Tag: GNSS spoofing

  • Timing matters: The critical role of GNSS-resilient systems in modern infrastructure

    Timing matters: The critical role of GNSS-resilient systems in modern infrastructure

    When a GNSS signal is lost, plenty of people think about navigation first. An aircraft may find itself deprived of precise position data, vessels may have difficulty determining their location, and vehicles may be forced to use alternative navigation methods.

    However, positioning is only part of the story. There is always something much more fundamental behind each navigation signal: time.

    As a matter of fact, there exists a whole invisible network of synchronization, without which the functioning of telecommunications networks, power distribution grids, transportation, aviation, and many others would become impossible.

    At this very moment, billions of devices around the planet are coordinated through the use of highly accurate timing signals provided by GNSS. This has been one of the most successful inventions of the modern era, though it also remains one of the most overlooked ones.

    However, with a growing number of jamming cases and increasing interconnectivity of critical infrastructures, times are changing. Today, the question is not whether companies need highly accurate timing, but how long they can operate without it.

    The World’s Most Invisible Dependency

    Timing rarely receives the same attention as positioning, yet it underpins many of the systems society depends upon daily.

    A mobile phone call connects because cellular networks remain synchronized. A financial transaction gets verified based on the system’s agreement on the accurate sequence of events. Electrical power can flow effectively from one country to another due to the shared timing reference point among substation and control centers.

    Aviation technology cannot ignore this either. Today, this field requires synchronized surveillance, communications, navigation, and operation systems. There are millions of interconnected processes at the airport, and they require timing for safety reasons.

    Emerging technologies, such as digital towers and more advanced air mobility systems, are becoming more reliant on the synchronization process. In most cases, for instance, GPS is used for its unmatched accuracy and accessibility.

    The challenge now is that dependence often breeds complacency.

    When Time Stops

    Contrary to a total breakdown, timing disruptions tend to be more subtle.

    A network can function while synchronization slowly becomes poor. A communication system can be working without issues while performance slowly declines. Timing disruption goes unnoticed by critical infrastructure operators until they discover that the common reference connecting various systems is no longer effective.

    It is because of this that timing disruption poses such a serious threat. Any small timing issue may rapidly spread across connected systems. Milliseconds can turn into seconds, whereas localized disturbances may quickly become network-wide issues. Depending on which industry sector is being considered, consequences may include reduced performance or even total disruption.

    As GNSS interference increases, this trend will only accelerate.

    Various instances of increased GNSS jamming and spoofing have already been recorded within aviation in Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world. Although all focus has been on navigation issues, the bottom line remains the same: if GPS signals are jammed or spoofed, so can timing signals be.

    Resilience Is the New Accuracy

    While accuracy has always been the main priority in the past several decades, nowadays, it starts being accompanied by resilience. Even the best timing solution in the world means nothing when it proves unreliable in case of any disruptions.

    As a result, today’s operators of critical infrastructure are changing their approach to timing, no longer focusing solely on accuracy. The target is to maintain reliable timing under any circumstances, including the presence of adversarial attacks or other forms of interference.

    Such an approach affects the design of the timing architecture itself, which in the future will likely become more complex and rely on multiple timing sources. GNSS systems will remain integral, while other elements, such as atomic clocks or resilient PNT technologies, will complement them.

    In other words, the future is no longer entirely about redundancy but about reliability.

    The Rise of Assured Timing

    Assured PNT is a term that has received considerable attention in recent years, especially among companies working in aviation, military, telecommunication, and energy fields. Its essence is clear and straightforward: companies should not depend completely on one source of time signal.

    On the contrary, robust systems need to continuously verify received data, identify irregularities, and continue functioning without the presence of any reliable time references. In other words, the system is intelligent enough to distinguish between correct and incorrect information.

    The matter is crucial given the current trend toward automation in different industries.

    Automation implies autonomous vehicles, sophisticated air traffic management systems, digital communications infrastructure, and energy distribution networks, all depending on precise timekeeping. Automation, however, doesn’t tolerate uncertainties. 

    In high-speed decision-making processes, synchronization becomes highly important. Otherwise, the notion of autonomy remains just a fiction.

    Building the Next Generation of Resilient Infrastructure

    The silver lining in this is the fact that the industry has responded to this challenge.

    Investments in robust timing solutions are increasing across the aerospace and critical infrastructure industry. Firms working on developing navigation, timing, and inertial system solutions are now developing technology-based solutions that are capable of ensuring accuracy irrespective of whether the GNSS solution is available or not.

    These include solutions around advanced atomic clocks, robust PNT solutions, and signal authentication and monitoring solutions that are capable of detecting any form of interference even before it affects the process.

    Organizations such as Safran have played an active role in this journey by backing the development of technology that enables infrastructure operators to maintain accurate PNT capability.

    The objective is not to replace GNSS. Rather, it is to ensure that critical systems remain operational when GNSS alone is no longer enough.

    The Strategic Importance of Time

    The importance of timing will only increase in the years ahead.

    5G and future communications networks require tighter synchronization. Autonomous transportation systems depend on coordinated decision-making. Smart grids must balance increasingly dynamic energy flows. Aviation continues its journey toward more connected and digitally integrated operations.

    Every one of these developments places greater value on resilient timing. For decades, timing has quietly powered the systems behind modern life. It has been so reliable that many organizations have treated it as a given. That assumption is beginning to change.

    The future of critical infrastructure will not be defined solely by how accurately systems can determine their position. It will be defined by how effectively they maintain trust when their primary sources of information are challenged.

    Because in a world built on synchronization, timing is more than a technical requirement. It is a strategic asset. And when it is lost, the consequences can be felt far beyond the systems that depend on it.

  • Unifly & Nexova complete NAVISP phase to advance cyber-resilient U-space operations

    Unifly & Nexova complete NAVISP phase to advance cyber-resilient U-space operations

    Unifly, in cooperation with Nexova, have successfully completed the SecureUTM 2 Phase I under the European Space Agency’s (ESA) NAVISP program, with emphasis on mitigating GNSS jamming and spoofing.

    The project establishes a certification-aligned, risk-driven cybersecurity foundation for secure, resilient and scalable unmanned traffic management (UTM) and U-space services across Europe. 

    As drone operations grow in complexity and cross-border interoperability, cybersecurity is becoming essential for operational continuity and public trust. SecureUTM 2 embeds cybersecurity engineering into the core architecture of UTM systems, aligning with European U-space regulations, Common Criteria methodology and ENISA risk frameworks. Security is treated as a foundational design principle rather than a late-stage compliance requirement. 

    Building on SecureUTM 1, SecureUTM 2 Phase I significantly expanded the cybersecurity baseline for UTM systems. Key outcomes include: 

    • Refinement of a harmonized Protection Profile (PP) for UTM 
    • Development of an updated Security Target (ST) for the Unifly platform 
    • Structured risk assessment and certification-aligned gap analysis 
    • Definition of a secure architectural baseline addressing real-world U-space complexity 
    • Setup of a PoC Testbed 

    Risk-based engineering roadmap

    A control-by-control gap assessment translated cybersecurity requirements into a prioritised implementation roadmap. Focus areas include: 

    • PNT source authentication and plausibility checks 
    • Enhanced session integrity and transport protection 
    • Denial-of-Service resilience 
    • Device-level authentication and auditing 
    • Secure storage and encryption 

    This structured approach supports operational deployment and future EU cybersecurity certification readiness. 

    Validated mitigations for GNSS and PNT threats

    SecureUTM 2 phase I placed strong emphasis on GNSS jamming and spoofing risks increasingly observed in drone operations. Practical, layered mitigations were validated through a dedicated U-space proof-of-concept testbed with Hardware-in-the-Loop UAV simulations. 

    Validated measures include: 

    • On-board GNSS jamming detection 
    • Fleet-level interference inference 
    • Trajectory plausibility and conformance monitoring 
    • OSNMA-based message verification 
    • Structured anomaly logging and alerting 

    The testbed enables repeatable attack simulation, KPI-based evaluation and regulator-ready evidence generation. 

    Foundation for Phase II and European deployment

    Phase I also delivered a structured U-space testbed blueprint, verification methodologies and digital twin foundations to support continued validation, operator training and continuous cybersecurity testing. 

    SecureUTM 2 directly supports Belgium’s U-space deployment strategy and strengthens its position in secure drone integration. 

    Phase II will focus on implementing prioritised controls, expanding validation capabilities and further aligning with EU certification frameworks. 

  • How to defeat harmful GPS/GNSS interference: A roadmap for action

    How to defeat harmful GPS/GNSS interference: A roadmap for action

    As GPS World readers know, the growing prevalence of GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing outside of conflict zones interrupts vital aviation safety technologies and presents challenges to maritime commerce and the global economy. An alarming example is playing out along the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, prompting 13 coastal European nations and Iceland to highlight in January 2026 “growing GNSS interference” and collectively reinforce requirements to comply with existing regulations and international law designed to ensure the safety of all maritime vessels engaged in shipping.

    As commercial aircraft report navigation anomalies and maritime operators experience false position data in congested waterways, global authorities are sounding alarms that GNSS interference will continue to rise without immediate action. In March 2025, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued a joint warning expressing “grave concern” that disruptions from GNSS jamming and spoofing constitute an urgent threat to public safety, telecommunications networks and international commerce.

    Compounding harmful interference incidents led the GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) to act. Defeating illegal and harmful interference outside of combat zones requires a coordinated, whole-of-government strategy that focuses on stopping bad actors through deterrence and enforcement, and directing resources toward preventing and sanctioning those violating international commitments and laws prohibiting jamming and spoofing. Investing in GPS modernization and integrating innovative signals from complementary PNT satellite systems into devices and receivers will deliver PNT that surpasses today’s technologies to the global community.

    Roadmap for Action

    In September 2025, GPSIA led a coalition of leading industry groups in sending a letter to the Departments of Defense and Transportation that called for urgent action to address GPS jamming and spoofing. We noted the United States has the technology and expertise to solve this issue, and the administration has the power to act. GPSIA followed the letter with a whole-of-government strategy providing a clear roadmap for the administration. While some recommendations have been implemented, other opportunities remain. 

    Focus on the Real Culprits 

    The culprits in each of these scenarios are bad actors putting public safety and global commerce at risk with harmful interference outside conflict zones. The global community relies on several unique technologies that can be impacted by harmful interference, such as cellular and Wi-Fi signals, radars and automated information systems. The misplaced focus on faint GNSS signals or dependencies on GNSS derail collective efforts to immediately regain interference-free global commerce and bolster public safety. 

    Governments and international organizations mandate certain industries integrate safety-of-life technologies into their operations — and they do, at great cost. Officials should in turn be given the political support and resources to stop bad actors from
    intentionally interfering with them.

    What to Do Next 

    Public and continued diplomatic engagement are critical. By amplifying European counterparts, condemnations from senior U.S. officials can raise the reputational costs for bad actors and reaffirm international norms that protect GNSS signals and other technologies from harmful interference. 

    Engaging with the ICAO is important. The U.S. should reinforce its commitment to providing modern civil GPS signals that support navigation in international airspace and encourage ICAO to prioritize the enforcement of global GNSS protections. 

    GPSIA also recommends Executive agencies establish an interagency task force that rapidly identifies and disseminates information about interference events with civil operators, including sanitized intelligence information on intentional jamming and spoofing of commercial aircraft and ships.

    Civil operators also should be invited to participate in interference coordination calls and reporting. Sharing radio-frequency interference data, incident reports and threat assessments among military and civil agencies and operators is essential to preserving public safety. The Performance-based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee’s recommendations for continuity of operations during GPS disruption events should continue to be implemented with urgency.

    The GPS III satellite has additional anti-interference features. (Image: Lockheed Martin)
    The GPS III satellite has additional anti-interference features. (Image: Lockheed Martin)

    Deterrence and information sharing must be coupled with sustained enforcement. Federal agencies have taken welcome action to interdict illegal jamming equipment, reporting an 830% increase in seizures since 2021. We applaud the U.S. government for prioritizing resources to stop the illegal import and sale of these devices.

    GPSIA commends the Kingdom of Norway’s annual Jammertest, which allows receiver and device manufacturers to test interference detection and counter jamming and spoofing. These realistic test scenarios, together with strengthened enforcement and prioritized intelligence collection and analysis, will enhance public safety.

    Modernize GPS 

    While GPS satellites continue operating with an extraordinary 99.99% availability and no outages on record, the health of the constellation and jamming and spoofing incidents affecting receivers and devices, demand action. The final GPS III satellite is scheduled to launch this spring. Next-generation GPS IIIF satellites are being built. Their launches should be prioritized to reduce the number of satellites on orbit that are one system or subsystem away from failure. GPSIA welcomed the passage of the FY2026 Defense Appropriations Bill, which bolstered national and economic security by investing needed funding for modernized GPS IIIF satellites and long-term PNT leadership. 

    Notably, the current GPS program plan does not include counter-spoofing technologies. Implementing counter-spoofing authentication capabilities for Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) signals would further strengthen aviation resilience.

    Ground infrastructure modernization is equally important. The GPS ground station must be able to command and monitor GPS III and IIIF satellites and the modern L5 aviation signal.

    Streamline Regulatory Activities 

    Regulatory modernization represents another area of progress. In September 2025, the State Department removed jam-and spoof-resistant Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), fulfilling one recommendation from GPSIA’s strategy. 

    Certification processes also must evolve, and integration of CRPAs into aircraft should be accelerated. The modern L5 signal and counter spoofing signal authentication signals must be incorporated into FAA-certified and other receivers as soon as possible. 

    Recommendations for the FCC 

    President Trump’s December 2025 Executive Order (EO), “Ensuring American Space Superiority,” directs U.S. departments and agencies to detect and counter threats to U.S. space infrastructure. It also states that his administration will enable industry to develop and deploy advanced space capabilities, including terrestrial and cislunar PNT applications. This EO should serve as a “North Star” for the FCC, resulting in increased enforcement resources to address illegal jamming and spoofing, and a regulatory environment prioritizing innovative, advanced commercial satellite PNT systems that complement GPS. Demonstrating American leadership in space demands that we step forward, not backwards, in our PNT capabilities.

    The FCC is evaluating the record developed in its Notice of Inquiry, Promoting the Development of PNT Technologies and Solutions, and is reportedly considering future rulemaking. The FCC’s task is not to replace GPS, but to ensure that the regulatory environment protects its spectrum, increases enforcement actions against those perpetuating harmful interference and enables innovation that complements this foundational system. This balanced approach will fulfill President Trump’s mandate, preserving public safety and economic security, and ensure continued American leadership in PNT.

    Global Safety and Commerce 

    Baltic and North Sea shipping lanes have become a flashpoint for GPS jamming and spoofing, prompting 13 European nations and Iceland to issue a joint warning in January 2026 over interference threatening maritime safety and global commerce. (Photo: Dmitri Toms / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images)
    Baltic and North Sea shipping lanes have become a flashpoint for GPS jamming and spoofing, prompting 13 European nations and Iceland to issue a joint warning in January 2026 over interference threatening maritime safety and global commerce. (Photo: Dmitri Toms / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images)

    The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry uncovered dozens of PNT technologies, ranging from those in the marketing stage, to hyper-localized solutions, to proposals to exploit “signals of opportunity.” Creativity and ingenuity abound in the commission’s record, but the docket’s many filings lacked technical details to evaluate whether the systems advance the nation’s
    PNT leadership.

    The hallmarks of GPS are its worldwide coverage, and the continuity, availability, integrity and accuracy of its signals. Our modern global community deserves complementary PNT systems and signals that meet or exceed GPS capabilities. A few satellite-based solutions stood out as holding promise to do so. 

    Systems operating in low-Earth orbit (LEO) can transmit stronger signal power due to their proximity to Earth, improving performance in urban environments and contested spectrum conditions. Systems operating in different frequency bands, such as TrustPoint’s C-band system, add spectral diversity, making it far more difficult for an adversary to disrupt all PNT services simultaneously. When combined with modernized GPS signals and authentication capabilities, this layered approach can deliver robust services while complementing the foundational role of GPS.

    Terrestrial systems cannot replicate global coverage of satellite constellations. They are also vulnerable to wildfires, hurricanes and other disasters.Building parallel terrestrial networks would require significant investment while delivering a fraction of modernized satellite systems’ capabilities. Nor do terrestrial signals provide the continuity, availability, integrity and accuracy of satellite systems. 

    The Progress is Real

    GPSIA is pleased to report that progress is being made in several areas outlined in its “whole-of-government” strategy. It’s time to accelerate that progress. In May 2026, GPSIA members will convene to evaluate this strategy and outline what more the PNT industry can do to play a part in defeating harmful interference. Our members also will meet with government officials to underpin that government-led enforcement and solutions to jamming and spoofing can further illustrate the importance of PNT to U.S. leadership in space, and national security, public safety and the global economy. 

  • Hybrid RTK: A scalable path to high‑precision positioning for the IoT era

    Hybrid RTK: A scalable path to high‑precision positioning for the IoT era

    The world is rapidly filling with connected devices. IoT Analytics reports that 18.5 billion IoT devices were online in 2024, with growth accelerating toward an expected 21.1 billion by the end of 2025 and 39 billion by 2030. As artificial intelligence drives demand for richer, more precise device data, the need for reliable, high‑accuracy positioning becomes foundational.

    Yet today’s GNSS infrastructure — including cellular-based real‑time kinematic (RTK) networks — was never designed for this scale. Billions of devices — from vehicles to drones to industrial sensors — depend on location data, but the traditional GPS model struggles under three converging pressures: (1) massive device growth, (2) rising accuracy requirements, and (3) increasing vulnerability to interference.

    These pressures are reshaping expectations for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) and creating demand for a new, more resilient delivery model.

    Why Accuracy and Resilience Matter More Than Ever

    Autonomous systems are the clearest example of the accuracy challenge. Xona Space Systems CTO Dr. Tyler Reid notes that safe autonomous driving requires 10 cm accuracy 95% of the time and 30 cm accuracy at “eleven nines” reliability. Standard GPS, accurate only to several meters, cannot meet these thresholds — even with traditional enhancement techniques.

    At the same time, GNSS signals face growing threats. Spoofing and jamming events are now daily occurrences in parts of Europe, and U.S. federal agencies increasingly require contract bidders to incorporate resilient PNT technologies alongside legacy GNSS.

    Finally, the explosion of IoT devices introduces a network‑scale challenge. Many of these devices could benefit from high‑precision positioning, but continuous unicast RTK streams are not an efficient use of cellular networks, especially as billions of devices come online.

    Together, these factors point to a simple conclusion:

    A new delivery model for high‑precision GNSS corrections is needed — one that is accurate, resilient, and scalable.

    Why a Hybrid Approach Is Required

    RTK positioning is the gold standard for centimeter‑level accuracy. It works by combining GNSS signals with correction data from a known base station. However, traditional RTK has two major limitations:

    1. Coverage constraints — corrections must be delivered within a limited range of the base station due to the fact that accuracy diminishes the further the GNSS base is from the rover.
    2. Network constraints — corrections are typically delivered over cellular networks, which become inefficient at scale.

    Precise Point Positioning (PPP‑RTK) can extend range and reduce dependency on local base stations, but today’s PPP‑RTK implementations are proprietary and lack a common standard.

    To support billions of devices — many mobile, many mission‑critical — the industry needs a correction‑delivery model that is:

    • Nationwide
    • Efficient at scale
    • Resilient to interference
    • Cost‑effective for high‑volume IoT deployments

    This is where hybrid RTK becomes essential.

    Introducing Hybrid RTK: A Dual‑Path Delivery Model

    Hybrid RTK refers to the dual‑path delivery of GNSS correction data, consisting of:

    • Primary path: ATSC 3.0 broadcast
    • Fallback path: Cellular (LTE/5G)
    • Upstream messaging: Cellular for acknowledgments or device telemetry

    Compared to a satellite-based RTK solution or even a cellular-only RTK solution, hybrid RTK will deliver corrections over a far more reliable and scalable network, because it’s both broadcast and terrestrial-based.

    Why broadcast first?

    ATSC 3.0 provides:

    • One‑to‑many multicast efficiency
    • Predictable capacity and uniform latency
    • Wide coverage footprints
    • Strong penetration in dense urban environments
    • Lower cost per delivered bit

    This makes it ideal for distributing high‑precision correction data to large numbers of devices simultaneously — something cellular networks are not optimized for.

    Why cellular second?

    Cellular fills in:

    • Coverage gaps where ATSC 3.0 is not yet deployed
    • Uplink needs (e.g., device status, position feedback)
    • Mobility scenarios requiring two‑way communication

    The result is a resilient, nationwide correction layer that scales with IoT growth.

    EdgeBeam Wireless: A New Entrant with a Broadcast‑First Architecture

    EdgeBeam Wireless is deploying a hybrid RTK network that leverages the existing infrastructure of U.S. television broadcasters — including secure facilities, hardened towers, and nationwide engineering resources — for both over-the-air RTK delivery and collocating GNSS base stations.

    This approach provides several advantages:

    • Accelerated deployment of GNSS base stations designed to complement existing base networks.
    • Lower infrastructure costs than cellular‑only RTK networks.
    • High reliability through broadcast delivery.
    • Scalable distribution for dense IoT environments.
    • Nationwide reach as ATSC 3.0 coverage expands.

    EdgeBeam’s broadcast‑first model — branded by the company as  “Enhanced GPS” or  “eGPS” — is best understood simply as hybrid RTK with broadcast as the primary downlink. While this hybrid approach does require some additional hardware to receive the broadcast, pricing is already very competitive to cellular because these chips will be found in every television set in the country. Moreover, EdgeBeam already has products available for end users that want to leverage a hybrid network without having to do any development work.

    Broadcast RTK: A New Network Layer at the Edge

    Broadcast RTK uses ATSC 3.0 to distribute GNSS correction data over the last mile. This creates a new edge network layer that can support both GNSS and other data applications, including:

    • High‑precision GNSS corrections
    • Multicast distribution of positioning data
    • Offloading of appropriate high‑volume traffic (e.g., video) from cellular networks
    • Enterprise‑grade reliability for industrial and transportation systems

    By shifting the heavy downlink load to broadcast, cellular networks are freed to handle uplink messaging and mobility support — a more efficient division of labor.

    This hybrid architecture is not just about improving individual device accuracy. It enables something more powerful.

    A New Generation of Shared Situational Truth

    When many devices operate on the same centimeter‑accurate reference frame at the same time, a new capability emerges: Shared Situational Truth (also known as shared situational awareness).

    This refers to a consistent, real‑time understanding of location and timing across a fleet, system, or environment. Hybrid RTK enables this by delivering synchronized, high‑precision PNT to large numbers of devices simultaneously. By offloading RTK delivery to a broadcast network, cellular and other communication networks can then be used to share a device’s position and other data with other local devices.

    What is being shared?

    • Precise location
    • Precise timing

    Who is sharing it?

    • Vehicles
    • Fleets
    • Drones
    • Industrial robots
    • Infrastructure sensors
    • Emergency services
    • Insurance and logistics platforms

    What does it enable?

    Examples include:

    • Safer ADAS/ADS through lane‑level awareness
    • Collision avoidance for drones and autonomous systems
    • Fleet optimization using precise, time‑aligned movement history
    • Improved insurance models through reliable behavior measurement
    • Faster accident resolution with time-synchronized location records
    • Infrastructure‑to‑vehicle coordination for road hazards or construction zones

    In transportation alone, EdgeBeam’s hybrid RTK solution could make entire traffic systems safer and more predictable — not just individual vehicles.  And importantly, this can be done far more efficiently than via just a cellular-based solution.

    Conclusion: A Foundational Shift in PNT Delivery

    The convergence of IoT growth, accuracy demands, and GNSS vulnerabilities is forcing a rethinking of how high‑precision positioning is delivered. Hybrid RTK — with broadcast as the primary downlink and cellular as a complementary path — offers a scalable, resilient, and cost‑effective solution.

    For industries ranging from automotive to logistics to public safety, the shift from “nice‑to‑have” to “must‑have” high‑precision PNT is already underway. As hybrid RTK networks expand, the ability to deliver centimeter‑level accuracy at scale will unlock new applications, new efficiencies, and new expectations for how devices understand and interact with the world.

    EdgeBeam Wireless is building this new correction layer — one designed for the billions of devices that will depend on precise, reliable positioning in the years ahead.

  • BeaconSat aims to make GNSS attacks visible with Austria’s first military satellite

    BeaconSat aims to make GNSS attacks visible with Austria’s first military satellite

    Austria is breaking new ground in space. BeaconSat is the largest satellite ever developed in Austria and also the country’s first military satellite. The project is being led by Austrian start-up GATE Space, based in Schwechat. Launch is planned for February 2027 aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket.

    BeaconSat is designed to detect and analyze jamming and spoofing attacks on GNSS — targeted attempts to interfere with and manipulate navigation signals such as GPS or Galileo. Austria is responding to a security policy development that has real implications for aviation, transport, energy supply, and military operations.

    Attacks on critical infrastructure

    Jamming and spoofing incidents are frequent in geopolitically tense regions. In aviation, repeated disruptions have affected civilian aircraft.

    “Space is now a central component of Europe’s and Austria’s security and defense strategy,” said Major General Friedrich Teichmann, head of the ICT and Cybersecurity Center. Navigation signals have long been part of critical infrastructure, and securing them is therefore of great strategic importance.

    However, many of these attacks remain invisible. Countries often do not know where the interference is coming from, how systematic it is, or what pattern lies behind it. This is where BeaconSat comes in.

    Technology demonstrator with strategic dimension

    BeaconSat will systematically detect and analyze GNSS interference signals from orbit for the first time. The aim is to obtain data on when and where navigation systems are being deliberately disrupted. The mission is designed as a multi-year research and development project.

    “It is important that we are able to act independently in terms of communication and navigation when necessary. This is a question of resilience and military capabilities,” emphasized Defense Minister Klaudia Tanner. “Space is an essential part of military capability.”

    The satellite is not intended to be an isolated military project, but rather a demonstrator. Civil space technologies are being further developed for security-related applications and tested under real-world conditions. The findings will be incorporated into the operational processes of the Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVL).

    Austrian industry at the center

    GATE Space has overall responsibility for the project. Founded in 2022, the spin-off from TU Wien develops chemical propulsion systems for satellites and currently employs around 27 people. For BeaconSat, the company is supplying the propulsion system, the satellite structure, and the thermal management system, among other things.

    “With BeaconSat, we are making a direct contribution to Europe’s security. The market for such capabilities is huge,” said Managing Director Moritz Novak.

    The engines were tested in more than 8,000 hot runs at the site near Vienna Airport, both under atmospheric conditions and in one of Europe’s most powerful vacuum chambers.

    GATE Space was supported by the Federal Ministry for Innovation, Mobility, and Infrastructure (BMIMI) through Austria Wirtschaftsservice (aws) with funding of around 750,000 euros.

    Jamming and spoofing detection

    A central contribution to the payload comes from the Graz-based company IGASPIN, which develops systems for the precise detection and analysis of GNSS interference. Additional components, including the on-board computer, are supplied by the Danish company Space Inventor.

    At the European level, the mission is supported and co-financed as a technology demonstration via the European Space Agency’s ESA Marketplace. Off-the-shelf systems are specifically used to test commercially available technologies under security-relevant conditions.

    New space chapter in the Ministry of Defense

    BeaconSat also marks a turning point institutionally. The BMLV is currently setting up its own organizational unit for space services. The focus is on three areas: satellite communication, satellite navigation, and satellite-based reconnaissance.

    “These space services are key to cross-domain operations and make a substantial contribution to the Austrian Armed Forces’ modern reconnaissance, command, and control network,” Teichmann said.

    BeaconSat will provide data that will be directly integrated into military decision-making processes. At the same time, the project contributes to European resilience: those who recognize threats early on can respond diplomatically, politically, or technically.

    Space as a growth area

    The strategic importance of space technologies is growing both in terms of security policy and economics. Austria has recently increased its contribution to the ESA from 260 to 340 million despite budgetary constraints. Space and aviation technologies are anchored in the government’s industrial strategy as one of nine key technology fields.

    Satellites have long been considered critical infrastructure. They enable navigation, communication, Earth observation, climate monitoring, and security applications. At the same time, new markets are emerging in the areas of propulsion systems, data analysis, and dual-use technologies.

    With BeaconSat, Austria is repositioning itself in terms of security policy and industry. The project is an example of how startups, established technology companies, ministries, and European partners can and must work together successfully.

  • The Hill: America is dangerously unprepared for a GPS attack

    The Hill: America is dangerously unprepared for a GPS attack

    We just finished the year that marked the 30th anniversary of America’s Global Positioning System (GPS) reaching full operational capacity. What began as a military tool to enable U.S. military forces to navigate more precisely and to support the use of precision strike weapons anywhere in the world has become the invisible infrastructure that powers nearly every aspect of civilian life. So much of our everyday lives, from smartphones and ATMs to aviation, shipping and Wall Street, run on precise timing and location information.

    However, that infrastructure is now under duress. Our adversaries are waging a sophisticated war on GPS signals, and the fallout is both significant and frightening. Reports of navigational issues across the Baltic and the Middle East have become a daily occurrence due to conflicts in the region. The impacts have extended into civilian life, impacting air, land and sea.

    It’s a miracle the regions have avoided a major aviation disaster, given that navigational warfare and space have become new domains of nation-state confrontation. Russia is spoofing and jamming signals across Eastern Europe. Russia and China are also shadowing military and civilian satellites, performing dangerous dogfighting maneuvers in orbit.

    Jamming and spoofing were once rare. Now, they are battle-tested tools in the electronic warfare arsenal, and the U.S. is not immune to their effects. What’s happening in these regions today could happen over Chicago or Atlanta tomorrow.  

    Similar interference has been detected near major U.S. airports, including Dallas and Denver, impacting nearly 350 flights. Nation-states were not responsible for these incidents, but they prove how vulnerable GPS is to disruption.

    This isn’t a Hollywood thriller. A coordinated attack on GPS would ripple across aviation, finance, emergency response, and daily life within minutes, not days. We’ve already seen how quickly systems collapse when digital links are severed.

    In 2022, a volcanic eruption in Tonga severed the country’s only undersea cable and blocked satellite signals, plunging the island into an instant blackout. Commerce broke down, and government emergency coordination collapsed. ATMs couldn’t dispense cash because banks couldn’t confirm account balances. Cargo planes couldn’t file manifests, and supply chains froze. Farms and fisheries couldn’t complete online forms, so produce rotted. Pharmacies couldn’t fill prescriptions because their supply systems were offline. The effects were immediate and took months to normalize.

    If GPS goes down, whether because of jamming, spoofing, a cyberattack or a natural disaster America is dangerously unprepared. Our widespread reliance on a vulnerable technology should be a wake-up call. A single sustained outage could cost the U.S. economy an estimated $1.6 billion per day.

    When I served as commander of U.S. Cyber Command, our team was responsible for ensuring the networks underpinning our military missions were fully operational and secure, and as the director of the National Security Agency, the team was focused on generating deep knowledge of threats to the U.S. and allied operations across land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. In both roles, it became very clear that we needed to protect our positioning, navigation and timing infrastructure, and that one of the keys to doing so was to create layered resilience.

    Solving a problem of this magnitude is a massive challenge. But we don’t need to start from scratch. By leveraging existing infrastructure in space and on the ground, we can accelerate deployment, reduce cost and avoid duplication. Speed and scale are essential. It’s not a question of whether the U.S. experiences a major GPS disruption, but when.

    Fortunately, the technology already exists. American companies are developing methods to provide positioning, navigation and timing backup via terrestrial 5G networks, offering timing and location signals that are independent of satellites. These solutions are scalable, cost-effective and designed to integrate directly into existing telecom infrastructure such as cell towers. If commercial providers are already exploring complementary backup technologies, why are we still lagging behind our adversaries?

    The real barrier isn’t technology — it’s policy. Moving the process forward to make these technical capabilities a reality is the challenge. Getting government bureaucracies to act with urgency is never easy, but the administration and Congress now recognize the stakes.

    The Federal Communications Commission has launched an inquiry into strengthening national positioning, navigation and timing infrastructure, including exploring ground-based alternatives such as 5G-powered systems. Now it’s time to follow through and move from planning to execution.

    The threats are real; the technology is ready; and the cost of inaction grows by the day. Replacing GPS is not a realistic near-term solution, either in terms of cost or the time frame required to do so. Our focus should be on building a layered, resilient system that provides users with multiple options to react to loss or degradation of our current positioning, navigation and timing structure. One layer of that system should be a ground-based component that takes advantage of the existing infrastructure already in place, saving us significant time and money in creating a solution to this critical problem.  


    This piece originally appeared on The Hill.

  • infiniDome launches GNSS anti-jamming protection tech

    infiniDome launches GNSS anti-jamming protection tech

    infiniDome has introduced Aura, a new GNSS protection system built for platforms that cannot afford to lose their way. According to the company, this development comes at a time when GNSS interference incidents have surged by more than 400% across Europe and the Middle East over the past two years, making uninterrupted navigation a strategic necessity.

    Developed from years of field-proven operational experience, Aura is designed to redefine navigation resilience with smarter algorithms, faster interference response and a compact, rugged design capable of operating in contested environments.

    The system is available in two configurations: Aura, the enclosed version for rapid deployment, and AuraCore, the OEM module for integration. The system brings mission-grade protection to platforms ranging from small UAVs to large autonomous vehicles.

    Among several new capabilities, Aura features enhanced null-depth performance, enabling the system to withstand higher jamming power, and a new saving power mode that dynamically reduces energy consumption when no interference is present.

    “Aura isn’t just an upgrade; it’s a new philosophy,” said Omer Sharar, CEO of infiniDome. “It takes everything we’ve learned from real-world interference events and transforms it into a smarter, faster and more adaptive layer of defense. With Aura, we’re not just protecting GPS; we’re protecting autonomy itself.”

    Engineered for modern battlefields and complex environments, Aura introduces a new level of performance and resilience.

    Its adaptive algorithms ensure reliable navigation under evolving jamming conditions, while the optimized C-SWaP design keeps the system lightweight, low-power and mission-ready.

    Capable of mitigating interference from up to three directions per frequency simultaneously, Aura delivers protection that is powerful and efficient, tested and validated in live high-power jamming environments across multiple regions.

    These results position Aura as one of the most advanced and field-proven GNSS protection systems available.

    With Aura, infiniDome said it continues to advance its vision of navigation resiliency, ensuring that operators stay connected, coordinated and in control, even under severe electronic attack.

    Aura is available for early access evaluation and OEM integration, with full release scheduled for early 2026.

  • Kolkata is latest Indian city to be affected by GNSS interference

    Kolkata is latest Indian city to be affected by GNSS interference

    India has issued a Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) warning of possible GPS interference or signal loss along air traffic routes near Kolkata, reports Business Today.

    The NOTAM, valid Nov. 13-17, alerts airlines and pilots to remain vigilant to GNSS disruptions. It follows previous communications sharing issues with GNSS interference in New Delhi and Mumbai. Pilots and air traffic controllers also were asked to report any interference incidents within 10 minutes to the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA).

  • India increases efforts to collect GNSS spoofing data

    India increases efforts to collect GNSS spoofing data

    India’s aviation regulator, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), is collecting data on GPS interference and spoofing to have a better understanding of the situation, reports several news outlets in the country. The urge to collect data comes after the Delhi airport experienced issues in the past few days.

    Following a circular issued by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation in 2023, instances of GPS interference/spoofing have been reported since November 2023.

    Recently, several airlines have faced GPS spoofing at the New Delhi airport, with at least eight such instances on Nov. 5, said an unnamed DGCA official. The interference instances were noticed in domestic and international flights.

    Generally, interference issues are reported in border areas, rather than at Indira Gandhi International Airport, the country’s busiest. Daily flight movements have increased to more than 1,500 following an airport terminal upgrade completed in October.

    As many as 465 GPS interference and spoofing incidents were reported in the border region, mostly in the Amritsar and Jammu areas, between November 2023 and February 2025.

  • Implementing assured PNT for static and dynamic applications

    Implementing assured PNT for static and dynamic applications

    Position, navigation and timing (PNT) services, derived primarily from GNSS constellations, have become a critical element underpinning the global economy, with a vast range of sectors depending on these signals.

    This includes coordinating financial transactions, stabilizing power grids as well as navigation, with supply chains set to become more reliant on the technology as autonomous vehicles become prevalent. However, GNSS is a vulnerable technology, with faint signals from medium-Earth orbit (MEO) satellites being susceptible to disruption.

    In this article we’ll look at how both static and dynamic applications can achieve resilient PNT, with strategies and sensor fusion techniques that allow operational capability when GNSS is denied.


    Seven hundred. That’s the number of GPS interference events such as jamming and spoofing that take place every single day, according to the U.S. government. And this number is increasing across North America and Western Europe, with it being especially prevalent in or near war zones.

    Indeed, in August, the navigation system of a plane carrying the EU President, Ursula von de Leyen, was reportedly targeted by a GPS jamming attack as it was due to land in Bulgaria — forcing pilots to rely on paper maps. And GPS interference has been linked to the crash of Azerbaijan Airlines flight J2-8243, which was shot down on Christmas Day, 2024.

    Relying on a single source for PNT is no longer a viable strategy and developing a resilient PNT ecosystem that can function in D3SOE (denied, degraded, and disrupted space operational environments) has become essential.

    While navigation is the most commonly understood application of PNT, the timing component is critical in so many of the static systems we rely on — not just finance and power (as listed above) but for AI data centers, asset tracking systems and communication networks — which require precise and stable time references to ensure data integrity, and need these to be synchronized across global networks.

    For such systems, the consequences of getting timing off by even the smallest amount can be seen in the 2016 decommissioning of the SVN23 GPS satellite. During this, a software error created a 13.7 microsecond anomaly across the entire constellation that, according to a UK government report caused issues with digital radio broadcasts and communication networks. The event is also seen by some as a warning for the financial sector and in particular for high-frequency trading (HFT), where trades take place in millionths and studies have suggested that a 1 ms advantage in trading applications could be worth $100 million a year to a major brokerage firm.

    By subtly altering timing signals used by trading systems, malicious actors can effectively see and use market data “from the future” and enact transfers worth billions of dollars.

    Similarly, a timing attack on the phasor measurement units (PMUs) used to measure real-time stress in power grids could trigger major blackouts. The effect of such an attack can be seen in 2003’s (pre-PMU) Northeast Blackout, in which a sagging power line touched tree and caused a series of cascading outages that affected 55 million people across the U.S. and Canada. 

    And further putting the importance of protecting PNT in context, in 2020 the U.S. defined 16 critical infrastructure sectors as part of its Executive Order 13905. Of these 14 (88%) of these are reliant on PNT for their safe operation. Going beyond the energy and finance examples above, this includes sectors like communications, transportation, and agriculture. In short, PNT resilience is essential across virtually the entire economy.

    Detecting a Compromised GNSS Signal

    Of course, the first stage in protecting a PNT signal is in the identification of an attack, and several techniques can be used to identify inconsistencies that point to jamming or spoofing.

    These range from the analysis of the signal’s Doppler shift (transmissions from nearby terrestrial spoofer will have a near-zero Doppler shift) to techniques like RAIM (receiver autonomous integrity monitoring), which continually recalculates position while excluding one satellite each time to see if the results are consistent.

    Cryptographic methods, such as Galileo’s Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA), are also available to verify a satellite’s digital signature and confirm the data’s authenticity.

    However, relying on cryptographic authentication alone still comes with risks. Notably, authenticated signals are susceptible to meaconing attacks, where a legitimate signal is recorded and replayed later to mislead a receiver. It is, however, possible to counter these attacks using a secure, out-of-band verification layer for all GNSS constellations. This involves the independent delivery of authentication data with hash authentication transmitted via encrypted L-band correction signals from geostationary (GEO) satellites.

    This approach can also be retrofitted to older equipment using PNT by using an RSR transcoding device (see below).

    For dynamic systems, an additional level of validation can be gained by inertial sensors, comparing their output against PNT data to detect both sudden large jumps in position and continual slight deviations that can be characteristic of a sophisticated spoofing attack.

    Timing in Static Applications

    The timing architecture of such systems must go beyond simply identifying a threat and validate incoming data. This requires the integration of alternative PNT sources through an intelligent sensor fusion framework. To achieve this level of resilience in a fixed location, a multi-source, zero-trust approach is necessary. This involves augmenting or replacing GNSS with a layered defense of terrestrial and alternative space-based signals that can be authenticated and trusted.

    Modern PTP grandmasters utilize the latest sub-microsecond accuracy Precision Time Protocol (PTP) and the more common millisecond-range Network Time Protocol (NTP) to ensure compatibility with nearly all standard IT equipment.

    High-speed 25G PTP Ethernet connections are also being implemented to support high-performance AI data centers and financial exchanges without creating data bottlenecks. To ensure continuous operation during extended GNSS outages, these systems can draw synchronization from terrestrial sources like a network PTP feed or an optional atomic caesium clock.

    Furthermore, it is also possible to use encrypted L-Band signals from geostationary (GEO) satellites, such as those from Inmarsat, which create an enhanced timing service with built-in GNSS authentication and anti-spoofing features to deliver timing accuracy of sub-5 ns.

    Figure 1: VIAVI’s Inertial Labs division has developed a Visual-Inertial Navigation System (VINS) that combines 3D vision aided mapping with inertial accelerometers to enable positioning in D3SOE environments – shown in prototyping stage
    Figure 1: VIAVI’s Inertial Labs division has developed a Visual-Inertial Navigation System (VINS) that combines 3D vision aided mapping with inertial accelerometers to enable positioning in D3SOE environments — shown in prototyping stage.

    Navigation Without a North Star

    While static applications can utilize fixed terrestrial infrastructure for backup, dynamic systems do not have this luxury.

    The inherent weakness of RF signals makes them easy to overpower through deliberate jamming by hostile actors. As such, navigation systems onboard UAVs and autonomous vehicles, as well as manned commercial and military vehicles require self-contained navigation capabilities that can function reliably when GNSS signals are compromised. This has driven significant advances in inertial navigation.

    Sensors like accelerometers and gyroscopes have become a critical source for orientation and direction data that remains available at all times. The development of micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) has been crucial, enabling the integration of inertial navigation into even the smallest systems.

    These sensors aren’t an alternative to PNT satellites. By their very nature they will accumulate errors over time, with sensor bias causing drift and random-walk deviations allowing random noise in each measurement to accumulate. However, recent years have seen significant gains in their accuracy, allowing navigation to continue for short periods after GNSS data is compromised.

    Combining these inertial sensors with sensor fusion techniques also allows each element in a multi sensor system (using magnetometer; and accelerometers/ gyroscopes for roll, pitch and yaw…) to be continually verified by the others for further improvements in accuracy, reducing overall level of error. Data from these IMUs can also be fused with signals from alternative satellite constellations like those in LEO.

    LEO satellite signals are less accurate for timing than GNSS (around 80 ns vs. sub-15 ns) but are significantly stronger. For example, the Iridium LEO STL signal is c.1,000 times stronger than GNSS, making these signals both more resistant to jamming and harder to undertake a (successful) denial of service.

    More recently, techniques using downward-facing camera to track fixed identifiable landmarks have been developed as an alternative / additional data validation method for dynamic systems.

    These external sources provide absolute reference points that can be used to correct the inertial system’s calculations, dramatically improving accuracy and enabling reliable navigation for much longer periods.

    Figure 2: VIAVI’s SecureTime uses GEO and LEO constellations to provide positioning and timing signals that are resilient to attacks.
    Figure 2: VIAVI’s SecureTime uses GEO and LEO constellations to provide positioning and timing signals that are resilient to attacks.

    Sensor Fusion Gives Resilience

    The limitations of individual PNT sources — whether the vulnerability of GNSS or the inherent drift of inertial sensors — mean they cannot depend on a single technology. The most effective strategy is often a hybrid one, combining a high-accuracy inertial sensor unit with inputs from other sensors.

    As we touched on above, adding data sources improves the ability to detect and counter PNT attacks. For example, the EU has confirmed it will deploy additional LEO satellites to bolster its ability to detect GPS interference. And vision cameras can also be used as part of a Visual-Aided Inertial Navigation System (VINS), which provides a powerful method for maintaining an accurate position in the complete absence of GNSS signals.

    This technique was developed in 2025 by VIAVI’s Inertial Labs division, with VINS combining processing with multiple inertial sensors to maintain position. This is reinforced with, and calibrated by a 3D vision-based positioning algorithm that compares visual patterns captured by an onboard camera (either daylight or infrared) with pre-loaded, satellite-imagery-derived 3D maps to track against known landmarks. In a GNSS-denied environment, a VINS system can maintain a horizontal position within 35 m, a vertical position within 5 m, and a desired velocity within 0.9 m/s.

    Conclusion: Bridging the Legacy Gap

    While modern systems can be designed from the ground up with a multi-layered, sensor-fusion PNT architecture, there is still the problem of the huge number of legacy systems that are very much prone to attack.

    These legacy PNT systems are still widely used, including in military conflicts where D3SOE attacks are prevalent. To address this vulnerability, resilient signal retransmission technology has been developed to cost-effectively upgrade these older systems. This approach uses RSR transcoders (constellation simulators) to take a trusted PNT signal, derived from multiple assured inputs, and convert it into the standard GPS format that legacy equipment is designed to receive. This set up – in which the GNSS aerial is replaced with the input from the RSR transcoder – allows the existing systems to operate with state-of-the-art resilience without requiring replacement.

    But, as we’ve seen in the above, a single, invulnerable replacement for GPS is simply not possible, so integrating multiple trusted sources is therefore essential. The path to assured PNT relies on a multi-layered ecosystem of diverse signals and sensors and applying this approach to both modern designs and legacy-system upgrades ensures all assets can maintain uninterrupted PNT access.

    viavisolutions.com

  • Testing for Efficient Transportation in War Zones

    Testing for Efficient Transportation in War Zones

    The demand for efficient transportation systems extends beyond traditional development projects, such as subsea transportation tunnels or deployment scenarios where positioning technology delivers centimeter-level accuracy for fleet vehicles. In active conflict zones, positioning signals are more susceptible to jamming and spoofing, which disrupts civilians’ daily activities. 

    In the northern Israeli city of Haifa, after decades of relying on digital navigation, shopkeepers have started stocking paper maps again. The reason is not nostalgia, but survival in an age of electronic warfare.

    The coastal city has become a testing ground for advanced GNSS technologies, where traditional satellite navigation systems regularly fail due to sophisticated spoofing attacks. These attacks not only disrupt military operations but also affect every smartphone, smartwatch and navigation device that relies on standard GPS signals.

    Dror Meiri, business development and strategy advisor at oneNav, said that in Haifa, “You start driving. Everything is fine. You know that the drive is going to last for 37 minutes or so, and then all of a sudden, you lose your location.”

    Researchers from oneNav conducted a comprehensive GPS resilience test in an active conflict zone near Haifa. The company’s mission was to compare how different navigation technologies perform when under electronic attack.

    The Journey North 

    For the test, four devices were mounted side-by-side on a car dashboard: three leading smartphones and one device equipped with experimental L5-direct receiver technology. All four would make the same journey from south of Haifa toward the city center, passing through zones where GPS spoofing is known to occur.

    The drive began in an area free from interference, where all devices accurately displayed their location in northern Israel. But as the car moved north toward Haifa, it entered what researchers describe as a “spoofed zone” — an area where military defense systems actively jam and spoof GPS signals.

    While still physically driving through Haifa’s streets, the three commercial smartphones suddenly began displaying a location more than 100 km away in Beirut, Lebanon. A fitness smartwatch included in the test showed the same false location. Only the L5-direct enabled device maintained accuracy to within 1 m of the actual position.

    The Technical Challenge 

    OneNav explains the vulnerability stems from the aging L1 GPS signal on which most consumer devices rely. First deployed decades ago, L1 signals are relatively easy to spoof with commercially available equipment. According to U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) documentation, spoofing has become so prevalent that it affects devices across vast geographical areas; in some cases, every smartphone and smartwatch tested was spoofed across distances exceeding 120 km.

    In response to the March 6 FCC inquiry on “Promoting the Development of Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Technologies and Solutions,” oneNav provided technical insights into spoofing vulnerabilities across different satellite navigation bands. The company explained that “spoofing in the L5 band will be much more difficult because the spoofing transmitter must have 10x wider bandwidth and 10x more precise spoofing correlator peaks to capture the L5 receiver. Spoofing transmitter power needs to be 20x higher in the L5 (GPS) band and 40x higher in the E5 band (Galileo) compared to spoofing L1C/A.”

    This technical assessment highlights why the newer L5 signal represents a significant advancement in navigation security. The enhanced signal architecture, with its wider bandwidth and more sophisticated coding structure, creates substantial barriers for potential attackers. The exponentially higher power requirements — 20 times greater for GPS L5 and 40 times greater for Galileo E5 compared to legacy L1 signals — combined with the demanding technical specifications, make widespread L5 spoofing both technically challenging and prohibitively expensive for most threat actors.

    Beyond the Battlefield 

    While Haifa’s situation is tied to regional security concerns, the implications extend far beyond conflict zones and affect autonomous vehicles, ride-sharing services, and logistics networks that have become essential infrastructure in modern cities. 

    “When I want to wait for a bus or public transportation, for gas or something like that, my phone tells me exactly where the bus is and how long it will take to reach the station,” Meiri said. “But the core system for that is the GPS, which is based on the bus, so the bus cannot send the right information to the server.”

    Local businesses are grappling with the unreliable GPS environment. According to oneNav researchers, companies in the region — including one that uses drones to clean windows on Haifa’s skyscrapers — face significant operational challenges when their navigation systems are deceived into believing they are operating in a different country entirely.

    Meiri, who conducted the oneNav test, notes the challenging conditions affecting transportation in Haifa could emerge in other urban areas as spoofing technology becomes more accessible.

    The ground transportation implications are particularly concerning for emergency services. When 911 calls are placed in areas experiencing GPS spoofing, emergency responders may be directed to locations hundreds of kilometers from the actual emergency. This challenge has prompted regulatory discussions about upgrading emergency location accuracy requirements. Current GPS emergency location systems can achieve accuracy within 50 m in ideal conditions, but dense urban environments and electronic warfare zones significantly degrade this performance.

    As spoofing technology proliferates beyond military applications, transportation systems worldwide may face the same navigational chaos currently seen in Haifa. 

  • ANELLO’s silicon photonics optical gyroscope is enabling GPS-free navigation

    ANELLO’s silicon photonics optical gyroscope is enabling GPS-free navigation

    For decades, GPS has been the cornerstone of modern navigation, guiding aircraft, vehicles, troops and commercial systems across the globe. As digital warfare intensifies, satellite signals are increasingly unreliable. From the battlefield to underground tunnels, to dense forests, and urban canyons, global positioning signals are being jammed, spoofed, or simply blocked by the environment. In these GPS-denied zones, the risks to navigation, targeting and mission success grow exponentially.

    Without reliable positioning, systems lose their sense of location, direction and speed — making it impossible to navigate to their destination. Yet in modern warfare, autonomous systems and industrial automation depend on precise and continuous navigation. ANELLO Photonics is tackling this gap head-on with a breakthrough silicon photonics-based optical gyroscope (SiPhOG) technology — one that seeks to reshape how machines, soldiers and vehicles navigate across land, air and sea when satellites fall silent.

    A Battlefield Blind Spot

    In GPS-contested environments such as urban warzones, subterranean tunnels, dense forests or near hostile jamming equipment, traditional navigation solutions fail. Spoofing attacks can instantaneously displace autonomous vehicles by kilometers. Jamming can cripple UAVs mid-flight, causing them to crash. Even in civilian settings — especially in and around conflict zones — GPS signal loss can disrupt commercial fleets, emergency responders, and industries like mining or agriculture. These dropouts stall autonomous operations, reduce productivity, and increase the risk of severe damage.

    These issues aren’t hypothetical. Adversaries have demonstrated sophisticated GPS interference capabilities that can mislead or immobilize multi-million-dollar defense assets. The need for self-contained, spoof-resistant navigation has never been more urgent.

    Strategic-Grade Precision in a Chip

    ANELLO Photonics took a radically new approach to building gyroscopes when it built its Silicon Photonics Optical Gyroscope (SiPhOG) using the same semiconductor processes used for integrated circuits. This breakthrough makes it possible to deliver high-precision optical navigation in a chip-scale form factor — smaller than a fingernail. The SiPhOG harnesses the proven Sagnac effect — central to traditional fiber-optic gyroscopes (FOGs) — but ANELLO has reimagined it using advanced silicon photonics, integrating this into a compact silicon photonic chip.

    This innovation enables:

    • Bias drift < 0.5°/hr. A performance level previously only achieved by large, costly fiber-optic systems.
    • Nanoradian-scale angular sensitivity. Essential for accurate navigation over long durations.
    • Superior to MEMS. Resilient to vibration, thermal variation and EMI — ideal for combat zones and industrial environments.
    • Compact, coin-sized form factor. Easily integrates into existing systems and is small enough to be used for soldier-worn devices, embedded robotics and scalable mass-market applications.

    The ANELLO SiPhOG offers the precision of strategic-grade FOG systems, but with the size, weight, power and cost suitable for widespread tactical deployment to the mass market. This balance makes it uniquely positioned to serve both high-end defense missions and cost-sensitive commercial markets.

    The Full-Stack INS Advantage

    SiPhOGs alone aren’t enough. ANELLO integrates its SiPhOGs with accelerometers, magnetometers, GPS (when available) and onboard CPU logic into a full-stack inertial navigation system (INS). Additionally, these systems use the ANELLO AI-based sensor-fusion engine to intelligently reconcile data, validate signal integrity and detect anomalies, such as jammed or spoofed GPS locations or signal dropouts across land, air and sea. The ANELLO AI sensor-fusion engine processes and tracks in real time the inertial position and GPS position every ~10 ms. The system auto-corrects and seamlessly transitions the sensor modes without any human intervention — always determining what is correct and what is false or being spoofed. The ANELLO AI sensor-fusion engine is continuously being tested and optimized by the ANELLO team with various customers in the field.

    The result is a self-contained, intelligent navigation platform that maintains accurate heading, velocity and position — even in total GPS darkness. The modularity of the ANELLO systems also enables easy integration into various host platforms, from aerial drones to armored vehicles to autonomous boats and robots.

    Field-Proven Resilience in Defense

    During U.S. Department of Defense trials, ANELLO’s INS systems successfully identified and mitigated GPS spoofing attempts in real time. When a vehicle’s GPS feed suddenly shifted its perceived location by kilometers, ANELLO’s AI engine flagged the change as physically impossible, rejected the GPS input and seamlessly relied on ANELLO inertial data to maintain accurate positioning.

    Such robustness makes the ANELLO technology suitable for:

    • UAVs operating in jammed or contested airspace
    • Autonomous Ground Vehicles (AGVs) navigating GPS-denied terrain • Marine systems facing jammed or spoofed GPS signals
    • Land vehicles such as emergency responders and even delivery vehicles
    • Handheld soldier systems that demand compact, rugged navigation capabilities for on-the-move operations.

    Whether installed on armored vehicles, on drones, or embedded in next-gen infantry kits, ANELLO’s optical gyro-based solutions deliver location certainty when precision and accuracy matter.

    Cross-Sector Use Cases

    Autonomy Without Satellites: While defense remains a clear application, the broader commercial value is just as transformative. In agriculture, autonomous vehicles often lose GPS coverage under thick orchard canopies. In underground mines or port operations, satellites are blocked entirely. In these environments, ANELLO’s SiPhOG-powered INS continues to provide reliable localization and position, ensuring autonomous systems don’t stall, stray or crash.

    Commercial applications for ANELLO’s SiPhOG technology include:

    • Autonomous mining vehicles. Enables self-driving trucks and loaders to navigate through tunnels and signal-blocked environments with precision and safety.
    • Port automation and crane systems. Supports operation of automated cranes and cargo movers in GNSS-challenged port environments for uninterrupted container handling and improved throughput.
    • Industrial robotics and logistics. Powers warehouse robots and inspection systems with high-precision navigation in indoor and metallic environments where GPS is unreliable or unavailable.
    • Autonomous maritime systems. Facilitates reliable navigation for unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) operating in coastal, harbor, or fully submerged missions where satellite signals are compromised.

    With rapid integration into commercial drones, robotic forklifts and construction fleets, ANELLO is extending military-grade navigation into everyday autonomy use cases.

    Smarter Navigation in Real Time

    At the heart of ANELLO’s platform is a sophisticated AI sensor fusion engine. Every 10 ms, the system ingests data from multiple sensors, validates physics-based plausibility and recalibrates its state estimates. This allows the system to detect and reject spoofed GPS signals, continue navigation autonomously through temporary GPS dropouts and identify signal degradation before failure occurs.

    This intelligence is what makes the system robust, not just a fallback, but a fully capable primary navigation method in harsh and dynamic environments. It also significantly reduces the operational risk and support burden typically associated with traditional inertial systems.

    Compact, Scalable, Mission-Ready

    As conflicts evolve and global infrastructure expands into GPS-hostile regions, inertial systems must become smaller, smarter and more affordable. ANELLO is advancing a roadmap toward fully integrated, chip-scale INS platforms with gyros, lasers, processors and algorithms all on a single platform. This enables faster deployment in the field, lower system power consumption and broader adoption across vast use cases for military and industrial systems.

    The company’s domestic chip fabrication capability also ensures supply chain security, an increasingly critical factor in national defense and industrial automation strategies. From soldier systems and UAVs to autonomous cargo vehicles and industrial robots, ANELLO’s technology is positioning itself as a cornerstone for resilient, GPS-independent autonomy.

    Navigatng a Standard for a Contested World

    The future of autonomous operations—military and civilian alike—will need to depend on navigation systems that do not falter when GPS disappears. With its SiPhOG-based inertial platform, ANELLO Photonics is offering not just a backup system, but a new standard: one that combines strategic-grade precision, compact design and AI-driven reliability that can be delivered to the mass market and installed into any vehicle or any moving platform.

    In an era where signal denial is not just a threat but a tactic, assured positioning is no longer optional—it’s essential. ANELLO is redefining the future of navigation, empowering not just autonomous systems but also the people who rely on navigation to operate with confidence and precision — anywhere, anytime — even when the sky goes dark.