Tag: FCC

How to defeat harmful GPS/GNSS interference: A roadmap for action

As GPS World readers know, the growing prevalence of GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing outside of conflict zones interrupts vital aviation safety technologies and presents challenges to maritime commerce and the global economy. An alarming example is playing out along the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, prompting 13 coastal European nations and Iceland to highlight in January 2026 “growing GNSS interference” and collectively reinforce requirements to comply with existing regulations and international law designed to ensure the safety of all maritime vessels engaged in shipping.

As commercial aircraft report navigation anomalies and maritime operators experience false position data in congested waterways, global authorities are sounding alarms that GNSS interference will continue to rise without immediate action. In March 2025, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued a joint warning expressing “grave concern” that disruptions from GNSS jamming and spoofing constitute an urgent threat to public safety, telecommunications networks and international commerce.

Compounding harmful interference incidents led the GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) to act. Defeating illegal and harmful interference outside of combat zones requires a coordinated, whole-of-government strategy that focuses on stopping bad actors through deterrence and enforcement, and directing resources toward preventing and sanctioning those violating international commitments and laws prohibiting jamming and spoofing. Investing in GPS modernization and integrating innovative signals from complementary PNT satellite systems into devices and receivers will deliver PNT that surpasses today’s technologies to the global community.

Roadmap for Action

In September 2025, GPSIA led a coalition of leading industry groups in sending a letter to the Departments of Defense and Transportation that called for urgent action to address GPS jamming and spoofing. We noted the United States has the technology and expertise to solve this issue, and the administration has the power to act. GPSIA followed the letter with a whole-of-government strategy providing a clear roadmap for the administration. While some recommendations have been implemented, other opportunities remain.

Focus on the Real Culprits

The culprits in each of these scenarios are bad actors putting public safety and global commerce at risk with harmful interference outside conflict zones. The global community relies on several unique technologies that can be impacted by harmful interference, such as cellular and Wi-Fi signals, radars and automated information systems. The misplaced focus on faint GNSS signals or dependencies on GNSS derail collective efforts to immediately regain interference-free global commerce and bolster public safety.

Governments and international organizations mandate certain industries integrate safety-of-life technologies into their operations — and they do, at great cost. Officials should in turn be given the political support and resources to stop bad actors from
intentionally interfering with them.

What to Do Next

Public and continued diplomatic engagement are critical. By amplifying European counterparts, condemnations from senior U.S. officials can raise the reputational costs for bad actors and reaffirm international norms that protect GNSS signals and other technologies from harmful interference.

Engaging with the ICAO is important. The U.S. should reinforce its commitment to providing modern civil GPS signals that support navigation in international airspace and encourage ICAO to prioritize the enforcement of global GNSS protections.

GPSIA also recommends Executive agencies establish an interagency task force that rapidly identifies and disseminates information about interference events with civil operators, including sanitized intelligence information on intentional jamming and spoofing of commercial aircraft and ships.

Civil operators also should be invited to participate in interference coordination calls and reporting. Sharing radio-frequency interference data, incident reports and threat assessments among military and civil agencies and operators is essential to preserving public safety. The Performance-based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee’s recommendations for continuity of operations during GPS disruption events should continue to be implemented with urgency.

The GPS III satellite has additional anti-interference features. (Image: Lockheed Martin)

Deterrence and information sharing must be coupled with sustained enforcement. Federal agencies have taken welcome action to interdict illegal jamming equipment, reporting an 830% increase in seizures since 2021. We applaud the U.S. government for prioritizing resources to stop the illegal import and sale of these devices.

GPSIA commends the Kingdom of Norway’s annual Jammertest, which allows receiver and device manufacturers to test interference detection and counter jamming and spoofing. These realistic test scenarios, together with strengthened enforcement and prioritized intelligence collection and analysis, will enhance public safety.

Modernize GPS

While GPS satellites continue operating with an extraordinary 99.99% availability and no outages on record, the health of the constellation and jamming and spoofing incidents affecting receivers and devices, demand action. The final GPS III satellite is scheduled to launch this spring. Next-generation GPS IIIF satellites are being built. Their launches should be prioritized to reduce the number of satellites on orbit that are one system or subsystem away from failure. GPSIA welcomed the passage of the FY2026 Defense Appropriations Bill, which bolstered national and economic security by investing needed funding for modernized GPS IIIF satellites and long-term PNT leadership.

Notably, the current GPS program plan does not include counter-spoofing technologies. Implementing counter-spoofing authentication capabilities for Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) signals would further strengthen aviation resilience.

Ground infrastructure modernization is equally important. The GPS ground station must be able to command and monitor GPS III and IIIF satellites and the modern L5 aviation signal.

Streamline Regulatory Activities

Regulatory modernization represents another area of progress. In September 2025, the State Department removed jam-and spoof-resistant Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), fulfilling one recommendation from GPSIA’s strategy.

Certification processes also must evolve, and integration of CRPAs into aircraft should be accelerated. The modern L5 signal and counter spoofing signal authentication signals must be incorporated into FAA-certified and other receivers as soon as possible.

Recommendations for the FCC

President Trump’s December 2025 Executive Order (EO), “Ensuring American Space Superiority,” directs U.S. departments and agencies to detect and counter threats to U.S. space infrastructure. It also states that his administration will enable industry to develop and deploy advanced space capabilities, including terrestrial and cislunar PNT applications. This EO should serve as a “North Star” for the FCC, resulting in increased enforcement resources to address illegal jamming and spoofing, and a regulatory environment prioritizing innovative, advanced commercial satellite PNT systems that complement GPS. Demonstrating American leadership in space demands that we step forward, not backwards, in our PNT capabilities.

The FCC is evaluating the record developed in its Notice of Inquiry, Promoting the Development of PNT Technologies and Solutions, and is reportedly considering future rulemaking. The FCC’s task is not to replace GPS, but to ensure that the regulatory environment protects its spectrum, increases enforcement actions against those perpetuating harmful interference and enables innovation that complements this foundational system. This balanced approach will fulfill President Trump’s mandate, preserving public safety and economic security, and ensure continued American leadership in PNT.

Global Safety and Commerce

Baltic and North Sea shipping lanes have become a flashpoint for GPS jamming and spoofing, prompting 13 European nations and Iceland to issue a joint warning in January 2026 over interference threatening maritime safety and global commerce. (Photo: Dmitri Toms / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images)

The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry uncovered dozens of PNT technologies, ranging from those in the marketing stage, to hyper-localized solutions, to proposals to exploit “signals of opportunity.” Creativity and ingenuity abound in the commission’s record, but the docket’s many filings lacked technical details to evaluate whether the systems advance the nation’s
PNT leadership.

The hallmarks of GPS are its worldwide coverage, and the continuity, availability, integrity and accuracy of its signals. Our modern global community deserves complementary PNT systems and signals that meet or exceed GPS capabilities. A few satellite-based solutions stood out as holding promise to do so.

Systems operating in low-Earth orbit (LEO) can transmit stronger signal power due to their proximity to Earth, improving performance in urban environments and contested spectrum conditions. Systems operating in different frequency bands, such as TrustPoint’s C-band system, add spectral diversity, making it far more difficult for an adversary to disrupt all PNT services simultaneously. When combined with modernized GPS signals and authentication capabilities, this layered approach can deliver robust services while complementing the foundational role of GPS.

Terrestrial systems cannot replicate global coverage of satellite constellations. They are also vulnerable to wildfires, hurricanes and other disasters.Building parallel terrestrial networks would require significant investment while delivering a fraction of modernized satellite systems’ capabilities. Nor do terrestrial signals provide the continuity, availability, integrity and accuracy of satellite systems.

The Progress is Real

GPSIA is pleased to report that progress is being made in several areas outlined in its “whole-of-government” strategy. It’s time to accelerate that progress. In May 2026, GPSIA members will convene to evaluate this strategy and outline what more the PNT industry can do to play a part in defeating harmful interference. Our members also will meet with government officials to underpin that government-led enforcement and solutions to jamming and spoofing can further illustrate the importance of PNT to U.S. leadership in space, and national security, public safety and the global economy.

March 30, 2026
RQ-170 stealth drones tied to Venezuela operation as FCC bans foreign UAV imports

As the news subsides on the U.S. operation in Venezuela to capture Nicolás Maduro and his wife, attention is now turning to the legal aspects of the prosecution. Nevertheless, this military undertaking was apparently extremely complex and involved very discreet initial persistent surveillance of not only Maduro’s location but also of a large number of military installations and facilities.

Venezuela has acquired an extensive arsenal of sophisticated Russian air defense capabilities beginning in 2011 and which were apparently recently upgraded in 2024. Heavy damage during the U.S. operation at La Carlota Air Base in Caracas, Fort Tiuna Military Complex, La Guaira Port and El Higuerote Airport appears to have overcome not only surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile systems but also Su-30 Sukhoi Flanker fighter aircraft armed with air-to-air missiles.

And how was this accomplished? Well, likely with the help of legendary Lockheed RQ-170 Sentinel Stealth Drones. Nothing in the classified operation has been positively confirmed, but it is known that one or two of these surveillance drones were videoed returning to Naval Station Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico in the early morning of Jan. 3 following the U.S. attack. And piecing together earlier photos of U.S. Latin American command with an RQ-170 operations operative, pundits now believe confirm RQ-170 involvement.

Lockheed RQ-170 stealth drone, nicknamed Wraith (Photo: USAF)

The 30th and 44th Reconnaissance Squadrons at Wing at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada are the only units the Air Force has confirmed to be operating RQ-170s Wraith low-observable stealth drones.

It’s therefore quite possible that when President Trump said, “I was able to watch it in real time, and I watched every aspect of it,” that the video link may have been supplied by one or more of the RQ-170 Wraith drones circling over the action on the ground.

Another aspect of the Venezuelan operation comes from people on the ground in Caracas who reported a number of instances of “flying bombs” which fell on targets during the U.S. operation. Video clips and numerous personal accounts apparently supported the reports that prop-powered attack drones were being crashed into ground targets, followed by big explosions.

And previously on Dec. 16, the U.S. had a “first” for the U.S. Navy to have launched a one-way attack drone from the deck of the USS Santa Barbara in the Arabian Gulf. These earlier reports indicated that these attack drones could be launched by catapult, using rocket assist and from mobile ground vehicles.

Therefore, it is not much of a leap to say it’s very likely that other marine and ground launch facilities in and around Venezuela dispatched many one-way, likely semi-autonomous attack-drones to take out targets prior to Delta Force being helicoptered in to capture Madura.

Meanwhile back in the U.S., well away from military action, the Federal Communications Commission has effectively banned the sale of any new UAS or parts for UAS being imported into the U.S. The ruling was developed after the White House initiated a review aimed at protecting American security which decided “that UAS and UAS critical component parts that are produced in foreign countries pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons.”

To somewhat clarify the situation, the FCC just added exemptions for Pentagon-approved “Blue List” drone models and parts thereof from EagleNXT, Parrot, Teledyne FLIR, Neros Technologies, Wingtra, Auterion, ModalAI, Zepher Flight Labs and AeroVironment — imports from these suppliers will be allowed through the end of 2026.

So with new models of foreign drones being prevented from entering the U.S., the U.S. drone industry has been granted, at least for the moment, an opportunity to develop leading UAS models which will eventually outpace existing foreign drones operating in the U.S. It’s predicted that the FIFA soccer World Cup this summer will need a lot of drone coverage for security purposes — possibly a new U.S. drone home market.

The Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey is a complex military tilt-rotor aircraft which overcame many hurdles in its development and initial operations phase, even having some incidents during its mature field operations.

Bell-Boeing V-22 Tilt-rotor aircraft (Photo: Boeing)

Nevertheless, the Chinese appear to have adopted a similar design approach for the Lanying R-6000 manned/unmanned tilt-rotor 6-12 passenger eVTOL and a 2-ton-cargo transport version. The promotional video for the Chinese United Aircraft R-6000 seems to interchange shots of the V-22 in hover mode with recent R-6000 prototype system in hover flight. However, Bell-Boeing web statements disclaim any linkage with the Chinese company or its R-6000 development.

If the name “United Aircraft” seems familiar, it’s because there was such a company in the U.S. in the 1930s, changing its name to United Technologies (Pratt & Whitney) in 1975, now RTX Corp.

United Aircraft in China has apparently been around since 2012 and has produced a number of vertical lift aircraft, including the TD220 twin-coaxial helicopter (without tail boom). As with most large industrial companies in China, this one also seems heavily engaged with the Chinese military and is now making inroads into the civilian marketplace with a number of UAVs for various applications, leading up to the projected 550 mph Lanying R-6000, which has been depicted in low-level flight mode.

Promotional image of eVTOL Lanying R-6000. (Photo: United Aircraft)

So, a mixed bag of unmanned aircraft reports this month, ranging from drones likely used in the recent U.S. action in Venezuela, FCC rulemaking to restrict imports of foreign UAVs into the U.S., and all the way to a new potential Chinese tilt-rotor eVTOL entrant.

January 13, 2026
RF terrestrial-based GPS packs a punch

Over time, GPS dependencies have become deeply embedded in much of the nation’s critical infrastructure, as shown in Figure 1 — from emergency services and transportation systems to critical manufacturing and logistics operations. For the past 20 years, however, efforts to protect these assets with a true backup system have stalled, despite the establishment of the U.S. Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Policy in December 2004.

With the recent Notice of Inquiry from the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an updated list of technological options is now on the table. However, most would require building new infrastructure or rely on quantum-based technologies that are still years away from being practical or available.

U.S. GPS Efforts Separating

Since its inception in 1977, GPS has drawn from a single technology to serve civil and military sectors. Now, with space — particularly satellites — becoming physically contested in wartime scenarios, the military is embarking on its own approach. This includes pairing GPS with military- grade receivers to improve service and protection for the global GPS layer. And two new layers are being developed as part of a multi-layer approach, deemed the “regional” GPS layer (i.e., per country) and the “local” GPS layer (i.e., per metro).

Yet, with this new system — although supporting modular, open-systems integration — the Department of Defense (DOD) is now distancing itself from other future endeavors, including supporting civil critical infrastructure. The future DOD PNT system will not follow the same path to civil/military use as was taken by GPS. The PNT capabilities employed by the DOD as such will be increasingly classified. The civil effort has not only been left to fend for itself, but it also has been tragically fragmented across many federal departments and agencies. We can only hope the recent FCC focus will help to solidify the civil GPS efforts.

Doors Open for New Solutions

The new orientation of the civil approach opens the door to significant focus on local and regional GPS services. Specifically, a new approach is based on data from the Earth’s “RF geospatial layer,” where geospatial is “relating to or denoting data that is associated with a particular location.” This layer’s data is about available RF signals, which can be used to derive the location of a particular end device anywhere in the blanket of signals. Devices using this new approach will be unencumbered by the intricacies and costs of satellite technology or having to be joint solutions required to meet military standards.

This also opens the door to the power of solutions available through consortia, which can tap into an order of magnitude more benefits through hearty partnerships. All of which also leads to the much-needed speed-to-market.

The Biggest Advantage

In the U.S., more than 110,000 towers transmit a variety of RF signals available to derive PNT. These towers provide a wide range of three-tower geometries needed for PNT calculations and enable strong resiliency (as an adversary cannot disable them all).

Two systems, in particular, are worthy of close consideration. The broadcast industry’s proposed Broadcast Positioning System (BPS) uses ATSC 3.0 infrastructure along with the existing MerlinTPS adaptive RF signal system. Both these systems take advantage of existing RF infrastructure prevalent in most developed and developing countries.

Don’t Fall Into the eLoran Trap

eLoran has been suggested by some as a viable alternative used for deriving PNT. However, this technology has notable shortcomings. The portion of the RF band it uses has several limitations. For example, eLoran is based on a 100 kHz signal, a low-frequency band that is highly susceptible to atmospheric noise.

Although some propose the use of existing AM towers for the eLoran signal, most are ~300 ft, of which eLoran tends to operate with 1600 ft towers. Attempts to operate eLoran using these shorter towers will make for reduced efficiency. Another misconception is about the proposed use of existing AM tower guidewires for transmission. At these wavelengths, that would restrict the towers to be 900 miles apart, having an impact on maintenance.

eLoran would require building new infrastructure for U.S. deployment, including 12 new towers and transmitters. The number of installations requiring significant maintenance and this low number can be taken out in physical warfare.

The eLoran system requires tight synchronization of the signals between each of its towers and the national epoch, requiring additional infrastructure with its attendant maintenance. eLoran supporting position accuracy is rated at 10 m to 20 m CEP, which is not within the FCC requirement of less than 3 m CEP.

Timing accuracy is +/- 50 ns, which meets today’s precision needs, although it is quickly becoming inadequate as needs in the precision timing market continue to increase.

Finally, the eLoran service is transmitted on one known frequency and in a published format, making it more vulnerable to jamming.

GPS RF Systems Pack a Punch

Given the issues associated with eLoran, other technologies must be considered. One such technology is available today and provided by a commercial company, MerlinTPS, which can transfer market-available, precise timing down to +/- 10ns. Such as precise timing provided by another commercial entity, Hoptroff, for example. Both companies currently provide the necessary components of a viable terrestrial GPS.

As a consortium, MerlinTPS/Hoptroff could deliver precise timing wirelessly to broadcast TV towers for BPS, while eliminating the need for signal conditioning and additional synchronization equipment at each tower, or any other related infrastructure.

MerlinTPS combined with BPS could provide all GPS services for primary and backup (not just timing). MerlinTPS can also fill in services for BPS edge cases having poor geometries. These services include portable and mobile devices. MerlinTPS is also able to handle both the enterprise and civil approaches similarly.

New open doors create freedom to quickly address the urgent national security need for reliable, alternative PNT. The consortium approach, adding commercially available technology to the broadcast infrastructure, allows for collaborative development while preserving individual market opportunities, making it an attractive proposition for all participants.

October 9, 2025
FCC opens door to GPS alternatives, but risks undermining its greatest strength
On March 27, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) unanimously approved a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) to explore GPS alternatives, amid escalating threats to security and system resiliency. The move signals growing federal concern about the reliability of space-based navigation and timing infrastructure amid rising global interference and spoofing incidents.

But while the FCC’s broad consideration of alternative technologies is a welcome step forward, its framing also risks weakening one of GPS’s most important defenses: the growing adoption of multi-constellation strategies across the commercial sector.

Rising Threats, Broader Mandates

The FCC’s decision follows the release of the International Air Transport Association’s (IATA) latest safety report, which documented a 175% increase in GPS interference and a 500% rise in spoofing attacks year-over-year. These incidents pose critical challenges to aviation safety, emergency services, telecommunications, and countless other sectors that rely on Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) services.

Against this backdrop, the Commission’s vote reflects a bipartisan sense of urgency. The NOI invites public comment on a range of technologies that could serve as complements or alternatives to GPS, including low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, terrestrial signals, and enhanced end-user devices. This broad framing is encouraging and acknowledges the multifaceted nature of PNT resilience.

A Multi-Layered Approach to PNT

The FCC’s focus on diversification — across space-based, terrestrial, and user-level technologies — is not only prudent, but essential. Enhancing national security and system redundancy requires more than a single backup solution. It demands layered resiliency that integrates complementary modalities into a cohesive ecosystem.

It is very encouraging that the NOI outlines a wide array of candidate technologies that could play a role in improving the U.S. PNT infrastructure. These range from inertial navigation systems and time transfer services to novel terrestrial radio signals and commercial LEO constellations. By casting a wide net, the FCC opens the door to innovation and allows market forces to contribute meaningfully to PNT modernization.

Commercial Reality vs. Government Narrative

However, the FCC’s discussion notably underplays a key reality: few commercial technologies today rely solely on GPS. The commercial PNT landscape has already moved beyond single-source dependency, with the vast majority of systems integrating multiple GNSS constellations (such as GPS, Galileo, BeiDou and GLONASS) alongside additional sensor and signal data to ensure robust coverage and accuracy.

This multi-constellation approach is arguably the single most powerful tool we have to strengthen the resilience of GPS-dependent systems. By allowing receivers to pull data from multiple GNSS sources, users gain spatial and signal diversity, enabling them to cross-check signals, reject spoofed or erroneous data, and maintain accurate position and timing even in degraded environments. It’s important to remember that a device can’t selectively use GNSS networks depending on the user’s geography. If U.S. device makers disable BeiDou and GLONASS, then anywhere in the world that receiver goes it will be less performant and competitive. In recent field tests, we found that disabling the BeiDou constellation decreased a device’s positioning accuracy by 30% to 40%.

This accuracy and resilience are especially important in sectors like aviation, autonomous systems, and emergency response, where signal fidelity and redundancy can be life-saving. Multi-constellation GNSS use isn’t theoretical: it’s already the industry standard.

The International Tightrope

Despite this, key elements of the NOI, as well as comments during the meeting, reflect a growing U.S. government skepticism toward the inclusion of foreign GNSS systems, especially BeiDou and GLONASS. While geopolitical caution is understandable, overly rigid restrictions on international signals could do more harm than good.

These systems are not merely foreign-owned alternatives. They are integral components of the modern GNSS environment. Many U.S. commercial devices — ranging from smartphones to augmented reality, fleet tracking systems, drones, and more — already leverage multiple GNSS sources by default. Future technologies such as autonomous vehicles, robotics and urban air mobility will also require multiple GNSS signals to function. Prohibiting or restricting their use could mean rolling back years of progress in signal resilience, not to mention stymying future technologies, and all for a speculative and largely unquantified national security risk.

While there are some valid concerns about adversarial control over PNT infrastructure, the FCC must weigh these carefully against the real, measurable benefits of an open and interoperable GNSS ecosystem. An overcorrection risks introducing new vulnerabilities in the name of mitigating others. In reality, the more vulnerable elements of the threat surface are GNSS receivers and mobile networks, particularly 5G systems, where user location is actually determined and tracked. Unlike the largely speculative and technically unproven threats tied to adversarial GNSS constellations, there are well-documented cases of compromised receivers and nation-state exploitation of mobile infrastructure – the very reason several countries have banned Chinese 5G providers. The FCC should focus on these clear and active risks, rather than reacting to theoretical scenarios that experts argue are not technically feasible.

Innovation at Risk

There is a significant opportunity at this moment. The NOI rightly identifies emerging technologies that can enhance U.S. resiliency, including advanced chipsets, LEO-based positioning, crowd-sourced signal verification, and next-generation timekeeping tools.

However, that innovation cannot thrive in isolation. If the U.S. limits the ability of domestic systems to take full advantage of all available GNSS sources, it will undermine both resiliency and competitiveness. Even worse, it could widen the gap with foreign alternatives, especially China’s BeiDou system, which is already surpassing GPS in both accuracy and global coverage. GNSS has always thrived on multi-national cooperation and the opportunity of soft power influence. Both of which are diminished by exclusion, which is likely why there have not been bans by other countries to date.

A Path Forward

The FCC is right to prioritize this issue. It is urgent for the U.S. to build a more robust and secure PNT infrastructure in the face of these mounting threats. But its long-term success will depend on whether or not it embraces the full complexity of the PNT landscape.

This means supporting:
- Open, multi-constellation GNSS access for commercial users.
- A flexible, layered approach that integrates space, terrestrial, and user-level technologies.
- Public-private collaboration to accelerate innovation and deployment.
- Clear regulatory guidance that balances national security concerns with commercial realities.
The future of secure and reliable PNT lies not in isolating GPS, but in augmenting it through interoperability, diversity, and resilience at every layer of the system.

If the FCC’s inquiry can steer the country in that direction, it will be a pivotal moment not just for GPS, but for the entire space-based infrastructure upon which modern life depends.
May 14, 2025
NextNav proposes a GPS complement and backup in the lower 900 MHz band

A year after NextNav shared a new vision for the Lower 900 MHz band, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) collected additional comments seeking to bolster positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) resilience by exploring terrestrial and space-based technologies, including NextNav’s, that could complement and back up GPS. The FCC’s PNT Notice of Inquiry (NOI) is a level set on PNT issues, and seeks to engage stakeholders across government and industry to advance a “whole-of-government approach” to building resiliency to safeguard America’s critical infrastructure, national security and public safety.

We caught up with NextNav’s Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, Renee Gregory, to hear more about how the company is thinking about a terrestrial complement and backup to GPS. Its technology is one of the solutions being discussed within the FCC and the broader industry.

Why is it important to create a complement and backup to GPS? 

Renee Gregory: GPS is an incredible technology that underpins national security, public safety and American commerce. However, GPS signals have physical limitations indoors and in urban canyons (i.e. big cities), plus the signals are vulnerable to intentional spoofing, jamming and unintentional interference. With GPS contributing more than $1 trillion to the U.S. economy since its inception, and a potential outage costing $1.6 billion per day, relying on a single system leaves us exposed. As Rear Admiral USN (ret.) David Simpson recently wrote, “If GPS goes down, critical infrastructure fails and our nation plunges into chaos.”

What is the Federal Government doing about the problem?

Gregory: Leaders, from President Donald Trump to Chairman Ted Cruz and Senator Ed Markey, have all advocated for the government to take action to ensure that a resilient PNT system of systems is in place. During President Trump’s first term, he signed an Executive Order establishing a comprehensive national policy to promote the responsible use of PNT services to strengthen critical infrastructure resilience. Earlier this year, the FCC adopted a NOI to promote the development of PNT technologies and solutions. It marked an important acknowledgment by the FCC of the seriousness of GPS vulnerabilities and limitations. It also reinforced the need for a system-of-systems approach that includes terrestrial PNT.

What should our readers know about the NOI?

Gregory: NextNav fully supports the FCC’s focus on resilient PNT. The FCC’s stated goal in the NOI is to build a record on specific actions the FCC can take to incentivize and support industry efforts to develop resilient and secure PNT technologies and solutions. The FCC intends to focus its efforts on utilizing its authority over non-Federal use of spectrum to rapidly support PNT solutions that could serve as complements or backups to GPS. NextNav has urged the FCC to enable at least one future-proof option that relies on market forces to deliver a terrestrial, wide-scale PNT solution that is broadly available to critical infrastructure, public safety, and consumers, and has a clear path to incorporation in consumer devices, like the smartphones we all use every day.

What is the solution NextNav is proposing?

Gregory: NextNav has a proven track record of providing accurate, reliable vertical location information to support first responders. Building on that legacy, NextNav’s next-generation 5G-based 3D PNT solution will leverage preexisting 5G networks and network capabilities, as well as the established and vibrant 5G device ecosystem, to enable a broadly available, widescale terrestrial complement and backup to GPS in partnership with one or more mobile network operators with experience in deploying newly-available spectrum and services within a relatively short period of time. This partnership model will rely on market forces and not taxpayer funding. NextNav brings not only its expertise in PNT technology but also its extensive spectrum licenses in the Lower 900 MHz band to address the critical need for resilient PNT.

What are other technologies under consideration in the NOI?

Gregory: The FCC is considering a range of terrestrial and space-based technologies as part of a system-of-systems approach to resilient PNT. Because different technologies and deployment models bring different strengths — and different weaknesses — truly resilient PNT requires multiple layers of redundancy and both space and terrestrial-based technologies. There is no single solution. We need an all-of-the-above approach.

Is NextNav trying to replace GPS? 

Gregory: No. NextNav’s efforts to develop a complement and backup to GPS will not diminish the role of GPS, which will remain vital to national and economic security.

Is NextNav asking for new spectrum to enable its terrestrial PNT solution?

Gregory: Some opponents have suggested that NextNav is asking the FCC to give it 15 megahertz of spectrum, but that’s simply not true. After acquiring extensive spectrum licenses at auction and in the secondary market, NextNav is the largest licensee in the lower 900 MHz band and is one of only two active geographic license holders in that band, which is today dedicated to terrestrial positioning services. In 2024, NextNav reached a commercial agreement to acquire the remainder of the licenses from the only other active geographic licensee in the band.

NextNav is suggesting a reconfiguration of the existing licensing scheme to ensure that the lower 900 MHz band can support next-generation 5G-based 3D PNT solutions that require multiple 5 MHz blocks of spectrum, for a total of one more megahertz than the amount of spectrum currently dedicated for geographically-licensed terrestrial positioning services. To enable this band configuration, and the availability of a terrestrial PNT complement and backup, NextNav has proposed a “swap” in which NextNav will return all its current and pending license holdings in exchange for a 15 MHz nationwide license, consistent with the technical characteristics of 5G networks.

How much does this plan cost?

Gregory: The market-based NextNav solution will not require any taxpayer funding or legislation.

What about those opposed to NextNav’s proposal?

Gregory: NextNav is focused on solving an urgent national security problem by enabling a complement and backup to GPS to advance resilient PNT. While some parties have raised objections based on claims of interference to current uses of the Lower 900 MHz band, they have not provided detailed technical analyses to support their claims that NextNav would interfere with their operations, or offered solutions beyond suggesting that the FCC reject NextNav’s proposal. Simply opposing one proposal without offering credible, fact-based solutions undermines the FCC’s goal of building a resilient, system-of-systems approach.

As a leader in PNT innovation, NextNav is looking forward to working closely with the Chairman, Commissioners and broader stakeholder community to accelerate the deployment of resilient PNT, building important redundancies into a system we rely on every day. 

May 12, 2025
Satellite Safety Alliance urges reversal of FCC Ligado Order

A new letter protesting the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Ligado Order marked the fifth anniversary of the controversial decision.

In the letter, the Satellite Safety Alliance (SSA) and 93 companies and organizations stated the need for the Ligado Order to be overturned by President Trump and Congressional leadership.

“The proposed network is designed to inappropriately use spectrum reserved for satellite communications, causing significant interference to other services,” the SSA stated. Interference with GPS is a major concern of the group.

The letter urges the president and the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate armed services and commerce committees to work with the FCC on granting petitions for reconsideration that will help prevent the building of Ligado’s terrestrial wireless network.

“Ligado’s network would threaten a wide range of critical government and commercial services, including military communications, private satellite communication, GPS, agriculture, aviation, weather forecasting, and more,” the SSA stated.

“For over two decades, Ligado and its predecessors have tried and failed to build a

terrestrial network that wouldn’t harm GPS, national security, and other critical interests,” commented the SSA. “The FCC’s Ligado Order has faced unprecedented opposition, including from 14 federal agencies and over 90 organizations representing huge swaths of the economy — from aviation and agriculture to science and manufacturing. Rarely does any issue garner

agreement from such a wide and divergent group of constituencies.”

Congress found through independent analysis that the Ligado Order poses unacceptable risks of interference to GPS, satellite communications, weather forecasting, and other services, the SSA explained. “Countless federal staff hours and resources have gone to reviewing, debating, and litigating this issue. It is past time the FCC put the issue to rest by granting the pending petitions for reconsideration.”

Copies of the letters are availble here.

April 28, 2025
FCC meets to strengthen PNT

The fire at an electrical substation that shut down London’s Heathrow Airport, Europe’s busiest hub, for 18 hours on March 21 was one of many periodic reminders of the vulnerability of much of our critical infrastructure to a single point of failure (SPOF). A previous one was the CrowdStrike software bug that disrupted hospitals, airlines, banks and scores of other businesses and services around the world on July 19, 2024. Think of the impact on your home or business if the power went out for hours or days, and you did not have a backup generator and/or solar panels.

Our society’s and economy’s enormous reliance on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) makes GNSS a huge SPOF. Hence repeated and urgent calls for increasing the resilience of GNSS and for developing complementary and/or alternative sources of PNT (or, to use the mantra of the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board in recent years, to “protect, toughen and augment” GNSS).

Yet, at least two existing directives for strengthening PNT have not been implemented: The National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 directed the U.S. Department of Transportation to ensure establishment of at least one terrestrial timing system as a backup for GPS signals, and President Trump’s January 2021 Space Policy Directive 7 ordered the entire U.S. government to “identify and implement … alternative sources of PNT for critical infrastructure, key resources and mission-essential functions.”

Awareness of the key importance and vulnerabilities of GNSS and of the urgent need to develop complementary and/or alternative technologies has reached the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC). It dedicated its March 27 open meeting to hearing recommendations on “promoting the development of PNT technologies and solutions,” which it deems “crucial for national security, public safety and economic stability.”

The Notice of Inquiry (NOI) that the FCC issued in preparation for the meeting is a thorough and very useful compilation of relevant policies, programs, initiatives, reports and policy documents. I highly recommend reading it. Clearly, the commission did its homework — in the footnotes, it cited four GPS World articles among its sources — and demonstrated that it understands the key challenges for GNSS, the options for complementary/alternative systems and the relevant policy history. (See Dana Goward’s March 7 article on this at gpsworld.com/fcc-to-meet-on-gps-alternatives/) The NOI also posed 94 questions to which the FCC seeks answers.

The FCC meeting, available on YouTube, was of great importance to the whole GNSS/PNT community. While the commissioners did not vote to support any existing or proposed PNT system, they engaged in a broad discussion of the issues and heard petitions from NextNav and the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) related to the provision of nationwide PNT services. NextNav requested spectrum for its project to work with telecom providers. NAB sought to accelerate and mandate implementation of the new ATSC 3.0 television broadcast format, which includes signals for its Broadcast Positioning System.

April 22, 2025
Flawed spectrum proposal could cause disruption and risks to public safety
On March 27, 2025, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) launched a proceeding on commercial technologies that would complement GPS. “Although GPS is indispensable to America’s economic and national security, it represents a single point of failure that can be vulnerable to disruption or manipulation by our adversaries,” said the FCC’s announcement, highlighting the federal government’s bipartisan call to develop complementary systems that provide positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) data to to better achieve PNT resilience nationwide and protect America’s economic and national security.

The Security Industry Association (SIA) commends the FCC’s commitment to protecting America’s economic and national security and exploring available PNT options. We believe the docket will show that there is a wide array of PNT technologies that can complement to GPS, and we look forward to providing information to the Commission about tradeoffs among these emerging PNT offerings and encouraging the Commission to avoid taking action that could disproportionately disrupt valuable public safety technologies.

One company, the for-profit entity NextNav, has petitioned the FCC to reconfigure the 902-928 MHz band (the Lower 900 MHz frequency) and grant it a nationwide license for 15 MHz of spectrum so it can establish a 5G terrestrial-based PNT network. NextNav also seeks the removal of the current requirement that it not cause unacceptable levels of interference to Part 15 devices. These devices include low-power, radio frequency (RF) devices ranging from consumer electronics and appliances to wireless alarm systems, smart home equipment, electronic access control devices and a wide range of devices used to increase economic productivity and efficiency, bolster safety, deliver innovation and provide other important benefits to consumers. This proposal has a dangerous likelihood of causing significant interference in the band that would be adverse to the public interest and threaten public safety.

The Lower 900 MHz band is vital for millions of security cameras, including popular models used in homes and small businesses. These devices are essential for protecting homes, preventing package theft and home intrusions, ensuring children’s safety and aiding law enforcement by capturing criminal activity. The changes proposed by NextNav would likely force these incumbent users into a shared portion of spectrum that is almost 60% smaller than the current Lower 900 MHz band — crowding that will cause many devices to stop operating reliably, compromising Americans’ safety and the security of our facilities and communities, and will be exacerbated by the growing concentration of devices using new technologies that require more spectrum bandwidth.

Another important service likely to be disrupted by the proposed band restructuring would be Z-Wave technologies. Z-Wave technology enables comprehensive home automation and security solutions —such as smart locks, thermostats and security systems — to integrate seamlessly with various smart home devices, while preserving advanced security features such as encrypted communication and secure inclusion. Z-Wave devices are not designed to withstand interference from fixed and/or mobile devices operating at commercial macro power limits and out-of-band emission limits, such as those in NextNav’s proposed high-power operations.

Additionally, millions of electronic access control and other wireless connected devices that are now in use in residential, institutional, commercial and government buildings across the United States would be impacted. The interference generated from NextNav’s higher-power communications would significantly impact the reliability of these important safety and security products and ecosystems, effectively making them unusable in the same spectrum.

In addition to these public safety and security uses, more critical systems that could be disrupted include:
- Municipal infrastructure, including such systems as traffic control, street lighting, weather monitors and flood warning systems that are deployed in this band to make communities safer and more energy efficient.
- Critical infrastructure, including utilities’ use of the band for remote monitoring and management of power, gas and water distribution networks.
- Railroad operations and safety, including the Automatic Equipment Identification network that enables tracking of rail cars and equipment, as well as essential traffic control, sensors and other devices necessary for operational safety and efficiency.
- Highway infrastructure and tolling, including the operation of electronic tolling systems, such as E-ZPass and other similar toll collection systems.
- Retail, manufacturing and supply chain operations, including building control systems, tank and leak monitoring system and inventory control systems.
- Agriculture solutions used for connecting modern farms’ Internet of Things devices and equipment to keep our farms connected.
As other concerned parties have pointed out, there are a number of existing backup GPS options available to establish a terrestrial PNT without any reallocation of spectrum. While a backup GPS system is ultimately necessary, the other solutions that would be much less disruptive. The tradeoffs required by implementing the NextNav proposal are simply not worth the risk to our nation’s security and safety.
April 7, 2025
FCC seeks public input to strengthen alternative PNT

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has issued a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) seeking public input on positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) systems and policies. While GPS is crucial for the United States’ economic and national security, its dependency as a single point of failure renders it vulnerable to disruption or manipulation by adversaries. Recognizing this vulnerability, leaders such as President Trump, Chairman Cruz, and Senator Markey have advocated for developing alternative systems to ensure resilient PNT capabilities.

PNT data is integral to countless military, public safety, agricultural, and commercial activities. Given the dependence of the American economy and national security on GPS as the sole PNT source, the agency states that the U.S. government is prioritizing efforts to create robust backup systems that can safeguard essential functions in the event of GPS signal disruptions.

The FCC’s NOI examines how the agency can foster the development of alternative and complementary PNT. It seeks feedback on various emerging PNT technologies being developed by broadcasters, wireless operators, satellite constellations and startups utilizing FCC-licensed spectrum. The inquiry also addresses tradeoffs among these technologies based on performance, scalability, geographic coverage, durability, cost and commercialization potential.

The Commission aims to establish a comprehensive record to guide its actions in enhancing GPS resilience and promoting alternative PNT solutions. Potential measures include regulatory changes, public-private partnerships, testbeds, Innovation Zones and other initiatives.

Two PNT-related petitions are currently under FCC consideration. NextNav has proposed allocating approximately $5 billion worth of spectrum to collaborate with telecom providers in establishing a PNT network. Meanwhile, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has suggested adopting a new TV signal format capable of transmitting PNT information without requesting additional spectrum allocation. Insights from the NOI will help inform decisions on these proposals.

The FCC’s inquiry reflects growing concerns about reliance on GPS as a single system for PNT data. By fostering alternatives like terrestrial networks or broadcast-based solutions such as NAB’s Broadcast Positioning System, the Commission seeks to strengthen national resilience against potential disruptions to critical infrastructure and services.

March 31, 2025
FCC to Meet on GPS Alternatives
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chair, Brendan Carr announced in a March 5 blog post that the commission would be addressing GPS alternatives along with Next Generation 911 issues at its next meeting.

Pledging that “…public safety and national security will be top priorities for us at the FCC” along with quick action on related issues, Chairman Carr said the commission’s March 2025 open meeting will start “… with an inquiry that explores alternatives to GPS.”

Describing GPS as indispensable but not infallible, Carr’s post showed a substantial appreciation of PNT and GPS alternative issues as well as much of the related policy history.

It also cites President Trump, Senator Cruz, and Senator Markey as advocating action to “… ensure we have a resilient system in place.”

In 2020, President Trump issued Executive Order 13905 on “Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Services.” Designed to stimulate adoption of open market commercial solutions, it does not seem to have made the nation’s PNT substantially more resilient in the intervening five years. This may be because GPS is free and time and navigation have been provided by the government as free utilities for hundreds of years. Also, many GPS users may be unsure about the need for alternatives since the federal government has not yet acted to protect itself with an alternative system. Potential users are also reluctant to purchase commercial PNT services as they are unsure which commercial services will have the longevity to make the cost and effort of adoption and integration worthwhile.

President Trump also supported the need for GPS alternatives in Space Policy Directive 7, “The United States Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Policy.” It called for the government to “…identify and implement, as appropriate, alternative sources of PNT for critical infrastructure, key resources, and mission-essential functions.” This directive was issued shortly before the end of the first Trump administration and, though the directive still stands, this provision has not yet been acted upon.

Carr’s mention of Senators Cruz and Markey undoubtedly refers to their joint sponsorship of the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018. The act called for the Department of Transportation to ensure establishment of at least one terrestrial timing system as a backup for GPS signals. The first Trump administration and the Biden administration never requested funding for such an effort, so the mandate has yet to be implemented.

Regarding GPS alternatives Carr’s post also says “…it is important that we catch up to other countries that are looking at robust alternatives of their own.” This is likely a reference to a memo ADM Allen, the chair of the National Space-based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board, sent to the deputy secretaries of Defense and Transportation in July of last year. It warns about the U.S. falling behind in PNT, especially compared to China.

An FCC meeting on GPS alternatives is also timely as the commission has received two petitions related to provision of nation-wide PNT services. One is from NextNav, seeking spectrum to underwrite its proposal to work with telecom providers. The other is from the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), asking to mandate and accelerate implementation of the new ATSC 3.0 television broadcast format. NAB says its Broadcast Positioning System signals will be included as part of that format.

While GPS alternatives will be discussed at the upcoming meeting, no decisions on systems is contemplated. Carr says the commission:

“… will vote on an inquiry to explore other Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) systems that can be complements or alternatives to GPS. Beyond answering technical questions, we hope this effort will engage stakeholders across government and industry to encourage the development of new PNT technologies and solutions.”

On March 6, the commission released a fact sheet with an attached draft Notice of Inquiry (NOI). The 24-page draft seeks public input on a wide variety of PNT policy and technical issues. The NOI is intended to:
- Discuss current PNT technologies and efforts, both from governmental and private sector entities, for developing complementary and resilient PNT technologies.
- Seek comment on various space-based solutions for resiliency of PNT, such as medium Earth orbit (MEO) satellite systems and low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite systems.
- Seek comment on various terrestrial solutions for resiliency of PNT, such as leveraging TV broadcast infrastructure, ground-based transmitters, and/or user equipment positioning.
- For all technologies, ask commenters for information on the benefits and challenges of particular PNT technologies or solutions based on factors such as: geographic coverage; availability of existing equipment; use of spectrum resources; the extent to which the technology should be viewed as a complement to or substitute for GPS and other PNT technologies; performance characteristics such as range and precision; durability; international considerations; and the cost and incentives to develop, deploy, and maintain the technology or solution.
- Seek comment on additional actions that the Commission could take to facilitate the security of PNT technologies available to consumers.
- Seek comment on whether to amend the Commission’s existing rules or adopt new rules to promote adoption of complementary and alternative PNT technologies.
- Ask questions about what role public-private partnerships, testbeds, or Innovation Zones may play to test and develop PNT technologies.
The FCC open meeting’s agenda also includes two items about 911 services. One of those is “Strengthening 911 Location Accuracy Rules” especially for the vertical (z) axis. This seems to be a separate and distinct issue from the PNT agenda item with the burden of performance and response placed on telecom providers. That said, some eventual linkage cannot be entirely discounted.

The meeting will take place on March 27 from 10:30 to 12:30 EDT. A formal agenda will be posted approximately a week in advance. The meeting can be live streamed at https://www.fcc.gov/March2025 and a recording will be available on YouTube shortly thereafter.
March 7, 2025
NextNav petitions FCC for new spectrum band

NextNav has petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to add a new spectrum solution in the Lower 900 MHz band (902-928 MHz band) to complement and backup GPS. The Lower 900 MHz band plan aims to give access to 15 MHz of low-band spectrum for 5G services.

The company filed a rulemaking petition to the FCC, proposing to rearrange the band to facilitate a terrestrial positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) network and broadband. The petition specifically asks the FCC to reconfigure the band plan and adopt new rules, including enabling a high-quality terrestrial complement and backup to GPS for essential PNT services and providing 15 MHz of low-band spectrum for use by mobile broadband networks.

The proposal, according to the filing, “enables high-quality terrestrial PNT, with the potential for widespread and inexpensive adoption in many use cases because it will use the 5G standard.” Because the company’s NextGen PNT solution uses a small amount of capacity in the 10 MHz downlink, mobile network providers can use most downlink capacity for broadband, “making the spectrum appealing for integration into existing networks and thereby accelerating the availability of terrestrial PNT services.”

According to the filing, “The 15-megahertz band plan is necessary for this broadband deployment, which enables an at-scale PNT network to be deployed efficiently, providing a unique path to resolving the coverage, cost, and user device issues that have prevented broad terrestrial PNT usage to date.”

NextNav recently signed an agreement to acquire spectrum licenses covering an additional 4 MHz in the lower 900 MHz band from Telesaurus Holdings GB and Skybridge Spectrum Foundation. In March 2024, the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Alameda, issued an Order approving the Receiver’s request to sell all of its Lower 900 MHz spectrum holdings to NextNav, allowing the parties to move forward with obtaining FCC approval.

The company plans to partner with mobile network operators or others interested in commercial deployment in the band for 5G and will ensure incumbent operations are protected. According to the company, it has used its existing licenses to develop PNT expertise and products, but, because of a legacy band plan and rules that limit the use of the spectrum for 5G, much of this band is underused.

The NextGen PNT technology and network are designed to use 5G and offer a 3D positioning solution with single-digit accuracy. The positioning solution is available indoors and outdoors and in urban corridors. It also seeks to provide wireless distribution of precise, resilient timing.

The current Lower 900 MHz Band is “not conducive for either terrestrial PNT or mobile broadband,” according to the filing, with shortcomings that include fragmented geographic licensing arrangements, outdated command-and-control requirements and other restrictions. Consolidating the geographically licensed spectrum blocks into a 15MHz nationwide configuration for both PNT and 5G broadband changes. This allows the band to support better use cases and serve as a high-performing complement and backup to GPS.

April 23, 2024
First Fix: Three recent articles that prove GNSS is constantly in the news

In one way or another, GNSS is constantly in the news, even though it rarely makes the headlines. Three recent articles prove this point.

Matteo Luccio

The article “Starburst” in the March 4 issue of The New Yorker, written by staff writer Kathryn Schulz, details how the next big solar storm could devastate the U.S. power grid and communication systems and questions whether we are prepared for it. Schulz focuses repeatedly on the key role of GNSS and how devastating it would be if their signals were disrupted by a solar storm. She points out that a large solar storm has not occurred since widespread electrification, let alone in the digital age, and that some scientists now believe there is an approximately 12% chance of an extreme geomagnetic storm striking Earth in the next decade. “The Army,” Schulz wrote, “concerned about overreliance on vulnerable technologies, has reinstated courses in orienteering, and the Navy has resumed teaching sailors how to use a sextant.”

A March 12 article in WISPOLITICS — which bills itself as “Wisconsin’s Premier Political News Service” — reports on a letter from the chairman of the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, Mike Gallagher, to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel. Following reports that U.S. cell phones and other devices are receiving and processing signals from Chinese and Russian GNSS satellites, Gallagher asked Rosenworcel whether it is “contrary to FCC rules for handsets and other devices to receive and process signals from unauthorized GNSS constellations.” I have long wondered the same thing. If any of you readers has a firm understanding of this issue, please let me know. Gallagher also asked whether it is “the responsibility of component vendors, device makers, or carriers to ensure that such signals are not received and processed by devices that use GNSS” and whether the FCC has taken any enforcement actions on this matter.

A March 14 article by Elliot Ackerman and James Stavridis in The Wall Street Journal warns that, as its headline says, “Drone Swarms Are About to Change the Balance of Military Power.” Ackerman, a Marine veteran, is the author of numerous books and a senior fellow at Yale’s Jackson School of Global Affairs. Admiral Stavridis, U.S. Navy (ret.), was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is a partner at the Carlyle Group. “Drones have become suddenly ubiquitous on the battlefield — but we are only at the dawn of this new age in warfare,” they wrote. “[D]ozens or hundreds of drones in AI-directed swarms will have the capacity to overwhelm defenses and destroy even advanced platforms. Nations that depend on large, expensive systems like aircraft carriers, stealth aircraft or even battle tanks could find themselves vulnerable against an adversary who deploys a variety of low-cost, easily-dispersed and long-range unmanned weapons.” While the article focuses on AI and does not mention GNSS, the latter is a key enabling technology for UAVs, as readers of this magazine know well.

April 11, 2024