    GPS World authors Oliver Montenbruck (German Space Operations Center) and Richard Langley (University of New Brunswick) have written an early analysis of the signals from FM3; this account will appear in the January issue of the magazine. A few selected excerpts from that article, and one figure:

    “Anyone with commonly available GNSS receivers can presently access the open signals in the E1, E5a, and E5b frequency bands as well as the wide-band E5 AltBOC signal.

    Source: GPS
    Figure 1: Pseudorange errors of IOV-3 tracking at Tanegashima, Japan, using the E1 BOC(1,1) signal (top) and the E5 AltBOC signal (center). The elevation angle over time is shown in the bottom panel.

    “According to an ESA statement, FM3will continue to use binary offset carrier modulation — specifically BOC(1,1) — on the E1 Open Service signals for the time being. In contrast to this, the first pair of IOV satellites has already started to use composite binary offset carrier modulation, which offers better multipath suppression in the received signal.

    “The E5 AltBOC pseudorange measurements in particular exhibit an exceptionally low noise and multipath level of better than 10 centimeters at mid- and high-elevation angles.”

    After discussing and displaying some carrier-phase measurements of the Galileo FM3 E1, E5, and E6 signals, Montenbruck and Langley conclude; “This level of performance highlights the potential benefit of Galileo signals in advanced triple-frequency techniques such as undifferenced ambiguity resolution and ionospheric monitoring.”

    Theoretically, the total of four Galileo IOV satellites now in medium-Earth orbit yield the minimum number needed to perform a 3D navigation fix, although no statement of initial — or even sketchy — operating capability has been issued by the European Space Agency (ESA), nor is one expected.

    Antonio Tajani, vice-president of the European Commission (EC) and head of the EC directorate-general responsible for industry and entrepreneurship, continues to publicly maintain a “political objective [of] the delivery of the first services before the end of 2014,” based on 18 orbiting satellites. In a December speech, he revised the basis for that position slightly to say the civil Open Service (OS) could be declared operational with as few as 12 satellites.

    The system operators had announced three dual-satellite launches in 2013, two dual-satellite launches and one four-satellite launch in 2014, hypothetically producing an operable constellation of 18 satellites by the end of the promised 2014. However, unconfirmed reports from Europe suggest that problems with manufacture of the next set of 14 Galileo satellites mean that no launches at all will take place until Q4 of 2013. Whether this will push out the service delivery date beyond 2014 or not remains open to conjecture.

    Compass

    Another matter open to conjecture and much speculation is whether the world will soon — or ever — see an interface control document (ICD) for China’s Compass system.  More than a year ago, I wrote that “The ICD has been rumored to be available previously to receiver manufacturers within China, creating some disgruntlement among companies outside the country . . .  GPS/Compass chips and receivers are being actively developed by many Chinese manufacturers and research institutes.”  Indeed, conference presentations, leading to a published article in this magazine’s October issue, “What Is Achievable with the Current Compass Constellation,“ confirm that this is so.

    And yet, the rest of the world neither has nor holds a Compass ICD.

    The end-of-year rumor mill has kicked into gear again, though. A GNSS industry representative stationed in Shanghai, China sent this message recently to a U.S. colleague: “Latest unofficial news said that the Compass Interface Control Document (ICD) will be released on 27th this month, and will be available on the internet on 28th.”

    We shall see what we shall see.

  • Avenza Releases MAPublisher 9.1 for Adobe Illustrator

    New ability to export HTML5 web maps and enhanced MAPublisher LabelPro features.

    Avenza Systems Inc., producers of the PDF Maps app for iOS and geospatial plugins for Adobe Creative Suite, including Geographic Imager for Adobe Photoshop, has released  MAPublisher 9.1 for Adobe Illustrator.  MAP Web Author now has the ability to export HTML5 web maps (in addition to the already available Flash output), which are suitable for mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones. In addition, the MAPublisher LabelPro extension has been updated to include the ability to use label filters and expressions for even more detailed labeling as well as a redesigned and more flexible user interface.

    “MAPublisher 9.1  now supports the export of HTML5 web maps. We’ve seen a growth in online mapping and the upward trend of using HTML5 technology to make websites more interactive and interesting. More importantly, map makers and webdesigners alike can extend their HTML5 web maps to smartphone and tablet browsers without the need for additional plug-ins,” said Ted Florence, President of Avenza. “With this new version, we are seeing increased labeling performance, detail, and flexibility.”

    Enhancements and new features of MAPublisher 9.1: MAP Web Author HTML5 export; MAPublisher LabelPro redesigned interface, new label filters feature, and improved performance; Various user interface and performance enhancements to improve usability

    MAPublisher for Adobe Illustrator is powerful map production software for creating cartographic-quality maps from GIS data. MAPublisher tools leverage the superior graphics design capabilities of Adobe Illustrator to manipulate GIS data and to produce high-quality maps with accuracy and efficiency.

  • SuperGIS Engine 3.1 Beta Version Released

    SuperGeo’s beta version of SuperGIS Engine 3.1, the collection of COM GIS components for customizing GIS applications, is now available.

    Integrating with map and GIS technologies, SuperGIS Engine 3.1 is the collection of COM-based components developed by SuperGeo. As the product of core components in SuperGIS series software provided for developers, SuperGIS Engine 3.1 can be embedded into programming language under Windows developing environment to integrate with other systems and enhance efficiency of system developing.

    SuperGIS Engine 3.1 provides 32-bit and 64-bit developing components that enable developers to develop GIS applications they need in common development environments such as Visual Studio 2005/2008/2010 Visual Basic, VB.NET, Visual C# and so on.

    Furthermore, SuperGIS Engine contains hundreds of GIS-related objects that allow developers to customize various applications elastically and achieve diverse GIS manipulation functions like layers overlaying, map viewing and querying, geoprocessing, etc.

    SuperGIS Engine 3.1 Beta is released. Users, who are interested in SuperGIS Engine 3.1, please visit SuperGeo website: http://www.supergeotek.com/ProductPage_SE.aspx , or contact us with e-mail: [email protected] .

  • Hexagon Acquires GTA Geoinformatik for 3D City Modelling

    Hexagon AB has acquired the business of GTA Geoinformatik GmbH, a pioneer in georeferenced virtual 3D city models and building reconstructions.

    Founded in 1995, GTA Geoinformatik is the developer of tridicon software, which enables the automatic generation of high-quality, colored 3D point clouds. The company also specialises in uniting point cloud data with aerial images including oblique and LiDAR images to create intelligent, navigable 3D city models, or smart cities.

    “The idea of creating a smart city has been an important part of Hexagon’s geospatial vision to merge maps with information and real-time updates,” said Hexagon President and CEO Ola Rollén. “Solutions such as those GTA Geoinformatik delivers are becoming increasingly important, as they build the foundation for industry-specific applications in areas of city development such as security, traffic, infrastructure management, energy and emergency response.”

    GTA Geoinformatik, based in Berlin and Neubrandenburg, Germany, is now fully consolidated. The acquisition will not have any visible impact on Hexagon’s earnings in the short-term, according to the company.

  • Human Geography at GEOINT

    Could the Connecticut Shootings Speed Human Geography Tools?

    By Art Kalinski, GISP

    During the past few days there has been a stream of talking heads offering advice after the tragic shooting in Newtown, Connecticut.  Some want schools to have airport like screening equipment with full time police officers, others want more aggressive psychological counseling, while others want to ban some or all guns.  Just last August, Norwegian mass killer Anders Breivik was sentenced to 21 years after his 2011 killing of 8 with a car bomb and 69 students in a summer camp with semi-automatic weapons.  That, in a country with some of the strictest gun laws in the world.  So what’s the answer?  I’m not sure but I lean toward more conceal and carry permits.  The cause and effect may only be statistical, but the numbers seem to show less crime where conceal carry permits are common.  Most bullies and killers fear someone fighting back so they almost always pick soft targets.

    There is another possible, longer term path that has the potential to be very beneficial and possibly very sinister, Human Geography.  In the early days of GIS I was thrilled to be able to print a simple zip code map with points plotted within the zip code to measure and display demographic data.  In the mid nineties, when I was the GIS manager of the Atlanta Regional Commission, my GIS team was able to help the Atlanta Fire Department catch a serial arsonist by mapping the arson locations and comparing that distribution to home addresses of know past arsonists.  Although not a perfect match, the plots did help identify and ultimately convict the arsonist.

    We are now well beyond points, lines, and polygons GIS.  Today I use my cell phone for navigation, voice directions as well as a street-level imagery of my destination along with photos, video and hundreds of other web based applications.  The same progress has occurred in the intelligence community as maps, imagery, live video, and “other” sources of information have been merged using “Geospatial Multi-INT fusion” to build pattern of life analysis with the potential to anticipate harmful actions.

    One of those “other” sources of data is social media and human geography which had its genesis with Web 2.0.  The term Web 2.0 was coined in 1999 to describe web sites that use technology beyond the static pages of earlier web sites.  It was not a new version of the World Wide Web but referred to the way web sites evolved to allow users to interact and collaborate with each other such as social networking sites, blogs, etc.  Although the US and Europe lead the world in use of social media, Second and Third World countries also have a strong user base of social media.  Most Third World countries never went through the long technology slog we went through laying miles of phone land lines as the technology evolved.  Many of them went direct to cell-phone technology, bypassing the expense and effort of land lines.  As a result, social media plays a surprisingly strong role in countries that still have limited mass media access.

    It’s no surprise that there was an increase in the number of human geography presentations and exhibitors at GEOINT.

    Geoint 2012 panel 

    There was even a pre-conference day devoted exclusively to Human Geography.  The following is a limited snapshot of exhibitors I saw that focused on human geography and social media.  Most of the big players such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, BAE, SAIC and others have been doing significant work in these areas but the below are small companies that focus exclusively on human geography.

    Aptima (www.aptima.com/products/lava ) produced LaVATM , a statistical tool for extracting concepts and patterns using natural language processing.  They use online news, social media and blogs to follow the spread of ideas.

    Berico Technologies (www.bericotechnologies.com) demonstrated CLAVIN (Cartographic Location And Vicinity INdexer) which is an open source software package that derives location names from unstructured text and compares them against a gazetteer.  CLAVIN doesn’t just “look up” location names – it uses intelligent logic paths to identify exactly locations based on the context of the text. CLAVIN also uses fuzzy logic to work its way through misspellings or language translations.  There is a USGIF video taken at GEOINT that explains the process (http://geointv.com/archive/geoint-2012-tech-talks-berico-clavin)

    Courage Services, Inc.  (www.courageservices.com)  does research and analysis related to human geography, Socio-cultural dynamics, social media, risk assessment and mitigation.  Their geospatial services include human geography mapping services, imagery and video analysis, mobile and web based applications.  They have focused heavily on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and development.  Specifically supply chain logistics, situational awareness, critical infrastructure mapping and emergency response support.

    DataCards (www.datacards.org)  indexes data sources that relate to irregular warfare, assessment, or can be used for socio-cultural modeling.  These cards provide a summary description and evaluation of the content, quality, intended purposes, and potentially appropriate uses of each source

    Ergo (www.ergo.net ) delivers ground truth and actionable intelligence from frontline sources.  Unlike other human geography firms they rely on hands-on experience and feet-on-the-ground rather than electronic media.  They have a network of vetted and trusted team members who are locals. They know the political and business environment, understand the customs, and speak the language.  They specialize in “hard cases” – opaque geographies, obscure topics, and sensitive issues that other firms struggle to address with open source media.  They’ve been in business for 7 years and have completed over 400 projects in 90 countries.

    The HumanGeo Group, LLC (www.thehumangeo.com) developed geospatial applications to synthesize, manage, and exploit large data sets, leading-edge non-traditional cyber security and specialized rapid search capabilities. The HumanGeo Group also brings together experienced special operations and intelligence agency veterans to address security and intelligence needs.  HumanGeo also provides business intelligence, geospatial visualization and innovative enterprise search applications that can help reduce risk.

    Recorded Future (www.recordedfuture.com) is in the business of mining “Big Data” to try to have advance knowledge or improved understanding of what might happen in the near future.  They continuously harvests and perform real time analysis of news from more than 40,000 sources on the web, ranging from big media and government web sites to individual blogs and selected twitter streams.  This analysis ties together countless pieces of information that highlight future events.  They can’t predict the future but they can highlight future events based on analysis of millions of events tied to more than 2 billion facts in their database.  This may sound somewhat Orwellian but does point to where things could be headed.

    Fulcrum (www.spatialnetworks.com) is a cloud-based data collection system for iPhone, iPad, and Android devices.  Users can create location-based data collection apps and deploy them to mobile devices within minutes.  It facilitates collaboration so a data collection team can work on the same project collecting data in the field quickly, accurately and with great flexibility.

    fulcrum

    GeoXray (www.terragotech.com) is a web-based software application that allows users to search the internet and social media sites for content relating to a geographic area and filter the results by topic, time and source.  TerraGo, creators of the ubiquitous GeoPDF, demonstrated interoperation by allowing a user to access GeoXray directly from a GeoPDF.  TerraGo’s Michael Bufkin indicated that the next step in this interoperability will be to cache the GeoXray discovered content within the GeoPDF when it is created, thus enabling access to the content directly from the TerraGo Toolbar. Users would then be able to discover GeoXray content even if not connected to the internet while using the same tools that they use for map display and collaboration.

    GeoCOP (www.hmstech.com) is a web-based voice, video, and data overlay service which connects people, applications, and knowledge.  “GEOCOP” stands for “Geospatial Common Operating Picture” and is a Sensitive but Unclassified web-based voice, video, and data overlay technology that instantly connects people, Geospatial Applications, and knowledge.  It was designed by former special agents and law enforcement experts, to provide law enforcement and intelligence agencies with an improved situational awareness tool.  I had a chance to test GeoCOP during a recent exercise where we combined real time earthquake data from USGS with tweets from the affected area verifying the extent of the damage.  I was very impressed with its functionality, broad access to extensive data sets, user friendliness and speed.  GEOCOP users can gather data from multiple online sources, then overlay the results alongside geospatial applications, web video players, live messaging, and other programs.

    geocop

    If your GIS life focuses on points, lines and polygons please look over the cubical wall. There is a silent revolution occurring in the geospatial community that may dwarf traditional GIS.  This has been the most rapidly expanding part of GEOINT as more and more users do a deep dive into all aspects of human geography.  Some of the growing capabilities are quite startling, almost “Big Brother” / “Minority Report” like science fiction.  If I’m still around, it will be interesting to attend GEOINT 2030.  Perhaps we’ll have tools that can use “Big Data” and analysis to anticipate and block damaging events.

    Kalinski photo

     

    Art Kalinski, GISP

    A career Naval Officer, Art established the Navy’s first GIS.  Completing a post graduate degree in GIS at the University of North Carolina, he joined the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) as the GIS Manager from 1993 to 2007.  He pioneered the use of oblique imagery for public safety and Homeland Security.  Art retired early from ARC to join Pictometry International to direct military projects using oblique imagery which led to him joining Soft Power Solutions, LLC.  He also writes a monthly column for GeoSpatial Solutions aimed at federal GIS users.

     

  • Compass ICD Rumored Again

    A GNSS industry representative stationed in Shanghai, China sent this message recently to a U.S. colleague: “Latest unofficial news said that the Compass Interface Control Document (ICD) will be released on 27th this month,  and will be available on the internet on 28th.”

    Such rumors have floated before, in late 2010, and again in late 2011.  As the U.S. colleague noted in passing on this light intelligence, “There was a lot of hand-wringing at ICG [Seventh Meeting of the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG), organized by the Government of China, Beijing, China, 5 – 9 November 2012] around the Chinese keeping their promise for 2012 release of the ICD.  Maybe they are just going to slip it under the wire.”

    In an October, 2011 newsletter column, the GPS World editor wrote: “The long-awaited signal interface control document (ICD) for China’s growing GNSS will appear this month, according to representatives of the system who spoke in a “Compass: Progress, Status, and Future Outlook” workshop as part of ION GNSS and the CGSIC meetings in Portland in September [2011].

    “The ICD has been rumored to be available previously to receiver manufacturers within China, creating some disgruntlement among companies outside the country. One of the workshop panelists affirmed that GPS/Compass chips and receivers are being actively developed by many Chinese manufacturers and research institutes.”