GPS World

Author: Tracy Cozzens

  • Aquark, UK Royal Navy trial cold atom-based atomic clock

    Aquark, UK Royal Navy trial cold atom-based atomic clock

    Quantum sensing specialist Aquark Technologies has completed a second trial of its AQlock atomic clock system, facilitated by the Disruptive Capabilities and Technologies Office (DCTO) of the UK Royal Navy. The AQlock functioned continuously aboard HMS Pursuer in the Solent area over three days, what Aquark calls an important milestone for position, navigation and timing (PNT) technology and a step forward in the mission to reduce global reliance on GNSS.

    The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory supported the company’s latest trial, providing time and frequency test and evaluation expertise and equipment. It aims to improve conventional PNT by transferring the stability of atoms that have been cooled to near absolute zero to a conventional oscillator to reduce long-term drift. This makes the technology capable of maintaining high precision for longer, without the usual required correction from GNSS, augmenting existing timing capabilities. 

    The AQlock is an industrially designed and built cold atom-based atomic clock. The technology is underpinned by the supermolasses trap, a unique method of trapping atoms pioneered by Aquark that makes the technology highly robust, portable, and more affordable. The technology is suitable for miniaturization due to its reduced component count and power requirements when compared to alternative methods.

    By demonstrating its ability to continuously operate aboard a Royal Navy vessel in rough offshore conditions, the company is moving closer to its goal to improve conventional PNT and reduce global reliance on GNSS for military operations, infrastructure, telecommunications, finance, transportation and other sectors.

    The AQlock was developed with support from a Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) grant from Innovate UK.

    “Ultimately, it moves us closer to a future where critical technologies can continue to operate seamlessly, even in the absence of GNSS,” said Alexander Jantzen, co-founder and COO of Aquark.

  • GNSS jamming widespread in Strait of Hormuz, ships collide

    GNSS jamming widespread in Strait of Hormuz, ships collide

    GNSS jamming is causing confusion for ships traveling through the Strait of Hormuz, reports gCaptain. The regional threat levels are labeled “significant” because of air strikes between Iran and Israel, according to the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC). Maritime threat levels are marked as “elevated”.

    The JMIC highlighted GNSS jamming problems around the Port of Bandar Abbas and throughout the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf regions. Nevertheless, commercial shipping traffic has continued at normal rates.

    Naivgational error is considered the cause of a collision June 17 between two tankers in the Gulf of Oman. The Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) Front Eagle, with 2 million barrels of Iraqi crude bound for China, hit the Suezmax tanker Adalynn 15 nautical miles off Fujairah. There was fire on both ships, but no injuries. The Front Eagle appeared to be onshore in Iran days before the collision.

    Nearly 1,000 ships in the Gulf have been affected by mass interference since the start of the Iran-Israel conflict on June 12, according to shipping analysis firm Windward. Recent tracking data has shown unusual positioning errors, with vessels appearing to be in impossible locations.

  • SeRo Systems unveils live GNSS situation display to detect jamming

    SeRo Systems unveils live GNSS situation display to detect jamming

    SeRo Systems, a German-based leader in air traffic surveillance security and monitoring solutions, is expanding its portfolio with the launch of its newest monitoring technology for improved aircraft
    situational awareness. The live GNSS RFI Situation Display (GRSD) is a real-time solution that combines live air traffic information with SeRo’s advanced GPS jamming and spoofing detection and short-term predictive alerts — offering enhanced visibility into the airspace.

    For more than 10 years, SeRo has developed advanced air surveillance and monitoring technology for customers including EuroControl, Baltic air navigation service providers (ANSPs) and spectrum regulators, Austro Control, armasuisse and other aviation organizations. SeRo is the only company that provides real-time GNSS RFI monitoring to two of the three Baltic states.

    Operational picture at a glance

    Designed with and customized for ANSPs and spectrum regulators, the new GRSD leverages SeRo’s vertically integrated receiver network and uses its anomaly detection and high-precision multilateration (MLAT) to help users assess their operational picture at a glance. The system monitors the airspace and displays live traffic combined with a color-coded real-time GNSS interference intensity map that
    identifies zones subject to interference.

    Its short-term interference alerting feature utilizes AI to predict when aircraft will experience interference and gives the user a time estimate. As soon as an aircraft is impacted by spoofing, GRSD automatically highlights the aircraft and generates an alert indicating both the spoofed and the correct aircraft position.

    “With jamming and spoofing incidents on the rise, timely and actionable intelligence matters more than ever,” said Matthias Schäfer, CEO of SeRo Systems. “Our new GRSD product delivers real-time insights on GNSS RFI and provides a live operational view that helps users prepare and respond.

    GRSD works seamlessly alongside SeRo’s SecureTrack platform, combining real-time data for instant decision-making with historical insights for strategic airspace monitoring, analysis, reporting, and incident investigation. “Together with our SecureTrack solution, ANSPs and spectrum regulators now have the tools they need for unmatched situational awareness,” Schäfer said.

  • Leidos uses quantum technology to thwart GPS jamming

    Leidos uses quantum technology to thwart GPS jamming

    Susceptibility to jamming is a significant military vulnerability of the GPS signal. Through a Defense Innovation Unit contract, Leidos is developing an alternative navigation technology that measures variations in the Earth’s magnetic field and harnesses the quantum properties of nitrogen in diamonds. 

    “With magnetic navigation (MagNav) there’s no signal to jam,” said Aaron Canciani, manager of the Leidos Transition of Quantum Sensing (TQS) team and a former U.S. Air Force scientist who is a pioneer of the technology. “The one thing MagNav does need is a very sensitive magnetometer, which is where quantum comes in.”

    Quantum sensing uses microscopic particles that can simultaneously exist in multiple states to more accurately detect aspects of geophysical properties like magnetic fields. Leidos has been doing quantum work for years, applying it to a variety of cyber security and sensing applications. 

    “Quantum magnetometers have the potential to greatly increase position and attitude accuracies in magnetic navigation systems,” Canciani said. “Nitrogen vacancy-diamond magnetometers use the crystal structure of a diamond to define a sensing axis in which quantum measurements of the complete vector field can be known to exquisite accuracies.”

    The sensor is being developed by Frequency Electronics Inc. under subcontract to Leidos and in collaboration with MIT Lincoln Lab.

    Compared to classic magnetometers, which tend to drift due to reliance on relative measurements, Canciani added, “These quantum measurements are linked to the magnetic field through fundamental physics-based constants.” 

    Ultimately, Leidos intends to fly a MagNav system with the new magnetometer. If successful, the technology has the potential to significantly advance navigation technology for military use.  

  • InfiniDome successfully resists jamming in test

    InfiniDome successfully resists jamming in test

    Security company InfiniDome has partnered with one of Israel’s largest vehicle tracking and fleet management companies to simulate a real-world car theft scenario.

    The test recreated a scenario in which criminals deploy in-car GNSS jammers to disable location reporting systems. Two identical tracking units were installed: one protected by OtoSphere-Lighthouse (80×78.5x28mm, 180g), infiniDome’s newest anti-jamming module for commercial use, and one left unprotected.

    Credit: InfiniDome
    Credit: InfiniDome

    As jamming began inside the vehicle, the unprotected tracker quickly lost GPS signal and failed to transmit location. In contrast, the protected unit maintained full functionality, continuously reporting real-time data throughout the test.

    The trial demonstrated the reliability of infiniDome’s technology in commercial environments, the company said. The OtoSphere-LightHouse module was developed to deliver advanced anti-jamming protection for critical applications. As GPS has become essential across industries — from logistics to emergency service — so have the risks.

    InfiniDome’s presence at the International Drone Show in Denmark June 18–19, comes at a time when European stakeholders are actively seeking solutions to protect UAVs, maritime, and fleet operations from GNSS disruption — a risk that’s no longer theoretical.

  • 13 EU member states demand action on GNSS interference

    13 EU member states demand action on GNSS interference

    13 member states of the European Union have called on the European Commission to respond to interference with GNSS in EU countries.

    The interference originates in Russia and Belarus, as a result of the ongoing war with Ukraine.

    The ministers for transport from 13 countries urged immediate and coordinated action in response, reports the Baltic Times. The joint letter was signed by the ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, Slovakia, Finland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and Romania.

    In the joint letter, the ministers emphasize that since 2022, two types of interference to GNSS — jamming and spoofing — have been observed in the airspace of the Baltic Sea Region, posing a threat to various modes of transport, particularly civil aviation and maritime navigation.

    The General Secretariat of the Council of the EU responded to the joint letter with an outline of potential actions.

    1. Evaluate and coordinate the possibility to suspend the right to Russia and Belarus in the ITU to register the use of radio resources while GNSS interference is in progress. The lack of procedural legislation cannot be an excuse for deliberately contravening the spirit of the ITU Constitution and its general principles, endangering public health and life, without suffering any consequences.
    2. Based on good practice of EU and NATO cooperation on critical undersea infrastructure, enhance civil-military coordination mechanisms among Member States for shared monitoring, data exchange, and possible response to GNSS interference. Explore the benefits of dual use of various equipment and measures to combat the risks caused by GNSS interference.
    3. Intensify RFI monitoring by eligible national organizations and bodies, e. g. national regulator, police and military, and aggregate non-classified information on observed RFI to a publicly available near real-time monitoring and alert service on European level.
    4. Accelerate the deployment of interference resistant GNSS services, especially the antispoofing features that are part of the Galileo program, e. g. authentication and/or encryption of signals exchanged between stations and user equipment.
    5. Reassess the current reliance on GNSS-based navigation and develop resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PST) services by deploying alternative or complementary systems, including ground-based legacy solutions. Simultaneously, upgrade and modernize conventional navigation infrastructures to serve as robust backups.
    6. Promote industry-manufacturer collaboration for mitigation tools and updates. Support operator-level reviews of backup system readiness, ensuring non-GNSS alternatives are usable and practiced. 2 TREE2B 9198/25 EN
    7. Draw the attention of critical infrastructure operators and unmanned system manufacturers to the risks that may arise from interference with GNSS.
    8. Develop action plans for different domains (space, aviation, maritime, telecommunications) to avoid potential duplication of efforts and coordinate short-term and long-term measures at EU and national level.
    9. Continue cooperation with all relevant stakeholders (ITU, ICAO, IMO, EASA, EMSA, IATA, EUROCONTROL). These actions, among others, could contribute to building the overall resilience of the critical infrastructure and strengthening safety and security in Europe.

    The letter highlights the urgent need to accelerate the deployment of interference-resistant GNSS services, enhance the overall resilience of critical infrastructure, and strengthen safety and security across Europe.

    “The current security environment demands a unified response to hybrid threats posed by hostile regimes, as well as close cooperation to strengthen Europe’s preparedness and resilience,” said Lithuanian Transport and Communications Minister Eugenijus Sabutis.

    “Disruptions to GNSS signals have a direct impact on strategic sectors such as transport, energy, and telecommunications. To prevent potential incidents, we must act swiftly and decisively at the European Union level — not individually, but in a coordinated manner,” Sabutis said.

    The interference is not random incidents but a systematic, deliberate action by Russia and Belarus, which can be used as a hybrid attack on strategic radio spectrum, essential for modern technology, regional safety and security, particularly in transportation.

    Furthermore, the ministers call on the EU to increase diplomatic efforts to address the interference and apply pressure on the responsible parties, including legal action against responsible individuals and entities involved in the deliberate interference with GNSS signals, to enhance European safety and security.

    “So far, the attempts by several Member States to address the problem have not brought any more tangible results,” the EU General Secretariats said. “Therefore, it is necessary to increase diplomatic efforts to address the interference and put the pressure on the responsible parties.”

    The ministers propose intensifying radio frequency monitoring and enhance civil-military coordination mechanisms among Member States for shared monitoring, data exchange and possible response to GNSS interference. They also advocate for accelerating the deployment of interference-resistant GNSS services, particularly the anti-spoofing features of the Galileo program, and for upgrading and modernizing conventional navigation infrastructure.

    Reports of increased interference include:

    • Lithuania: starting from 556 cases in March 2024 to 890 in October 2024 and 1185 in January 2025
    • Latvia: 790 cases in October 2024 to 1288 cases in January 2025
    • Estonia: 1150 cases in October 2024 and 1085 cases in January 2025
    • Poland: 1908 cases in October 2024 to 2732 cases in January 2025.

  • Lithuanian port hit by GNSS interference

    Lithuanian port hit by GNSS interference

    Russia’s war with Ukraine continues to affect GNSS signal availability in the Baltic Sea, reports LRT News. Aircraft and ships near the Lithuanian seaport of Klaipėda are losing signals becausse of Russia’s efforts to shield its Kaliningrad exclave from potential airstrikes, said Saulius Skvernelis, speaker of the Lithuanian parliament.

    “The Russians are protecting the Kaliningrad region from potential air attacks,” Skvernelis told LRT TV. “This is not specifically intended to disrupt or harm our aircraft flying to Lithuania. It’s just that the protection zone extends beyond the Kaliningrad region’s borders, and the threat, the interference, is affecting our territory as well.”

    Skvernelis warned that this problem will persist across the region as long as the Kremlin continues its war in Ukraine.

    Thirteen European Union member states have called on the European Commission to respond to interference with GNSS in EU countries. In a joint letter, the countries stressed that GNSS interference cases are not random incidents but systematic and deliberate action by the Russian and Belarusian regimes aimed at destabilizing regional infrastructure, especially in the transport sector, reports LRT.

    “We can appeal to all EU countries and any institution, but it won’t help as long as Russia uses this kind of electronic protection for its military sites to defend itself against Ukrainian strikes,” Skvernelis said. “We must force Russia to end the war and then this problem will simply go away.”

  • UAV companies discuss FAA BVLOS policy at White House

    UAV companies discuss FAA BVLOS policy at White House

    Representatives from 18 drone technology companies — including AgEagle Aerial Systems, uAvionix, BRINC, Kelly Hills and Pierce Aerospace — participated in a second high-level, invitation-only policy discussion with the White House, hosted by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). This most recent engagement was centered on the proposed FAA Rule Part 108, which will define the regulatory framework for beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) drone operations across the United States.

    The finalization of FAA Rule Part 108 is expected to replace the current piecemeal waiver-based system, providing a more predictable, scalable, and innovation-friendly regulatory environment.

    Enactment of Part 108 would remove operational barriers, drive capital investment, and unlock next-generation drone technologies that enhance both commercial and public sector applications, explained AgEagle CEO Bill Irby.

    “This follow-up invitation by OIRA reaffirms the strategic importance of expanding BVLOS operations for the domestic drone industry,” Irby said. “Thoughtful and timely rulemaking can accelerate innovation, improve safety and compliance, and strengthen the U.S. position as a global leader in drone technology. Of particular value was the discussion of how streamlined regulation will allow broader deployment of autonomous data solutions and open the door for increased economic activity.”

    The engagement was made possible in part through the leadership and coordination of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) and the Commercial Drone Alliance (CDA), who played key roles in facilitating industry participation and ensuring productive dialogue between the private sector and federal stakeholders.

  • Low-cost antennas power high-precision space-based positioning

    Low-cost antennas power high-precision space-based positioning

    A novel method using signals of opportunity from low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites is redefining what’s possible in satellite-based navigation. Researchers have developed a joint pseudo-range and Doppler positioning technique that taps into signals from constellations like Starlink and Iridium NEXT — without relying on traditional navigation signal structures.

    By employing low-cost, wide-beam antennas and a specially designed time–frequency inversion algorithm, the team achieved remarkable accuracy: 3.6 meters in 2D and 6.2 meters in 3D, surpassing Starlink positioning approaches based on parabolic antennas by 35%.

    Technical barriers in using signals of opportunity include signal transmission times, low signal power, and imprecise orbital data, all of which hinder accurate positioning. Addressing these challenges demands a new approach to extracting usable navigation data from LEO constellations.

    In response, researchers from the Aerospace Information Research Institute introduced a joint pseudo-range and Doppler positioning method using wide-beam antennas to receive LEO satellite SOPs. The approach centers on a signal time–frequency inversion algorithm that reconstructs key signal parameters, alongside a novel accuracy metric called Equivalent Position Dilution of Precision (EPDOP).

    Real-world experiments combining Starlink Doppler data and Iridium NEXT pseudo-range signals confirmed strong performance, especially in long-baseline conditions — reinforcing the method’s global applicability.

    To overcome the cost and complexity of existing satellite tracking equipment, the team employed low-noise bock (LNB) wide-beam antennas capable of simultaneously receiving signals from multiple Starlink satellites. The core innovation lies in a signal processing algorithm that estimates transmission time and frequency from the received code phase and Doppler shifts — enabling both pseudo-range and Doppler observations without needing exact satellite clock data or real-time ephemeris.

    To quantify system performance under real-world errors, the researchers developed the EPDOP metric, adapted to mixed measurement inputs. Tests demonstrated the method’s robustness: 3.6 m 2D and 6.2 m 3D positioning using Starlink Doppler signals, and up to 24 m (2D) and 41 m (3D) accuracy using Iridium NEXT SOPs over a 40 km baseline. Compared to Doppler positioning techniques, the algorithm reduced positioning errors by over one-third and successfully suppressed the impact of orbital inaccuracies inherent in public two-line element set (TLE) datasets.

    “This work marks a key step toward accessible, accurate navigation using commercial satellite constellations,” said lead author Ying Xu. “By integrating Doppler and pseudo-range measurements and introducing a flexible precision metric, we can now harness Starlink and Iridium NEXT signals for high-precision positioning, even without access to proprietary signal structures. The proposed low-cost architecture opens new possibilities for resilient navigation in GPS-denied environments.”

    Because of its ability to operate with low-cost antennas and weak, unstructured signals, the technique is poised to support a wide range of applications: from autonomous driving and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) navigation in remote regions to emergency response and IoT asset tracking. Its resilience to satellite orbital prediction errors and adaptability across different LEO constellations make it a strong contender for next-generation positioning systems. As LEO deployments continue to expand globally, this approach offers a scalable and practical solution for real-time, high-accuracy navigation—promising enhanced capabilities for both civilian infrastructure and defense operations.

    The researchers’ study is published in Satellite Navigation (DOI: 10.1186/s43020-025-00163-y).

    Signal acquisition of Iridium NEXT satellites’ signal in the long baseline positioning scenario. (Credit: Aerospace Information Research Institute)

  • u-blox launches triple-band GNSS module for fast-scaling robotics

    u-blox launches triple-band GNSS module for fast-scaling robotics

    u-blox has expanded its ZED form-factor portfolio with the ZED-F20P, a L1/L2/L5 triple-band GNSS module designed for high precision applications in ground and air robotics.

    The ZED-F20P provides OEMs deploying fleets of ground robots, drone light shows, and other dynamic autonomous platforms with centimeter-level RTK and PPP-RTK positioning, fast convergence times, and integrated security features.

    Within the u-blox high precision receiver family, the ZED-F20P is a dedicated L1/L2/L5 triple-band specialist. It delivers deterministic, centimeter-level RTK and PPP-RTK accuracy tailored to the needs of lightweight and dynamic platforms. Its end-to-end silicon-to-firmware architecture supports 25 Hz update rates, robust security features, and low power consumption in a streamlined design.

    These capabilities combine to deliver industrial-grade reliability and enable smooth scaling from proof-of-concept to high-volume deployment without increasing system cost, power consumption, or integration complexity.

    Compatible with the established ZED footprint and UBX protocol, the ZED-F20P fits directly into existing layouts. The expanded ZED portfolio now covers dual-, triple- and all-band GNSS options, giving developers the flexibility to select the best fit while reusing the same board layout. This enables both flexible design choices and a straightforward upgrade from earlier products.

    The ZED-F20P pairs with the u-blox ANN-MB2 all-band high precision antenna to ensure optimal RF performance, offering a one-stop solution for streamlined evaluation and integration. This consistent design approach accelerates time to market while preserving hardware and software continuity.

    PointPerfect Flex and Live native support:

    When combined with u-blox PointPerfect Flex and Live GNSS correction services, the ZED-F20P becomes a complete, production-ready GNSS solution that delivers centimeter-level accuracy in seconds, without the need for a local base station. The triple-band L1/L2/L5 architecture ensures rapid convergence and resilience in challenging environments, while PointPerfect provides reliable corrections across key regions. This tight integration simplifies development and accelerates time-to-market for mass-market autonomous platforms. 

    “The ZED-F20P delivers the precision and reliability required for today’s ground and air robotics,” said Mårten Ström, director of product management at u-blox. “It strikes a rare balance between performance, integration simplicity, and application-specific focus, enabling engineering teams to move from prototype to fleet deployment with confidence. We’re already seeing strong interest from robotic lawnmower markets preparing for large-scale rollout.”

    Engineering samples of the ZED-F20P are available now. Developers can evaluate the module using the EVK-X20P evaluation kit, with a simple configuration.

  • Russian jamming creates ‘Bermuda Triangle’ in Baltic

    Russian jamming creates ‘Bermuda Triangle’ in Baltic

    Russian jamming of GPS signals is suspected to be the cause behind a new “Bermuda Triangle” of navigation confusion in the eastern Baltic Sea.

    In the Gulf of Finland, ships are disappearing from radar and Russian fighter jets are traveling through NATO airspace, according to Danwatch, a Danish news outlet.

    Ship monitoring service MarineTraffic shows the position of ships in completely different places than their actual positions, currently on land east of coastal city Primorsk, Russia.

    Experts say that not only is GPS being disrupted, but hackers are also manipulating navigation data. They blame Russia for its hybrid activities and attacks, which it carries out both from its mainland territory and from the Kaliningrad enclave, located between Poland and Lithuania.

    Screenshot of MarineTraffic now shows boats traveling in a circle inland from the Baltic Sea.
    Screenshot of MarineTraffic taken June 4, 2025, shows ships traveling in a circle on land, well east of the Baltic Sea.

    Romania also has issues with Russian jamming and spoofing activities. The website Defense Romania quotes Gen. Gheorghiță Vlad, chief of the Romanian Defense Staff, who said jamming and spoofing has occurred on the Black Sea weekly since the start of Russia’s war with Ukraine. Also, Romanian defense forces have discovered 122 floating mines in the sea.

  • Drones at War: Ukraine’s bold attack shows future warfare era

    Drones at War: Ukraine’s bold attack shows future warfare era

    On June 1, 117 drones rose up from wooden boxes inside Russia and attacked bombers parked on runways at military bases. The attack — dubbed Operation Spider Web — startled the world with its audacity.

    Approximately 41 planes were struck at four military bases, including the Belaya Air Base in Siberia hundreds of miles from Ukraine’s borders. In all, the attack destroyed a third of the bombers Russia uses as strategic cruise-missile carriers to destroy targets in Ukraine.

    The drones were smuggled into Russia via commercial trucking transportation.

    According to an analysis by Michael C. Horowitz for the Council on Foreign Relations, the strikes “once again demonstrated Ukraine’s ability to be at the cutting edge of technology and tactics. Ukraine has consistently and successfully leveraged and integrated everything from old military technology and off-the-shelf commercial systems to artificial intelligence (AI) for its military operations. This has been a difference maker in the war since its early days, giving Ukraine new and unexpected vectors to attack Russian forces and territory.”

    The analysis, by Michael C. Horowitz, calls this a new era for warfare — the era of precise mass. “The combination of AI and autonomous weapons, precision guidance, and commercial manufacturing mean that low-cost precision strikes are now accessible to almost any state or militant group,” Horowitz writes.

    Horowitz described the era of precise mass in a feature in Foreign Affairs magazine, November/December 2024.

    The attack demonstrates that countries can be at risk to drone attacks even deep inside its borders, and precision strikes the capability of any actor. Low-cost off-the-shelf drones can be readily used, along with open-source autopilot software and AI code. Drones can supplement or even replace traditional artillery or expensive cruise missiles.

    Read the full analysis here.