A plane carrying the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was targeted by GPS jamming while attempting to land at Plovdiv International Airport in Bulgaria on Aug. 31, according to a European Commission spokesperson.
Bulgarian authorities suspect Russia was responsible for the interference, European Commission Deputy Chief Spokesperson Arianna Podestà told CNN.
The Kremlin has denied the allegation. Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told The Financial Times, which first reported the story, that the information was incorrect.
The plane landed safely despite the GPS disruption, with pilots reportedly using paper maps to navigate, according to a source familiar with the situation.
Von der Leyen was traveling as part of a seven-country tour of the European Union’s frontline states to rally support for Ukraine. The incident occurred as her charter flight approached the southern Bulgarian airport during her diplomatic mission to reinforce the bloc’s commitment to defending against Russian aggression.
Podestà told CNN that the incident highlighted the urgency of von der Leyen’s current trip to frontline member states, where she has witnessed daily threats from Russia and its proxies. The spokesperson noted it remained unclear whether attackers specifically targeted the flight or if it was caught in broader GPS interference operations.
Expert Insights: Searching for Resilience
This latest incident comes amid a dramatic surge in GPS jamming and spoofing attacks across the region since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, creating an increasingly challenging environment for critical navigation systems.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s current tour through Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania takes her directly through many of the continent’s GPS disruption hot spots. These nations have experienced some of the most severe interference with GNSS, making the timing of her defense-focused diplomatic mission particularly significant.
According to GPS World Editorial Advisory Board Member Mitch Narins, the current crisis represents the culmination of concerns that have been raised for more than twenty years. “Concerns and warnings regarding interference to GNSS have been raised for over two decades,” Narins explains. “Despite these concerns, attempts to install and upgrade alternative or complementary PNT systems on the ground and in aircraft have failed and resulted solely in increased investment in satellites and their signals, all of which are extremely low-power by design and vulnerable to interference.”
“Regrettably, the substantial financial resources required to fund these satellite projects have pushed for discontinuance of resilient ground-based alternatives and to consider them ‘cost offsets,’” he notes. The economic incentives have favored satellite constellation expansion over diversification, despite the vulnerabilities of space-based systems.
When it comes to alternative options, Narins explains, “For the cost of building and launching a single GNSS medium-Earth orbit (MEO) satellite, one could fund the replacement or installation and operation of many resilient ground-based systems for many years.”
The current approach to PNT systems represents a departure from fundamental systems engineering principles, according to Narins. “When initiating a customer need analysis, a systems engineer does not begin with the solution and work backwards,” he emphasizes.
Instead, the focus should be on meeting actual requirements: PNT systems must “always” provide the accuracy, availability, integrity and continuity of services necessary to support safety, security and economic well-being across thousands of use cases spanning every critical infrastructure sector.
“Therefore, resilience must be a critical part of a PNT system’s performance if it is to be considered a potential solution,” Narins said. Rather than pursuing interoperability between GNSS constellations — which still leaves users dependent on inherently weak satellite signals — the industry should have prioritized diverse solutions from the outset.
He added, “This is not a simple problem with a single, simple solution, but it is time to start thinking about resilience first and leaving the identification of solutions to a proper system engineering process.”
New Ways to Counter EW Threats
The dangerous GPS jamming of the plane carrying carrying European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen can be alleviated with advanced technology, according to Michael Biercuk, CEO of Q-CTRL, developers of quantum-based navigation systems:
“The incident regarding the European Commission President’s plane has raised GPS denial from inconvenience to a strategic security threat. This is why we’ve focused our quantum tech development efforts on building resilient quantum navigation systems truly immune to jamming and spoofing. This technology is not science fiction – it has been validated in flight to outperform the best existing GPS backups by up to 100X. Through our partnerships with Airbus, Lockheed Martin, and others we’re ready to help build resilience for European transport, defense and commerce.”
Chris Shaw, CEO and co-founder of Advanced Navigation also spoke on the incident, commenting “The answers to the GPS crisis are already here,” said Chris Shaw, CEO and co-founder of Advanced Navigation, which specializes in anti-electronic warfare navigation technology. “The problem isn’t innovation, it’s stagnation. GPS alone can no longer be treated as a reliable source of truth. What’s needed is a resilient architecture — inertial-centered and fused with multiple sensors — that keeps systems operating even when signals are denied or manipulated.
“The reality is that adversaries are moving at the speed of code, while government procurement still runs at the speed of bureaucracy. That gap is a national security risk. Unless governments adopt a new model of rapid integration and real-time collaboration with industry, they will continue to be outpaced.
“This isn’t optional. Survivability in GPS-contested environments depends on prompt deployment of inertial navigation. The companies pushing this forward aren’t just keeping up, they’re rewriting the playbook — and the cost of delay is measured in mission failure and compromised sovereignty.
“Ukraine has shown what’s possible. By demanding real-time software updates and rapid hardware upgrades in close collaboration with industry, its forces are reshaping autonomy, navigation, drone swarms and integrated defense systems at an unprecedented pace — allowing them to outpace adversaries.
“So why aren’t we applying this model more broadly beyond the battlefield? The solutions exist, with inertial navigation at the core. The real question is whether we’ll act before the cost of delay becomes irreversible.”
The GPS Collapse isn’t fiction — it’s a warning of what happens when action is delayed.
