Ukraine’s hacker underground named GLONASS as one of its top priorities, according to media reports that cite a post on the “IT army” Telegram channel.
The IT army, formed on Saturday, is a collective of volunteer hackers. “We need to mobilize and intensify our efforts as much as possible,” the IT army posted.
Besides GLONASS, hackers are focusing on Russian telecom companies and the railway network in Belarus — a key staging area for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The Belarusian Cyber Partisans, a hacking team focused on Belarus, told Reuters it had disabled railway traffic systems in Belarus. Another target is the electrical grid.
U.S. forces have detected Russian jamming of GPS signals in the Ukraine region, according to Breaking Defense. But Pentagon officials say the jamming has not affected U.S. support operations.
U.S. reconnaissance aircraft have detected jamming over the Black Sea, but when asked about Russian jamming, a U.S. Space Command spokesperson told Breaking Defense, “There are no impacts to U.S. and Allied forces in Europe at this time.”
Russia’s space agency Roscosmos is suspending cooperation with Europe on space launches from the Kourou spaceport in French Guiana, including future Galileo satellite launches.
As reported by Rueters, Roscosmos chief Dmitry Rogozin said Saturday the action is in response to Western sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
“In response to EU sanctions against our companies, Roscosmos is suspending cooperation with European partners on space launches from Kourou, and is withdrawing its technical staff…from French Guiana,” Rogozin said in a post on his Telegram channel.
Russia’s decision will have “no consequences on the continuity and quality of Galileo and Copernicus services,” EU Commissioner Thierry Breton said in a statement. “This decision does not call into question the continuity of the development of these infrastructures either.”
“We are also ready to act with determination, together with the Member States, to protect these critical infrastructures in the event of an attack.”
“We will, in due course, take all the necessary decisions in response and resolutely pursue the development of the second generation of these two sovereign space infrastructures of the Union,” Breton said. “We are also prepared to act determinedly together with the member states to protect these critical infrastructures in case of an attack, and to continue the development of Ariane 6 and VegaC to guarantee the strategic autonomy with regard to carrier rockets.”
The Galileo program had already planned to shift to using Ariane 6 rockets for satellite launches. The launcher is undergoing the final stages of development, led by prime contractor ArianeGroup.
From 2023 onward, the remaining Galileo Batch 3 satellites will be launched with the new Ariane 62 launch vehicle, a variant of Ariane 6 with two strap-on solid boosters.
The most recent Galileo satellite launch took place on Dec. 5, 2021, using Soyuz launcher VS-26 to carry the first pair of Galileo Batch 3 satellites into orbit. The announcement will delay a Soyuz launch of two more Galileo satellites scheduled for April from French Guiana; a third pair of Galileo satellites was scheduled to launch in autumn on another Soyuz.
Galileo launch 11 from Europe’s spaceport in French Guyana. (Photo: ESA/CNES/Arianespace)
Russia’s military could target GPS and communication satellites as part of its war in Ukraine, reports Space News.
The news outlet cites U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Director Christopher Scolese speaking Feb. 23 at the National Security Space Association’s Defense and Intelligence Space Conference.
“I think we’re seeing pretty clearly that Russia is committed to doing what they want to do in Ukraine, and they want to win,” Scolese said. “So I think it’s fair to assume that, to the extent that they can, and to the extent that they feel it won’t extend the conflict out of their control, that they will extend it into space.”
An attempt to disrupt the United States’ space ability could affect satellites of private operators as well, such as Maxar, which is distributing imagery of the conflict.
A next-generation GPS III satellite on orbit. (Artist’s Rendering: Lockheed Martin)
In mid-November, Russia destroyed a retired satellite with a ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. This created significant debris, which endangered other assets in low-Earth orbit, including the International Space Station (ISS). Two Russian cosmonauts were serving on the seven-person ISS crew at the time.
Based on the ASAT demonstration and unclassified reports from the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, it is pretty clear that Russia can destroy all, or at least most, GPS satellites in one go.
What is less clear, is whether Russia would really do that.
To find out, Dana A. Goward spoke with George Beebe, who once served as the Central Intelligence Agency’s top analyst for Russia and Eastern Europe. He is now the director of programs at the Center for the National Interest, a center-right think tank.
Dana A. Goward: Russia’s threat to destroy GPS was made shortly after they destroyed an old satellite in space. What do you make of that demonstration, and all the dangerous debris it created?
George Beebe: Well, they were clearly sending a message — several messages, in fact. First, of course, that they have the ability to destroy satellites in space. This is part of a larger narrative they want to tell — that they are a world power which must be reckoned with. And it is no coincidence that this was done while they were amassing troops along Ukraine’s borders.
Another message is that they know the U.S. and Europe are very dependent on space, and we are vulnerable there.
DG: But the space debris will threaten satellites and people in low-Earth orbit for years to come. That seems to be reckless and counter to their own interest.
GB: While others see that as reckless and irresponsible, Russian officials almost certainly see it as an expression of resolve. That was actually another message. They were saying, “We are willing to endanger our own equipment and people.”
Translate that to their concern about keeping Ukraine from joining NATO and otherwise falling into the West’s sphere of influence. It might be, “We are willing to accept the pain in order to keep Ukraine from leaving our orbit.”
Unfortunately, I am not sure most Western leaders picked up on the “We are resolved” message.
DG: Attacking GPS would be a huge, devastating and dangerous move, though. How could things get so bad they would do that?
Beebe is the author of The Russia Trap. (Cover: Thomas Dunne Books)
GB: Russia sincerely believes it is generally threatened by the West, and specifically by NATO.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, they have seen their global influence recede, and Western influence on their borders greatly expand. Some of their neighbors have joined NATO. Others, like Ukraine, have not, but would like to eventually come under the NATO umbrella. For the Kremlin, this is unacceptable. It is akin to what Soviet missiles in Cuba were for the United States.
Over the last decade and a half, Putin has rebuilt the Russian military. He is now looking to draw lines in the sand for the West to not cross.
At the same time, the West feels threatened by Russia. Hitler’s aggression and refusal to be appeased by territorial concessions is standard reading in every Western history class. American and European leaders feel compelled to hold the line and not give into what they see as Putin’s territorial ambitions.
This is a very dangerous situation as both sides see themselves acting defensively and the other acting aggressively.
DG: I guess it is much easier to justify something to yourself and your compatriots if you think you are only acting in self-defense.
GB: Exactly. The problem comes when one side does something in self-defense and, in response, the other side feels compelled to do something as well. This can spawn an escalating tit-for-tat that spirals out of control into a bigger conflict no one wants.
DG: The West is imposing economic sanctions. At least that is harder to interpret as aggressive.
GB: Before World War II, the U.S. imposed severe economic sanctions on Japan in response to its expansionist moves in Asia. The sanctions were so severe that they were crippling and threatened to bring down Japan’s military government. The week before Pearl Harbor, the Japanese delivered a diplomatic note to the United States saying the sanctions amounted to an act of war. So, economic sanctions are not always an absolutely safe route.
DG: Do you think Russia would ever really attack GPS? And how might that go down?
GB: It depends on how backed into a corner they feel. They certainly know that our military and our homeland are very dependent on GPS, and we have no real alternative in place. It doesn’t help that they are much less dependent on GLONASS and have an alternative for when signals from space are not available.
So, they can definitely do more harm to us than we can to them by interfering with navigation satellites.
It would take a lot to goad them into physically attacking GPS satellites. That would be an irreversible step they undoubtedly understand could lead to all-out war.
Far more likely would be a cyber-attack on the systems controlling the GPS constellation. Such an attack could be harder to attribute to them. It could also be reversed if they got what they wanted.
I could also see them jamming GPS and Galileo signals across Europe and the United States as part of an escalated conflict. Russian forces excel at electronic warfare, and the jamming could easily be turned off once they achieved their goals, or if things seemed to be getting out of hand.
Photo: Stanislav Ostranitsa/iStock/Getty Images Plus/Getty Images
Two recent reports from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have described a recent increase in GPS jamming, presumably by Russian or pro-Russian forces in Ukraine. This comes as Russia has increased its troop numbers and activity along its border with Ukraine.
OSCE is charged with a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in Ukraine which observes and reports on how well both sides are adhering to the Minsk Protocol agreement. The agreement was signed in September 2014 by participants in the conflict in an effort to end open hostilities.
One of the ways the OSCE mission monitors activity and compliance in the region is with long range UAVs. As early as November 2014, the organization reported UAV operations being thwarted by interference with GPS signals.
Two recent OSCE spot reports have highlighted a resurgence in jamming.
An April 7 report described interference that prevented a UAV takeoff the previous day. While the organization’s UAVs had been experiencing increased interference since March, this was the first time since October 2014 that it had thwarted a mission before takeoff.
The report also documented an increasing level of jamming activity.
“Over the last two months, 62.5 percent of SMM long-range UAV flights encountered GPS signal interference and on 75 percent of the affected flights it occurred more than once.”
A second report on April 9 outlined continuing problems that caused missions to be aborted. It emphasized that this was a violation of the agreement signed by all parties and greatly hampered OSCE’s mission.
“Any GPS signal interference hinders the Mission’s ability to conduct effective monitoring and reporting of the security situation in line with its mandate. Long-range UAVs are an essential part of SMM operations, especially at night and in areas where the Mission’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted.”
GPS jamming and spoofing are important parts of Russia’s arsenal to counter any technological advantage the west may have over their forces. A 2015 Sputnik article bragged their electronic warfare kept U.S. cruise missiles from hitting their targets at the start of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Also, that this advanced capability “renders aircraft carriers useless.”
Interference with GPS signals is a regular feature of Russian military and internal security operations.
The United States has formally expressed concerns about the recent increase in the number of Russian troops and their activity at the Ukrainian border. It has been reported that two U.S. Navy ships are on their way to the Black Sea to help monitor the situation.
Dana A. Goward is president of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation.
A Ukranian MIG-29. (Photo: Ministry of Defense, Ukraine)
Ukrainian Lviv Aircraft Repair Plant is upgrading the country’s MIG-29 fighter jets with domestically developed GNSS-assisted navigation capability, reports defenseworld.net.
GNSS data will be viewed on a 8-inch, highly informative Cockpit display alongside the map of the terrain being overflown, target data and weapons parameters.
Also being upgraded is the jet’s air-to-ground and surface attack capability, making it a “multi-role” fighter aircraft.
The air-to-ground capability will be achieved through the use of TV-guided missile-bomb weapons of the X-29T and KAB-500KR types. The MiG-29 was originally designed as an air-superiority fighter to provide cover to ground attack planes such as the MiG-21.
