GPS World

Tag: Russia

  • Research exposes Russia as jamming culprit

    Research exposes Russia as jamming culprit

    Radio waves emanating from secretive facilities run by Russia’s military are the culprit behind GNSS jamming in the Baltic Sea, according to Defense News.

    The news outlet reports that Polish researchers collected jamming and spoofing information on incidents covering the Gdansk airport, shipping lanes, and the airspaces of Estonia and Finland. The interference has been recorded almost daily since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, resulting in flight cancellations, airport closures and commercial ships steering off track.

    In March, eight European countries, including the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, France, the Netherlands and Ukraine, lodged a complaint with the UN about the practice. Several UN agencies have also taken up the issue, including the International Maritime Organization, the civil aviation authority ICAO and the International Telecommunications Union.

    Russia, itself a Baltic Sea country, has not responded to the charges of interference. Likely origin spots include Kaliningrad, which is between Poland and Lithuania, and the St. Petersburg area. Both regions are known to have a heavy Russian military presence, including divisions specialized in electronic warfare.

  • 13 EU member states demand action on GNSS interference

    13 EU member states demand action on GNSS interference

    13 member states of the European Union have called on the European Commission to respond to interference with GNSS in EU countries.

    The interference originates in Russia and Belarus, as a result of the ongoing war with Ukraine.

    The ministers for transport from 13 countries urged immediate and coordinated action in response, reports the Baltic Times. The joint letter was signed by the ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, Slovakia, Finland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and Romania.

    In the joint letter, the ministers emphasize that since 2022, two types of interference to GNSS — jamming and spoofing — have been observed in the airspace of the Baltic Sea Region, posing a threat to various modes of transport, particularly civil aviation and maritime navigation.

    The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU responded to the joint letter with an outline of potential actions.

    1. Evaluate and coordinate the possibility to suspend the right to Russia and Belarus in the ITU to register the use of radio resources while GNSS interference is in progress. The lack of procedural legislation cannot be an excuse for deliberately contravening the spirit of the ITU Constitution and its general principles, endangering public health and life, without suffering any consequences.
    2. Based on good practice of EU and NATO cooperation on critical undersea infrastructure, enhance civil-military coordination mechanisms among Member States for shared monitoring, data exchange, and possible response to GNSS interference. Explore the benefits of dual use of various equipment and measures to combat the risks caused by GNSS interference.
    3. Intensify RFI monitoring by eligible national organizations and bodies, e. g. national regulator, police and military, and aggregate non-classified information on observed RFI to a publicly available near real-time monitoring and alert service on European level.
    4. Accelerate the deployment of interference resistant GNSS services, especially the antispoofing features that are part of the Galileo program, e. g. authentication and/or encryption of signals exchanged between stations and user equipment.
    5. Reassess the current reliance on GNSS-based navigation and develop resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PST) services by deploying alternative or complementary systems, including ground-based legacy solutions. Simultaneously, upgrade and modernize conventional navigation infrastructures to serve as robust backups.
    6. Promote industry-manufacturer collaboration for mitigation tools and updates. Support operator-level reviews of backup system readiness, ensuring non-GNSS alternatives are usable and practiced. 2 TREE2B 9198/25 EN
    7. Draw the attention of critical infrastructure operators and unmanned system manufacturers to the risks that may arise from interference with GNSS.
    8. Develop action plans for different domains (space, aviation, maritime, telecommunications) to avoid potential duplication of efforts and coordinate short-term and long-term measures at EU and national level.
    9. Continue cooperation with all relevant stakeholders (ITU, ICAO, IMO, EASA, EMSA, IATA, EUROCONTROL). These actions, among others, could contribute to building the overall resilience of the critical infrastructure and strengthening safety and security in Europe.

    The letter highlights the urgent need to accelerate the deployment of interference-resistant GNSS services, enhance the overall resilience of critical infrastructure, and strengthen safety and security across Europe.

    “The current security environment demands a unified response to hybrid threats posed by hostile regimes, as well as close cooperation to strengthen Europe’s preparedness and resilience,” said Lithuanian Transport and Communications Minister Eugenijus Sabutis.

    “Disruptions to GNSS signals have a direct impact on strategic sectors such as transport, energy, and telecommunications. To prevent potential incidents, we must act swiftly and decisively at the European Union level — not individually, but in a coordinated manner,” Sabutis said.

    The interference is not random incidents but a systematic, deliberate action by Russia and Belarus, which can be used as a hybrid attack on strategic radio spectrum, essential for modern technology, regional safety and security, particularly in transportation.

    Furthermore, the ministers call on the EU to increase diplomatic efforts to address the interference and apply pressure on the responsible parties, including legal action against responsible individuals and entities involved in the deliberate interference with GNSS signals, to enhance European safety and security.

    “So far, the attempts by several Member States to address the problem have not brought any more tangible results,” the EU General Secretariats said. “Therefore, it is necessary to increase diplomatic efforts to address the interference and put the pressure on the responsible parties.”

    The ministers propose intensifying radio frequency monitoring and enhance civil-military coordination mechanisms among Member States for shared monitoring, data exchange and possible response to GNSS interference. They also advocate for accelerating the deployment of interference-resistant GNSS services, particularly the anti-spoofing features of the Galileo program, and for upgrading and modernizing conventional navigation infrastructure.

    Reports of increased interference include:

    • Lithuania: starting from 556 cases in March 2024 to 890 in October 2024 and 1185 in January 2025
    • Latvia: 790 cases in October 2024 to 1288 cases in January 2025
    • Estonia: 1150 cases in October 2024 and 1085 cases in January 2025
    • Poland: 1908 cases in October 2024 to 2732 cases in January 2025.

  • Lithuanian port hit by GNSS interference

    Lithuanian port hit by GNSS interference

    Russia’s war with Ukraine continues to affect GNSS signal availability in the Baltic Sea, reports LRT News. Aircraft and ships near the Lithuanian seaport of Klaipėda are losing signals becausse of Russia’s efforts to shield its Kaliningrad exclave from potential airstrikes, said Saulius Skvernelis, speaker of the Lithuanian parliament.

    “The Russians are protecting the Kaliningrad region from potential air attacks,” Skvernelis told LRT TV. “This is not specifically intended to disrupt or harm our aircraft flying to Lithuania. It’s just that the protection zone extends beyond the Kaliningrad region’s borders, and the threat, the interference, is affecting our territory as well.”

    Skvernelis warned that this problem will persist across the region as long as the Kremlin continues its war in Ukraine.

    Thirteen European Union member states have called on the European Commission to respond to interference with GNSS in EU countries. In a joint letter, the countries stressed that GNSS interference cases are not random incidents but systematic and deliberate action by the Russian and Belarusian regimes aimed at destabilizing regional infrastructure, especially in the transport sector, reports LRT.

    “We can appeal to all EU countries and any institution, but it won’t help as long as Russia uses this kind of electronic protection for its military sites to defend itself against Ukrainian strikes,” Skvernelis said. “We must force Russia to end the war and then this problem will simply go away.”

  • Russian jamming creates ‘Bermuda Triangle’ in Baltic

    Russian jamming creates ‘Bermuda Triangle’ in Baltic

    Russian jamming of GPS signals is suspected to be the cause behind a new “Bermuda Triangle” of navigation confusion in the eastern Baltic Sea.

    In the Gulf of Finland, ships are disappearing from radar and Russian fighter jets are traveling through NATO airspace, according to Danwatch, a Danish news outlet.

    Ship monitoring service MarineTraffic shows the position of ships in completely different places than their actual positions, currently on land east of coastal city Primorsk, Russia.

    Experts say that not only is GPS being disrupted, but hackers are also manipulating navigation data. They blame Russia for its hybrid activities and attacks, which it carries out both from its mainland territory and from the Kaliningrad enclave, located between Poland and Lithuania.

    Screenshot of MarineTraffic now shows boats traveling in a circle inland from the Baltic Sea.
    Screenshot of MarineTraffic taken June 4, 2025, shows ships traveling in a circle on land, well east of the Baltic Sea.

    Romania also has issues with Russian jamming and spoofing activities. The website Defense Romania quotes Gen. Gheorghiță Vlad, chief of the Romanian Defense Staff, who said jamming and spoofing has occurred on the Black Sea weekly since the start of Russia’s war with Ukraine. Also, Romanian defense forces have discovered 122 floating mines in the sea.

  • Ukraine’s Ruta missile to get EW-immune navigation system

    Ukraine’s Ruta missile to get EW-immune navigation system

    The Ruta OWA drone — actively used by Ukrainian forces for strikes at ranges up to 300 km — is being improved with a new visual navigation system, tested in combat conditions.

    The Ruta, manufactured by Destinus, is essentially a miniature cruise missile. It is often referred to as a “missile drone.” It will receive a new navigation system enabling high-precision strikes in GPS-denied contested environments, especially those from enemy electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures.

    The new navigation and guidance system will be provided by Spanish company UAV Navigation, part of Grupo Oesía, which entered an agreement with the Ukrainian Destinus on May 13.

    The agreement will focus on Ruta in its first phase. Ruta is the first low-cost missile (LCM) drone developed by Destinus designed to operate in highly contested scenarios. The system incorporates an advanced guidance, navigation and control system, developed by UAV Navigation-Grupo Oesía, which has been validated in real-world combat conditions, including GNSS-denied environments or under jamming and spoofing attacks.

    Ruta offers autonomous flight capabilities, target-referenced navigation, terminal optical guidance, and coordinated swarm operations, enabling the execution of complex synchronized attack maneuvers to saturate or deceive defense systems. The platform flies at a cruising speed of Mach 0.8, has a range of up to 500 km, and a terminal impact accuracy of 15 square meters.

  • Is Russia behind new GPS interference in Bulgaria?

    Is Russia behind new GPS interference in Bulgaria?

    On Dec. 12, 2024, the European Union decided to include Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen visa-free zone. On the same day, Bulgaria’s capital, Sofia, began experiencing interference with GPS signals. The interference, as reflected in aviation ADS-B systems and reported on GPSJam.org, continued through the new year and is ongoing as of this writing. 

    While these two events may be entirely unrelated, Vladimir Putin has a history of using GPS jamming and spoofing to show his displeasure with his neighbors growing closer to the West.

    • On Dec. 15, 2023, Poland activated a U.S. Aegis anti-missile system near its border with Kaliningrad, Russia. On the same day, Russia began jamming and spoofing GPS signals in northern Poland and parts of the Baltic. That interference persists to this day.

    The interference in Sofia may be contributing to a prolonged Bulgarian political crisis. Politicians there have been struggling to form a new government since elections in October. Dec. 10 saw the beginning of a new attempt. Interference with GPS can undermine overall confidence in government systems and institutions — another of Putin’s goals for neighbors with whom he is displeased.

    Another, though less likely, impact may be on Bulgaria’s electrical service. On Dec. 25, 2024, 20,000 households in western Bulgaria (Sofia is in the far west) lost electrical power and the outage continued for days. Many grid operators use GPS timing to help manage their systems. While press reports put the outages down to heavy snow and fallen trees, increased difficulty managing the grid might also be a factor.

    Bulgaria’s GPS interference appears to be coming from somewhere in Sofia, not from Russian territory, as is the case in the Baltic. Yet Russia may still be involved, at least in a supporting role.

    On Dec. 11, the news outlet Balken Insight reported on five Bulgarians being tried by the United Kingdom as Russian spies. It also said the Bulgarian interim prime minister was being urged to investigate alleged links between the case and top officials in Sofia.

    GPS interference in Sofia, Bulgaria, began on dec. 12, 2024, and has continued at varying intensities. (Photo: GPSJam.org)
    GPS interference in Sofia, Bulgaria, began on Dec. 12, 2024, and has continued at varying intensities. (Photo: GPSJam.org)
  • Recent advancements in unmanned systems

    Recent advancements in unmanned systems

    Unmanned surface vessels (USVs) are becoming a reality for many sea-going countries around the world. Belgium and The Netherlands have partnered to acquire a proven autonomous mine-clearing solution supplied by Exail Technologies in Paris, France.

    A nearly $60 million contract awarded in July 2024 by NATO will allow Exail to deliver several hundred K-STER underwater vessels, which can find and destroy both floating and anchored mines.

    Equipped with a shaped charge, the unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) is launched from a safe distance by a minesweeping ship, currently undergoing sea trials – the Oostende new generation minesweeper. Similar to the Kamikaze aerial drone, it autonomously seeks out a mine at a predetermined location and destroys it.

    Photo:
    K-STER UUV encounters. (Photo: Exail)

    Meanwhile, as the war in Ukraine continues, drone warfare continues to evolve. Ukraine has developed electronic warfare systems that have progressed from merely jamming control signals and GNSS navigation to actually spoofing GNSS guidance. These systems overcome direct satellite signals with a stronger signal, providing gradually changing guidance to the drone, ultimately steering it back toward Russian-friendly Belarus.

    Several recent intense Russian drone attacks were with tens — and even hundreds — of Iranian Shahed attack dones. 151 were spotted in November alone, 148 of which were Shahid drones that carry an 88 lb explosive warhead. On November 26, the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia attacked with 188 Shahed drones along with a few Iskander-M ballistic missiles. Ukraine responded with aircraft, helicopters, shells fired from fixed ground installations, and signals designed to jam drone electronics and guidance systems. Around 80 attacking drones succumbed to these Ukrainian defenses.

    In addition, electronic GNSS spoofing of more than 90 drones diverted them from their targets – this implies a widespread array of electronic resources that intercepted in-flight drones coming from Russia. Diverted from their planned tracks to their targets, these drones will crash when they eventually run out of fuel. In a large number of cases, the ground defense systems were able to steer the attackers toward Russian-friendly Belarus, where they also crashed when fuel was exhausted. So perhaps less than 50% of this specific attack resulted in the use of precious Ukrainian ordinance, a good sign for future defense capabilities.

    Meanwhile, on the other side of the “Pond” (Atlantic Ocean), British and U.S. forces at bases in Southern England have been dealing with an uninvited invasion of overflying drones, somewhat similar to reported incursions over airforce bases (AFB) in the U.S., such as Langley AFB.

    RAF Lakenheath is a joint UK/US base used by the US 48th Fighter Wing and is thought to also house NATO’s nuclear weapons – this base is one of four that is thought to have been harassed by drone overflights. Other UK bases which now also have heightened security include RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall, and RAF Feltwell in the Southeast and RAF Fairford in Southwest England. We might speculate that the drones could be collecting Video and maybe Lidar information on assets on the ground, but surely this has already been gained by spy satellites belonging to Russia and China, the principal suspects for these incursions — so what exactly could be the intent?

    The incursions were happening at the same time that Ukraine was using UK Storm Shadow missiles against Russia. Some speculate that this might be a demonstration of capability by Russia, indicating an ability to quickly, without any opposition, gather a number of drones and fly them over UK NATO bases. Whilst unarmed for this demonstration, in the future, they could wreak havoc on aircraft and personnel. A number of criminal investigations are apparently underway to determine who was responsible.

  • How the US is defending against drones

    How the US is defending against drones

    The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has spooled up to take the lead in drone warfare with its Replicator 1 program initiative. Securing $500 million in funding in 2023 for “attributable UAVs, DOD is planning another half of a million dollars for the Replicator 2 program. The Replicator initiatives are intended to bring on large volumes of potentially existing capability through increased manufacturing and technological capability. AeroVironment received Rep 1 funding for Switchblade-600 kamikaze drones, which had previously been used successfully in Ukraine, and various initiatives are also underway with many U.S. manufacturers of unmanned surface vessels (USVs), including Anduril’s Dive-LD autonomous underwater vehicles.

    Photo:
    Anduril Dive-LD unmanned undersea vehicle. (U.S. Navy photo by Ian Delossantos)

    Having launched contracts increasing the available volume of attack UAVs (loitering munitions), it has been decided that the Replicator 2 program will go after the protection of U.S. forces from enemy drone attacks. Both sides in Ukraine have built up their UAV attack capability, and as a consequence, both sides now need better defenses against offensive UAV threats. DoD has also learned from experience in the Middle East, where its naval assets have suffered from kamikaze UAV attacks in the Gulf.

    Inexpensive, commercially available UAVs loaded with explosives and remote control and proximity detonators have proved effective weapons. The next phase of Replicator will seek funding in 2026 for counter small-unmanned aerial system (C-sUAS) initiatives, building up existing capability and technology and developing improved defense capabilities.

    Photo:
    Switchblade-600 loitering munition. (Photo: AeroVironment) 

    Several c-UAS systems have been developed and fielded in recent years, but DOD’s efforts on Directed Energy Weapons are being intensified. High power microwave (HPM) systems can be used to jam UAV communications and disrupt onboard drone electronics such as navigation, guidance, sensors and control systems. Its only drawback is that effectiveness diminishes rapidly with the range from the HPW transmitting antenna. This is due to the increased dissipation of microwave energy in the air with the square of the distance traveled – straight physics. Nevertheless, if you can pump enough power out of the transmitting antenna, say in a narrower beam, you may still be able to cover enough distance to disable an attacking swarm of adversary UAVs, even if it ends up being close in as the UAVs approach the target.

    Based in Los Angeles, Epirus recently delivered its Leonidas Expeditionary HPM system under a U.S. Navy contract. The system is mounted on a towed trailer, with the HPM antenna mounted on a turntable to enable directional aiming for a more dynamic ground-based defense against drones. Previous testing has demonstrated the system’s capability to “fry” single and multiple UAVs.

    Photo:
    Leonidas high-power microwave system. (Photo: Epirus)

    A U.S. Army 2023 contract allowed Epirus to prototype four of the Leonidas systems, which have been delivered to the agency and are potentially slated to find active service in the Middle East. This real-world test aims to shake down the systems under high-stress defensive situations, providing feedback for future improvements if required. The situation on the ground clearly demands improved defensive capability.

    Earlier tests of high-power laser defenses in the region allegedly encountered some difficulty with durability and heat dissipation for 50Kw vehicle-mounted systems, while 20Kw laser systems performed better.

    It would seem that the high-intensity microwave beams used by the Leonidas systems might be more usable by ground forces. Epirus has reported that a unique approach to power management was one of the initial core elements developed for the Leonidas system, which may affect the ability to form high-power microwave beams.

    Earlier defensive approaches have included rifle fire, shoulder-mounted missiles, expensive guided missile defenses, anti-drone drones that collide or throw nets, jamming of the control signals, and, of course, GNSS jamming and/or spoofing. HPM “frying” of multiple drones at a time may be another key defensive approach that may make drone attacks harder for adversaries to inflict on our forces on the battlefield.

    So, the next phase of this game could be to develop counter-counter-drone technologies to defeat the defensive systems—this may be a never-ending process.

  • Unidentified UAVs over Langley Air Force Base raise security concerns

    Unidentified UAVs over Langley Air Force Base raise security concerns

    The Wall Street Journal has reported mysterious UAVs spotted surveilling some of America’s most sensitive military sites, leaving the Pentagon struggling to respond. These unidentified UAVs have been seen flying over military installations in Virginia and Nevada throughout the past year, including the secret base of the Navy’s elite SEAL Team Six and Naval Station Norfolk, recognized as the world’s largest naval port.

    Former U.S. Air Force Gen. Mark Kelly told The Wall Street Journal he first became aware of mysterious UAV sightings in December 2023, when officials at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia reported seeing dozens of UAVs flying over the base at night.

    The source of these UAVs remains unknown, leaving officials puzzled about whether they were operated by sophisticated hobbyists or potentially by Russia or China. The complexity and coordination of the flights suggested a level of sophistication beyond civilian drone operations, according to the report.

    The U.S. military faced significant challenges in addressing this threat. Federal law restricts the military’s ability to shoot down UAVs over bases unless they pose an immediate threat. Aerial snooping does not qualify as a threat, though some lawmakers hope to give the military greater leeway to address these challenges in the future.

    The sightings ended on Dec.23, 2023, with authorities still unsure of the UAVs’ origin or who controlled them. However, a clue emerged in January 2024 when a Chinese student named Fengyun Shi, studying at the University of Minnesota, was caught flying a UAV near Langley Air Force Base. Shi’s UAV got stuck in a tree, which he abandoned before flying to California. The FBI retrieved the drone, discovering it had taken photos of Navy ships docked at the base, which led to Shi being sentenced to six months in federal prison.

    In October 2024, U.S. officials confirmed that similar drone swarms had been observed near Edwards Air Force Base in Nevada. The Department of Defense (DOD) has not publicly identified the source behind these surveillance drones.

    In response to these incidents and potential threats, Langley Air Force Base is exploring new measures to safeguard its airspace. The base’s 633rd Contracting Squadron issued a notice seeking proposals for installing anti-drone nets around sunshades used for aircraft, including F-22s. These nets are designed to disable small UAVs while allowing quick retraction to ensure flight operations remain unaffected. The proposed system would withstand extreme weather conditions and prevent drones from interfering with aircraft or personnel.

  • Israeli air base identified as alleged source of GPS disruptions in Mideast

    Israeli air base identified as alleged source of GPS disruptions in Mideast

    Photo: Sauce Reques / Royalty-free / iStock / Getty Images Plus
    Photo: Sauce Reques / Royalty-free / iStock / Getty Images Plus

    Researchers from the University of Texas at Austin have identified an Israeli air base as a large source of widespread GPS disruptions affecting civilian airline navigation in the Middle East, reported The New York Times. 

    The spoofing disruptions involve the transmission of manipulated GPS signals, which can cause airplane instruments to misread their location. Lead researchers Todd Humphreys and Zach Clements stated they are “highly confident” that Ein Shemer Airfield in northern Israel is the source of these attacks. The Israeli military declined The New York Times’ request for comment. 

    The research team utilized data emitted by the spoofer and picked up by satellites in low-Earth orbit (LEO) to determine its location. They then confirmed their calculations using ground data collected in Israel.  

    Spoofing, along with GPS jamming, has significantly increased over the past three years, especially near war zones such as Ukraine and Gaza. In these areas, militaries interfere with navigation signals to redirect aerial attacks. 

    The Middle East has emerged as a hotspot for GPS spoofing, with The New York Times reporting that a separate analysis estimates more than 50,000 flights have been affected in the region in 2024 alone. Researchers from SkAI Data Services and the Zurich University of Applied Sciences, analyzeding data from the OpenSky Network and, found that these attacks have led pilots to mistakenly believe they were above airports in Beirut or Cairo. 

    Swiss International Air Lines told The New York TimesNYT that their flights are spoofed “almost every day over the Middle East.” 

    The issue extends beyond the region, with Estonia and other Baltic nations having blamed Russia for disrupting signals in their airspaces. Additionally, in April 2024, Finnair temporarily suspended flights to Tartu, Estonia, amid the rise of GPS jamming in the region affecting civilian air travel.  

    The attacks have not led to significant safety risks as pilots can use alternative navigation methods. However, they do raise concerns. 

    Jeremy Bennington, vice president of Spirent Communications, told The New York Times, “Losing GPS is not going to cause airplanes to fall out of the sky. But I also don’t want to deny the fact that we are removing layers of safety.” 

    The spoofing attacks may cause false alerts about planes being too close to the ground, leading to navigation confusion and possibly compromising flight safety. 

    As these disruptions continue to affect large areas far from active conflict zones, the aviation industry and international authorities are under increasing pressure to address this emerging threat to air travel security. 

  • FCC warns of security risks

    FCC warns of security risks

    Image: FCC logo
    Image: FCC logo

    The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is investigating whether the use of Russian and Chinese foreign satellite systems by U.S. mobile phones and other devices poses security threats.

    The FCC has concerns that U.S. handheld devices are receiving and processing GNSS signals from satellites controlled by foreign adversaries in violation of commission rules.

    The FCC is seeking answers from handset manufacturers Apple, Google, Motorola, Nokia, Samsung and others that collectively cover more than 90% of the U.S. smartphone marketplace.

    “There is no established record of what security threats, if any, these signals carry and whether the manufacturers of handheld devices are processing these signals in violation of the Commission’s rules,” an FCC spokesperson said in a statement.

    Representative Mike Gallagher, chair of the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, wrote FCC Chair Jessica Rosenworcel earlier this week raising concern about reports that U.S. cell phones were receiving and processing signals from Chinese and Russian satellites.

    The FCC has only approved U.S. phones to receive and process signals from the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and the European Galileo GNSS.

  • UK Defense Minister’s plane jammed near Russia

    UK Defense Minister’s plane jammed near Russia

    Image: Phillip Silverman / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images / Getty Images
    Image: Phillip Silverman / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images / Getty Images

    A plane carrying British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps had its satellite signal jammed as it flew near Russian territory, the government reported on March 14.

    The government said that the Royal Air Force jet carrying Shapps, officials and journalists “temporarily experienced GPS jamming when they flew close to Kaliningrad” on a flight from Poland to the UK.

    The Times of London, whose reporter was onboard, said that for about 30 minutes mobile phones could not connect to the internet and the aircraft was forced to use alternative methods to determine its location.

    Kaliningrad is a Russian enclave bordered by Poland and Lithuania, home to the Russian Navy’s Baltic Fleet. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak’s spokesman, Dave Pares, said “the jamming didn’t threaten the safety of the aircraft at any point.” He added that it is not unusual for aircraft to experience electronic jamming near Kaliningrad.