GPS World

Tag: Department of Defense

  • GAO Report checks defense on PNT tech

    GAO Report checks defense on PNT tech

    Cover: USGAO Report
    Download the GAO Report.

    A May report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) explores Department of Defense (DOD) strategy for positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) technology to complement GPS. The 51-page report takes a comprehensive view of alternative PNT policy and leadership across the department.

    While GPS will remain the core of DOD’s PNT solution, it will use other PNT technology to complement GPS or as an alternative for when GPS is degraded or unavailable. DOD is exploring both improved sensors to provide relative PNT information, and external sources to provide absolute positioning and navigation.

    DOD also is working to create common standards and interfaces to help integrate and field new PNT technologies faster and at lower cost. DOD also is developing its PNT modeling and simulation capabilities to evaluate the performance of new PNT technologies.

    Challenges for DOD

    Officials from across DOD and experts told GAO that alternative PNT solutions are not prioritized within DOD. For example, there is no central program office responsible for developing the variety of alternative PNT technologies across DOD.

    DOD’s continued reliance on GPS, despite known GPS vulnerabilities to disruption, presents a challenge for obtaining sufficient support to develop viable alternatives. Defense officials and experts also said challenges in establishing clear PNT performance requirements hinder technology development.

    In response, GAO developed six policy options that may help address challenges with developing and integrating alternative PNT technologies. The policy options identify possible actions by policymakers, who may include Congress, federal agencies and industry groups.

    1. Increase collaboration. Consider mechanisms to coordinate across DOD to clarify responsibilities and authorities in prioritizing the need for alternative PNT technologies.
    2. Focus on resiliency. Consider selecting the most resilient technologies as the cornerstone of the PNT suite for military missions, rather than defaulting to GPS.
    3. Clarify requirements. Consider opportunities to clarify what level of PNT performance actually is needed for missions, rather than defaulting to requirements that match GPS performance.
    4. Coordinate with industry. Consider ensuring DOD and industry coordinate so that industry is prepared to meet DOD’s needs, and DOD can leverage industry advances.
    5. Institutionalize open architecture. Consider making the open architecture initiative more permanent, including providing funding.
    6. Analyze vulnerabilities. Consider having DOD conduct ongoing analysis of vulnerabilities of different PNT systems.

    The GAO reviewed technical studies, agency documents, and other key reports; interviewed government officials and researchers about alternative PNT technologies; and convened a three-day meeting of experts from government, non-governmental organizations, academia and industry.

  • Controversial GAO report on DOD nav webinar June 15

    Controversial GAO report on DOD nav webinar June 15

    webinar ad

    On May 10, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on navigation efforts n the Department of Defense (DOD). Among its findings were that the department regularly fails to establish validated navigation and timing requirements for systems and instead defaults to the capabilities of GPS. Also, that alternate positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) efforts are not prioritized, and sometimes actively opposed, by forces within DOD.

    One of the report’s more startling recommendations is that the department change its focus from GPS as the central pillar of its PNT strategy going forward in favor of resilient technologies.

    The Institute of Navigation (ION) and Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation (RNTF) are hosting a webinar to discuss the report with two of its authors on June 15 at 11 a.m. ET. Two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff have also been invited as panelists.

    After a panel discussion moderated by Dana A. Goward, president of the RNT Foundation, attendees will have the opportunity to ask questions of the panelists.

    The event is open to the public, but attendees must register in advance.

  • ColdQuanta awarded US government contracts for atomic clock

    ColdQuanta awarded US government contracts for atomic clock

    Projects will advance technology used for secure GNSS, quantum timekeeping and communications

    ColdQuanta, which specializes in cold atom quantum technology, has been awarded two development contracts from U.S. government agencies worth $2.55 million. Both projects are based on the company’s Quantum Core technology, which uses atoms cooled to a temperature of nearly absolute zero and lasers to manipulate and control the atoms with extreme precision.

    Prototype Atomic Clock

    The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering (OUSD R&E) awarded ColdQuanta $1.8 million for the development of a prototype atomic clock that could enable reliable, highly accurate position, navigation and timing (PNT) capabilities necessary for the functioning of critical infrastructure around the world. Atomic clocks are used for GPS/GNSS systems as well as for time-distribution services that are the basis of financial networks, computer, TV and radio services and other applications.

    Alternative PNT. However, services such as satellite-based GPS can be spoofed, lack encryption or other security features, and often can’t deliver the signal strength required. Because of this, the development and deployment of a PNT system that doesn’t depend on GPS is a critical need across governments and industry, according to ColdQuanta. The company said this is especially true for mobile systems such as aircraft and spacecraft that need to know their position with great precision even when GPS is unavailable.

    Under this project, ColdQuanta will deliver a state-of-the-art atomic clock with “instant on” capability if a GPS signal is lost, with a timing accuracy comparable to the best commercial clocks. It will also be ruggedized, portable and compact to enable its use in aircraft, and will minimize the power draw in between periods of demand.

    “High-performance atomic clocks are the backbone of the internet, electrical power grids, financial networks, and autonomous navigation. Combining this with ColdQuanta’s development of related inertial navigation devices — such as gyroscopes, accelerometers and gravimeters — will lead to the first Quantum Positioning Systems,” said Dan Caruso, executive chairman and CEO of ColdQuanta. “We’re excited to work closely with the Department of Defense to meet their urgent needs, while also advancing the capabilities needed for future, unassailable global positioning technology.”

    This velocity-distribution data for a gas of rubidium atoms confirmed the discovery of the Bose–Einstein condensate in 1995. In these three snapshots in time, atoms—cooled to near absolute zero—condensed from less dense areas on the left (red, yellow, and green) to very dense areas at the center and the right (blue and white). (Image: NIST/JILA/CU-Boulder)
    This velocity-distribution data for a gas of rubidium atoms confirmed the discovery of the Bose–Einstein condensate in 1995. In these three snapshots in time, atoms—cooled to near absolute zero—condensed from less dense areas on the left (red, yellow, and green) to very dense areas at the center and the right (blue and white). (Image: NIST/JILA/CU-Boulder)

    Miniaturized Ion Trap System

    Also, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) awarded ColdQuanta $750K for the development of a high-performance miniature ion trap system. Compact ion trap systems are applicable to a spectrum of quantum applications including quantum networks, computing, metrology, and timekeeping.

    ColdQuanta previously developed a prototype miniaturized ion trapping system with performance that is competitive with traditional, large-footprint vacuum systems. The system maximizes performance and robustness while minimizing size, weight, and power consumption (SWaP). The new AFRL award will build on the success of this prototype to increase performance, reduce cost, and create a robust architecture for deployable quantum platforms.

    Bose-Einstein Condensate

    The story of ColdQuanta began in 1924 with the discovery of the Bose-Einstein condensate (BEC) — also known as the fifth form of matter — by Satyendra Bose and Albert Einstein. Seventy years later, BEC was first synthesized at the University of Colorado at Boulder in collaboration with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), for which Eric Cornell and Carl Wieman won a Nobel Prize in 2001. Their colleague, Dana Anderson, co-founded ColdQuanta, which is using the fifth form of matter as the foundation for its cold atom quantum technology.

    When atoms are cooled to a few millionths of a degree above absolute zero, they take on quantum properties. Lasers are used to arrange the atoms, hold them in place, run computations on them, and read out the results. Quantum calculations, communications and sensing are the result.

    ColdQuanta is collaborating with global customers including major commercial and defense companies; the U.S. Department of Defense; national laboratories operated by the Department of Energy, NASA, and NIST; major universities; and quantum-focused technology companies to advance products and services development with Cold Atom Quantum Technology. ColdQuanta is based in Boulder, with offices in Madison, Wisconsin, and Oxford, United Kingdom.

  • Federal policy aimed at GPS interference, critical infrastructure

    Federal policy aimed at GPS interference, critical infrastructure

    In its closing days, the Trump administration issued several new policy documents affecting positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) issues.

    Some have questioned the long-term impact of these, given the significant policy differences between the previous and current administrations. Yet policies in relatively non-controversial areas such as PNT are generally developed by career personnel who tend to remain in place from administration to administration. While they must adhere to the philosophical tenets of extant elected officials, these policies tend to endure longer than others.

    Even if this weren’t the case, considering the wealth of other issues the new administration is grappling with, these new policies could remain in force for some time, even if the new regime ultimately decides to change them.

    Several themes run through many of the documents. These include:

    • Space-based PNT is vulnerable and must be protected.
    • America needs to monitor for GNSS disruption.
    • More sources of PNT than just GPS are needed.

    National Space Policy

    The first of these late-term documents to be published was the National Space Policy issued on Dec. 9, 2020. Highlights and possible impacts for the PNT community include:

    • A goal to “Promote and incentivize private industry” could have implications for low-Earth orbit (LEO) PNT services.
    • A goal to “Increase the assurance of national critical functions” could include GPS/PNT resilience.
    • A pledge to “Safeguard space components of critical infrastructure” undoubtedly includes GPS. The section also has ominous statements about U.S. responses to purposeful interference and tasks the Defense and Homeland Security secretaries with having those responses ready.
    • Another pledge to “Maintain and Enhance Space-based Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Systems” is followed by eight explanatory paragraphs, many of which repeat previous policy. One new item is a promise to invest in detection and mitigation of harmful interference. A mention is also made of the need for multiple and diverse PNT sources, and responsible use of PNT, echoing the February 2020 Executive Order on the subject. Both of the latter two mentions were in the context of critical infrastructure and mission essential functions versus the security of the nation and economy as a whole.

    Report to Congress: GPS Backup Tech Demo

    Congress mandated a GPS backup technology demonstration in 2017, and $10 million was subsequently provided for that purpose. Various internal government delays resulted in the project not getting underway until March 2019. It concluded about a year later.

    On Jan. 14, the Department of Transportation (DOT) posted its 457-page “Complementary PNT and GPS Backup Technologies Demonstration Report” to Congress on its website.

    While some people have been critical, it is important to remember the report documents 11 vendor demonstrations, not engineering tests. Technologies were demonstrated in different locations and under differing conditions.

    There is no silver bullet for meeting the nation’s needs. It must be a system of systems.

    Also, the amount of effort and equipment in the demonstrations depended in some cases upon infrastructure available and the amount of money the government and vendors were able to spend. This meant that at least one technology was “demonstrated” mostly by explaining the concept, and other vendors were able to only partially demonstrate their technologies.

    All of that said, the report offers valuable information about how America should make its national PNT much more resilient and reliable. First, it reinforces DOT’s message that there is no silver bullet for meeting the nation’s needs. It must be a system of systems. Second, the report goes further and says what that system of system should look like: “Those technologies are LF and UHF terrestrial and L-band satellite broadcasts for PNT functions with supporting fiber-optic time services to transmitters/control segments.”

    From a policy perspective, this is a huge step forward. It resolves previous ambiguity and positions the nation to establish a resilient PNT architecture, one that will do more than be a “GPS backup.” It will be an architecture that will better support current applications and better enable emerging ones like autonomy, 5G and “NextG.”

    National Research and Development Plan for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Resilience

    Published one hour and fourteen minutes before the end of the administration on inauguration day, this plan was mandated as part of the February 2020 Executive Order on responsible use of PNT. By taking a comprehensive look at how we can do better, it provides an interesting outline of the challenges associated with America’s current over-reliance on GPS. While not a policy or directive document, it does suggest two or three departments and agencies that might be tasked with addressing each challenge.

    It also addresses the need for interference detection and monitoring, and diverse sources of PNT.

    U.S. Space-Based PNT Policy (Space Policy Directive 7)

    This directive was published five days before the end of the administration and replaced the previous policy, 2004’s NSPD-39.

    While the old policy calls for performance monitoring of GPS signals, the new one also has investment in interference detection and monitoring as a goal.

    Perhaps the most significant change in the new policy was the absence of the words “backup capability” and the lack of a mandate for DOT to lead its establishment. Yet the policy hammers home multiple times the need for more than GPS as a source of PNT. And it doesn’t abandon the idea of government involvement in making that happen.

    In addition to reinforcing Executive Order 13905 on responsible use of PNT, the directive defined a new (for presidential policies) term. “Alternative PNT Service” was described as “a PNT service that has the capability to operate completely independent of, or in conjunction with, other PNT services.” The directive goes on to say that “Multiple, varied PNT services used in combination may provide enhanced security, resilience, assurance, accuracy, availability and integrity. An alternative PNT service allows a user to transition from the primary source of PNT signals in the event of a disruption or manipulation.”

    And while the policy does not say the government will establish or support an alternative PNT service, it comes pretty close. One of its goals is “Invest in… as appropriate, alternative sources of PNT for critical infrastructure, key resources, and mission-essential functions.”

    It goes on to task the departments of Defense, Homeland Security and Transportation with making that happen.

    So “backup” is out, “alternative PNT” is in. We agree words are important and are happy to have the new words. Let’s hope the new administration will match the new words with action (as appropriate).

    Feature image: niarchos/DigitalVision Vectors/Getty Images

  • DSI to host 2021 Assured PNT Summit in April

    Logo: Defense Strategies Institute

    The Defense Strategies Institute’s (DSI) Assured Positioning, Navigation & Timing (PNT) Summit will take place April 14-15 at the Mary M. Gates Learning Center in Alexandria, Virginia.

    According to DSI, the event will bring together members of the military services, Department of Defense (DoD), federal government, industry and academia in a “town hall” style forum to discuss how important GPS and space-based PNT systems are to the overall resilience of the warfighter, as well as critical infrastructure across the United States and abroad.

    The 2021 Assured PNT Summit also will offer senior-level insight into how the U.S. military has been a leader in integrating PNT into its everyday operations and how such capabilities have become vital to the military’s ability to shape the global arena, deter aggression, and fight and win wars.

    Confirmed speakers for this year’s event include William Nelson, SES, director, APNT CFT, Army Futures Command; Brig. Gen. Heather L. Pringle, USAF, commander, Air Force Research Laboratory; Anthony C. Smith, SES, director, C3I, DoD CIO; Richard De Fatta, SES, director, U.S. Army Space & Missile Defense Center of Excellence; Cordell “Del” DeLaPena, SES, program executive officer for Space Production Space & Missile Systems Center, USAF; Harold W. Martin III, SES, director, National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing; and Col. Jason Joose, USA, chief of staff/APNT signature effort lead, Army Futures Command.

    A number of topics will be covered at the 2021 Assured PNT Summit, including:

    • Leading current DoD initiatives toward integrating new PNT capabilities to help the Warfighter remain resilient in a dynamic threat environment;
    • Synchronizing PNT, navigation warfare and space capability development efforts across the Army to help reduce key capability gaps;
    • Delivering resilient, affordable and sustainable space capabilities such as modernized GPS to enhance warfighter superiority;
    • Providing alternate PNT for potential GPS-denied environments;
    • Accelerating the implementation of cutting-edge Air Force research projects such as NTS-3 GPS Satellite to provide the most value to the warfighter;
    • Developing critical PNT-related products to enable a Soldier’s PNT capabilities in all warfighting domains;
    • Overseeing the collection of GPS-related information from multiple federal agencies in an effort to improve and maintain space-based PNT capabilities;
    • Advancing efforts to provide GPS protection for all naval air platforms; and
    • Detailing the Department of Homeland Security plan to test the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure systems, networks and assets if PNT services were to be disrupted or manipulated.

    Register for the event here.

  • 2021 Defense Act signals turning point for Congress and PNT

    2021 Defense Act signals turning point for Congress and PNT

    Senate poised to join House this week and override Trump’s veto

    The U. S. Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees, have long been concerned about GPS and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) issues. Over the last two decades Congressional hearings, demands for reports, and investigations have dealt with acquisition, contingency plans for when space is not available, deliberate interference, and a host of other issues.

    While these all evidenced Congress’ interest and concern, they were relatively passive measures.

    The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

    This began to change in 2018 with passage of the National Timing Resilience and Security Act. It requires the Department of Transportation to establish a terrestrial timing system to backup GPS signals.

    Then in 2019, Congress appropriated money for a GPS Backup Technology Demonstration. And the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020 required the Air Force to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of its resiliency efforts.

    The NDAA for 2021 seems to finalize Congress’ transition from an interested observer, mostly on the sidelines, to an active player in national PNT issues and policy.

    Capitol Hill observers say this is the result of several things that have come to a head over the last year. Taken together, they have convinced many legislators that GPS is under threat and PNT issues are not being taken seriously enough by the executive branch. These include increased jamming and spoofing (especially by China and Russia), full implementation of China’s BeiDou system and its marketing to other nations as a superior alternative to GPS, the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) decision on Ligado Networks, and the Pentagon’s failure to respond to combatant commanders’ Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements for non-GPS PNT.

    Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com
    Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com

    Here are some of the provisions of the 2021 NDAA of interest to the PNT community.

    Military Multi-GNSS Receiver Prototype

    The 2018 NDAA required the Defense Department to incorporate Europe’s Galileo and Japan’s QZSS satellite navigation signals into military user equipment. The idea was to make it more resilient to disruption. Also required was an investigation into using non-allied signals.

    Apparently not satisfied with progress on this project, Congress mandated a project to develop a prototype multi-GNSS receiver as part of the 2020 NDAA.

    The 2021 NDAA seems to indicate the Congress is still not happy. It withholds 20% of the funding for the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force until such time as the department certifies the prototype project is underway and provides briefings to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

    Resilient Survivable PNT

    Language in the 2021 NDAA also seems to show Congress is impatient with the Pentagon’s lack of responsiveness to combatant commanders’ requests for non-GPS PNT systems.

    Section 1611 of the Act is entitled “Resilient and Survivable Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Capabilities.” It requires development, integration, and deployment of these capabilities for combatant commanders within two years. This, it says, is “… consistent with the timescale applicable to joint urgent operational needs statements…”

    The act says the new PNT capabilities shall “generate resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing signals” and “process resilient survivable data provided by signals of opportunity and on-board sensor systems.”

    The act also reverses the Defense Department’s 2018 PNT Strategy’s plan for future systems to be classified and for military use only. It directs the department to work with the National Security Council, Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security and others “to enable civilian and commercial adoption of technologies and capabilities for resilient and survivable alternative positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities to complement the global positioning system.”

    To help ensure prompt action on this, the act requires a report to Congress within six months and authorizes the department to reprogram funds from other areas to finance the effort.

    Responding to FCC’s Decision on Ligado Networks

    By far the most PNT-related text in the 2021 NDAA includes a host of measures responding to FCC Order 20-48 approving an application by Ligado Networks. An order which the executive branch is on record as strongly opposing saying it will degrade GPS service for many.

    Senator Jim Inhofe, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has regularly expressed outrage at the FCC’s decision and has called for its reversal.

    Among its provisions the act:

    • Requires the Department of Defense to estimate and report to Congress the cost of damage to department systems as a result of the FCC order.
    • Prohibits using department funds to upgrade or modify military equipment to make it resilient to interference caused by broadcasts in the spectrum allocated (the FCC order requires this to be funded by Ligado)
    • Prohibits contracting with any entity using the frequency bands allocated to Ligado unless the Secretary of Defense certifies the use will not interfere with GPS services
    • Requires the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine for an independent technical review of the FCC order.
  • FLIR Systems acquires Altavian for defense sUAS

    FLIR Systems acquires Altavian for defense sUAS

    Photo: FLIR Systems
    Photo: FLIR Systems

    FLIR Systems Inc. has acquired Altavian Inc., a privately held manufacturer of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) for defense and public-safety customers.

    Altavian’s airframes integrate multiple sensors, including FLIR thermal technology, to provide users with decision support and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability.

    Based in Gainesville, Florida and founded in 2011, Altavian designs and manufacturers Group 1 UAS solutions for long or short range operations. With both quadcopter and fixed-wing UAS designs, Altavian’s expertise includes aeronautics, avionics, and software, and its solutions are engineered around an open system architecture aligned to the needs of government and defense customers.

    Altavian is one of five drone manufacturers approved by the U.S. Department of Defense under the Blue sUAS program to sell to the U.S. military and federal agencies.

    “Altavian’s proven engineering expertise and assets will allow us to offer customers the most comprehensive solution portfolio of any American sUAS provider,” said Roger Wells, general manager of the Unmanned Systems and Integrated Solutions business of FLIR Systems’ Defense Technologies Segment, under which Altavian will be integrated. “With the addition of both a low-cost, rapidly deployable quadcopter and a longer range fixed-wing UAS, FLIR is strengthening its already impressive drone lineup, including our Black Hornet and SkyRaider platforms used extensively by militaries around the globe. We’re excited about the multiple new franchise opportunities FLIR will be able to pursue for defense, public safety, and industrial markets worldwide.”

    For more information about FLIR Systems’ existing sUAS solutions, visit flir.com/defense-uas.

  • US Air Force awards $20M to Alion for autonomous navigation

    US Air Force awards $20M to Alion for autonomous navigation

    The U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has awarded Alion Science and Technology a $20 million task order for a 60-month period to provide Autonomy and Navigation Technology (ANT) development.

    The ANT Center is a forward-looking research center within the AFIT seeking to identify and solve tomorrow’s most challenging autonomy and navigation problems.

    The ANT Center’s goal is to develop navigation technology that ensures the Department of Defense (DOD) can navigate anywhere, anytime, using anything, and to improve the DOD’s ability to conduct autonomous operations.

    Alion will research, assess, analyze and develop the ANT Center’s research in autonomous and cooperative systems, non-GPS precision navigation, and robust GNSS navigation/Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR). This effort supports the AFIT’s mission to advance air, space, and cyberspace power for the nation, its partners, and our armed forces by conducting relevant defense-focused research to enhance technical graduate and continuing education, while supporting the development and evolution of navigation and autonomy technologies, impacting weapon systems across the DOD.

    “Alion has some of the greatest engineering and technology minds in industry partnering side-by-side with our customers to face challenging issues and create technologies, solutions and advancements in innovation to keep our nation ahead,” said Eric Wright, Alion’s vice president of the Integrated Solutions Operation within the Advanced Technology Group. “We are privileged to be working with the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology to achieve the goals of the ANT Center.”

    This task was awarded under the Department of Defense Information Analysis Center Multiple Award Contract (IAC MAC) issued by the Air Force Installation Contracting Center. This material is based upon work supported by the DOD Information Analysis Center Program Management Office (DOD IAC PMO), sponsored by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) under Contract No. FA807518D0002.

    Photo: U.S. Air Force/Tech. Sgt. Anthony Nelson
    Photo: U.S. Air Force/Tech. Sgt. Anthony Nelson
  • Microchip introduces timing GPS with embedded M-code receiver

    Microchip introduces timing GPS with embedded M-code receiver

    New SyncServer S650 M-Code secures military communication systems, radar and networks reliant on GPS signals

    Photo: Microchip
    Photo: Microchip

    Threats from intentional jamming and spoofing of GPS signals, as well as cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure, demonstrate the need for powerful and secure time and frequency systems that ensure continuing operability and performance.

    Microchip Technology’s SyncServer S650 M-Code time server has received approval from the U.S. Air Force GPS Directorate of the Los Angeles Air Force Base for use in support of military communication systems, radars and networks.

    M-code, an encrypted military signal broadcasted in GPS frequency bands, is required by congressional mandate for mission critical Department of Defense (DOD) applications in hostile environments. Microchip’s SyncServer S650 M-Code equipped time and frequency server provides a secure, accurate, flexible platform for synchronizing mission-critical electronic systems and instrumentation.

    For DOD programs requiring jam-resistant, encrypted time and frequency signals from the GPS military M-code Precise Positioning Service (PPS), the SyncServer S650 M-Code is a secure time and frequency instrument with a fully integrated M-code GPS receiver.

    “As the first time and frequency instrument enabling DOD compliance for M-code-based GPS systems, this technology demonstrates Microchip’s continuing commitment and investment in the security of time and frequency systems,” said Randy Brudzinski, vice president, Frequency and Timing Solutions business unit. “This time server represents a new level of security hardening built on Microchip’s proven commercial SyncServer S650 time server that provides extreme timing accuracy, security and flexibility.”

    The SyncServer S650 M-code equipped time and frequency instrument is a rack mounted server device that synchronizes to the atomic clocks aboard GPS satellites via M-code. The S650 M-code leverages new technology to provide enhanced anti-jamming protection and further hardening against spoofing, providing greater accuracy, and improving operator ease-of-use for key loading.

    Harder to jam than commercial CA-Code GPS, M-code provides a more secure signal than the commercial CA-Code or SAASM P(Y) signal, with greater accuracy. The instrument also is easier for operators to load crypto keys.

    Staff Sgt. Daniel Pennington, a flight engineer assigned to B Co "Big Windy," 1-214th General Support Aviation Battalion, takes in his 'office' view from the ramp of his CH-47 Chinook while flying over the island of Cyprus on Jan. 14, 2020. (Photo: U.S. Army/Maj. Robert Fellingham)
    Staff Sgt. Daniel Pennington, a flight engineer assigned to B Co “Big Windy,” 1-214th General Support Aviation Battalion, takes in his ‘office’ view from the ramp of his CH-47 Chinook while flying over the island of Cyprus on Jan. 14, 2020. (Photo: U.S. Army/Maj. Robert Fellingham)

    The SyncServer S650 M-Code can utilize Microchip’s FlexPort technology for multiport, user definable output signal configurations for Inter-Range Instrumentation Group (IRIG) timecodes, pulses and a variety of signal types essential for military communication, radars and network system synchronization. This is coupled with Microchip’s NTP Reflector technology for robust security, accuracy and reliability of network-based time services such as Network Time Protocol (NTP) and Precision Time Protocol (PTP). Other features include:

    • Four standard GbE ports, all with patented NTP hardware time stamping, with two additional 10 GbE ports optional
    • Contains most popular timing signal inputs/outputs standard in the base timing I/O module (IRIG B, 10 MHz, 1PPS)
    • Web-based management with high security cipher suite
    • Rubidium atomic clock or OCXO oscillator upgrades
    • Superior 10 MHz low phase noise options

    Microchip has been delivering the SyncServer S650 to synchronize business critical and mission critical operations, across all industry segments, since its commercial introduction in 2016.

  • Capt. Sullenberger, PNT board against Ligado decision

    Capt. Sullenberger, PNT board against Ligado decision

    Opposing the FCC’s Ligado Decision

    Not surprisingly, the primary topic at the July 1 meeting of the National Space-based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board was the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decision on Ligado Networks.

    The meeting, virtually hosted by NASA, began with board chair retired Admiral Thad Allen reading a statement for the board’s record from Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger condemning the FCC’s action.

    In it Captain Sullenberger cited many of the issues the board’s vice chair, Brad Parkinson, discussed later in the meeting. Sullenberger’s statement is available here.

    In his presentation, Parkinson called the FCC decision “a grave error.” He outlined his rationale in 21 information-packed slides.

    Parkinson summarized his presentation up front with three points:

    1. Repurposing the Mobile Satellite Services (MSS) radio spectrum is very high risk and brings virtually no near-term benefit to the United States.
    2. The risks affect much more than the Department of Defense: high-value civil applications are also in jeopardy.
    3. Any such repurposing should have been subject to a formal rulemaking process.

    At the end of the presentation, the board voted unanimously to adopt the presentation, with slight modifications, as a reference document for posting on the board’s website.

    The group had previously made strong recommendations to the Departments of Defense and Transportation to oppose any such action by the FCC. Both departments have done that and are continuing to do.

    Hazardous information versus losing lock

    One slide in Parkinson’s presentation included a Department of Transportation (DoT) depiction how of Ligado transmissions would cause several types of receivers to “lose lock.” This graphic was used in a recent DoT presentation to the FCC.

    DOT briefing to FCC: “Concerns Over Ligado Order & Authorization,” June 2020. (Slide: DOT)
    DOT briefing to FCC: “Concerns Over Ligado Order & Authorization,” June 2020. (Slide: DOT)

    Heretofore DoT has usually discussed the points at which Ligado transmissions would cause a 25% increase in the noise floor for receivers. This is an important metric as tests have shown that beyond that point many receiver types begin to give hazardously misleading information. DoT officials have used the example that the 1dB limit is like putting a load limit on vehicles crossing a bridge so that the bridge never reaches its breaking point. An important consideration with a safety-of-life application like GPS.

    The National Space-Based PNT Advisory Board. (Board photo)
    The National Space-Based PNT Advisory Board. (Board photo)

    A receiver often gives inaccurate positioning and timing data, possibly hazardously misleading information, before it “loses lock” and stops providing any information at all. It is more difficult for a receiver to “acquire lock” than to track satellites and provide information, so equipment is rarely able to function again until it moves out of the area of interference.

    When asked why DoT would bother to show such information to the FCC, one official suggested that loss of lock was more in line with the criteria the Commission used in making the Ligado decision. The hope was that, by showing that even this flawed standard had significant impacts which the FCC perhaps did not fully recognize, further technical discussions and reconsiderations could be realized.

    Other Topics

    While discussion of the FCC’s decision took the most time in the on-line meeting, several other issues were discussed as well.

    Colonel Curtis Hernandez from the National Security Council briefly described development of a new space-based PNT policy to replace NSDP-39 which was put in place by President Bush in 2004.

    He was not able to provide any specifics as it is a draft and still under consideration. Answering a question, he did say that the draft policy outlined the responsibilities of various departments, including for interference detection and monitoring.

    Adam Balkcum from the Office of Science and Technology Policy discussed his office’s nascent efforts to investigate non-GNSS PNT as directed by the recent Executive Order on Responsible Use of PNT. The question of whether this includes possible PNT services from low earth orbit and geostationary satellites remains an open one.

    Other presenters included:

    • Seth Jonas of the National Security Council staff on the recent Executive Order on Responsible Use of PNT,
    • Andrew Hansen of the Volpe Transportation Systems Center who spoke about efforts to monitor for GPS interference, especially in the post-FCC Ligado decision environment, and
    • NASA’s Chris Bonniksen discussed issues with operating and funding the agency’s Global Differential GPS system.

    The agenda for the meeting and presentations are available here, as will be the meeting minutes once they have been finalized.

  • US Air Force grants Honeywell GPS/INS contract

    Honeywell logo

    Honeywell has been granted a four-year, $99 million contract to help the U.S. Air Force for the embedded GPS and inertial navigation systems (INS) modernization program (EGI-M). Honeywell will provide engineering, manufacturing and development services to the EGI-M program under the sole-source contract, according to the Department of Defense.

    Work will be performed in Clearwater, Florida, through April 19, 2024.

    The contract is the result of a sole-source acquisition and only one offer was received. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Position, Navigation & Timing Contracting Branch, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity (FA8576-20-C-0001).

  • FCC pushes back on Ligado decision despite GPS interference concerns

    FCC pushes back on Ligado decision despite GPS interference concerns

    U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Ajit V. Pai has responded to a congressional letter expressing objections to the April 20 FCC decision to allow Ligado to establish a broadband network.

    In a May 27 email sent to GPS World, the FCC wrote, “Given your interest in the Ligado order that the Commission adopted unanimously last month, we wanted to share with you the text of the letter Chairman Pai recently sent to members of Congress on this topic.”

    The five-member FCC voted unanimously in April to approve an order to allow Ligado Networks to deploy a low-power nationwide 5G network. Experts and policy makers have said the broadband network could — or likely would — interfere with reception of GPS signals.

    On May 7, a bipartisan group of 23 members of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) sent a letter to the FCC questioning the decision, and this is the letter the FCC is now responding to.

    The letter from Committee Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) and Ranking Member Mac Thornberry (R-Texas) says the FCC order did not comply with Section 1698 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. That act prevents the commission from approving commercial terrestrial operations in certain portions of the L-band spectrum until 90 days after the commission resolves concerns of harmful interference to GPS devices.

    The Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the topic on May 6 with Department of Defense officials, and on May 15, 32 senators asked the FCC to address their concerns and stay the Ligado approval order while doing so.

    “GPS has no right to operate in the spectrum in question, so there is nothing for Ligado to share.” — FCC Chairman Pai

    The letter insists that GPS will remain protected. “Although your letter references the shared use of spectrum, the Commission’s L-band decision does not authorize any spectrum sharing between Ligado and GPS. In fact, spectrum in this band has been licensed to Ligado and predecessor companies for over 30 years — with those companies authorized to deploy terrestrially since 2004. And as mentioned above, one of the FCC’s conditions require separation of Ligado’s operations from GPS spectrum by means of a 23-megahertz guard band. Thus, any implication that the Commission has authorized Ligado to “share” spectrum that is currently allocated to GPS is incorrect. GPS has no right to operate in the spectrum in question, so there is nothing for Ligado to share.”

    Download the full letter to Rep. Smith here. Download HASC letter to the FCC here.

    The email to GPS World included the following statement: “The FCC is required by law to make its decision based on the facts in the record, and federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, were provided with multiple opportunities to put whatever facts they believed to be relevant into the record, including classified information, which the Commission has a process in place to protect.

    “The Commission based its decision on all of the information in the record.  Moreover, we are not aware of the FCC refusing any request by the Department of Defense to provide a briefing related to this matter.

    “To the extent any federal agency opposed to the Ligado application chose not to share information with the Commission, that was the agency’s decision and suggests that it did not believe that the information in question would bolster its case.”

    Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com
    Photo: Andrea Izzotti/Shutterstock.com