Tag: GNSS spoofing

Xona satellite begins tests for commercial LEO navigation
Xona Space Systems’ Pulsar-0 satellite, the company’s first production-class asset for a commercial navigation constellation, is now operational and undergoing in-orbit testing. Launched in March 2024 on SpaceX’s Transporter-10 mission, Pulsar-0 is designed to assess the performance of Xona’s Pulsar architecture, which aims to provide high-accuracy, resilient positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services from low-Earth orbit (LEO).

According to Xona, Pulsar-0 is transmitting LEO-based PNT signals using a payload built to support signal authentication and increased resilience against interference — capabilities that have become more important as concerns about vulnerabilities in traditional GNSS systems grow. The system’s encrypted and authenticated signals are intended to mitigate risks from jamming and spoofing, and deliver stronger, more reliable service in environments where legacy GPS may be degraded.

Xona’s Pulsar constellation is being developed as a commercial complement to GNSS, offering centimeter-level accuracy and greater resistance to interference through modernized signal design and LEO deployment. The company reports that its initial signal waveforms are already being used by select government and commercial partners for prototyping and validation.

Pulsar-0’s technical objectives include:
- High-precision GNSS corrections: Real-time correction data from LEO, targeting position accuracy within 10 cm.
- Signal authentication: Cryptographically verifiable signals to reduce the risk of spoofing.
- Jamming resistance: A signal strength up to 100 times greater than GPS, enhancing reliability in contested or congested radio frequency environments.
- Stronger signals: Stronger signals designed to perform in obstructed locations, such as indoors or in dense urban areas.
The Pulsar-0 mission is primarily focused on validating Xona’s core technology and enabling live sky testing with early partners, paving the way for future launches and eventual commercial operations. The company aims to launch a constellation of hundreds of satellites to provide persistent, redundant PNT coverage for sectors including defense, logistics, mining and autonomous systems.

Further details on Pulsar-0’s performance are expected as data collection and testing continue throughout the year.
July 7, 2025
Thales invests €55M to advance resilient navigation in France

Thales, a European leader in resilient navigation, announced a €55 million ($63 million) investment to expand its industrial sites in Châtellerault and Valence, France. The investment, scheduled between 2025 and 2028, aims to address increasing demand for advanced navigation solutions in both civilian and military sectors and to reinforce the company’s sovereign industrial base.

The company is responding to rising threats such as GNSS jamming and spoofing by deploying a suite of resilient navigation technologies. These solutions combine precision, autonomy and security, which are critical for maintaining operational continuity in military missions and civil aviation. Thales integrates inertial navigation systems with GNSS signal reception, enabling reliable navigation even in contested environments. The TopAxyz inertial navigation system ensures autonomous capability, while the TopStar-M receiver and TopShield anti-jamming technology protect signal integrity. These advancements are supported by France’s Directorate General of Armaments under the OMEGA program for the modernization of GNSS equipment for the armed forces.

At the Châtellerault site, Thales plans to quadruple production capacity for inertial navigation systems by 2028. With six decades of expertise in laser gyroscopes, this facility is the only European supplier equipping civil aircraft and will expand its offerings for aircraft, land vehicles, ships and munitions. In Valence, mass production of TopStar-M receivers and TopShield systems is set to begin in 2026. The site will also introduce a new production line for inertial MEMS sensors, a technology that combines compact design with high performance, positioning Valence as a leader in France’s MEMS technology sector for defense. The launch will be accelerated with support from Tronics Microsystems for specialized industrial expertise.

Currently, more than 800 employees work at the two sites, with plans to hire 150 additional staff by 2028. The investment seeks to strengthen Thales’ regional presence and contribute to France’s position in the industry.

June 18, 2025
VIAVI unveils second-generation RSR Transcoder for reliable PNT in GPS-denied environments
VIAVI Solutions Inc. has introduced its second-generation RSR Transcoder, engineered to maintain operational capability in GPS/GNSS-denied, degraded or disrupted space operational environments.

This development comes amid a global increase in GPS and GNSS jamming and spoofing, which have become standard tactics in electronic warfare. These hostile activities, while primarily aimed at military operations, also threaten sectors that depend on precise timing and geolocation, such as aviation, communications and emergency services.

The new RSR Transcoder is designed to deliver assured positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) in a wide range of outputs to upgrade legacy systems. The device features a GPS full constellation simulator and employs a patented algorithm to rapidly convert assured inputs — including M-Code, SAASM, IMU/INS, and other signals of opportunity — into universal GPS L1 and L2 signals with both C/A-code and P-code outputs. This capability allows for the straightforward enhancement of older GPS systems, providing them with modern, resilient PNT functionality.

The RSR Transcoder is housed in ruggedized IP68 enclosures suitable for deployment on land, sea and air platforms. It is capable of covert, lights-out operation and offers a 100 Hz output rate with an ICD-GPS-153 interface. The device is available with holdover oscillator options of 4, 8 and 24 hours, supporting continued operation during signal loss.

On Display at the Joint Navigation Conference

The RSR Transcoder will be demonstrated at the 2025 Joint Navigation Conference, which is held June 2-5 in the Greater Cincinnati Area and jointly hosted by the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security. It will be on display at VIAVI’s booth #406. VIAVI’s Inertial Labs division will also demonstrate recent breakthroughs in D3SOE navigation at booth #430.

VIAVI and its Inertial Labs division will also give three presentations:
- “3D Vision-Based Positioning for Autonomous Aerial Platform Navigation and Human-in-the-Loop Reconnaissance Mission”: Monday, June 2 at 1:50 PM ET
- “Anti-Jam/Spoof Phased Array Antenna”: Wednesday, June 4 at 10:50 AM ET
- “Retrofitting At-Risk GPS Defense Equipment with a Multi-Orbit LEO and GEO Clock System for Resilient PNT Services”: Wednesday, June 4 at 11:30 AM ET
May 29, 2025
India’s UAV progress threatened by GNSS jamming; infiniDome offers solutions

India continues to make significant progress in developing indigenous unmanned aerial vehicles, loitering munitions and autonomous systems. However, many of these platforms face a critical vulnerability: their reliance on unprotected satellite navigation. This threat is no longer theoretical.

Recent escalations with Pakistan, including drone incursions, cyber operations and suspected GPS interference near sensitive border areas, have underscored the growing use of low-cost, easily concealed GNSS jamming tools. Such devices can disrupt UAV operations, sever navigation links and compromise mission success, regardless of how sophisticated the system may be.

Without robust GNSS protection, even the most advanced unmanned systems are at risk of operational failure, loss of control and diminished national security capabilities.

One countermeasure comes from infiniDome, a global provider of GNSS protection technology. The company develops lightweight, easily integrable anti-jamming solutions that are already deployed by leading defense forces to ensure continuous operation in contested electromagnetic environments.

InfiniDome has extensive operational experience in active conflict zones and a strategic focus on compact, cost-effective systems. These solutions are well suited to India’s growing demand for scalable, lightweight UAVs and autonomous platforms, according to the company.

May 27, 2025
GNSS under attack: Recognizing and mitigating jamming and spoofing threats
In today’s hyper-connected world, GNSS signals face unprecedented threats from jamming and spoofing attacks. As these signals traverse 20,000 km from satellites to Earth, they become vulnerable to interference that can degrade positioning accuracy or eliminate position availability altogether. Understanding how to recognize these attacks and implement protective measures has become critical for industries depending on precise positioning.

Two Distinct Threats

Jamming occurs when signals are disrupted or denied, making it difficult or impossible for receivers to interpret information correctly. In contrast, spoofing involves malicious transmission of fake signals that mimic real ones, tricking receivers into delivering inaccurate location data. Spoofing is basically someone trying to pretend they’re a real satellite.

While jamming focuses on disruption through noise and interference, spoofing relies on deception, sending false signals that systems accept as legitimate. Both pose serious challenges, but their differences require unique detection and prevention strategies.

When jamming occurs — whether it be noise (chirp) jamming, tone jamming or pulsed jamming, devices may experience significant signal degradation resulting in interrupted communication and loss of both data and situational awareness. By contrast, spoofing — be it meaconing, coherent or signal overlay — can subtly alter data, leading to false readings and misguided actions.

How to Know If Your Signal is Under Attack

With the surge in electronic devices in today’s IoT-rich world, interference from radio frequencies — whether intentional or situational — is common. This is partly because multiple sensors are often situated close to each other on equipment, vehicles, drones and more. So how do you know if your system is under attack? GNSS interference typically manifests through several telltale indicators, including erratic or unstable device performance, frequent signal interruptions or a marked decline in data precision. Deception often reveals itself via red flags such as unusual location data inconsistencies, abrupt and unexplained shifts in data patterns, signal quality degradation (e.g., drop in carrier-to-noise ratio or high noise floor), sudden position drifts, frequent re-acquiring of signals, large discrepancies detected by Kalman filters or unexpected signal peaks.

With jamming, the first step is to recognize you’re being jammed by using a receiver as a jamming detector and utilize an onboard spectrum analyzer to identify interfering frequencies. Not only is this valuable for external jamming, but it is hugely helpful for companies as many accidentally self-jam with other components on the device.

Identifying these signs promptly is crucial for preserving system functionality and preventing potentially catastrophic consequences.

Industry Impact: Beyond Navigation

Beyond the military and cybersecurity, public safety, transportation, marine, construction, agriculture and utilities are highly susceptible, posing a significant threat.

Autonomous vehicle systems face the greatest risk, as they depend heavily on GNSS data for navigation accuracy and split-second decisions. Jamming can cause vehicles to struggle with lane-keeping, misinterpret traffic signals, or stop without warning, while spoofing presents a more subtle, yet still dangerous threat by potentially diverting vehicles from intended routes with harmful intentions, increasing the likelihood of collisions with obstacles, other vehicles or people.

Interruptions in key transportation networks can also lead to vehicles being misdirected, potentially leading to collisions, and even becoming targets for malicious actions like cargo theft. Railway systems have emerged as major targets, with “ransomware attacks becoming the most prominent threat against the rail sector” across the EU, according to Marianthi Theocharidou of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). In the Baltic region alone, 46,000 aircraft exhibited possible jamming signs between August 2023 and March 2024.

In ag, precision farming technologies requiring reliable data for optimizing planting, watering and harvesting schedules face major disruptions that translate directly into resource waste and profit drain.

Navigation systems critical for safety and cargo protection are particularly vulnerable in maritime and logistics. Recent incidents include the hijacking of trucks carrying over $1 million worth of Santo tequila in Texas, where investigations suspect spoofing made the vehicles appear in the right location when they weren’t.

The Growing Accessibility of Attacks

Where skilled hackers once dominated the scene, inexpensive jammers now flood the market. Despite being illegal in most countries, these devices — often disguised as USB sticks or car chargers — have become increasingly accessible. One tiny 10mW chirp jammer plugged into a car socket can knock out GNSS signals within several miles.

Spoofing, once a complex task, is now achievable using open-source software or low-cost components, making robust countermeasures essential for systems across all industries.

Trimble’s Multi-Layered Defense

When looking for ways to mitigate these risks, it’s important to look for technology with embedded security features designed to combat both jamming and spoofing via cutting-edge innovation in radio frequency and processing technologies. Trimble’ GNSS receivers incorporate Maxwell technology, including:
- Digital Signal Processing (DSP) – rejection of spoofed signals through sophisticated tracking algorithms to detect multiple signals.
- Satellite Data Verification – historical logging of orbital parameters to detect unexpected changes or deviations from reasonable bounds, enhancing reliability.
- Autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) for identifying and rejecting potentially spoofed satellite data, a practice well-established in the aviation industry.
- Real-time monitoring with position sanity checks, limited satellite search windows and worldwide testing to stay ahead of the curve in developing further protection technologies.
Trimble solutions monitor and analyze the signals received in each of the GNSS frequency bands using the receiver’s ProPoint positioning engine. Trimble ProPoint GNSS technology allows for flexible signal management, which helps mitigate the effects of signal degradation and provides a GNSS constellation-agnostic operation. For example, when individual frequencies and constellations are spoofed or jammed, the receiver continues to provide positioning using available measurements. The onboard spectrum analyzer feature helps users identify interference on the bench or post-mission and take steps to remove.

In the past year, Trimble has added support for Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA).This helps safeguards receivers by verifying the authenticity of Galileo navigation data, effectively mitigating data-level spoofing threats and bolstering overall system security. ProPoint receivers also have the ability to verify GPS and BeiDou-3 broadcast ephemeris via RTX NMA. This uses Trimble’s global network of reference stations with validity flags sent over MSS and IP links.

The Path Forward

With spoofing incidents expected to rise, the time for vigilance is now. Organizations must conduct risk assessments to identify vulnerabilities, implement multi-layered defense strategies and stay informed about emerging threats.

Through participation in global test programs like the JammerTest in Norway and the DHS’s GET-CI, Trimble has demonstrated the importance of continuous innovation in protection technology. During the JammerTest in September 2024, Trimble engineers joined the world’s largest GNSS jamming and spoofing exercise, testing the resilience of its positioning technology. The team drove a van packed with receivers and raw radio frequency (RF) data recorders from Munich to Norway. On the way they collected data through various terrains and conditions, including tunnels, ferries and bridges. On location, they participated in intense jamming, spoofing and meaconing tests across multiple sites, gathering data on various Trimble receivers, and also observing the performance of Trimble IonoGuard technology in the high ionospheric activity of northern latitudes. The event provided critical insights into GNSS interference detection and protection from jamming and spoofing, ultimately shaping the future development of Trimble Positioning Services and the industry.

As GNSS signals become increasingly critical for autonomous systems, smart cities and precision applications, protecting their integrity isn’t just about maintaining accuracy—it’s about safeguarding lives, preserving economic interests and ensuring the reliable operation of essential infrastructure.

The question isn’t whether GNSS interference will affect your systems, but when. By recognizing the warning signs, understanding the risks, and implementing robust protection measures, organizations can stay ahead of evolving threats and maintain the precision their operations demand.
May 27, 2025
Seen & Heard: Amazon sued, Europe’s first lunar lander and more

“Seen & Heard” is a monthly feature of GPS World magazine, traveling the world to capture interesting and unusual news stories involving the GNSS/PNT industry.

Amazon sued for alleged privacy violations

Photo: Hispanolistic / E+ / Getty Images

Amazon is facing a lawsuit in Washington state, marking the first dispute under the state’s My Health My Data Act. The lawsuit accuses Amazon of violating privacy laws by collecting location data from millions of Americans without their consent through its software development kits used in various mobile applications. The collected data allegedly included information that could indicate a consumer’s attempt to acquire health services, violating the My Health My Data Act, which requires explicit consent for collecting and selling health-related data.

Europe’s first lunar lander underway

Photo: ESA

The European Space Agency (ESA) has partnered with Thales Alenia Space to develop Argonaut, Europe’s first lunar lander. This spacecraft will provide autonomous access to the Moon, supporting international exploration efforts. Starting in the early 2030s, Argonaut will conduct regular lunar missions, delivering infrastructure, scientific instruments, rovers and essential resources for astronauts. Designed to withstand harsh lunar conditions for up to five years, Argonaut will play a crucial role in sustainable lunar exploration, according to ESA.

Leica Geosystems, SCI-Arc equip future architects

Photo: Leica Geosystems

Leica Geosystems and the Southern California Institute of Architecture (SCI-Arc) have partnered to equip future architects with advanced technology skills. Leica is donating more than $200,000 in equipment, including lidar scanners, and offering expert guidance and scholarships to students. SCI-Arc students are applying this technology to create digital archives of Los Angeles structures and visualize rewilded wilderness.

GNSS spoofing disrupts wildlife tracking

Photo: rockptarmigan / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images

In a recent study published by Nature Communications, researchers share that GNSS spoofing in conflict zones is disrupting wildlife tracking efforts, particularly affecting black-tailed godwits migrating through Eastern Europe. Researchers tagged 15 godwits in Finland in May 2024. Eight of these birds displayed spoofed geolocations during their migrations. The most significant spoofing occurred near Simferopol airport in Crimea, where birds were falsely located while flying over Ukraine or Romania. This spoofing added substantial errors to migration tracks, in one case creating a false 7,200-km round trip.

March 28, 2025
Editorial Advisory Board Q&A: The hidden cyber threats to GNSS/PNT systems

When we discuss the security of GNSS/PNT systems, we nearly always focus on interference — i.e., meaconing, intrusion, jamming or spoofing. However, GNSS/PNT systems are embedded in systems of systems that also offer many other opportunities for cyberattacks.

What should we do about it?

Ellen Hall

“The key is platform architecture, specifically ensuring robust spatial and temporal partitioning between safety-critical and non-safety-critical functions. Safety-critical functions, such as navigation and autopilot, must be isolated from non-safety-critical functions, such as mission compute, where artificial intelligence typically operates. This partitioning minimizes the scope and effort required to produce design assurance artifacts for airworthiness certification. Additionally, it enhances security by reducing potential attack vectors through the isolation of safety-critical and mission-critical capabilities.”

— Ellen Hall
Imminent Federal

Mitch Narins

“An old mariner’s proverb is: ‘The prudent mariner never relies solely on any single aid to navigation.’ A more recent statement offers: ‘With so many pieces of sophisticated electronic equipment at our beck and call it would seem some are lulled into complacency and are ignoring basic seamanship.’ In September 2018, the U.S. Naval Institute published an article titled, ‘Professional Mariners Cannot Rely on Electronics Alone.’ The recent news that the U.S. ITAR restrictions on multi-element antenna arrays will be lifted (thanks to many in our community who have lobbied hard for this for many, many years) is excellent news. It will help and was a necessary change — but it is not sufficient. It certainly does not remove the need to pursue complementary, PNT solutions that will ensure the safety, security, and economic well-being of PNT users and their PNT-dependent systems worldwide. From a basic systems engineering perspective, incorporating multiple solutions with independent failure mechanisms is ultimately the end product that we in the PNT community should all be seeking. We must not forget, however, a key element of many of these systems: the human in the loop, who, if continually provided the opportunity to train in PNT-challenged environments, often can be the ultimate system safety element. This will require the design of our PNT services to ensure that the human factors designed into these systems include sufficient information for the human component to understand an off-normal situation and have the training and skills to take the appropriate corrective actions.”

— Mitch Narins
Strategic Synergies

February 27, 2025
FAA and NAWCAD advance CRPA approval process

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has partnered with the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) to initiate steps toward approving Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CPRAs) for use in aircraft. This collaboration addresses GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing threats, with the current focus on a Request for Information (RFI) to study anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technologies. The RFI, published on SAM.gov, aims to identify and evaluate vendors’ antenna technologies for potential integration into civilian aircraft.

CPRAs could significantly mitigate terrestrial-based GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing, enhancing aviation safety by preserving situational awareness and reducing pilot workload during disruptions. The technology’s effectiveness in neutralizing ground-based threats positions it as a critical tool for maintaining reliable navigation systems.

RFI details and next steps

NAWCAD is leading the RFI process, which includes hosting industry days and establishing Cooperative Research and Development Agreements for testing hardware and evaluating performance. Responses to the RFI are due by May 26, 2025, at 5:00 PM EST, with questions accepted until April 25, 2025. Data from the RFI and subsequent testing will inform updated Minimum Operational Performance Standards for GPS/GNSS antennas and cockpit displays.

Dana Goward, president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, noted that this is a great first step, but cautioned that widespread adoption of CPRAs in commercial aircraft will take a long time due to the lengthy FAA approval and certification processes, along with the significant financial investment and effort required to install CRPAs in airplanes.

Although CPRAs address terrestrial threats, space jamming continues to be a critical concern. Adversaries often outpace countermeasures, necessitating continuous innovation to keep up with advancing threats.

FAA safety alert highlights risks

The FAA issued Safety Alert for Operations (SAFO) 24002 on Jan. 1, 2024, to alert operators and manufacturers about the risks of GPS/GNSS disruptions. The alert emphasized the potential for increased pilot workload and safety risks due to situational awareness loss during jamming or spoofing incidents.

On Jan. 17, 2025, the State Department proposed removing CPRAs from the U.S. Munitions List (USML), shifting their regulation to the Commerce Department’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This change, effective Sept. 15, 2025, aligns CRPA export controls with other dual-use technologies, streamlining their adoption. A 60-day public comment period is open via regulations.gov.

February 26, 2025
GNSS disruption at sea level: An interference study in the Baltic Sea
For years, aviation safety organizations and maritime authorities have relied on ADS-B-based reports to assess GNSS interference. Services such as gpsjam.org, spoofing.skai-data-services.com and flightradar24 have provided valuable insights into interference patterns at high altitudes. However, this data tells only part of the story. Ground-based infrastructure — ports, telecommunications networks, and precision navigation systems — operate in a vastly different signal environment. High-altitude detections cannot reliably indicate the presence or impact of interference at sea level.

To address this critical knowledge gap, GPSPATRON and Gdynia Maritime University have conducted a six-month study on GNSS interference in the Baltic Sea. Using terrestrial GNSS monitoring technology, the project examined the frequency, duration and characteristics of interference events affecting maritime navigation and other critical applications.

Data collection and analysis

At the core of this study is a terrestrial GNSS monitoring system developed by GPSPATRON, designed to capture and analyze signal disruptions in real-time. Installed at the Faculty of Navigation at Gdynia Maritime University, this system continuously recorded GNSS signal integrity and transmitted the collected data to a cloud-based analytics platform. This platform facilitated the automated detection, classification and visualization of GNSS interference events, providing a comprehensive understanding of interference patterns and their potential impact on maritime navigation. The results paint a stark picture of persistent and evolving interference patterns in the Baltic region. More than 84 hours of GNSS interference were recorded, with October exhibiting the highest activity. Two primary interference types were identified: multi-constellation jamming, prevalent in the summer months, and multi-tone interference, which emerged in October.

Key findings
- Persistent GNSS Interference: A total of 84 hours of GNSS interference was detected, indicating continuous disruptions in the region. Most incidents were caused by jamming rather than spoofing.
- October saw peak interference levels: The month recorded six major jamming events totaling 29 hours, showing an escalation in disruption frequency and severity.
- Maritime sources of interference suspected: Signal pattern analysis confirms that the source was mobile, reinforcing the likelihood of a single ship or multiple vessels operating the same advanced jamming technology.
- High-Precision Jamming Signatures: The interference signals detected exhibit structured modulation patterns and frequency agility, suggesting the use of highly sophisticated jamming techniques. These characteristics indicate high-grade equipment, potentially of military origin, with capabilities far exceeding those of common commercial jammers. The consistency and precision of these disruptions highlight the need for further investigation into the source and intent behind these operations.
- No link to ADS-B reports: Despite extensive ground-level interference, ADS-B-based monitoring systems failed to register corresponding events, highlighting their limitations in assessing terrestrial threats.
- Long-duration disruptions: Some interference events lasted more than seven hours, significantly affecting GNSS-dependent operations in maritime navigation and port activities.
Implications for maritime and critical infrastructure

The findings of this study expose a critical gap in current GNSS monitoring methods. High-altitude interference reports, primarily based on ADS-B data, fail to capture the real impact of jamming and spoofing at ground level. Maritime operations, port logistics, and other critical infrastructure remain vulnerable due to this oversight.

Ports, telecommunications providers, and emergency services rely heavily on GNSS for navigation, timing synchronization, and security. Without precise ground-level monitoring, disruptions can go unnoticed, leading to cascading failures across multiple sectors.

A major concern is the false sense of security created by ADS-B-based detection systems. While these services report daily interference incidents, they do not reflect the full extent of ground-based GNSS disruptions. As a result, infrastructure operators may underestimate the risk, assuming that existing monitoring solutions provide adequate coverage. This misconception is dangerous, as it masks the severity of interference threats that remain undetected in high-altitude datasets.

To mitigate these risks, there is an urgent need for a dedicated GNSS interference monitoring network along the Baltic Sea coast. Such a network would provide real-time, localized data to accurately assess threats, detect interference sources, and enhance infrastructure resilience against GNSS disruptions.

Conclusion

This study confirms that GNSS interference is a persistent issue at sea level, posing a serious threat to critical infrastructure, which predominantly operates at ground level. Prolonged interference events were recorded, some lasting several hours, leading to significant degradation in positioning and timing accuracy. This disruption directly impacts maritime operations, telecommunications, emergency response, and other sectors reliant on GNSS services.

High-altitude interference detection alone is insufficient, as it fails to capture threats affecting ground-level operations. Relying solely on ADS-B-based reports creates a false sense of security, leaving critical systems vulnerable to undetected risks.

To mitigate these risks, there is a clear need for a dedicated ground-based GNSS interference monitoring network. Such a system would provide real-time detection, precise geolocation of interference sources, and timely countermeasures to protect infrastructure.

GPSPATRON and Gdynia Maritime University urge regulatory bodies to take proactive steps toward enhancing GNSS interference detection and mitigation. Without coordinated action, vulnerabilities in national infrastructure will continue to escalate, leading to potentially severe operational and security consequences.

The full report can be downloaded from the GPSPATRON website.
February 18, 2025
Labsat shares results of Jammertest 2024

Labsat has released updates from Jammertest 2024, where the team addressed real-world challenges related to GNSS jamming and spoofing attacks. According to Labsat, the team was on-site with the Labsat 4 GNSS Record & Replay device, which effectively captured the entire GNSS RF environment during the tests. The team shared that this technology has allowed Labsat to collect more than 20 TB of data, enabling them to reproduce complex signals under laboratory conditions.

Labsat recorded GNSS signals at 12 bits of I&Q resolution across multiple frequency bands to accurately capture the RF conditions. With this data, LabSat 4 users can recreate these signals on their test benches, allowing them to evaluate their GNSS receiver performance against the same challenges encountered during the event.

Labsat said it plans to make these recordings available to its LabSat 4 users, allowing them to experience a full range of jamming and spoofing scenarios firsthand. This offers GNSS engineers a unique chance to prepare their technology for real-world threats.

Labsat 4 GNSS Record & Replay device. (Photo: Labsat)

October 29, 2024
Adtran’s Oscilloquartz aPNT+ takes Jammertest 2024

Adtran’s Oscilloquartz team of network synchronization specialists has demonstrated the capabilities of its positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) solution, the OSA aPNT+, during Jammertest 2024 in Norway.

According to the team, the OSA aPNT+ platform demonstrated exceptional resilience against jamming and spoofing attacks during the series of real-world tests. It seeks to serve as a vital role in PNT security for critical sectors such as infrastructure and defense. As we rely more on PNT systems, there is a need for robust protection against increasingly sophisticated threats. To meet this challenge, the OSA aPNT+ platform employs a multi-layered protection strategy and zero-trust architecture.

The company said that by integrating diverse PNT sources, including Iridium Satellite Time and Location (STL) services, the platform can effectively mitigate risks and establish new standards for securing applications across the public and private sectors.

Adtran’s Oscilloquartz aPNT+™ solution is built around a multi-layered approach, incorporating advanced GNSS signal analyzers, anti-jamming antennas and AI/ML-enhanced firewalls. Key products, including the OSA 5412, OSA 5422 and OSA 5430 grandmaster clocks, along with the OSA 5401 and OSA 5405 Series of small-form-factor solutions, underwent thorough testing at Jammertest.

The integration of Iridium’s Satellite Time and Location (STL) services was evaluated, showcasing its ability to diversify PNT sources and bolster defenses against jamming and spoofing attacks. The company shared that Oscilloquartz’s Syncjack technology could detect and mitigate meaconing attacks.

This approach aligns with IEEE 1952 standards and establishes Oscilloquartz solutions as indispensable for critical sectors dependent on assured PNT, including telecommunications, defense and finance.

October 28, 2024
GNSS spoofing threatens airline safety, alarming pilots and aviation officials

Photo: Oundum / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images

The increasing prevalence of GNSS spoofing in commercial aviation poses significant safety concerns and highlights the need for robust alternative positioning, navigation and timing (A-PNT) sources. This form of electronic warfare, which uses fake signals to confuse aircraft navigation and safety systems, has become a growing issue for civilian flights worldwide.

Pilots told The Wall Street Journal that spoofing incidents have risen in recent months. According to analyses from SkAI Data Services and the Zurich University of Applied Sciences, the number of affected flights per day increased from a few dozen in February to more than 1,100 in August 2024.

The issue of spoofing has expanded beyond active conflict zones near Ukraine and the Middle East, and now affects hundreds of civilian pilots daily on a global scale. The modern cockpit’s heavy reliance on GPS technology means that falsified data can have far-reaching consequences, breaching multiple aircraft systems and causing disruptions that may last anywhere from a few minutes to an entire flight.

According to anonymized reports shared with government agencies and industry groups, pilots have experienced many alarming incidents, including sudden clock resets, false terrain warnings and unexpected flight path deviations. This surge in GNSS spoofing attacks highlights the vulnerability of critical navigation systems and raises significant concerns about aviation safety in an increasingly complex environment.

All jammed up
The Wall Street Journal reported that in August 2024, a United Airlines flight from New Delhi to the New York area encountered a GPS spoofing incident that affected its navigation systems for the duration of the flight.

Initially, the flight seemed to adhere to the standard GPS route across Asia, mirroring the path taken by previous flights heading to Newark Liberty International Airport. The spoofing attack, originating in the Black Sea region south of Ukraine, caused the aircraft’s GPS coordinates to deviate progressively from its actual position throughout the remainder of the flight.

Even after the plane had left the affected area, its reported GPS location continued to show erratic behavior, occasionally making sudden jumps. This suggested that the navigation equipment was struggling to recalibrate accurately. While alternative navigation systems ensured the flight’s safe completion of its intended route, the compromised GPS data indicated that it had terminated in the Atlantic Ocean. In reality, the aircraft landed safely at its scheduled destination in Newark.

Keeping operations safe
Aviation safety officials said spoofing has disrupted some flights but has not posed major safety risks. Pilots are trained to use A-PNT systems as backups. However, managing false GNSS signals and alerts risks dividing the operator’s attention if a more severe problem arises.

“If we lose an airplane because of workload issues because of these problems we’re encountering, compounded with an emergency, that is going to be a horrendous event,” said Ken Alexander, the Federal Aviation Administration’s chief scientist for satellite navigation, during a pilot union forum in Washington, D.C.

Airlines are collaborating with aircraft manufacturers, parts suppliers, and aviation safety authorities to devise immediate solutions and long-term strategies. For example, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) are openly discussing these challenges and holding workshops to share best practices. Safety bulletins have also been issued for operations where spoofing and jamming are known to have occurred.

Industry insiders told The Wall Street Journal that the development of new equipment standards to enhance civilian aircraft resilience against spoofing attacks is not expected to be finalized until 2025.

Navigating issues across sectors
According to anonymized reports collected by OpsGroup, an aviation safety organization that includes pilots, dispatchers and other airline staff, various attacks have caused navigation issues across multiple sectors.

GNSS spoofing has disrupted operations in Europe but has not endangered flights, said Florian Guillermet, executive director of the European Union Aviation Safety Agency. Pilots had to divert to airports they did not intend to land at, and earlier this year, an airline temporarily halted operations at an Estonian airport that was not equipped with ground-based navigation as a backup for GNSS.

Boeing said manufacturers, carriers and regulators globally are contributing GPS expertise for solutions to ensure safety. Boeing and Airbus are working with airlines to help develop procedures to assist pilots, the companies said.

United and American said their pilots are equipped with several ways to navigate with precision, even with GPS interference. American said it has not experienced disruptions or significant safety concerns from GPS interference.

Insights from industry experts
During the 64th Civil GPS Service Interface Committee Meeting — hosted at ION GNSS+ 2024 from Sept. 16-17 — The presentation “Complementing GNSS for Resilient Performance Based Navigation” by Okuary Osechas Ph.D., and Gary A. McGraw, Ph.D., addressed the critical role of complementary positioning, navigation and timing (CPNT) technologies in aviation, particularly in light of increasing threats to GNSS.

The presentation highlights the impact of radio frequency interference (RFI) on aviation, including jamming and spoofing. These pose significant risks to aviation safety by reducing operational margins. The prevalence of these threats is increasing, necessitating alternative navigation solutions.

Performance-based navigation (PBN) is essential for modern aviation, enhancing efficiency and flexibility. However, it relies heavily on GNSS, making it vulnerable to disruptions, again highlighting the need for CPNT services.

Integrating CPNT sources ensures resilient navigation capabilities. This includes leveraging legacy navigation aids and modernized terrestrial systems. Various complementary technologies such as eDME, eLORAN, LDACS-NAV and LEO SATNAV are being assessed for their operational effectiveness, compatibility and potential to support aviation needs.

The researchers recommend the following to address these challenges:

Near-term solutions: Implementing eDME for backward compatibility.
Medium-term strategies: Utilizing eLORAN for wide-area time distribution.
Long-term goals: Developing LDACS-NAV to enhance spectrum efficiency and standardization.
Collaborative efforts: The presentation calls for international cooperation in research and development to advance standards and infrastructure investments in complementary PNT technologies.

September 24, 2024