Author: GPS World Staff

  • What happened when Galileo experienced a week-long service outage

    What happened when Galileo experienced a week-long service outage

    Analysis of the Signal Outage

    By Fabio Dovis, A. Minetto, A. Nardin, Politecnico di Torino Department of Electronics and Telecommunications,
    E. Falletti, D. Margaria, M. Nicola, M. Vannucchi, LINKS foundation

    Following the issue by the Galileo Service Center of the Notice Advisory to Galileo Users (NAGU) reporting Service Outage for all the Galileo satellites, as curious Galileo users our team of researchers of the NavSAS group started an independent investigation of the received signals in space (SISs).

    In fact, we observed that a commercial ublox EVK-M8T receiver, forced to use Galileo-only satellites, provided a “no-fix” indication. Three Galileo-enabled smartphones, the Xiaomi MI 8, Huawei P 10 and Samsung Galaxy S8, which use assistance from the cellular network, were also not providing a Galileo-based position solution, considering the Galileo satellites as “not usable.”

    However, the investigation started exploiting our in-house developed software receiver NGene, that was used in the past for similar monitoring of the GNSS signals, for example at the time of the transmission of the first IOV Galileo satellites in 2012, and the transmission of anomalous GPS signals from SVN49 in 2009. Monitoring the Galileo SISs, which were usable until the day before, we found that they were still correctly trackable, with normal power levels and Doppler profiles within feasible limits.

    At the time of the first analysis, seven satellites were visible in the sky over Torino, Italy. Figure 1 reports a screenshot of the positions computed by means of NGene between 07:14:54 and 07:24:54 UTC on July 15, plotted on Google Earth. The position estimated using the Galileo-only satellite or hybrid GPS-Galileo solutions (red dots) showed errors on the order of 500 meters or even more. The georeferenced antenna position is depicted by the green pin.

    Figure 1. Misplaced Galileo and GPS+Galileo solutions. (Screenshot: Politecnico di Torino and LINKS Foundation)
    Figure 1. Misplaced Galileo and GPS+Galileo solutions.
    (Screenshot: Politecnico di Torino and LINKS Foundation)

    The monitoring of the status flags taken from the Galileo E1B I/NAV message showed that the SIS was marked as “healthy” for all the visible PRNs apart the number 14, which is known to be “not usable” for a long time. The Signal in Space Accuracy Index (SISA) was set to 109, which is an acceptable prediction of the minimum standard deviation of an overbound of the SIS error.

    According to the Galileo Open Service, Service Definition Document (OS SDD, issued 1.1, May 2019), a SIS “Healthy” means that the SIS is expected to meet the Minimum Performance Level and “a navigation solution obtained with Galileo SIS is expected to meet the Minimum Performance Levels reported in the Galileo OS SDD only if receivers comply with the assumptions reported in Section 2.4, including the use of navigation parameters within their broadcast period.”

    In fact, the document specifies that “The navigation solution is expected to meet the Minimum Performance Levels only if receivers do not use navigation parameters beyond their broadcast period. The maximum nominal broadcast period of a healthy navigation message data set is currently 4 hours.”

    The check of the nominal broadcast period was bypassed in our software receiver, which is indented as a research tool and not a commercial product as the one mentioned above, so that we were still able to obtain a GPS + Galileo PVT solution, since this check looked to be the only discrimination factor to validate and thus exclude the computed solution.

    On July 17, the SISA flag was changed to 255: according to the OS SDD, the accuracy status was “No Accuracy Prediction Available (NAPA).” This means that the status of the broadcast SIS must be intended as “Marginal.” In this condition the EVK-M8T restarted to provide Galileo-based fixes, while the Xiaomi Mi8 Pro smartphone still excluded the Galileo satellites from its PVT fix.

    The analysis of the decoded Galileo navigation message led to the conclusion that ephemerides and clock correction data were last updated around 19:00 UTC of 1July 16. For example, PRN 3 and 15 changed Issue Of Data (IOD) from 958 to 17 at Galileo Signal Time TOW 241855, which corresponds to 19:01:25.

    As a final check, we used external ephemerides to process the Galileo signals during the “system outage.” Figure 2 and Figure 3 show different navigation solutions obtained by processing a data collection taken on July 12 at 10.00 UTC (12.00 Local time). The purple dots indicate few fixes obtained by demodulating the navigation message transmitted by the Galileo satellites and show a remarkable bias with regard to the reference antenna location.

    Figure 2. Comparison of Galileo-only solutions using Navigation message ephemeris data and IGS ephemeris. (Image: Politecnico di Torino and LINKS Foundation)
    Figure 2. Comparison of Galileo-only solutions using Navigation message ephemeris data and IGS ephemeris. (Image: Politecnico di Torino and LINKS Foundation)
    Figure 3. Zoom on the Galileo-only positions obtained by using IGS data.(Image: Politecnico di Torino and LINKS Foundation)
    Figure 3. Zoom on the Galileo-only positions obtained by using IGS data.(Image: Politecnico di Torino and LINKS Foundation)

    In Figure 3, the green dots are the navigation solution obtained correcting the satellites positions according to precise orbits data and clock drift provided by the IGS network. The fix is a simple code based Least Mean Square solution without smoothing of the pseudoranges.

    The two results were obtained by processing the same satellites signals, thus proving that their quality was still sufficient to get an acceptable positioning solution during the Galileo service outage period. This brought us to the conclusion that, during the outage, only the ephemerides updates were affected by problems, while the other SIS components appeared sound and usable.

    The NavSAS group is a joint team of researchers of Politecnico di Torino and LINKS Foundation. The full analysis of the outage can be found at www.navsas.eu.

  • NASA wants to use GPS at the Moon for Artemis missions

    NASA wants to use GPS at the Moon for Artemis missions

    News from NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center

    GPS could be used to pilot in and around lunar orbit during future Artemis missions.

    A team at NASA is developing a special receiver that would be able to pick up location signals provided by the 24 to 32 operational GPS satellites. Such a capability could soon also provide navigational solutions to astronauts and ground controllers operating the Orion spacecraft, the Gateway in orbit around the Moon and lunar surface missions.

    The advanced GPS receiver would be paired with precise mapping data to help astronauts track their locations in space between the Earth and the Moon, or on the lunar surface.

    Artist’s concept of NASA’s Magnetospheric Multiscale mission consists of four identically equipped observatories that rely on Navigator GPS to maintain an exacting orbit that is at its highest point nearly half-way to the Moon. (Image: NASA)
    Artist’s concept of NASA’s Magnetospheric Multiscale mission consists of four identically equipped observatories that rely on Navigator GPS to maintain an exacting orbit that is at its highest point nearly halfway to the Moon. (Image: NASA)

    Navigation services near the Moon have historically been provided by NASA’s communications networks. The GPS network could help ease the load on NASA’s networks, freeing up that bandwidth for other data transmission.

    “What we’re trying to do is use existing infrastructure for navigational purposes, instead of building new infrastructure around the Moon,” said engineer and principal investigator Munther Hassouneh at Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland.

    NASA has been working to extend GPS-based navigation to high altitudes, above the orbit of the GPS satellites, for more than a decade. The agency now believes its use at the Moon, which is about 250,000 miles from Earth, can be done.

    “We’re using infrastructure that was built for surface navigation on Earth for applications beyond Earth,” said Jason Mitchell, chief technologist for Goddard’s Mission Engineering and Systems Analysis Division. “Its use for higher altitude navigation has now been firmly established with the success of missions like Magnetospheric Multiscale mission (MMS) and the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES). In fact, with MMS, we’re already nearly halfway to the Moon.”

    Navigator GPS

    The team developing a GPS receiver for use in and around lunar orbit (from left): Jason Mitchell, Luke Winternitz, Luke Thomas, Munther Hassouneh and Sam Price. (Photo: NASA/T. Mickal)
    The team developing a GPS receiver for use in and around lunar orbit (from left): Jason Mitchell, Luke Winternitz, Luke Thomas, Munther Hassouneh and Sam Price. (Photo: NASA/T. Mickal)

    The lunar GPS receiver is based on the Goddard-developed Navigator GPS, which engineers began developing in the early 2000s specifically for NASA’s MMS mission, the first-ever mission to study how the Sun’s and Earth’s magnetic fields connect and disconnect. The goal was to build a spacecraft-based receiver and associated algorithms that could quickly acquire and track GPS radio waves even in weak-signal areas. Navigator is now considered an enabling technology for MMS.

    Without Navigator GPS, the four identically equipped MMS spacecraft couldn’t fly in their tight formation in an orbit that reaches as far as 115,000 miles from Earth’s center — far above the GPS constellation and about halfway to the Moon.

    “NASA has been pushing high-altitude GPS technology for years,” said Luke Winternitz, the MMS Navigator receiver system architect. “GPS around the Moon is the next frontier.”Extending the use of GPS to the Moon will require some enhancements over MMS’s onboard GPS system, including a high-gain antenna, an enhanced clock and updated electronics.

    “Goddard’s IRAD (Internal Research and Development) program has positioned us to solve some of the problems associated with using GPS in and around the Moon,” Mitchell said, adding that a smaller, more robust GPS receiver could also support the navigational needs of SmallSats, including a new SmallSat platform Goddard engineers are now developing.

    Building on NavCube

    NavCube, which will be tested aboard the International Space Station later this year, is being used as a baseline for a lunar GPS receiver. (Photo: NASA/W. Hrybyk)
    NavCube, which will be tested aboard the International Space Station later this year, is being used as a baseline for a lunar GPS receiver. (Photo: NASA/W. Hrybyk)

    The team’s current lunar GPS receiver concept is based on NavCube, a new capability developed from the merger of MMS’s Navigator GPS and SpaceCube, a reconfigurable, very fast flight computer platform. The more powerful NavCube, developed with IRAD support, was recently launched to the International Space Station where it is expected to employ its enhanced ability to process GPS signals as part of a demonstration of X-ray communications in space.

    The GPS processing power of NavCube combined with a receiver for lunar distances should provide the capabilities needed to use GPS at the Moon. Earlier this year, the team simulated the performance of the lunar GPS receiver and found promising results. By the end of this year, the team plans to complete the lunar NavCube hardware prototype and explore options for a flight demonstration.

    “NASA and our partners are returning to the Moon for good,” Mitchell said. “NASA will need navigation capabilities such as this for a sustainable presence at the Moon, and we’re developing enabling technologies to make it happen.”

  • Collins taking orders for miniature M-code GPS receiver

    Collins taking orders for miniature M-code GPS receiver

    Photo: Collins Aerospace
    Photo: Collins Aerospace

    Collins Aerospace Systems, a unit of United Technologies Corp., has begun taking orders for its latest-generation Miniature PLGR Engine – M-Code (MPE-M) GPS receiver set for 2020 production deliveries.

    According to independent testing, the MPE-M is the lowest size, weight and power (SWaP) small Type II form factor ground receiver available and incorporates the company’s recently certified Common GPS Module (CGM).

    As a drop-in replacement for the thousands of customers using Collins’ Miniature PLGR Engine-SAASM (MPE-S) GPS receiver, the new MPE-M technology provides ten-times stronger anti-jamming capabilities for the direct acquisition of GPS signals than its predecessor.

    The MPE-M is capable of receiving the current military Y-Code GPS signal along with the newer Military Code (M-Code) signal. For all GPS signals, the MPE-M provides warfighters improved security and assured positioning, and it satisfies the U.S. government’s requirement for all military GPS equipment to be M-code-capable.

    “The MPE-M is ideal for lightweight, ground-based applications such as radios, blue force trackers, targeting devices, vehicle LRUs and small unmanned aircraft,” said Troy Brunk, vice president and general manager, Communication, Navigation and Electronic Warfare Systems for Collins Aerospace. “The implementation of M-code will provide our warfighters with increased mission effectiveness and safety due to the improved reliability of the signal.”

    Collins Aerospace is currently the only military GPS receiver provider that manufactures its products in house, assuring control over quality and delivery schedules. The MPE-M’s security certification also makes the receiver eligible for export to U.S. allies through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

    See also The promises of M-code and quantum.

  • Rohde & Schwarz releases free eBook on 5G

    Rohde & Schwarz releases free eBook on 5G

    Photo: Rohde & Schwarz
    Photo: Rohde & Schwarz

    Is 5G simply another generation of mobile communications technologies? Or is it something revolutionary?

    To help with answers, test and measurement specialist Rohde & Schwarz has compiled an in-depth book describing the main aspects of 5G New Radio (NR) technology. The contents of the book can be read online for free.

    Rohde & Schwarz has been an active participant in the 3GPP standardization process involving cellular technologies, including the upcoming 5G NR. Five technology experts at Rohde & Schwarz wrote the book to provide in-depth information for professionals working with 5G NR technology.

    The 400-page 5G New Radio: Fundamentals, Procedures, Testing Aspects provides insights into fundamentals and procedures on the architecture and transmission of 5G NR technology. The chapters provide answers to how

    and why the 5G technology was specified a certain way by 3GPP. The book also discusses the new challenges to test and measurement, brought about the arrival of 5G technology, and presents modern, innovative test solutions to solve these challenges.

    The 5G NR book can be read online via the Rohde & Schwarz GLORIS customer portal.

  • FAA restricts drones over additional military facilities

    FAA restricts drones over additional military facilities

    Photo: FAA
    Photo: FAA

    The Federal Aviation Administration has added new airspace restrictions — effective July 11 — on unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) attempting to fly over national-security-sensitive locations.

    The FAA has been cooperating with federal partners to address concerns about malicious drone operations by using the agency’s existing authority under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 99.7 (14 CFR § 99.7), Special Security Instructions, to establish UAS specific flight restrictions over select, national security sensitive locations.

    The FAA’s Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), FDC 8/3277, defines these special security instructions. The FAA published a NOTAM, FDC 9/3332, which alerts UAS operators and others in the aviation community of this change and points to FDC 8/3277.

    The additional 12 restricted locations requested by the U.S. Department of Defense are identified below.

    • Raven Rock Mountain Complex in Adams, PA
    • Lake City Army Ammunition Plant in Independence, MO
    • Pine Bluff Arsenal in White Hall, AR
    • Tooele Army Depot in Tooele, UT
    • Hawthorne Army Depot in Hawthorne, NV
    • Pueblo Chemical Depot in Pueblo, CO
    • Iowa Army Ammunition Plant in Middletown, IA
    • Watervliet Arsenal in Watervliet, NY
    • Blue Grass Army Depot in Richmond, KY
    • Letterkenny Army Depot in Chambersburg, PA
    • Rivanna Station in Charlottesville, VA
    • Maui Space Surveillance Site in Maui, HI

    UAS operators, in particular, are urged to review the special security instructions prescribed by FDC 8/3277 and the important supporting information provided by the FAA’s UAS Data Delivery System (UDDS) website.

    The UDDS website provides easy access to the text of FDC 8/3277 and other UAS-specific security NOTAMs; a current list of the airspace to which these special security instructions have been applied, supported by an interactive map and downloadable geospatial data; and other crucial details. A link to these restrictions is also included in the FAA’s B4UFLY mobile app.

    The new UAS flight restrictions highlighted above and by FDC 9/3332 are pending until they become effective on 07/11/2019. UAS operators should keep in mind that access to the airspace identified by FDC 8/3277 and UDDS is strictly controlled.

    Operators who violate these flight restrictions may be subject to enforcement action, including potential civil penalties and criminal charges.

    The FAA is continuing to consider additional requests by eligible Federal security agencies for UAS-specific flight restrictions using the agency’s 14 CFR § 99.7 authority as they are received. The FAA will announce any future changes, including additional locations, as appropriate.

    For further, broader information regarding flying drones in the National Airspace System, including frequently asked questions, please refer to the FAA’s UAS website.

  • Viametris launches new version of urban and road scanner

    Photo: Viametris
    Photo: Viametris

    Viametris has launched the second-generation version of the vMS3D, its urban and road lidar scanner.

    The second-generation version of the 3D mobile vehicle scanner has been redesigned to be more compact. The system has been simplified considerably in both electronic and ergonomic terms to make it more robust and stable in adverse conditions and challenging environments.

    Despite being lighter, the second generation offers the same technological capacities as its predecessor, but is simpler to use and can be mounted on a vehicle in minutes.

    The system component (including the sensors) and the element to affix the device to the vehicle (the frame) previously formed one unit, but are now separated.

    • The redesigned system is much lighter (9 kg) and more compact.
    • The mechanism to fix the scanner to the vehicle, which formed part of the system in the first-generation version, has been transformed. A rigid metal frame, fixed onto two roof bars, now holds the system, which fits into a dedicated compartment in seconds. As the frame is rigid, it limits vibrations between the system and the vehicle and prevents any strain on the mechanics during acquisition.
    • The second auxiliary antenna, which measures the heading by satellite, is discreet and non-removable, and fixed directly to the vehicle chassis.

    The new design makes it easier to mount and use the system, a task that can be accomplished by a single person in under three minutes. Alignment takes place the first time the system is mounted and does not need to be repeated, saving valuable time each start.

    Technological features

    The vMS3D comprises a new set of components that are more robust and stable in difficult conditions.

    • The integrated connectors are next-generation and embedded-grade.
    • The control box for power supply and communication with the tablet has been moved inside the vehicle to offer increased comfort to the user.

    Specifications

    Receiver: Septentrio AsteRx-m2a GPS+GLONASS+BeiDou+Galileo, 448 channels – L1/L2, B1/B2, E1/E5B, RAW

    IMU: SBG-Systems Ellipse2-D

    Scanner: 700,000 points per second

    Centimeter precision

    Panoramic 30MP FLIR Ladybug 5+ camera

    Double antenna

    SLAM compatible

  • Raytheon, AirMap work on integrating drones into national airspace

    Raytheon Company has signed a strategic agreement with AirMap, an airspace intelligence platform for drones, to collaborate on projects to safely integrate unmanned aerial systems (UAS) into the national airspace system. This will help unlock the positive economic and social benefits of expanded commercial drone operations, the companies said.

    Unmanned air traffic control advances will unlock safe, efficient and scalable drone operations with a myriad of economic and social benefits.

    “AirMap is ushering in a new era in drone aviation,” said Matt Gilligan, vice president of Raytheon’s Intelligence, Information and Services business. “Drones must safely operate in an already complex ecosystem, which is where our experience matters.”

    The agreement combines the two companies’ expertise:

    • Raytheon’s Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System, or STARS, is used by air traffic controllers across the U.S. to provide safe and efficient aircraft spacing and sequencing guidance for more than 40,000 departing and arriving aircraft daily at both civilian and military airports.
    • AirMap is a global provider of airspace intelligence for UAS operations, with over 250,000 registered users. In 2018, U.S. registered commercial drone pilots used AirMap to request more than 45,000 automated authorizations to fly in controlled airspace.

    “Raytheon technology has helped safely and effectively manage airspace in the most complex, dense controlled airspace in the world for decades,” said Ben Marcus, AirMap co-founder and chairman. “They are an ideal partner to join AirMap on the path toward enabling safe, efficient, and scalable drone operations in U.S. low-altitude airspace between 0 and 400 feet.”

    The two companies are working toward an integrated demonstration that will showcase how AirMap’s unmanned aircraft traffic management platform can increase air traffic controllers’ awareness of potential conflict between drones and manned aircraft near airports to ensure overall safety of the airspace.

  • L3Harris Technologies merger completed

    L3Harris Technologies merger completed

    The Harris-supplied navigation payload before integration into the second GPS III SV. (Photo: Harris)
    The Harris-supplied navigation payload before integration into the second GPS III SV. (Photo: Harris)

    L3Harris Technologies announced the successful completion of the all-stock merger between Harris Corporation and L3 Technologies on June 29. Headquartered in Melbourne, Florida, L3Harris becomes the sixth largest defense company in the U.S., and a top 10 defense company worldwide, with approximately $17 billion in revenue and 50,000 employees, including 20,000 engineers and scientists.

    Both companies have long been dominant presences in the U.S. GPS industry: Harris as a provider of the GPS satellite navigation payloads and geospatial intelligence software products, and L3 as a provider of military GPS user equipment and guided munitions. Both companies supply a wide range of other geospatially-related products as well.

    L3Harris has organized its operating businesses into four segments to best meet customers’ mission requirements and leverage the combined company’s broad technical capabilities:

    • Integrated Mission Systems — headquartered in Palm Bay, Florida, with approximately $4.9 billion in revenue. Includes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; advanced electro optical and infrared solutions; and maritime power and navigation
    • Space and Airborne Systems — headquartered in Palm Bay, Florida, with approximately $4.0 billion in revenue. Includes space payloads, sensors and full-mission solutions; classified intelligence and cyber defense; avionics; and electronic warfare
    • Communication Systems — headquartered in Rochester, New York, with approximately $3.8 billion in revenue. Includes tactical communications; broadband communications; night vision; and public safety
    • Aviation Systems — headquartered in Arlington, Texas, with approximately $3.8 billion in revenue. Includes defense aviation products; security, detection and other commercial aviation products; air traffic management; and commercial and military pilot training

    Shares of Harris common stock, which traded on the NYSE under the ticker symbol “HRS,” began trading on July 2 under the ticker symbol “LHX.” L3 Technologies shares ceased trading upon market close on June 28 and have converted into 1.3 L3Harris shares for each L3 share.

    The merger comes at approximately the same time that two other leading GPS companies, Raytheon and United Technologies, itself a merger including the former Rockwell Collins, now Collins Aerospace, also merged.

  • Road corrections: Trimble provides PPP for autos

    Road corrections: Trimble provides PPP for autos

    Image: Trimble
    Image: Trimble

    Incorporating precise and consistent absolute location information is an essential component of enabling advanced driver assistance (ADAS) and autonomous driving (AD) technology for vehicles.

    To help meet this need, Trimble recently released Trimble RTX Auto. The Trimble RTX Auto correction service provides a precise point position (PPP) solution that can be used to correct the position of any auto grade GNSS chipset. RTX Auto works in parallel with other on-vehicle sensors to deliver a positioning solution that satisfies ADAS and AD requirements.

    Absolute position contributes to many features:

    • Lane centering. Systems designed to keep a car centered in a lane, relieving the driver of the task of steering, is often achieved with cameras and absolute position data. Absolute position can be used when lines disappear, or weather prevents them from being seen.
    • Map aiding. a combination of precise map and location data helps to navigate junctions, lane changes, roundabouts or intersections where lane information is essential to safe driving.
    • Prediction of future road structure. Both allow a vehicle to begin slowing in advance of a bend in the road and to avoid harsh braking that would happen if the system only relied on short range sensors.
    • Adhering to the speed limit. This helps drivers anticipate changes in speed limits when a downpour prevents cameras from seeing the speed limit signs or when they might be obscured by natural surroundings or another vehicle.

    RTX Auto is both Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) and Automotive Software Process Improvement and Capability Determination (ASPICE) certified. These certifications validate that Trimble RTX Auto meets functional safety requirements for ADAS and autonomous applications in the auto industry.

    Super Cruising. Trimble is on the road today providing RTX-based absolute positioning within General Motors’ Super Cruise driver assistance feature, a hands-free driving system for the freeway. For more information on Super Cruise, visit www.cadillac.com/world-of-cadillac/innovation/super-cruise.


    See also Autonomous street sweeper relies on Unicore precision.

  • 2019 GPS Public Interface Control meeting set for Sept. 25

    2019 GPS Public Interface Control meeting set for Sept. 25

    CGSIC logo

    On Sept. 25, the GPS Directorate will host the 2019 Public Interface Control Working Group and Open Forum to update the public on GPS public document revisions.

    The meeting will collect issues and comments for analysis and possible integration into future GPS public document revisions.

    The 2019 Public Interface Control Working Group and Open Forum are open to the general public. It can be attended in person or by dial-in connection.

    Documents Affected

    • IS-GPS-200: Navigation User Interfaces
    • IS-GPS-705: User Segment L5 Interfaces
    • IS-GPS-800: User Segment L1C Interface
    • ICD-GPS-870: NAVSTAR GPS Control Segment to User Support Community Interface

    Meeting Address: SAIC, 100 N Sepulveda Blvd., El Segundo, CA 90245, The Great Room

    Meeting Dial-in Number: 310-653-2663 Meeting ID: 20190925 Password: 123456.

    Documents and proposed changes and the official meeting notice are posted on GPS.gov.

  • Tesla Model S and Model 3 vulnerable to GNSS spoofing attacks

    Tesla Model S and Model 3 vulnerable to GNSS spoofing attacks

    Tesla Model 3. (Photo: Tesla)
    Tesla Model 3. (Photo: Tesla)

    Autopilot Navigation Steers Car off Road, Research from Regulus Cyber Shows

    The Tesla Model S and Model 3 — electric cars built for speed and safety — are vulnerable to cyberattacks aimed at their navigation systems, according to recent research from Regulus Cyber.

    During a test drive using Tesla’s Navigate on Autopilot feature, a staged attack caused the car to suddenly slow down and unexpectedly veer off the main road. Regulus Cyber, the first company to deal with smart-sensor security across a wide range of applications including automotive, mobile, and critical infrastructure, initially discovered the Tesla vulnerability during its ongoing study of the threat that easily accessible spoofing technology poses to GNSS receivers.

    The Regulus Cyber researchers found that spoofing attacks on the Tesla GNSS receiver could easily be carried out wirelessly and remotely, exploiting security vulnerabilities in mission-critical telematics, sensor fusion, and navigation capabilities.

    Regulus Cyber experts traveled to Europe last week to test-drive the Tesla Model 3 using Navigate on Autopilot. An active guidance feature for its Enhanced Autopilot platform, it’s meant to make following the route to a destination easier, which includes suggesting and making lane changes and taking interchange exits, all with driver supervision.

    While it initially required drivers to confirm lane changes using the turn signals before the car moved into an adjacent lane, current versions of Navigate on Autopilot allow drivers to waive the confirmation requirement if they choose, meaning the car can activate the turn signal and start turning on its own. Tesla emphasizes that “in both of these scenarios until truly driverless cars are validated and approved by regulators, drivers are responsible for and must remain ready to take manual control of their car at all times.”

    Designed to reveal how the semi-autonomous Model S and Model 3 would react to a spoofing attack, the Regulus Cyber test began with the car driving normally and the autopilot navigation feature activated, maintaining a constant speed and position in the middle of the lane.

    Although the car was three miles away from the planned exit when the spoofing attack began, the car reacted as if the exit was just 500 feet away — abruptly slowing down, activating the right turn signal, and making a sharp turn off the main road. The driver immediately took manual control but couldn’t stop the car from leaving the road.

    The testing revealed another unexpected finding that significantly amplified the threat—a link between the car’s navigation and air suspension systems. This resulted in the height of the car changing unexpectedly while moving because the suspension system “thought” it was driving through various locations during the test, either on smooth roadways, when the car was lowered for greater aerodynamics, or “off-road” streets, which would activate the car elevating its undercarriage to avoid any obstacles on the road.

    Yoav Zangvil, Regulus Cyber CTO and co-founder, explains that GNSS spoofing is a growing threat to ADAS and autonomous vehicles. “Until now, awareness of cybersecurity issues with GNSS and sensors has been limited in the automotive industry. But as dependency on GNSS is on the rise, there’s a real need to bridge the gap between its tremendous inherent benefits and its potential hazards. It’s crucial today for the automotive industry to adopt a proactive approach towards cybersecurity.”

    The Regulus Cyber testing is designed to assess the impact of spoofing with low-cost, open source hardware and software, the same kind of technology that is accessible to anyone via e-commerce websites and open source projects on GitHub. Taking control of Tesla’s GPS with off-the-shelf tools took less than one minute.

    The researchers were able to remotely affect various aspects of the driving experience, including navigation, mapping, power calculations, and the suspension system. Under attack, the GNSS system displayed incorrect positions on the maps, making it impossible to plot an accurate route to the destination.

    Tesla’s response on Model S

    Prior to the Model 3 road test, Regulus Cyber provided its Model S research results to the Tesla Vulnerability Reporting Team, which responded with the following points at that time:

    Any product or service that uses the public GPS broadcast system can be affected by GPS spoofing, which is why this kind of attack is considered a federal crime. Even though this research doesn’t demonstrate any Tesla-specific vulnerabilities, that hasn’t stopped us from taking steps to introduce safeguards in the future which we believe will make our products more secure against these kinds of attacks.

    The effect of GPS spoofing on Tesla cars is minimal and does not pose a safety risk, given that it would at most slightly raise or lower the vehicle’s air suspension system, which is not unsafe to do during regular driving or potentially route a driver to an incorrect location during manual driving.

    While these researchers did not test the effects of GPS spoofing when Autopilot or Navigate on Autopilot was in use, we know that drivers using those features must still be responsible for the car at all times and can easily override Autopilot and Navigate on Autopilot at any time by using the steering wheel or brakes, and should always be prepared to do so.

    “This is a distressing answer by a car manufacturer that is the self-proclaimed leader in the autonomous vehicle race,” Zangvil commented. “As drivers and safety/security experts, we’re not comforted by vague hints towards future safeguards and statements that dismiss the threats of GPS attacks.”

    He offers the following counterpoints in response:

    • Attacks against any GPS system are indeed considered a crime because their effects are dangerous, as we’ve shown, yet the same devices we used to simulate the attacks are legally accessible to any person, online via e-commerce sites.
    • Taking steps to “introduce safeguards for the future” indicates that spoofing is, in fact, a major issue for Tesla, which relies heavily on GNSS.
    • In the case of cars, a spoofing attack is confusing in the best case, and a threat to safety in more severe scenarios.
    • The more GPS data is leveraged in automated driver assistance systems, the stronger and more unpredictable the effects of spoofing becomes.
    • The fact that spoofing causes unforeseen results like unintentional acceleration and deceleration, as we’ve shown, clearly demonstrates that GNSS spoofing raises a safety issue that must be addressed.
    • In addition, the spoofing attack made the car engage in a physical maneuver off the road, providing a dire glimpse into the troubled future of autonomous cars that would have to rely on unsecure GNSS for navigation and decision-making.
    • Given that the trust of the public still has to be earned as the automotive industry moves towards autonomy, the leading players are accountable for a responsible deployment of new technology.
    • As Tesla clearly stated, drivers are responsible for overriding autopilot under a spoofing attack, so it appears its auto pilot system can’t be trusted to function safely under a spoofing attack.
    • Because every GNSS/GPS broadcast system can be affected by GNSS/GPS spoofing, the issue is everyone’s problem and shouldn’t be ignored; furthermore, governments and regulators that have a mandate to protect the public’s safety must engage in proactive measures to ensure only safe GNSS receivers are used in cars.

    “According to Tesla, they’ll soon be releasing completely autonomous cars utilizing GNSS, which means that, in theory, an attacker could remotely control the car’s route planning and navigation,” Zangvil said. “We’re obligated to ask what steps they’re taking to address this threat, and whether new safeguards will be implemented in its next generation of entirely autonomous cars.”

    Although Regulus Cyber researchers tested only the Model S and Model 3, they concluded that the “disturbing vulnerability” of Tesla’s GNSS system is most likely company-wide, as the same chipsets are used across the Tesla fleet.

    “Just a few months ago we saw that during a spoofing incident in a car show in Geneva, seven different car manufacturers complained that their cars were being spoofed. This incident proves that many other automotive companies that are working on the next generation of autonomous cars are also vulnerable to these attacks. As an industry, to win public trust and succeed, every car manufacturer should be proactive and prepare against these threats,” Zangvil said.

  • Emcore’s new EN-2000 micro INS ready for defense, UAVs

    Emcore’s new EN-2000 micro INS ready for defense, UAVs

    Photo: Emcore
    Photo: Emcore

    Emcore Corporation has launched the EN-2000 to the Emcore-Orion series of micro-inertial navigation (MINAV) systems.

    The new EN-2000 will represent the pinnacle of performance in Emcore navigation systems, and realizes the company’s vision of a closed-loop, solid-state design that will deliver higher performance at lower cost than traditional RLG (ring laser gyroscope) navigation systems.

    The EN-2000 expands Emcore’s navigation systems line that also includes the EN-1000 introduced in 2017. The Emcore-Orion series of inertial navigation system (INS) are designed for use in a broad range of defense, aviation and aeronautics applications.

    The unit was introduced at the Paris Air Show, held June 17-20 at the Parc des Expositions Paris-le Bourget in Hall 6, Stand #C65.

    Today, there is an ever-increasing premium being placed on modern navigation systems for improved size, weight and power (SWaP). Traditional RLG navigation systems placed a premium on accuracy and performance, but not SWaP. Typical RLG and FOG systems are large and heavy, ranging in volume from 330 in3 to 540 in3, weighing 13 to 22 pounds with power requirements of 25 to 38 watts.

    Many modern weapon systems are now remotely operated, unmanned or man-portable and may need to operate where GPS is unavailable or denied. The compact EN-2000 is designed for these applications. It puts a premium on accuracy and performance, but also on smaller size, less weight and lower power consumption.

    The new Emcore-Orion EN-2000 MINAV is a three-axis design using the company’s proprietary, next-generation solid-state optical transceiver with advanced integrated optics, combined with all new field programmable gate array (FPGA) electronics to deliver stand-alone aircraft-grade navigator performance at one-third the SWaP of legacy or competing systems.

    The EN-2000 model comes in two standard versions, an IMU version and a standalone INS configuration. The INS version can gyrocompass to less than 0.7 milliradians and maintain near-GPS-level positional accuracy without the use of a GPS receiver. This makes it suitable for use in GPS-denied environments.

    To provide customers with additional flexibility, the unit is also capable of being aided by an external GPS for applications where needed.

    The Emcore-Orion EN-2000 is compact and lightweight, weighing less than 7 pounds, with very low power consumption of 10 watts. It can deliver twice the performance of the EN-1000 with the same form factor.

    The low SWaP of the EN-2000 makes it a suitable inertial navigation system for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), manned aircraft, rotorcraft and dismounted soldier applications.

    “With the introduction of the EN-2000, Emcore can now offer class-leading performance at a fraction of the size, weight and power of competing systems with increased reliability,” said David Faulkner, Emcore vice president and general manager of aerospace and defense. “Emcore’s goal of a true full navigation system that can replace older technology navigation systems in UAVs, UUVs, UGVs, manned aircraft and rotorcraft is fully realized with the introduction of the EN-2000.”

    “Our Emcore-Orion series micro navigators improve dramatically on the size and cost of navigation and azimuth sensing equipment by utilizing affordable lightweight sensors that reduce overall system weight and increase accuracy,” added K.K. Wong, Sr., director of fiber optic gyro products for Emcore. “The digital interface is also fully programmable at Emcore’s factory enabling it to directly replace competing units.”