The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces on Nov. 26 struck a Russian factory that produces GLONASS navigation equipment for Shahed drones and Kalibr missiles, weapons used in a strike in Kyiv that killed seven people dthe day before, The factory is 1,000 km from the border between the countries.
The VNIIR Progress factory in Cheboksary, Chuvash Republic, Russia, specializes in manufacturing GNSS receivers and antennas for satellite systems, including GLONASS, GPS, and Galileo, as well as navigation modules such as Kometa, which are resistant to electronic warfare measures.
Thes modules are used on Russian missiles, including the Kalibr, Kh-69, Iskander-M, and S-800 Banderol, as well as on UAVs such as Shahed, Orlan-10 and Forpost. The Kometa module is also part of the Unified Modules for Planning and Correction, which Russia uses to convert conventional bombs into precision-guided munitions.
Ukraine unveiled its TLK-1000 underwater drone — capable of striking targets as distant as 2,000 km (1,240 miles) away — at the Defense Tech Valley 2025 exhibition in Lviv on Sept. 19.
While the torpedo drone itself moves underwater, it has surface elements including antennas for receiving GPS signals, video and thermal imaging cameras, and communication equipment, reported Militaryn in February, when Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky first introduced the Toloka drone at the Support Ukraine summit. Designed for stealth operations just below the surface, it uses electric propulsion to evade detection and penetrate Russian defenses.
Kyiv has repeatedly used maritime drones to inflict heavy losses on Russian assets in the Black Sea, according to Defense Express. The TLK-1000 could threaten the Crimean Bridge, a supply and transport route for Russian forces to occupied territories, as well as Russian submarines.
There are three models of Toloka. The largest, TLK-1000, is 12 meters long with a warhead payload of up to 5,000 kg and a range up to 2,000 km (1,240 miles). It is built for long-distance missions and heavy loads. It navigates with GNSS supplemented by AI-INS with a Doppler Velocity Log (DVL).
The TLK 400 also navigates with AI-INS with DVL and GNSS. It is 4 to 6 meters long, its payload can be up to 500 kg, and its range can be up to 1,200 kilometers. The TLK-400 features a hybrid propulsion system and is intended for reconnaissance, mining, signal relay and strike operations.
The TLK 200 navigates with GNSS + AI-INS. It is 2.5 meters, its range 100 km, and its payload 20 to 50 kg of explosives. Typical tasks include reconnaissance, mining, short-range strike missions and radio-relay support.
Ukraine has received its first Shark ultralight aircraft with electronic warfare (EW) capabilities from the Czech-Slovak company Shark.Aero, reports European Security and Technology (ES&T), a German publication. The Shark can detect and jam enemy drones and will strengthen the defense of Ukraine against Russian attacks.
The Shark’s two-seat tandem configuration was originally designed as a high-performance ultralight aircraft for civilian use. Its main features are its high speed of nearly 300 km/h and its maneuverability.
The military version of the ultralight is designed to detect and jam enemy drones. It offers the Ukrainian army a mobile, airborne defense option against loitering UAVs and reconnaissance drones.
Electronic warfare system
The first EW component suppresses GNSS navigation signals; the second suppresses video and remote control channels of enemy drones. The system is installed in a suspended container under the center of the fuselage so as not to affect the aerodynamics of the craft. From an altitude of 1800 m, the system can interfere with the operation of drones within a radius of up to 4.5 km.
A Shark representative discusses the ultralight with EW capabilities below.
On Dec. 12, 2024, the European Union decided to include Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen visa-free zone. On the same day, Bulgaria’s capital, Sofia, began experiencing interference with GPS signals. The interference, as reflected in aviation ADS-B systems and reported on GPSJam.org, continued through the new year and is ongoing as of this writing.
While these two events may be entirely unrelated, Vladimir Putin has a history of using GPS jamming and spoofing to show his displeasure with his neighbors growing closer to the West.
On Dec. 15, 2023, Poland activated a U.S. Aegis anti-missile system near its border with Kaliningrad, Russia. On the same day, Russia began jamming and spoofing GPS signals in northern Poland and parts of the Baltic. That interference persists to this day.
The interference in Sofia may be contributing to a prolonged Bulgarian political crisis. Politicians there have been struggling to form a new government since elections in October. Dec. 10 saw the beginning of a new attempt. Interference with GPS can undermine overall confidence in government systems and institutions — another of Putin’s goals for neighbors with whom he is displeased.
Another, though less likely, impact may be on Bulgaria’s electrical service. On Dec. 25, 2024, 20,000 households in western Bulgaria (Sofia is in the far west) lost electrical power and the outage continued for days. Many grid operators use GPS timing to help manage their systems. While press reports put the outages down to heavy snow and fallen trees, increased difficulty managing the grid might also be a factor.
Bulgaria’s GPS interference appears to be coming from somewhere in Sofia, not from Russian territory, as is the case in the Baltic. Yet Russia may still be involved, at least in a supporting role.
Unmanned surface vessels (USVs) are becoming a reality for many sea-going countries around the world. Belgium and The Netherlands have partnered to acquire a proven autonomous mine-clearing solution supplied by Exail Technologies in Paris, France.
A nearly $60 million contract awarded in July 2024 by NATO will allow Exail to deliver several hundred K-STER underwater vessels, which can find and destroy both floating and anchored mines.
Equipped with a shaped charge, the unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) is launched from a safe distance by a minesweeping ship, currently undergoing sea trials – the Oostende new generation minesweeper. Similar to the Kamikaze aerial drone, it autonomously seeks out a mine at a predetermined location and destroys it.
K-STER UUV encounters. (Photo: Exail)
Meanwhile, as the war in Ukraine continues, drone warfare continues to evolve. Ukraine has developed electronic warfare systems that have progressed from merely jamming control signals and GNSS navigation to actually spoofing GNSS guidance. These systems overcome direct satellite signals with a stronger signal, providing gradually changing guidance to the drone, ultimately steering it back toward Russian-friendly Belarus.
Several recent intense Russian drone attacks were with tens — and even hundreds — of Iranian Shahed attack dones. 151 were spotted in November alone, 148 of which were Shahid drones that carry an 88 lb explosive warhead. On November 26, the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia attacked with 188 Shahed drones along with a few Iskander-M ballistic missiles. Ukraine responded with aircraft, helicopters, shells fired from fixed ground installations, and signals designed to jam drone electronics and guidance systems. Around 80 attacking drones succumbed to these Ukrainian defenses.
In addition, electronic GNSS spoofing of more than 90 drones diverted them from their targets – this implies a widespread array of electronic resources that intercepted in-flight drones coming from Russia. Diverted from their planned tracks to their targets, these drones will crash when they eventually run out of fuel. In a large number of cases, the ground defense systems were able to steer the attackers toward Russian-friendly Belarus, where they also crashed when fuel was exhausted. So perhaps less than 50% of this specific attack resulted in the use of precious Ukrainian ordinance, a good sign for future defense capabilities.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the “Pond” (Atlantic Ocean), British and U.S. forces at bases in Southern England have been dealing with an uninvited invasion of overflying drones, somewhat similar to reported incursions over airforce bases (AFB) in the U.S., such as Langley AFB.
RAF Lakenheath is a joint UK/US base used by the US 48th Fighter Wing and is thought to also house NATO’s nuclear weapons – this base is one of four that is thought to have been harassed by drone overflights. Other UK bases which now also have heightened security include RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, and RAF Feltwell in the Southeast and RAF Fairford in Southwest England. We might speculate that the drones could be collecting Video and maybe Lidar information on assets on the ground, but surely this has already been gained by spy satellites belonging to Russia and China, the principal suspects for these incursions — so what exactly could be the intent?
The incursions were happening at the same time that Ukraine was using UK Storm Shadow missiles against Russia. Some speculate that this might be a demonstration of capability by Russia, indicating an ability to quickly, without any opposition, gather a number of drones and fly them over UK NATO bases. Whilst unarmed for this demonstration, in the future, they could wreak havoc on aircraft and personnel. A number of criminal investigations are apparently underway to determine who was responsible.
Researchers from the University of Texas at Austin have identified an Israeli air base as a large source of widespread GPS disruptions affecting civilian airline navigation in the Middle East, reported TheNew York Times.
The spoofing disruptions involve the transmission of manipulated GPS signals, which can cause airplane instruments to misread their location. Lead researchers Todd Humphreys and Zach Clements stated they are “highly confident” that Ein Shemer Airfield in northern Israel is the source of these attacks. The Israeli military declined TheNew York Times’request forcomment.
The research team utilized data emitted by the spoofer and picked up by satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) to determine its location. They then confirmed their calculations using ground data collected in Israel.
Spoofing, along with GPS jamming, has significantly increased over the past three years, especially near war zones such as Ukraine and Gaza. In these areas, militaries interfere with navigation signals to redirect aerial attacks.
The Middle East has emerged as a hotspot for GPS spoofing, with TheNew York Timesreporting that a separate analysis estimatesmore than50,000 flights have been affected in the region in 2024 alone. Researchers from SkAI Data Services and the Zurich University of Applied Sciences, analyzeding data from the OpenSky Network and, found that these attacks have led pilots to mistakenly believe they were above airports in Beirut or Cairo.
Swiss International Air Lines told TheNew York TimesNYTthat their flights are spoofed “almost every day over the Middle East.”
The issue extends beyond the region, with Estonia and other Baltic nations having blamed Russia for disrupting signals in their airspaces. Additionally, in April 2024, Finnair temporarily suspended flights to Tartu, Estonia, amid the rise of GPS jamming in the region affecting civilian air travel.
The attacks have not led to significant safety risks as pilots can use alternative navigation methods. However, they do raise concerns.
Jeremy Bennington, vice president of Spirent Communications, told TheNew York Times, “Losing GPS is not going to cause airplanes to fall out of the sky. But I also don’t want to deny the fact that we are removing layers of safety.”
The spoofing attacks may cause false alerts about planes being too close to the ground, leading to navigation confusion and possibly compromising flight safety.
As these disruptions continue to affect large areas far from active conflict zones, the aviation industry and international authorities are under increasing pressure to address this emerging threat to air travel security.
A UK judge just jailed a student for building a UAV. How could that be? Well, the 3D-printed UAV built by a guy in his room at home was only part of the story. It turns out that his jailing was perhaps more related to his connection to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and his apparent intent to use this UAV loaded with explosives or a chemical weapon to attack ISIS enemies.
3D-printed drone seized by anti-terror officers and rear access panel (Image: West Midlands CTU/PA)
The experts who analyzed the vehicle stated that it was only partially built and appeared somewhat ‘primitive’ in its construction. It would seem that an explosive charge or chemical weapon would need to be located with its fusing circuitry at the front end of the UAV, and maybe the enclosure was rather an access panel to aid the build process.
It is unclear whether the protruding black item towards the front of the UAV is either a GNSS or communications antenna. This antenna would normally be placed on the upper skin and relatively close to the autopilot or comms radio. It is possible that there is a communications/control signal antenna at the top of the vertical stabilizer. Rudimentary landing gear can be seen aft of the control surfaces of the wing, but the rear propulsion does not appear adequate for the size of the vehicle. Not a bad attempt to create an amateur UAV, but a pretty bad idea for the guy involved to intend it to be a kamikaze, one-way drone for ISIS — he received a 20-year sentence.
Both Russia and Ukraine continue to churn out new models of one-way UAVs, which they enthusiastically hurl at one another. Russia unveiled a new swarm drone known as ‘Product 53’ which apparently has the ability to seek and identify targets autonomously.
With a payload of only 3-5 kg it cannot inflict severe damage on major targets, but the plan is apparently to bombard an area with large numbers of Product 53 controlled as a swarm.
So, Russia’s latest software-driven, sophisticated kamikaze UAV is a far cry from the primitive, partially constructed, 3D-printed UAV which lead a UK court to jail its constructor. Much more was obviously made of his encrypted online contacts with ISIS and his intent to inflict potential death and destruction on behalf of a terrorist group.
On a far brighter note, a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project known as Control of Revolutionary Aircraft with Novel Effectors (CRANE), which first went out to industry for proposals back in 2021, has now moved into Phase 3 build and manufacture following a successful Phase 2 Critical Design Review (CDR).
Aurora Flight Sciences, a Boeing Company subsidiary, has been authorized to begin building a 7000 lb X-wing manned/unmanned aircraft. The aircraft is intended to prove out a design for aerodynamic control without the use of moving surfaces.
Illustration of proposed X-Wing aircraft (Image: DARPA)
Elevators, flaps, slats and rudders on conventional modern aircraft require significant internal hydraulics and/or cabling and actuators throughout the airframe, which add to the complexity, and potential failure modes, aerodynamic drag and weight. Most current UAVs emulate these flight control systems and use external control surfaces.
The DARPA X-Wing aircraft may use compressed air jets or even electrical discharges emitted at critical actuation points along its outer surface to ‘gently push’ the aircraft from its existing path through the airstream, which allows the remote pilot to maneuver the aircraft. Known as Active Flow Control (AFC) this technology has been prototyped to one extent or another in recent years, but this DARPA/Aurora project aims to prove the concept.
For the demonstration aircraft, normal moving control surfaces will be installed and retained. The aircraft will initially be flown using these standard airflow controls to form a baseline for how the aircraft performs. The control surfaces will then be locked down and the aircraft will be flown using AFC, and the performance will be compared to the standard controls baseline.
Understandably, the earlier phases of the project likely worked through the required control systems for the unique X-wing configuration. Aurora may have been well positioned to provide such flight control systems, autopilot and software from its store of Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) technology — the basis for the operation of autonomous air vehicles.
Building illicit UAVs intended for terrorism may not be one of the best academic projects to undertake when you’re an ISIS supporter; Russia and Ukraine appear to be in a race to mass produce ever more sophisticated UAVs; and DARPA/Aurora appear to be headed to a relatively heavy prototype air vehicle demonstrating not only X-Wing technology, but also active flight control. Overall, there is a variety of news on UAVs in various configurations and applications.
Airbus is working with a team to develop a “hybrid” approach to electric aircraft, which means that their experimental aircraft is not only using electric power — with electric motors and propellors (propulsers), an 800-volt battery, and a hi-voltage distribution and control system. It also has a conventional turbine which supplies torque to a conventional propeller and generates electrical power to maintain charge for the 800-volt battery.
Airbus EchoPulse demo aircraft. (Photo: Airbus/EchoPulse)
The team working with Airbus includes Daher, which has modified its TBM 900 turboprop aircraft to add the electrical system, motors and props supplied by Safran. Airbus has developed the 800-volt battery and the Flight Control System for the aircraft, through which any future autonomous capability would likely be brought about.
The decision to try this ‘hybrid’ approach may have been influenced by Volvo, which is pressing this approach for the Series 90 and 60 of its hybrid Electric Vehicles (EV). Combining recharging by an internal combustion engine with a battery and electric drive system greatly extends the range of this model, greatly reduces its gas consumption, and minimizes the hunt for rare recharging outlets.
It would seem that the principal benefit from the Airbus team development could be the 800-volt DC battery design, and the high voltage distribution/control/recharging system when they are potentially spun off and applied to other manned/unmanned eVTOL passenger aircraft. The basic problem for eVTOL aircraft is payload and range – is that something that a huge energy reservoir such as this battery system could support?
Airbus EchoPulse demo aircraft. (Photo: Airbus/EchoPulse)
Developed by Airbus Defense and Space in Toulouse, France, the 800-volt DC battery system delivers up to 350 kilowatts to the electric system on the aircraft. The battery was derived from earlier versions that were flown on Airbus CityBus eVTOL demonstrator and FlightLab helicopters. The Lithium-ion battery weighs in at 350 kg (772 lbs.) and is mounted in an enclosure of the belly of the EcoPulse demonstration aircraft.
Airbus reportedly plans on taking this high energy-density battery into its commercial aircraft business. But the main market could be for hybrid eVTOL aircraft, which can carry this heavy battery and its control system and to benefit from the massive energy density.
Meanwhile, as the Russian-Ukrainian war drags on with both sides throwing at each other increasing numbers of ‘kamikaze’ UAVs carrying explosives, interest has recently been growing around a 2020 report out of St. Petersburg Electro-technical University in Russia that critiques the Russian air defense system. According to the report, these defenses are poorly adapted to detect or destroy vehicles as small and slow-moving as UAVs.
Ukrainian UAV troops were only recently pictured assembling weaponized drones for their one-way trip to Russian-owned targets.
Photo released by General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on Telegram
The explosive carriers are frequently simple racing UAVs. In one released photo, an inexpensive quadcopter is taped together with plastic explosives and an RPG warhead using adhesive tape. Nothing has to be very durable, just durable enough to last for its short one-way trip through Russian defenses.
The Russian air defenses rely on several tracked and/or wheeled mobile systems using both guns and missiles. This includes radar-guided and heat-seeking missiles, such as the Pantsir-S1, the Tunguska, the Tor, the Strela-10, and the Igla-S man-portable missiles, all of which are designed to combat high-speed jet aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles. At the same time, UAVs are slow and very small in comparison.
Unfortunately, the missiles ‘ poor target detection capability and detonation control systems appear to be the culprits for the inability to strike down UAVs. Tor radar has been seen to only detect at 3-4km (1.8 -2.5 miles), while the minimum operating range is about the same. Thus, misses are reportedly more likely than taking out attacking drones. While the system may be somewhat ineffective, the cost of using missiles is huge.
A Ukrainian UAV recording within close range of a Russian Tor defense system has captured video of a missile hurtling past and failing to bring it down. Similar results have been found with both the Pantsir-S1 and Tunguska defense systems.
For the close-in gun and cannon defense systems, Russian tests demonstrated that to raise the probability of a direct hit to just 50% for an attacking drone at a distance of 1.3 miles, between four to 13 thousand shells would need to be fired. This is significantly more ammunition than one Tor system can fire in one volley without reloading, even at 5,000 rounds/minute of which it is capable.
Ukrainian war strategists continue to acquire thousands of UAVs each month, while its troops continue to throw them against their Russian invaders with improvised explosive payloads. Meanwhile, as of December 2023, Congress is continuing negotiations over another $61.4 billion in funding to further Ukraine’s war efforts, even while President Zelenskyy visited Washington to urge the U.S. to maintain its support.
The problem with this situation is that both sides have learned that UAV warfare’ is simpler, less dangerous for the aggressor, and less costly than regular offensives. Thus, a stalemate might prolong the war for even longer.
So, on the commercial, peaceful side of drone development, the possibility of a hybrid-electric approach for eVTOL passenger-carrying autonomous vehicles is making progress. Nevertheless, as the war continues in Ukraine, could the reduced cost of UAV warfare’ possibly prolong it?
Electronic warfare in the Middle East and Ukraine is affecting air travel far beyond the battlefields, unnerving pilots and revealing unintended consequences of a tactic that experts believe will become more widespread, reportedThe New York Times.
Planes are losing satellite signals, flights have been diverted and pilots have received false location reports or inaccurate warnings that they were flying close to terrain, according to European Union safety regulators and an internal airline memo viewed by The New York Times. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has also warned pilots about GPS jamming in the Middle East.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, radio frequency interference only continues to increase across the Middle East as of autumn 2023. These interferences can involve jamming GNSS signals to obstruct or block them using noise, or mimicking signals to trick GNSS receivers into picking up counterfeit satellite signals, known as spoofing.
Aircraft systems have been unable to detect GPS spoofing and ultimately correct for it. According to Opsgroup, an organization that monitors changes and risks in the aviation industry, one Embraer jet bound for Dubai nearly veered into Iranian airspace in September before the pilots figured out the plane was chasing a false signal.
“We only realized there was an issue because the autopilot started turning to the left and right, so it was obvious that something was wrong,” crew members reported to Opsgroup.
Issues arise
With the rise of electronic warfare, the strain on aviation could be a sign of more serious economic and security issues.
The U.S. government calls GNSS signals “an invisible utility.” Smartphones, cars, stock exchanges, data centers and countless industries rely on them for time, navigation or both. Similar systems exist around the world, such as Galileo in Europe, Glonass in Russia, QZSS in Japan, NavIC in India and BeiDou in China. One study from Britain said a five-day disruption of satellite signals could cost the country $6.3 billion.
Minor interference with GPS signals is fairly common. GPS jamming devices, while illegal to use, are inexpensive and easy to obtain from vendors on the internet. Governments, too, have been more willing to overtly interfere with signals as a tactic in electronic warfare.
It is not always possible to distinguish jamming from spoofing, or to determine who is behind the interference. Israel said in mid-October it had restricted GPS in the region and had warned pilots not to rely on satellite navigation systems for landing.
Russian interference is well-documented. A 2019 report by the Washington-based analytical nonprofit group C4ADS showed extensive spoofing from a Russian-controlled air base in Syria. Reports also indicated that, when Russian President, Vladimir Putin, traveled to remote locations or Russian-occupied Crimea, he was flanked by mobile GPS-spoofing technology.
Jamming is common in conflict zones. Spoofing, until recently, was considered rare.
The interference has been felt up to 190 miles away from battlefields and “appears to go well beyond simple military mission effectiveness,” according to Eurocontrol, Europe’s primary air-traffic-control manager. The worst-affected regions include the aerial space above the Black Sea area from Turkey to Azerbaijan; the Mediterranean Sea extending from Cyprus to Libya; the Baltic Sea near Poland and Latvia; and the Arctic near Finland and Norway.
Airbus said it recorded nearly 50,000 interference events on its aircraft last year, more than four times as many as the year before. This came on top of an over twentyfold jump in radio-interference events from 2017 to 2018, as recorded by a voluntary incident reporting system run by Eurocontrol. Eurocontrol said the increased jamming since 2018 was most likely meant to interfere with battlefield UAVs.
In the Middle East, there have been reports of false signals telling pilots their aircraft were directly above the airport in Tel Aviv despite being far away. Opsgroup said it had received around 50 similar reports. In some cases, onboard equipment showed that planes were approaching airports in Baghdad, Cairo or Beirut, Lebanon, when they were not.
Looking ahead
Spoofing is hard to distinguish because the signal appears legitimate. Only Europe’s Galileo incorporates an authentication system that can verify when a signal is from its satellites. Galileo, which currently is the most accurate and precise navigation satellite system, plans to introduce an even stronger level of authentication, according to the European Commission.
But even Galileo’s authentication cannot protect against one of the most dreaded types of spoofing, known as “meaconing.” In a meaconing attack, a spoofer would record satellite signals, and then rebroadcast them with an amplification or a delay. Experts have not publicly confirmed any meaconing attacks in the Middle East.
Opsgroup said the latest events should prompt manufacturers to re-examine the integration of satellite signals in aircraft electronics, known as avionics, without a safeguard that can identify false signals.
In this environment of intentional GPS jamming and spoofing, Israel has produced a leading anti-jam technology company, InfiniDome, located in Caesarea. According to co-founder Omer Sharar, the company has been working to defend GPS signals for more than seven years and has also seen the rise of devices to jam the GPS L1 frequency that anyone can buy online for $100.
Most readily available jammer electronics only output interference disrupting GPS L1, which is commonly installed for vehicle tracking and UAV guidance. InfiniDome says it has successfully protected trucking, UAV operations and others in Israel and around the world with its Infinidome GPSdome-1 and GPSdome-2 anti-jam products.
It is clear the conflict’s repercussions extend well beyond the battlefield, highlighting the critical need for security assessments or alternative PNT systems to protect civilians. While there is going to be a significant impact on commercial airline travel to and from Israel while hostilities continue, there is hope for a possible long-term solution for the intense jamming that has plagued the region for years.
Trimble has partnered with HALO Trust, a landmine-clearing non-profit organization, to help expand its demining operations across Ukraine.
The grant from the Trimble Foundation Fund will focus on strengthening the HALO Trust’s ability to locate and remove landmines, unexploded ordnance and other explosive hazards from civilian areas to create safer communities. In addition, it will allow HALO to support the Ukrainian national authorities in planning and coordinating landmine clearance activities by streamlining the mapping and data flow from the operational teams in the field to the national database.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has left areas of the country contaminated with landmines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices. These hazards block access to farmland, impede reconstruction efforts, prevent displaced persons from returning to their homes and continue to hinder the safety of Ukrainian civilians. The Ukrainian government estimates that 174,000km2 of the country’s land may be contaminated.
More than a thousand HALO staff members are active daily, both to clear explosives in critical priority areas and to recruit and train hundreds of new staff members to help keep communities safe from dangerous weapons left behind.
Surveying and mapping technology has played a significant role in the success of HALO’s operations around the world, including in Ukraine. Over the last six years, Trimble R1 and Trimble R2 GNSS receivers along with Esri ArcGIS Survey123 software have been used by HALO to identify and clear landmines.
Trimble’s Geospatial and Positioning Services businesses provided HALO with a new deployment of 255 high-precision Trimble DA2 GNSS receivers with Trimble Catalyst corrections service, allowing HALO to modernize and transform its landmine clearance operations by providing improved accuracy for more detailed maps, streamlined data flows and increased operational efficiency and safety.
Ukraine’s allies in Europe are sending the country new UAVs and counter-UAV equipment, reported The Defense Post.
German weapons provider Rheinmetall is preparing to send its LUNA NG (next generation) unmanned reconnaissance UAV to Kyiv, the company announced August 14. The system should be delivered by the end of the year, according to Rheinmetall.
The LUNA NG is part of a sizable military aid package for Ukraine initiated by the German government in July. Per Rheinmetall, the package includes a ground control station and several UAVs, as well as a launch catapult, an optional net equipment for catching landing UAVs and equipment for rapid repair. The system is mounted on a Rheinmetall HX truck with a swap body system.
The UAV is designed for a range of mission-specific payloads — including LTE network and electronic warfare support measures such as detection, classification and analysis of electromagnetic radiation for threat detection.
UAV can remain aloft for more than 12 hours and maintain a datalink range of up to 100 kilometers normally, and up to 300 kilometers when fitted with optional satellite communication equipment, according to Rheinmetall.
The Bundeswehr (the German military) has operated LUNA UAV systems since the early 2000s. Those were originally developed by German manufacturer EMT Penzberg, which was acquired by Rheinmetall in 2021.
Berlin has already delivered several reconnaissance UAVs to Ukraine, including 88 Vector UAVs from Quantum Systems, 20 RQ-35 Heidrun systems Sky-Watch, and 32 unspecified reconnaissance UAVs, as of August 9.
Ukraine will also soon receive a series of Cortex Typhon counter-UAV systems made by Norway’s Kongsberg, after the company signed an agreement via the International Fund for Ukraine.
The delivery consists of several Cortex Typhon systems — developed to counter a wide spectrum of UAVs with solutions to either physically harm or disable an aerial threat, Kongsberg said.
Russia released a large number of attack UAVs targeting Kyiv, Ukraine, in the early morning of June 20, reported the New York Times. The UAV attack on Kyiv was the first in several weeks after Russian forces repeatedly targeted the city throughout May.
The air-raid alert started in Kyiv around 3 a.m. local time and lasted for more than three hours, as UAVs came in waves from all directions. According to the New York Times, Ukraine’s Air Force said Russian forces had launched 35 Iranian-made UAVs around Kyiv.
Ukraine air defenses shot down 32 of the UAVs, which included more than a dozen near the capital.
On June 21, Reuters reported that Russian air defense had downed three UAVs in the Moscow region in what they believe to have been a Ukrainian attack. The Defence Ministry stated that Russian forces had used electronic jamming, which caused the UAVs to lose control and crash.
Reuters could not independently verify details of this incident or who had launched the UAV attack.
