Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) has selected NovAtel’s GAJT-700ML antenna for testing on Canadian Army armored vehicles. The GAJT-700ML, developed in Calgary at NovAtel’s global headquarters, is a single-unit GPS anti-jam antenna system for land vehicles.
The testing is being conducted through PWGSC’s Build in Canada Innovation Program (BCIP).
NovAtel was selected to participate under the BCIP’s “safety and security” priority area. PWGSC will procure a number of GAJT-700MLs on behalf of the Department of National Defense (DND). The Directorate of Land Requirements (DLR) — with the assistance of the Quality Engineering Test Establishment (QETE) and the Land Force Trials and Evaluation Unit (LFTEU) — will oversee all testing on DND’s behalf.
Field testing, centered on battlefield days, is expected to take place in early March of 2014 at 4th Canadian Division Support Garrison Petawawa. The battlefield days will analyze the performance of GAJT on the Artillery Observation Post Variants (OPV) of the Light Armored Vehicle III (LAV III) in operational conditions to confirm the suitability and robustness of GAJT-700ML for this role. The process is expected to be completed by the end of March.
“NovAtel has worked closely with Canadian and Allied defence agencies to test the resilience of the GAJT-700ML in challenging jamming environments,” said Jason Hamilton, vice president, Marketing and Product Management. “The BCIP program provides an opportunity to expand this testing to incorporate end user soldier feedback on the installation and operational effectiveness of GAJT during battlefield usage of the LAV OPV. This invaluable feedback will be used by NovAtel to further drive product innovation in support of Canada and its Allied partners.”
“The Canadian Army requires accurate, secure and reliable access to Global Positioning Systems to conduct operations throughout the full spectrum of conflict in all potential theatres of operation,” said Colonel Andrew Jayne, Director Land Requirements. “With the ever-increasing demands on the electromagnetic spectrum and threat of harmful interference, technologies which contribute to the assurance of position and timing information are a critical enabler of Army and Canadian Armed Forces operations in today and tomorrow’s operating environment.”
GAJT is a null-forming technology that negates jammers, ensuring the satellite signals necessary to compute position and time are always available. Three categories of GAJT are manufactured by NovAtel:
GAJT-700ML: for use with military land vehicles, networks and timing infrastructure
GAJT-700MS: for marine vessels, from small boats to capital ships
GAJT-AE: for use with an external antenna in size and weight constrained applications
The BCIP was created by the Government of Canada to strengthen Canadian innovation. The program offers procurement and testing of pre-commercialized products and services, at a late stage of development. The BCIP:
Bridges the “pre-commercialization gap”
Supports Canadian suppliers by connecting innovators and government users and by testing innovations
Provides real-world evaluation of pre-commercial goods and services
Improves the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations
Highly precise and free for use by anyone with an inexpensive receiver, GPS and other GNSS are great. Their navigation and timing signals have been incorporated into nearly every aspect of modern life, from synchronizing power grids to financial systems, the Internet, telecommunications, and transportation. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security estimates that these signals are used by all 16 of U.S. critical national infrastructure sectors, and are essential to the functioning of 11.
Jamming Threat Growing. When these faint signals can’t be received, people start to feel the impact immediately. Usually outages have minimal impact because they are localized and short-lived. Often they occur because the user is temporarily in an area without a good view of the sky. More and more often, though, they are due to the presence of one of a growing number of people with jamming devices (many of which also block cell phone frequencies).
Inexpensive, easy to obtain, and illegal, jammers are spreading as people become more concerned about privacy and being tracked by their employer, spouse, the National Security Agency, and others. Although the government tries to collect information on jamming incidents, no widespread detection system has been established, and few verbal reports are received. For the calls that do come in, it is often impossible to determine which are because of user error and which are purposeful interference.
For those cases where jamming is discovered, locating and identifying the perpetrator is difficult and often impossible. As one example, in spite of near-daily disruption of GPS that caused the shutdown of a new landing system at Newark International Airport, it took the Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Communications Commission more than two years of concerted effort to identify the single perpetrator.
If a navigation satellite outage became widespread and lasted more than a few hours because of a major solar flare, software problem, hacker or cyber-attack, most authorities agree that the impacts would be catastrophic. While much of the information is classified, we do know that transportation would immediately become much less efficient and more dangerous; even many traffic lights are coordinated using satellite timing. Telecommunications, financial, energy and other systems would soon begin to fail as their back-up timing systems lost synchronization with each other. Power grids would lose synchronizations and outages may occur as transmission points became overloaded.
More than speculation, these problems have been documented in academic papers, proven in government tests in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the early stages of such impacts have been observed in localized and short-term outages in the United States. Most dramatically, they have been demonstrated by North Korea’s intentional jamming of South Korea.
Spoofing. Of equal concern is the problem of spoofing. The world’s preeminent ethical spoofer of satellite navigation receivers, Todd Humphreys of the University of Texas, Austin, has demonstrated how easy it is to take control of unmanned aircraft and ships on autopilot by sending a slightly stronger navigation signal, making the receiver think it is somewhere other than where it is. Iran claims to have done something similar, capturing a U.S. military drone in 2010. Humphreys has also shown (on paper) how time-stamps on automated financial transactions could be altered through spoofing. This could do things like reverse the buy-sell equation at a stock exchange, allowing someone to sell at a higher price before buying at a lower one.
The Government Solution
What is to be done? The challenges have been extensively documented and discussed since at least the 1990s. In 2004, President Bush issued the National Space Policy (NSPD-39) that addressed the problem. Although portions of it are still classified, contained within the publically releasable section was direction for the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to, in coordination with the Department Homeland Security (DHS): “develop, acquire, operate, and maintain backup position, navigation, and timing capabilities that can support critical transportation, homeland security, and other critical civil and commercial infrastructure applications within the United States, in the event of a disruption of … space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services.”
eLoran Recommended. In response, the two departments consulted numerous experts and commissioned a study by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) to determine what system or systems should be procured. The IDA study team, which included Brad Parkinson, widely recognized as the father of GPS, unanimously recommended that an existing and outdated nation-wide navigation system called Loran-C be greatly updated and modernized to eLoran. Such a system would provide a navigation and timing signal comparable with and complementary to GPS. They concluded that:
“eLoran is the only cost-effective backup for national needs; it is completely interoperable with and independent of GPS, with different propagation and failure mechanisms, plus significantly superior robustness to radio frequency interference and jamming. It is a seamless backup, and its use will deter threats to US national and economic security by disrupting (jamming) GPS reception.”
What the IDA did not find, but that has since become evident, is that establishing an eLoran system could be an important part of a network to identify and locate jamming attempts. Since all eLoran transmitters would be synchronized with GPS, and many navigation receivers would have both GPS and eLoran sensors, differences between the two systems could be immediately detected and reported.
The body in charge of coordinating navigation and timing issues for the federal government is the National Space-Based Position Navigation and Timing Executive Committee (NPEC). It is chaired by the Deputy Secretaries of Transportation and Defense. Responding to early briefings on the IDA report (which was not formally published until 2009), the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security in 2007 told the NPEC that they had decided eLoran was the right answer. After further federal deliberations over how to create an eLoran system, 2008 saw:
A press release by DHS saying that the department would implement eLoran, using the old Loran-C infrastructure (February 7, 2008)
The DHS 2009 Budget in Brief (February 2008) propose transferring legacy Loran-C systems and $34.5 million/year from Coast Guard to the National Protection & Programs Directorate (NPPD) within DHS, stating:
“The FY 2009 budget transfers the budget authority for the LORAN C system from the United Sates Coast Guard to the NPPD. The Department, acting as Executive Agent, will begin development of enhanced eLORAN as a backup for GPS in the homeland.”
The National PNT Executive Committee endorse the above decisions (March 2008).
Failure to Launch
Unfortunately, DHS funding for 2009 came as part of a continuing resolution, and the Congress did not see fit to approve the transfer of funds from Coast Guard to NPPD.
This was because influential members of Congress wanted the nation to have eLoran, but were concerned about the lack of a plan for transition of this important capability from one agency to another. The administration was asked to develop and submit a plan with with the next budget cycle. A year later, though, no plan had been presented, and the President’s request (and enacted legislation) for 2010 contained no request to move and upgrade the system. In fact, it contained provisions for shutting down and defunding the old Loran-C system without providing funds for NPPD or any other agency to establish the new eLoran capability.
No Solution at All. What happened between one budget year and the next to take the nation from “solution-in-hand” to “no solution at all” is not a matter of public record. Internal administration budget deliberations are not generally released to the public. It does appear, though, that a new administration putting together its first real budget quite rightly wanted to shut down an antiquated system, but did not understand the importance of a new one. This, and many other factors, unquestionably played a role.
Movement Backward
Without any funding, DHS has since conducted several studies and experiments, but has done very little of substance to address this critical infrastructure issue. While Department of Defense (DOD) officials talk about the need for resilience, experts throughout government and industry decry the lack of action, and the Department of Transportation still has acquiring “backup position, navigation, and timing capabilities” on its to-do list, none have seen fit to move forward on their own.
Felling Towers. Worse, DHS is actually reducing the nation’s ability to create eLoran and a wide-area interference detection and mitigation system. An ongoing effort to fell towers and dispose of equipment from the legacy Loran-C system will significantly increase the cost and time-to-operation of the new system the nation needs.
The Way Forward
Fortunately, awareness and understanding of the problem within government, and the general public has continued to grow.
The U.S. National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Advisory Board published a seminal white paper in 2010 on the topic, strongly recommending the establishment of an eLoran system. Todd Humphreys, the UK navigation authority, and others have provided numerous graphic demonstrations of the folly of relying upon just one electronic navigation system, and how things can go horribly wrong. Some of these have been well publicized. Other incidents are known only to a few.
There are also signs that the U.S. intelligence, cyber, and defense communities are becoming more and more concerned. North Korea’s repeated jamming of satellite navigation and timing signals has delivered a particularly powerful lesson. South Korea has reacted by committing to establishment of a robust eLoran system. The UK has established an eLoran system and is expanding it. Russia and China have retained their versions of Loran-C and are using it to augment satellite services. Russia has announced it will upgrade its system to eLoran in cooperation with the UK, and China may not be far behind. Saudi Arabia is upgrading its system to eLoran, and India has plans for an eLoran network in the near future. In December, Iran announced it has established a land-based system with “powerful transmitters” that is “completely different with GPS.”
Allies, adversaries, and economic competitors are augmenting satellite services with strong terrestrial ones. The United States will soon be one of only a small number of major economies that does not have a strong, difficult-to-disrupt terrestrial system protecting its critical infrastructure and providing value-added utilities. DOD’s chief information officer expressed interest in eLoran as part of DOD’s pivot to the Pacific. But providing a system at home is not in Defense’s job description, nor should it be.
Respected leaders at the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security still see this as an important issue that needs to be addressed. The question for them now is not one of technology. The technology decision made in 2008 has since been revalidated by a plethora of academic papers, risk estimates, and white papers. eLoran still appears to be the most effective and least expensive solution available. DOT and DHS must resolve questions of governance and how to fund the system in one of the most difficult federal budgetary climates in decades.
How? The answer could lie in a public-private partnership (P3). In such an arrangement, the government would bring its interests and the infrastructure it owns to the table. An entity in the non-profit sector or industry would provide investment to refurbish the infrastructure, stand up, and operate the system. Such a P3 enterprise could not only pay for itself, but be an on-going source of revenue for both the government and the private entity.
The Business Model: Demand
A well-configured eLoran system can provide navigation accuracy to within 8 to 10 meters and timing accuracy to within 30 nanoseconds. This meets the needs of an estimated 95 percent of users in the United States. While eLoran does not offer the sub-meter precision of a high end, augmented GPS/GNSS system, it has its own advantages. In addition to being very difficult to disrupt, its high-power (typically 400 kW transmitters), low-frequency (100 kHz) signal easily penetrates and is usable underground, inside buildings, and underwater — where satellite and cell phone signals on much higher frequencies cannot reach.
The UK experience with eLoran and private surveys in the United States have shown high commercial demand for a ubiquitous, wireless, precise, and resilient time and navigation service. Power companies want to synchronize grids with a signal that can’t be disrupted by a delivery driver trying to avoid being tracked by his boss. Cell phone companies would be happy to have alternative timing capability in their networks, provided through inexpensive eLoran receivers. Operators of autonomous vehicles want a robust navigation signal and guaranteed communications. And it would be welcomed by the many users who, research shows, rely upon GPS/GNSS time for mission-critical applications, and who have no secondary source on which to fall back in the event of a disruption.
Since eLoran easily penetrates inside buildings, underground, and underwater, it can be used for timing and navigation in many places where no other navigation and timing sources are available. For example, it has been used for underground and underwater navigation. When paired with an accurate satellite signal before going underground or submerging, eLoran could enable a navigation receiver to maintain a comparable level of precision for several hours. Even after that, it would provide the navigator an accurate underground/underwater compass, and a good position.
The eLoran navigation and timing system now in operation in the United Kingdom also generates revenue by transmitting data. While the full potential of this third-party data-channel capability is still being explored, the ability to assure data delivery to, and communicate with such areas is appealing to many commercial and government organizations. Potential first-responders and commercial benefits appear almost limitless.
The Business Model: Costs
The cost for the P3 to standup and operate an eLoran system in the United States would be exceptionally low. Most of the needed infrastructure is already owned by the federal government in the form of the sites for the shuttered Loran-C system. Many of these still have transmission towers and other equipment that could be repurposed. Re-using this infrastructure and equipment would greatly reduce both the time and expense needed, compared to standing up the new system from scratch.
Operating and maintenance costs would also be low. Solid-state equipment, remote monitoring, and other advances in technology make the process of re-establishing a transmission site fairly inexpensive. Today’s eLoran transmitting site consists of a tower, an equipment enclosure for the transmitter, a fence, and a backup generator. With only a modest investment to refurbish existing infrastructure, regular outlays to service capital debt would be minimal, at best.
Some estimates predict that a terrestrial precise navigation and timing system, such as the one established in the United Kingdom and the one up for contract by South Korea, could be established in the continental United States within three years and for approximately $40 million, if the existing infrastructure were repurposed. Operating costs are estimated at approximately $16 million per year.
Business Model: Revenues
Significant national and homeland security concerns, high demand, and low cost (especially compared to any government space program) — clearly, but for a series of unfortunate bureaucratic reasons, eLoran would have been established in the United States, probably as a government-owned and operated system, long ago.
But high demand and low cost are also excellent ingredients for a business enterprise, provided there are sources of revenue. An eLoran P3 could have multiple sources of revenue. Depending upon the type of partnership and business model(s) the government selected, surplus revenue could also be generated to help fund other programs or offset the deficit. Some of the possibilities include:
◾ Guaranteed Delivery Data Transmission. As mentioned earlier, eLoran’s high power and low frequency mean that the signal penetrates where few others will. In addition to navigation and timing information, which are inherent in the basic signal, low-rate data can also be included between the primary pulses. The highest demonstrated data transfer rate to date has been 1300 bps, which is fine for texting and issuing commands. Many believe that, with a modicum of research, that rate can be much higher. As the owner of the high-power transmitter network, the P3 would generate revenue the same as any telecommunications provider: by charging per message or for time on the network.
Applications could include:
• Assured wireless control of remote equipment and vehicles, including indoors, underground and underwater;
• Information delivery to first responders and other crews regardless of location — especially good for pre-programmed emergency and operational commands to evacuate, use another procedure, and so on.
• Immediate device updates and reprogramming. The ability to reach all of the enabled devices on a given network at the speed of light and virtually simultaneously has unlimited potential.
◾ PNT Interference Detection and Monitoring. One of the biggest challenges to countering jamming satellite navigation and timing signals is the lack of a detection network. The eLoran transmitter and receiver network will continuously synchronize with GPS/GNSS signals and instantly detect when differences between the two dissimilar systems occur. Instant reports could be generated to inform federal, state, and local authorities of the anomalies and their locations. Mobile disruptors could even be tracked as they drove down the highway, sailed through the port, or flew across the sky. The P3 could generate revenue by contracting to provide such information to private parties and government agencies concerned about interference incidents.
◾ Licensing Receivers. One of the simplest ways to generate revenue and endow the P3 would be for the government to assess a small fee on every eLoran and satellite navigation receiver sold in the United States. A one dollar fee per unit could generate more than $20 million per year and fund operation of the entire system. Such a fee could be discontinued as other sources of revenue from the system made it unnecessary.
◾ Broad-based User Fees. Since navigation and timing signals are essential to so much U.S. critical infrastructure, a case could be made that the cost to endow the P3 should be spread as broadly as possible across the technologies it supports. For example, a temporary 8-cent fee on every monthly U.S. cell phone and electric bill for just one year could provide enough funding to endow the P3 in perpetuity.
◾ Value-Added Services For High-End Users. More than 90 percent of the users of precise time in the United States require it at the microsecond (1,000 nanoseconds) level of accuracy. eLoran can provide a signal accurate to 30 nanoseconds. To achieve that level of precision, the eLoran network transmits data that compensates for low-frequency signal propagation over non-homogenous terrain. This correction data could be encrypted. Most users would access the signal at the microsecond level of accuracy for free. Revenue could be generated by charging those who desire the higher level of precision a fee for the encrypted portion of the signal.
eLoran is an essential national and homeland security capability. The above list of potential revenue sources is just a sampling of the many ways a P3 could be funded. The point is that financing the enterprise need not come from tax dollars, and should not be an obstacle to its creation.
The Public-Private-Partnership
The U.S. government has had some great successes solving previously intractable problems through public-private-partnerships. Probably the best known of these are the P3s formed for housing on military bases. Establishing a business model that has private partners constructing and managing on-base housing produced more and higher quality housing for our troops.
Such arragnements must be carefully managed, however. Both the Congressional Budge Office and the Office of Management and Budget are understandably concerned that P3s may get a project going, but soon the costs may fall entirely on the government.
Success in any endeavor often depends upon its execution. The type of partnership the government selects and creates will be key. While, at its heart, a P3 is just a contract, the nature and provisions of government contracts are endlessly varied. Issues to address will include how the infrastructure is provided, if it is to be retained in perpetuity by the government or will be conveyed to the private party, what length of contract will allow the private partner to recoup its initial investment, and the business model(s) to be pursued.
The type of governance will also be important. Models vary from establishment of a self-funded government corporation to oversee daily operations, to an agency-supervised, performance-based contract that only requires regular reports on system availability and performance.
Of course, the concerns of CBO and OMB must be met. Fortunately, the federal government is not without experience with P3s. Also, there are many supporting resources available, such as the National Council for Public Private Partnerships.
We Have to Do It
Establishing a public-private partnership will bring together the best of both the government and the private sector. For its part, the government will bring the legacy infrastructure and its interest in safeguarding the public good to the table. The private sector will bring financing, technical know-how and innovation. A better system for America will result than would have been possible if either were to act alone.
It is unquestionably in our urgent national interest to address the problem now, before jamming becomes more widespread, or we have a larger, more damaging event. The need is clear. The technology exists and works great. All that remains is for dedicated leaders within government and the private sector to work together and implement the solution.
Dana A. Goward is the president and executive Director of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, a non-profit organization devoted to educating people about the need for and encouraging resilient navigation and timing ecosystems with services that complement each other and have different failure modes. See www.RNTFnd.org.
GPS is an essential element of the global information infrastructure and supports nearly every facet of modern life. However, the availability and usage of low-cost GPS jamming devices has resulted in the increased threat of intentional and unintentional disruption to commercial and industrial systems that rely on precise GPS data. That is why Exelis developed Signal Sentry 1000, a solution that enables authorities to locate with pin-point accuracy the sources of interference thereby assuring safety, efficiency, and revenue. This webinar will discuss the threat and Signal Sentry, and will be of interest to anyone whose organization relies on GPS for information or commerce. Registration is free.
Date: Thursday, December 5, 2013 Time: 10 a.m. PST / 1 p.m. EST / 6 p.m. GMT
Moderator
Don Jewell, Editor, Defense PNT Newsletter
Speaker
Jeff Coffed, Product Marketing Manager, Exelis Inc.
Jeff Coffed is a marketing professional with over 20 years’ experience in the high-tech sector. Currently, he has product marketing responsibility for the Analytical Instruments, Precision Optics, Precision Structures and Positioning, Navigation and Timing divisions at Exelis.
Panelists
Carl Slutsky, Product Manager for Signal Sentry 1000, Exelis
Carl leads product strategy and development efforts and is responsible for product technology road maps and the engineering requirements for the ongoing development of the Signal Sentry product line.
Joseph Rolli, Signal Sentry Business Manager, Exelis
Joseph Rolli is a senior program manager in the Positioning Navigation and Timing group at Exelis.
Jon Schnabel, Chief Scientist, Geospatial Systems, Exelis
Jon Schnabel is a Senior Staff Scientist at Exelis Geospatial Systems with 33 years of Systems Engineering experience. He has worked on for 15 years in various Systems Engineering roles on both the Space Segment (Blocks IIR, IIR-M, III) and Ground Segment (OCX) programs.he pace will only accelerate. Sort through the multiple issues and get your roadmap to the future with Janice Partyka and a panel of industry experts.
On August 30, QinetiQ and Rockwell Collins demonstrated the first joint satellite navigation positioning using live signals from the encrypted governmental services from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) GPS Precise Positioning Service (GPS-PPS) and the new European Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS). The signals on GPS L1 and L2, together with Galileo PRS L1A and E6A, were processed and combined to form multi-frequency, multi-constellation position fixes.
Positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services provided by GNSS, such as GPS and the forthcoming Galileo system, are essential to underpinning both commercial and economic activity (the EC estimates 6-7% of the developed world’s GDP) and the delivery of governmental responsibilities including the safety and security of citizens.
GNSS systems such as GPS and Galileo make use of very low power signals and are subject to inadvertent interference, deliberate jamming and spoofing (where an attacker generates a false signal masquerading as a valid one to mislead a user receiver). Attacks on GNSS may range from low-level criminal nuisance (a delivery driver stopping their employer tracking them), enabling theft of high-value vehicles fitted with trackers, through to state-sponsored attacks. This is potentially a significant concern for a wide range of governmental users including law enforcement, security and emergency services, critical national infrastructure, transport and defense users. The use of multiple independent, secured navigation services provides significant improvements to navigation robustness and, along with other measures, offers substantial counters to these threats.
“This has been our first opportunity to explore how secured navigation services on GPS and Galileo can be used together to provide users with critical reliance on PNT with robust and continuous navigation services,” Nigel Davies, Head of QinetiQ’s Secured Navigation Group said. “QinetiQ is proud to be a key, long-term contributor to the Galileo Programme, having been working closely with the European Space Agency (ESA), the European GNSS Agency (GSA), European industrial partners and European Member States since 2003. QinetiQ and Rockwell Collins wish to thank ESA, the EC and GSA for support in accessing Galileo, as well as the UK Space Agency, UK Satellite Applications Catapult and the UK MOD for their support.”
Signal Sentry 1000, an Exelis product that detects and locates GPS interference sources in 3-D by using longitude, latitude and altitude has demonstrated successful results during a planned field testing event held last week at the Vidsel Test Range in Sweden.
Taking advantage of the range’s remote location, Exelis was able to conduct tests of its Signal Sentry 1000 product using controlled jamming. The test was conducted without disrupting the GPS signal relied upon by civilian and military operations outside of the test range location. The test employed eight sensors positioned in an array pattern and showed that Signal Sentry was able to successfully detect and locate the jamming source. Having demonstrating interference detection and location capability, Signal Sentry 1000 can be deployed to collect actionable intelligence for law enforcement and protect GPS signal-dependent critical infrastructures.
Signal Sentry 1000 technology is a network of threat-detection sensors, which is part of a centralized server executing Exelis-developed proprietary location algorithms. These sensors can be strategically located around different types of critical infrastructure, such as shipping ports, utilities and government facilities to automatically sense and locate any intentional or unintentional GPS jamming source. Should a threat be detected, users would receive location information and actionable intelligence in order to determine an interference-mitigation plan.
“Exelis developed Signal Sentry 1000 to help protect critical infrastructure and to deliver intelligence to law enforcement operations that depend upon GPS availability,” said Mark Pisani, vice president and general manager of precision instruments and positioning, navigation and timing for Exelis Geospatial Systems. “Achieving this field test milestone proves that our detection technology works. The next step is to evolve this technology for our military customers.”
Signal Sentry 1000 builds upon Exelis expertise in the field of GPS and positioning, navigation and timing. Exelis payloads and payload components have been on board every GPS satellite for nearly 40 years. Today, Exelis is involved in GPS modernization initiatives, building tomorrow’s GPS III satellite constellation by developing and integrating the navigation payloads. Exelis is also providing navigation processing components, precision monitor station receivers, and key components of the system security design for the GPS Operational Control System, known as OCX.
Raytheon UK has taken its first order for a pre-production MiniGAS, the latest in GPS Anti-Jam technology, designed and manufactured by the company in the U.K. This contract, awarded by an undisclosed customer, requires Raytheon UK to produce demonstrator units for customer evaluation.
MiniGAS is the latest in Raytheon’s GPS anti-jam family of products, and it aims to be the lightest and smallest GPS anti-jamming system produced by Raytheon UK. It will have flexible form factors, suited to land, unmanned aerial vehicles and missile platforms. Raytheon is also producing demonstration units of its Landshield high performance digital anti-jam product for customer evaluation.
As well as developing new products, Raytheon has also received an order for a further 100 of its Advanced Digital Antenna Production (ADAP) systems with the U.S. government. To date, more than 500 ADAP systems and more than 6,600 GAS-1 systems have been delivered to the U.S. government and other international customers over the course of 15 years.
“Raytheon UK is a world leader in the production and supply of GPS anti-jamming systems to the majority of the world’s military forces,” said Richard Daniel, defence director for Raytheon UK. “These contracts and milestones demonstrate that we continue to make advancements in new systems, ensuring that Raytheon’s systems continue to meet the latest platform requirements.”
Raytheon continues to deliver GPS anti-jam systems to Northrop Grumman Italia to be used in the Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft, and the company has also delivered a significant number of systems for the Airbus Military A400M aircraft. The company also completed the delivery of its first order for its latest GPS Anti-Jam Land product to the UK Ministry of Defence within six months of contract award.
The Navy’s Communications and GPS Navigation Program Office (PMW/A 170) mounted a Small Antenna System on an Aerostar unmanned aircraft then placed it in a room lined with signal-absorbent material, where it was subjected to GPS jamming signals at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md. Part of an initiative to protect GPS technologies on small unmanned aerial vehicles, the Navy conducted the tests in July to demonstrate how miniaturized GPS protection devices can prevent interruption of the mission-critical global positioning data. (U.S. Navy photo)
Part of an initiative to protect GPS technologies on small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), the Navy recently conducted tests to demonstrate how miniaturized GPS protection devices can prevent interruption of this mission-critical global positioning data.
From July 10 to 24, the Communications and GPS Navigation Program Office, headquartered in San Diego, mounted a Small Antenna System (SAS) on an Aerostar unmanned aircraft, then placed the small UAV in a room lined with signal-absorbent material at the FARM (Facilities for Antenna and RCS Measurements), where it was subjected to GPS jamming signals.
Equipped with model jammers, the FARM facility was used as a stage for the “enemy” to jam the GPS signal and try to knock the UAV off course, said Eric Stevens, the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Communications and Navigation lead for PMW/A-170, which supplied the antenna system. Knocked off course, the UAV would not be able to relay critical intelligence back to the ground control station — disrupting communications among U.S. and allied forces’ ships, aircraft and submarines. In a worst-case scenario, GPS jamming could even cause UAVs to crash.
“If an enemy is trying to jam, or interfere, with the GPS frequency, this antenna allows us to be able to track and acquire the true GPS satellites even in the midst of this jamming and interference,” Stevens said. “What we are doing is demonstrating and quantifying the value of this antenna on small UAVs.”
Personnel involved in the testing were optimistic about the results.
“We are hoping to gain some ground and show there are smaller GPS protection solutions out there,” said Michelle Jackson, an electronics engineer with experience in testing SAS systems on other platforms.
Equipped with the SAS, the Aerostar will be also used to support a U.S. Army pre-deployment war-game scenario conducted at Fort Polk, La., in August, said Donn Rushing, the project lead for MUDO. Rushing participated in the Fort Polk exercises last year and said the addition of the GPS anti-jamming antenna will give the “good guys” an edge this year.
“This new anti-jam system decreases the footprint normally required of such a system, which is now ideal for UAV incorporation and service,” Rushing said. “What makes us smarter is knowing our enemies are smart and that we have to stay one step ahead of them. The SAS development is the latest GPS anti-jam capability to aid the war fighter in combating the bad guys.”
U.K. firm Chronos Technology has released the CTL3520 handheld GPS Jamming Detector and Locator System. Aimed specifically at detecting GPS jammers hidden in vehicles, the unit can pinpoint even the weakest jammer and identify the vehicle in which the jammer is hidden, even in a busy multi-storey car park, Chronos said. Other applications include detecting vehicles with jammers at ports, fleet depots, airport car parks and taxi ranks.
The CTL3520 device was recently tested by representatives of law enforcement and security agencies in screened rooms at the MIRA test facility in Warwickshire and successfully identified hidden jammers both in vehicles and people’s pockets.
The CTL3520 was developed from research undertaken by the University of Bath and is a significant commercial outcome of the Sentinel research project, which was partly funded by the Technology Strategy Board.
“Previous jamming detecting products have been unable to identify which vehicle is hosting the jammer,” said Charles Curry, founder and managing director of Chronos Technology Ltd. “This has been a particular limitation and a major challenge for people wishing to protect critical infrastructure if faced with GPS jamming emanating from a nearby vehicle. Most websites currently selling GPS jammers maintain that the operating distance of a jammer is just a few meters. This is simply not true. We have tested GPS jammers in controlled trials and their range is easily 250/300 meters which makes specific vehicle identification extremely difficult, particularly in a multi-storey car park. The CTL3520 solves this problem and can pick out one vehicle in a thousand which has the jammer installed.”
“This product contains advanced technology which is the culmination of more than two-years of research and development at the University of Bath, funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) within the Sentinel project. We are delighted that our collaboration with Chronos has led to a commercial product,” said Robert Watson, University of Bath Electronic & Electrical Engineering Department.
In addition to UK users, Chronos is seeking international resellers and distributors to take the product into critical infrastructure protection and law enforcement markets where there is a recogniszd concern about the proliferation of low cost GPS jammers used by criminals to cover their tracks or vehicle drivers for personal privacy purposes.
GPS Source announced today that GLI-FLO has been granted security approval by the U.S. Air Force Global Positioning Systems Directorate. The GPS Directorate security approval provides GPS Source with the opportunity to supply military end-users and prime contractors with a DAGR Distributed Device (D3) that meets the mandate for reliability and security, GPS Source said.
GLI-FLO is a secure (ICD-GPS-153 compliant) GPS position, navigation, and timing (PNT) distribution device. One GLI-FLO has the same capability as four DAGRs operating in a platform mounted application (eight DAGRs with custom cabling). GLI-FLO serves ICD-GPS-153 PNT data simultaneously to multiple communication or weapon systems that require GPS information. It routes PNT data while secured in the bracket now used by the DAGR, utilizing standard DAGR accessory cables. When GLI-FLO is connected to one DAGR (or as alternative option, interfaces with an internal secure GPS receiver), secure PNT data can be distributed without the integration of GB-GRAM cards to multiple devices.
GLI-FLO meets the stringent requirements for reliability and security by integrating a GPS Directorate-approved SAASM receiver (Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module). SAASM is the security architecture selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide current security functions for GPS-authorized military users.
“We understand the importance of reliable GPS/PNT data for synchronizing military operations and the need to protect against jamming and/or spoofing,” said Robert Horton, CEO of GPS Source. “We further realize the importance of protecting our national assets by designing products that fully comply with all GPS Directorate security requirements. This security approval makes it possible for our GLI-FLO to be deployed by military forces without reservation.”
In addition to the SAASM compliance, other GLI-FLO features include the ability to serve ICD-GPS-153 PNT data simultaneously to multiple communications or weapon systems that require secure GPS information. It is a significant step for GPS Source toward compliance in GPS Signal Distribution (Single PNT Distribution Point). With zero impact to subscriber application software/hardware, it removes the need to rely on multiple, expensive GB-GRAMS found in military platforms.
An ITT Exelis product that detects and locates GPS interference sources in 3-D by using longitude, latitude and altitude has successfully completed a significant integration milestone.
Signal Sentry 1000, formerly known as GPS Interference, Detection and Geolocation, may now be deployed to collect actionable intelligence for law enforcement, such as tracking high-value targets and protecting critical infrastructure.
Signal Sentry 1000 is a proprietary product that leverages GNSS signal domain knowledge; it is based upon patented technology developed by Exelis through many years of designing and fielding electronic intelligence systems, ITT Exelis said.
“Exelis developed Signal Sentry 1000 to help protect critical infrastructure and to deliver intelligence to law enforcement operations that depend upon GPS availability,” said Kevin Farrell, positioning, navigation and timing general manager for Exelis Geospatial Systems. “Jamming devices can transmit signals capable of disrupting the synchronization of critical infrastructure, such as utility power grids, and timing information of financial transactions. This is why we are continually making improvements in our technology, and the latest milestone achievement is a testament to our goal to deliver actionable interference intelligence to agencies that rely upon GPS operational availability.”
Signal Sentry 1000 technology is a network of threat-detection sensors, which are part of a centralized server executing Exelis‐developed proprietary location algorithms. These sensors can be strategically located around areas of critical infrastructure, such as shipping ports, utilities and government facilities to automatically sense and locate any intentional or unintentional GPS jamming source. Should a threat be detected, users would receive accurate location information and actionable intelligence in order to determine an interference-mitigation plan.
“Signal Sentry 1000 builds upon Exelis expertise in the field of GPS and positioning, navigation and timing. Exelis payloads and payload components have been on board every GPS satellite for nearly 40 years,” said Farrell. “Today, Exelis is involved in GPS modernization initiatives, building tomorrow’s GPS III satellite constellation by developing and integrating the navigation payloads. Exelis is also providing navigation processing components, precision monitor station receivers, and key components of the system security design for the GPS Operational Control System, also known as OCX.”
Presentation to the 11th Meeting of the PNT Advisory Board
The following is an abbreviated transcript of Don Jewell’s briefing to the PNT Advisory Board at its meeting on Tuesday, May 7. The slides from Jewell’s briefing and the other briefings to the board are available at pnt.gov under the heading 11th PNTAB meeting.
First, a prefatory note from Don Jewell:
Author Sets the Scene
The old adage “A picture is worth a thousand words” certainly applies to the atmosphere of a PNT Advisory Board meeting. And in this case, so does the oft repeated and entirely inadequate phrase “You had to be there.”
The atmosphere of an Advisory Board meeting is extremely dynamic. You have a very distinguished board of PNT subject-matter experts who are very passionate about their areas of expertise. Some, like Drs. Parkinson and Schlesinger, the co-chairs, have been involved with PNT and GPS matters for 45 years or more. Therefore, the danger of an abbreviated transcript of an emotion-filled briefing is always unsatisfactory at best, because you miss the give and take, the repartee of experts that have invested much of their lives in this arena. So it is important that the reader understand the context of the questions and answers and sidebar conversations that took place before, during, and after the briefing, to put it in context.
It would be easy after reading this transcript and others during the meeting to put the blame for antiquated PNT equipment on the manufacturers. But nothing could be farther from the truth. The truth is, the culprits here are numerous but identifiable. They are:
1. Outdated government regulations, directives and procurement/acquisition procedures that seriously hamper equipment manufacturers from doing their best and updating equipment as necessary.
2. Timelines that totally ignore the dynamics of Murphy’s Law — a law of ever-shrinking timelines battling a glacial process of ever-increasing requirements bounded by antiquated procurement procedures and fiscal indecision.
In the case of military user equipment (MUE), the warfighters, first responders, and government users are the unfortunate recipients of this morass of near-pandemonium and downright confusion. Dynamic and critical user requirements are sacrificed upon the altar of “the program of record” and an agonizingly glacial government bureaucracy. Be assured that the “program of record” delivered exactly what was asked for by the original RFP and subsequent contract award.
Take Rockwell Collins for instance. Rockwell is a great company, building rugged, reliable, precision instruments. I have flown with Rockwell communications and aviation equipment in various aircraft cockpits for the last 40 years, and they are indeed the gold standard in that arena. Rockwell has been delivering GPS military user equipment since 1978 and the company has always delivered exactly what was asked for. The problem is that the operational and refresh cycle for government user equipment needs is inside the acquisition cycle, and unfortunately exceeds it by a factor of ten — hence Murphy’s Law.
The Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR) was an excellent device when conceived and was the only game in town as regards jamming and spoofing environments. I am confident that Rockwell would have continuously updated the DAGR and made it relevant today, given the opportunity, which they were not.
In my opinion, government regulations in the area of user equipment, especially electronics and highly dynamic technological areas, need to be drastically altered to follow the aircraft procurement cycle. For example, there are probably 50 or more different block versions of the F-16 aircraft, that in truth are radically different. In some respects the “Block 1” F-16 resembles the capabilities of the “Block 50” version only in that it is an airborne vehicle with wings, engine, and a fuselage. Electronically and technically, it is a totally different aircraft. But the contracts for General Dynamics and now Lockheed Martin were not recompeted every time the user requirements, and hence the capabilities of the F-16 changed. I hope you all agree that would be ludicrous — and yet that is exactly the situation with MUE. When the scope changes, the contracts are painfully and laboriously recompeted, with lag times that make the process laughable — if indeed it were not so sad.
Then there is the government’s serious lack of information and training concerning MUE devices. I have been around GPS user equipment for 35 years and yet I am sure I still do not understand all the capabilities of the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR) and DAGR. Imagine how befuddled a young warfighter becomes when given the devices and only a cursory amount of training, that is not only inadequate but sadly many times misleading or just flat wrong.
In our interviews we founds trainers — those that taught warfighters how to use the PLGR and DAGR — who were not aware the unit could be “keyed” or encrypted for greater accuracy. Of course we also found excellent trainers, but they were the exception to the rule. Who trains the trainers?
Although it sounds trite and seems to be a copout, don’t blame the equipment manufacturers for the current state of MUE. Blame the system and then get involved and help us change it to what it should be.
Good morning, everyone.
A special thanks to Jim Miller, Dr. James Schlesinger and Dr. Bradford Parkinson for inviting me to speak this morning on the future trends of PNT user equipment, particularly as it pertains to warfighters and first responders — certainly a subject I have been passionate about for only…oh, let’s say about 35 years.
Why GPS World?
Ever since the agenda for the PNT Advisory Board meeting appeared online, I have been receiving emails and phone calls asking why I was speaking not as one of the IDA (Institute for Defense Analyses) subject-matter experts on GPS but as the Contributing Editor for Defense for GPS World. Frankly, the answer is simple. Wearing the GPS World hat gives me the freedom to say what needs to be said today, whereas the IDA think tank attribution and publication rules, which are absolutely necessary for an FFRDC (Federally Funded Research and Development Center) to operate effectively and efficiently, would unduly restrict my comments.
Plus, for 21 years GPS World magazine has been the publisher of the definitive GPS user equipment survey for global users. It’s free for everyone to use, and it covers PNT receiver information from 55 global manufacturers with data on all aspects of 502 PNT receivers. And it is a great boon for me personally, as I only receive on average about 50+ emails or letters per month from users simply wanting to know what GPS/PNT receiver they should purchase. It is wonderful to be able to point them to the GPS World Receiver Survey.
Also wearing my GPS World hat, I can easily refer to the several thousand warfighter and first responder inputs we have received over the last 10 years — generally expressing what they would like to see in a GPS/PNT receiver or sometimes specifically the Perfect Handheld PNT Transceiver (PHPNTT), which I first wrote about six years ago (and most recently in December) in GPS World magazine.
Top 10 Warfighter – First Responder Requirements for the PHPNTT
Adhering strictly to the latest fad in government briefing formats, it is now time for me to BLUF, or give you the Bottom Line Up Front. However, being a journalist, I also have to hold something back for the end. So here are the top 10 PHPNTT requirements, in order of preference, as submitted over the last 10 years by thousands of warfighters and first responders:
Mil-Spec rugged – solid state drive – no moving parts
Friendly, intuitive, familiar interface – easy to use
Multi-GNSS – All signals available – space and terrestrial
SWAP friendly, long battery life, with solar charger
Real-time 3D map data, NGA, Google, satellite imagery
Not a stand-alone PNT device
Embedded in a computer with multiple communication capabilities – one must be secure
Must be able to download, store and utilize new applications
Software-defined and expandable
Act as a sensor with automatic reporting
All these “user requirements” are closely related to what our warfighters and first responders don’t like about the current GPS MUE or Global Positioning System Military User Equipment. I state that specifically because, make no mistake about it, the current MUE is strictly GPS-based. However, the current MUE only receives two of the many signals available today on the GPS SVs, and certainly not any of the other numerous PNT (position, navigation and timing) signals also available, which of course is the crux of the issue for user equipment of the future.
Most of the top 10 requirements, and there were more than 50 requirements identifiable in all, are self-explanatory, and time does not permit me to cover them all in detail. But bear with me for a couple of quick explanations. Certainly the rugged requirement is readily understandable, and there are numerous manufacturers around the globe today that make excellent Mil-Spec rugged devices. However, the one I am most familiar with and have been extremely happy with are the rugged units from Trimble Navigation produced in Corvallis, Oregon. Trimble also happen to be a certified SAASM (Selective Availability and Anti-Spoofing Module) supplier as well. More on those units later.
The second bullet concerns the human-machine interface on the current MUE, which is so poor that a Marine three-star wrote me a few years ago to say that in his opinion, “If anyone wants an example of how not to design an operational equipment interface then they should refer to the PLGR or DAGR. Both are consistently and sufficiently horrendous, in my opinion.” I could not have said it better. The PLGR and DAGR use the gold standard for PNT as a signal, but the human-machine interface (HMI) is, in my opinion and in the opinion of thousands of warfighters, so antiquated and non-user friendly as to be almost unuseable. However, the units do work well and provide outstanding signals when embedded with other equipment. They just do not work well as a handheld device. The other items on the list we will cover as we proceed through the briefing.
GPS MUE Historical Perspective
I have been involved with GPS user equipment for the last 35 years, and this behemoth of a receiver was my first unforgettable encounter.
Yes, this huge device is GPS user equipment. Can you imagine? It weighs more than 300 pounds, without the two operators, and was the very first workable GPS receiver produced for the U.S. military by Rockwell Collins, who has been producing GPS MUEs ever since. Which is an example of the prodigious acquisition issues that also need to be addressed, or corrected, if you will. Our antiquated acquisition practices are to blame for many of the failings in MUE equipment today. While I feel it is critical to mention this as a major contributing factor to the state of MUE today, it is also a story for another time.
Other than being the first GPS MUE, the significance of this huge receiver is that in my estimation it is the first and last time the U.S. military possessed a purpose-built military GPS receiver clearly superior to the products being produced by commercial and civil manufacturers for global users.
First Significant Usable and Transportable GPS Civilian Receiver
Fortunately, a good friend and colleague, both at IDA and ION (Institute of Navigation), Philip Ward, came to the rescue of all GPS users in 1981 when he delivered the TI 4100 NAVSTAR Navigator Multiplex Receiver.
The TI 4100 was indeed the first commercially viable receiver that could be considered a transportable by anything other than an aircraft. To be historically correct, there were some backpack models that were very short-lived and not as significant as the TI 4100. The main unit and two antennas weighed approximately 50 pounds and showed promise in station wagons and helicopters. I can see a few folks in the audience smiling, so I will reiterate that the TI 4100 was a significant milestone, both in SWAP (size, weight and power), accuracy and TTFF (time to first fix). TTFF was 15-20 minutes in search mode, however; after the four SVs were located and the unit was initialized, it could consistently present a fix location in just a couple of minutes. Plus, the TI 4100 was immune from most jamming signals of the day — an impressive receiver and accomplishment for 1981.
Evolution of Commercial GPS/PNT UE
Fast-forward several years and the following picture presents a view of how quickly GPS UE developed.
The first unit on the right in the above photo is a Trimble unit that was about the same size as the TI 4100, but considerably more capable. As you follow the units around counter clockwise, you will see that they decrease in size and weight, but what you can’t see is that they also increase incredibly where acquisition and processing speed (TTFF), accuracy and capability are concerned. Note also that you start to see stand-alone units that appear to be antennas with separate handheld display units. This is a feature the commercial manufacturers incorporated over 20 years ago, and in some respects a feature the MUE manufacturers and services are just now considering.
Note also the Garmin GPS wrist receiver (right), which until 2005 was the most prevalent civil receiver in both of the wartime AORs (Area of Responsibility). Compare this Garmin wrist unit to the 300-pound Rockwell Collins unit I first showed you and consider that where SWAP and performance are concerned, the wrist unit is hundreds of times more capable and portable.
Current MUE – Program of Record and the Future
The pictures below depict the current MUE – Program of Record equipment, again both manufactured by, you guessed it, Rockwell Collins. First is the PLGR or the Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver. Second is the DAGR or Defense Advanced GPS Receiver. The third unit, known simply as the “Puck,” is what the U.S. Army would like to field in the next couple of years along with that separate display unit I spoke of earlier. Starting to sound very commercial, right? By the way, the Puck measures only 2 x 2 x 1/2 inches and weighs just a few ounces.
Between the PLGR, which was decertified by the Marine Corps in 2010, and the DAGR, there are approximately 500,000 of these MUE devices fielded today, and yet almost none of them are utilized as handhelds. Our research shows that indeed only 1 in 40 is used as a true stand-alone handheld. Most DAGRs are primarily used to interface with legacy communications equipment, primarily U.S. Army, that calls for fire support, read ordnance, and all the others are either stored or embedded with other equipment, which means the “horrendous user interface,” a common warfighter description, is not a major issue. The bottom line is the DAGR is very good at what it does, it is just that what it does (warfighter quote) “…stopped being functional, when compared with other more capable PNT equipment, almost the day is was delivered to the AOR in 2005.”
While the Puck is certainly a major improvement in SWAP and concept, it essentially provides the same two GPS signals and SAASM capability as provided by the DAGR, just in a smaller form factor, and it does away with the continuously vilified user interface. The Puck technology totally ignores current-day PNT, multi-GNSS platforms and the other 160 PNT signals available today. Review the GPS World 2013 Receiver Survey and you will only find a handful of receivers that are so incredibly limited, and they are invariably produced, you guessed it, for the U.S. government as part of a GPS program or alternate program of record.
MUE: How Not to Build a PNT Device, or Why Warfighters Use Garmins and iPhones
The list you are looking at now is comprised of the first 15 minutes of conversation with thousands of warfighters interviewed over the last 10 years — they just had to tell us what was wrong with the current MUE before they finally got around to telling us what, if they were king or queen for a day, they wanted to see in the PHPNTT. This is not my opinion but the actual words of the warfighters. First of all, understand that the PLGR is a single-frequency GPS-only receiver with a security module (PPS-SM) to access encrypted P(Y)-code for anti-jam purposes. It was initially fielded 1990-2004, replaced by the DAGR in 2005. There are approximately 165,000 PLGRs and 450,000 DAGRs fielded at a cost of more than $1 billion. Now the warfighter comments:
Both the PLGR and DAGR have an antiquated, proprietary OS and “extremely unfriendly — non-intuitive” user interface.
PLGR and DAGR are not functional as handheld units but function well as embedded devices — although typically not networked, and we are not even sure they can be networked.
Example: One STRYKER vehicle variant has nine separate DAGRs incorporated, each with its own antenna and operating totally independently of the others.
PLGR was decertified by U.S. Marine Corps in 2010 due to friendly-fire incidents.
DAGR used today primarily as embedded device only with a “ horrible user interface”:
Monochrome screen, no active maps, navigation direct waypoint only. Provides user with PNT information as coordinates — requires paper map to be an effective tool.
For other than straight-line navigation — time, distance and ETA are incorrect.
Programming/mission planning require special cables, software and a laptop computer.
Additional cables, radios and hardware are required for PLGR or DAGR to communicate.
Proprietary OS — no capability for additional programs to be added or utilize.
SWAP issues — large, heavy, limited battery life (multiple batteries) for typical missions.
TTFF — warm, approximately 2 minutes; cold with almanac download, 30+ minutes.
Position accuracy expressed as PDOP (1-6) on separate screen from PNT data. Nominal accuracy of a coded DAGR is typically about 1 meter or more.
Advantages: Anti-jam and legacy interface capabilities.
So, the bottom line as far as the warfighters are concerned is that if you want to operate legacy equipment that requires a GPS input, such as calling in “fires” or artillery or if you are in a jamming environment, then you need the DAGR or its capability. Our survey shows, however, that only 1 in 40 use the DAGR as a handheld, and yet every single one of our respondents — that’s 100 percent, a rarity in statistics — stated they had a backup unit, primarily a Garmin, until 2005, and then popular backup units were more than likely an iPhone, iPad or Trimble unit.
One of the Most Popular PNT Devices in Theater Today – More than 365M Sold to Date
Today there is no question concerning the most prevalent PNT unit in both AORs. It is, you guessed it, the Apple iPhone and/or the Apple iPad. Let’s take a brief look at the capabilities of this non-ruggedized but still amazing device, which can easily be made Mil-Spec rugged with aftermarket cases and enclosures such as those produced by Otterbox, which I have personally tested and reviewed numerous times.
The attributes you see listed here are for the iPhone and iPad, and are those that assist in some aspect of PNT and/or integrity and accuracy.
Assisted GPS SBAS — WAAS (PNT)
Assisted GLONASS — (SBAS) (PNT)
Digital compass (PN)
Wi-Fi (Communications-Data + PNT)
Cellular (Communications-Data + PNT)
Bluetooth (Communications-Data + PNT)
Skyhook Wireless (PNT)
Three-axis gyro (PN)
Accelerometer (PN)
Pedometer (PN) – Application
Internet (Communications-Data) Skype application (PNT)
Real-time accuracy and integrity representation (PN)
361+ navigation applications in the App Store ready for instant download and designed for iPhone and iPad. The majority of these applications are available at no cost to the user.
All this capability available in just four ounces — truly a SWAP and capability revolution.
Apple logo
Of course, what really makes the list of iPhone and iPad capabilities revealing is that the first two attributes alone more than double the number of PNT signals received and utilized by the iPhone versus the DAGR, and that number does not account for the GPS L2C (second civilian signal) and L5 (DOT safety of life signal) with CNAV, which when activated will be the strongest GPS signal broadcast to date. The CNAV data is an upgraded version of the original NAV or navigation message. It contains higher precision representation and nominally more accurate data than the nominal NAV data. There are 26 more PNT satellite signals available today in the iPhone and iPad, and they are comprised of multi-GNSS signals and augmentations. The kicker for me is that in addition to all the additional space signals are terrestrial signals, and almost any map or grid system the user desires. Plus there are apps (software applications) that translate between grid systems. And if you don’t like the interface of the navigation program you are using, then there are literally 360+ other choices. I also find the pedometer function interesting, in that firefighters now use this capability along with the Blue Force Tracking app in buildings when they are momentarily without GPS, GLONASS (Russian GNSS), WAAS (U.S. Wide Area Augmentation System), EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service) or other SBAS (Satellite Based Augmentation System) signals.
Realistically, to defeat the current unencrypted MUE today, an adversary only has to jam one GPS signal, but to defeat the iPhone or iPad an adversary has to jam all the GPS signals, all the GLONASS signals, all the Wi-Fi signals, all the mobile 3G and 4G CDMA and GSM (read as different mobile telephone systems) signals and still the iPhone or iPad will use the accelerometer, gyro, compass and pedometer functions to determine position. Indeed, it will continue to function as a PNT device. All this in just four ounces at a cost about one-sixth of the DAGR displayed on a screen that has 100 times greater resolution and is in color. Remember, the DAGR has a monochrome screen. No contest. Plus try saying, “Take me home, Siri” to a DAGR and see what happens.
Garmin
What about Garmin, you ask? At the beginning of the current conflicts, Garmins were the prevailing additional PNT device. There are still thousands of them in theater, and they have saved many lives, as we will see. However, just look at this sales chart for smart PNT devices.
ProductsTotal Units Sold (approximate)
iPhone (since 2005) 250,600,000 (M)
iPad (since 2010) 115,000,000 (M)
Garmin Sales ~100,000,000 (M)
iPhone/iPad App Store (since 2008)
Downloads of the 361+ navigation apps 2,200,000,000+ (B)
(Note: Total App Store downloads will exceed 50 billion by the time this is published.)
The Future
The future of PNT devices globally, especially for warfighters and first responders, is clearly with rugged mobile devices capable of downloading, storing, updating and utilizing applications. The Garmin cannot do that, although it can be updated, and just look at the numbers. Garmin started business as a GPS device provider in 1989. In that time, while branching out into marine and aviation devices, some of the best in the world for those purposes, they are still primarily GPS only (with SBAS). They have sold approximately 100M devices in 24 years compared to Apple’s iPhone and iPad numbers, which total more than 365M devices in less than eight years. The iPad alone outsold all Garmin products in just three years. I confess that I happily own several Garmins, think that are fantastic PNT devices, and it is really tough to beat the $99 wrist Garmin. When all is said and done, the Garmin gives you better information in a non-jamming environment than the DAGR. And Garmin units are still saving lives. Take this vignette from SSG Kyle Dorsch:
“My name is SSG Kyle Dorsch…a Reconnaissance team leader in the 2-30 Infantry Battalion, 10th Mountain Division, deployed to the Logar province, Afghanistan. I have used my Garmin eTrex Vista H throughout my deployment…it has been a lifesaver in more than a literal sense. In fact, there isn’t a leader in our establishment without a Garmin product…my Garmin guided me and my four-man team seamlessly through some of the toughest areas of Afghanistan…it also literally saved my life.”
SSG Dorsch goes on to explain that the eTREX, which was placed strategically on his combat vest, actually stopped an enemy bullet meant for him, and just like Timex the eTREX kept on ticking.
My Obligatory Caveat
Note that SSG Dorsch has always had a Garmin with him in theater and indicates that his leadership has as well. There is no doubt the eTrex saved his life, literally. However, I would never tell a warfighter to not use their government-issued MUE. In a severe jamming environment, it may prove to be a lifesaver, and it may be the only equipment that interfaces with legacy communications and fire support equipment. Take that advice for what it is worth today, because hopefully this will not be the case much longer.
DARPA and Smart COTS Devices on the Battlefield Now
DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the real inventors of the Arpanet and the Internet), a much-storied DoD research arm, launched an effort recently called “Transformative Apps.” It developed a few dozen smart applications that work on a number of mobile devices. In addition to mapping, navigation and smart routes, the apps identify explosives and various weapons, and help navigate and locate parachute drops.
A screenshot of the DARPA Smart Routes application. The green routes are safe routes and the red are routes that have been traveled too many times or indicate where problems may exist.
DARPA builds prototypes that are transferred to the Services and become official applications used by hundreds of thousands of warfighters. The challenge is to rapidly adapt COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) technology to the unique circumstances of the military, which often operates over large, hostile areas with little to no formal communications infrastructure.
DARPA reports that more than 1,000 war fighters in Afghanistan now use the DARPA Transformative Apps technology as it continues to be rolled out to the Services.
The most interesting aspect of DARPA’s participation in PNT software is that it will definitely accelerate the multi-GNSS and all-signals-available scenario, because it is not constrained by woefully out-of-date DoD regulations. DARPA does what is smart, what cutting-edge technology will support, what makes sense, and ultimately what saves lives.
The U.S. Department of Defense expects in coming weeks to grant two separate security approvals for Samsung’s Galaxy smartphones, along with iPhones and iPads running Apple’s latest operating system — moves that would boost the number of U.S. government agencies [ed. legally] allowed to use those devices.
In my humble opinion, this announcement is simply outstanding…albeit about 10 years late to need. Indeed, Ms. Teri Takai, the current DoD CIO (Chief Information Officer) gest it and is trying hard, but she can’t do all the heavy lifting alone.
Old Adages Die Hard
I remember an old GPS adage that portentously proclaimed, “If it is not supported on the GPS satellite, it cannot be supported in the user equipment.” Unfortunately, there are those still holding to this totally fallacious belief. Today in the current budget environment, amazing capabilities are being implemented with user equipment that multiply the capabilities of the PNT satellite, other satellites and space signals, terrestrial signals and synergistic augmentations. Indeed, the total price of the PLGR and DAGR program combined would barely pay for some NRE (non-recurring engineering) costs and two launches of the GPS III satellites that should be ready for launch in 2014. Today we need to look even harder at what is doable with user equipment, especially in the military, because it is all we can afford. As Winston Churchill was once quoted as saying, “Gentlemen, we have run out of money; now we have to think.” However, having said that, let’s not forget that the multi-GNSS environment has multiplied many fold the number and capabilities of PNT signals on orbit today.
PNT User Equipment TRENDS — Space SIGNALS available
Jim Doherty, USCG Captain retired, and I are friends and colleagues at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA). We are both old retired navigators as well. We both still have the skills to successfully navigate an aircraft or ship, for that matter, from San Francisco to Tokyo using only a sextant. While we are proud of that talent or ability, one that very few possess today, we would much rather accomplish the feat with an exceptional multi-GNSS device, and they exist today like never before. These next lists show all the signals that are available today compared to what the GPS MUE can receive and use for PNT purposes. Plus, Jim and I both share a firm belief in another old navigators’ adage: Receive Everything – Trust Nothing!
Civil-commercial multi-GNSS UE receives more space and terrestrial signals than U.S. GPS MUE.
GPS MUE “officially” utilizes L1(CA), L2 P(Y) with SAASM.
There are NO commercially viable M-code receivers available today and there will not be for several years to come.
PNT civil UE philosophy: Track and use all PNT signals available.
GPS L1-CA/L2-codeless and ready for L2C, L5, L1C (GPS III & QZSS)
SBAS (WAAS, EGNOS, MSAS, GAGAN, SDCM) + NDGPS & many other augmentations
GLONASS L1/L2/L5
Galileo E1/E5 (CBOC & Alt BOC)
Compass B1/B2/B3 (carrier signals only- no full signal specifications)
And do not be deceived: there are plenty of PNT receivers available today to receive all these signals and they have existed for some time. Equipment manufacturers have been ready to receive, process and utilize all the GPS and multi-GNSS signals for years. For example, Trimble built and shipped an L2C receiver in 2003, and that signal has still not been activated on any U.S. GPS payloads although, as we heard from Major General Marty Whelan (USAF – AFSPC/A5) earlier today, General Shelton (USAF), the four-star commander at AFSPC (Air Force Space Command) has announced a six-week test of the L2C signal and full CNAV message in June of this year. A great step forward.
One of these days we might even catch-up with the Japanese – more on that in a moment.
Trimble built and shipped receivers for GLONASS signals in 2006, even though GLONASS did not reach FOC or Full Operational Capability until late in 2010. A designation it is having serious problems maintaining. Trimble also ships L5 receivers as well as commercial SBAS receivers that result in extremely accurate and reliable positions. Lest you think all these signals have gone to waste, remember that Japan’s QZSS-1 broadcasts both L2C and L5 with a full CNAV message today, and the Trimble receivers and others with the multi-GNSS capability work well with those signals, as we shall see.
Global Virtual Reference Stations
Trimble (VRS) and John Deere (StarFire) PNT receivers have the capability Trimble has designated as Global Virtual Reference Stations, which — along with real-time kinematic (RTK) processing — provide users with an unprecedented number of signals and a real-time processed signal with corrections. This results in centimeter-level accuracy for any of their receivers that have the capability to receive and process the signals. For both manufacturers, that will soon be almost all of their receivers. Sure, there will probably be a small monthly fee involved, but the accuracy difference between 1 meter (~3 feet) and 3 centimeters can mean life and death if you are unlucky enough to be in the collateral damage zone or in the sights of a Hellfire missile during war time.
Multi-GNSS SVs and Signals in View
To highlight this point, just glance at the following graphical log file generated by software in the latest Trimble Multi-GNSS PNT receiver. The chart depicts a log file from a receiver located in Singapore. The location is significant only because in that location the receiver is in full view of the Japanese QZSS-1 PNT SV and all its extra U.S. originated PNT signals (L2C & L5) mentioned earlier. This particular Trimble receiver is networked and reports results automatically and continuously to a web page, while receiving GVRS updates and corrections plus other PNT information, such as an updated almanac, over the same network. The question becomes, is it a PNT device with a computer and embedded communications? Or is it a computer with communications and an embedded PNT function? You be the judge. Regardless of which you choose, this is the future of PNT and MUE.
This civil receiver reports 40+ SVs with 169 separate signals in view and usable. This does not count the number of Wi-Fi and/or GVRS signals it is capable of receiving. Meanwhile, a GPS MUE receiver in the same location only observes a total of 10 SVs it can process for a total signal count of 20. However, one of the key points on this log depiction has to do with integrity. Notice the orange and red lines. They indicate that the receiver has labeled these signals as “suspect” and has automatically dropped them from the solution for any of a host of reasons — a failed integrity check, jamming, spoofing, wrong way path, a runaway clock, etc. You name it, and if it is suspicious, the receiver will drop that SV and its signals from its PNT calculations. Built-in integrity.
The obvious question becomes just how accurate is this Trimble receiver over a 24-hour period? The next graphical log file denotes that it is accurate within 3 centimeters.
Trimble multi-GNSS receiver web page log file denotes continuous availability of PNT signals with an average accuracy of 3 cms.
Assured PNT
When we asked warfighters what was more important to them in a combat zone — availability or accuracy of the PNT signals, the answer was, not surprisingly, both. But, of course, they need to receive the signal first, and then they can worry about accuracy.
So, if you were Ms. Teri Takai and you were worried about “assured PNT,” would you rather do that with 20 signals from 10 SVs or 169 signals from 49 SVs and some very strong, difficult to jam, terrestrial signals as well — adding up to, on average, 33 times more accuracy than the GPS-only signal? To me, the answer is obvious. And of course, all that is on the line with every mission the DoD performs, as is the safety of our critical national infrastructure as this next chart depicts.
Assured PNT or lack thereof impacts all missions, across all platforms and domains
Assured GPS MUE PNT today depends on:
L1(C/A), L2 P(Y), SAASM (Future M-Code)
Accuracy ~ 1m
Assured Multi-GNSS MUE PNT with all signals available depends on:
GPS L1/L2/L5/L1C/L2C/M-Code/SAASM
SBAS (WAAS, EGNOS, MSAS, GAGAN, SDCM+)
GLONASS L1/L2/L5
Galileo E1/E5 (CBOC & Alt BOC)
Compass B1/B2/B3
QZSS GEO – L1 CA/C/SAIF, L2C, L5, LEX Pilot
Two-way communications, Networking, PNT servers, each PNT device with unique IP address and each PNT device serves as a sensor
Software definable devices
Multiple software applications (Apps)
Accuracy ~ 3 cm
Army Making Strides
I spoke above about DARPA getting into the PNT business, and that is a good thing. But how about the largest military user of PNT, the United States Army? The U.S. Army is making some interesting changes as well. The Army announced a few months ago that there would be no more purchases of DAGRs, and that it was pursuing smartphones as a communications and small computing platform as well as an alternate PNT tool and display device. This is where the Puck comes into play.
While it is a wonderful idea I fully endorse, the problem with the Puck is that under the current design scheme it will still only transmit the current two GPS signals to a smartphone or other PNT display device. And warfighters lament that it is another device run by batteries for which our warfighters need to carry spares. Why not make the Puck a multi-GNSS device? we asked. The answer we received is that it would make it too power hungry and just require more batteries. So to misquote Shakespeare “…for want of a battery, the war was lost?” The Army is definitely on the right track, but they need to figure out how to make the Puck a multi-GNSS device. Can you say Lithium ION and solar charger – Hoorah!?
The Army Hub
The Puck is moving in the right direction. However, with the addition of another device, the Army is definitely on the right track. This device is designated the “Hub,” and while it is again GPS-oriented, it contains multiple terrestrial and internal signal augmentations and backups, as the image depicts.
With apologies to the U.S. Army, I unabashedly modified the chart, and I made it very obvious. The red text depicts my addition of a multi-GNSS card or module versus or in addition to the CGM (Common GPS Module) and GB-GRAM or Ground-Based GPS Receiver Application Module. The multi-GNSS card/module already exists today. Several PNT receiver manufacturers manufacture it with 28-nm technology versus the 95-nm technology — for the as-yet-unavailable for about four more years if the rumors are correct — GPS-only CGM. For me, the addition seems to be an easy fix, as there is lots of room in the Hub. But this fix or module (CGM) is years and millions of dollars down the road, versus a solution that exist today.
YUMA 2 or Hub or Both
The solution, frankly, is one of the smart tablets available today from numerous manufacturers — seven, actually, that have the wherewithal to produce a secure multi-GNSS device with a SAASM module.
The Trimble Yuma 2.
This is an example of the solution in the form of a Yuma 2 tablet computer from Trimble, which I am in the processing of reviewing for GPS World. The Yuma 2 has all the multi-GNSS features we have been discussing and more, plus it can in time accommodate all the modules scheduled to be incorporated into the Hub. Why build a whole new display device when the core already exists with many more capabilities than were imagined or real estate would ever allow for the Hub? Plus, it is available today as a rugged Mil-Spec device with a full color, high-resolution touch screen. And in the end it will provide a 3-cm solution versus a 1-meter solution. What more could you want? And it is available today with an outstanding and intuitive interface.
Conclusion – Services PNT UE Trends
I have been focusing on the Army today not simply because they are the biggest U.S. military user of PNT devices, but because they are moving in the right direction for the future of PNT and MUE devices. Of course, all the services and many agencies need a well-thought-out and secure PNT solution, and if we have learned anything it is that one size does not fit all. Indeed, our national security and our national infrastructure depend upon future PNT devices. For security purposes alone, they should have a certain degree of application and signal diversity.
Now let’s review:
Army has a way ahead with an assured PNT program.
Includes end of PLGR and DAGR and adding new networkable devices.
Plans for fourth-generation multi-GNSS and multi-function handheld devices and embedded PNT devices as sensors to include the Puck and Hub.
Marine Corps: Decertified PLGRs in 2009 and attempts to limit the use of DAGRs.
DAGRs used primarily as embedded devices.
Purchasing approved SAASM devices from commercial vendors.
USAF: Outfitted 70% of aircraft with modern, integrated, networkable and upgradeable PNT devices.
Navy: More than 60% of the fleet outfitted with modern PNT networked devices.
The Bottom Line is – One size does not fit all but one conclusion is clear – while GPS may and will always hopefully be the Gold Standard – multi-GNSS solutions are the future.
The Future of PNT Devices
This last list depicts the future of PNT as best as I can define it; indeed, as it has already been defined for us by our warfighters and first responders or, as Kirk Lewis would have me say, government users. The users are not waiting around, nor have they bothered to adhere to woefully out-of-date regulations. It is what they desire, and since their lives depend on it, it is what they should have.
Multi-GNSS — Utilize all PNT signals available.
Space and Terrestrial (GPS, GLONASS, eLORAN).
Traditional and non-traditional (Wi-Fi, GVRS, carrier signals).
Multi-function COTS devices with non-proprietary OS (operating System), intuitive interfaces and Mil-Spec ruggedized.
Multiple methods of communications: Wi-Fi, Skype, 4G, text, auto-text, satellite.
Software Downloads – Applications
COTS applications plus .mil apps store.
Networked devices for SA, updates and PNT,
Real-time satellite imagery and mission data injects.
Defense and intelligence LBS.
Each device will be a sensor on a network,
Automatically report jamming, interference and location data.
Utilize SAASM and anti-jam military signals only as required.
Thanks you for your time and kind attention today. And remember, Happy Navigating!
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The system leverages GNSS signal domain knowledge, and is based upon patented technology developed through the company’s history of designing and fielding electronic intelligence systems, ITT Exelis said.
Leveraging Exelis GNSS signal domain knowledge, the system is implemented using commercially available GPS receiver and computer server/data technology. Actionable intelligence is available in the form of pin mapping of interference sources in addition to longitude/latitude/altitude data, all available through a web-enabled graphical user interface.
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