When a GNSS signal is lost, plenty of people think about navigation first. An aircraft may find itself deprived of precise position data, vessels may have difficulty determining their location, and vehicles may be forced to use alternative navigation methods.
However, positioning is only part of the story. There is always something much more fundamental behind each navigation signal: time.
As a matter of fact, there exists a whole invisible network of synchronization, without which the functioning of telecommunications networks, power distribution grids, transportation, aviation, and many others would become impossible.
At this very moment, billions of devices around the planet are coordinated through the use of highly accurate timing signals provided by GNSS. This has been one of the most successful inventions of the modern era, though it also remains one of the most overlooked ones.
However, with a growing number of jamming cases and increasing interconnectivity of critical infrastructures, times are changing. Today, the question is not whether companies need highly accurate timing, but how long they can operate without it.
The World’s Most Invisible Dependency
Timing rarely receives the same attention as positioning, yet it underpins many of the systems society depends upon daily.
A mobile phone call connects because cellular networks remain synchronized. A financial transaction gets verified based on the system’s agreement on the accurate sequence of events. Electrical power can flow effectively from one country to another due to the shared timing reference point among substation and control centers.
Aviation technology cannot ignore this either. Today, this field requires synchronized surveillance, communications, navigation, and operation systems. There are millions of interconnected processes at the airport, and they require timing for safety reasons.
Emerging technologies, such as digital towers and more advanced air mobility systems, are becoming more reliant on the synchronization process. In most cases, for instance, GPS is used for its unmatched accuracy and accessibility.
The challenge now is that dependence often breeds complacency.
When Time Stops
Contrary to a total breakdown, timing disruptions tend to be more subtle.
A network can function while synchronization slowly becomes poor. A communication system can be working without issues while performance slowly declines. Timing disruption goes unnoticed by critical infrastructure operators until they discover that the common reference connecting various systems is no longer effective.
It is because of this that timing disruption poses such a serious threat. Any small timing issue may rapidly spread across connected systems. Milliseconds can turn into seconds, whereas localized disturbances may quickly become network-wide issues. Depending on which industry sector is being considered, consequences may include reduced performance or even total disruption.
As GNSS interference increases, this trend will only accelerate.
Various instances of increased GNSS jamming and spoofing have already been recorded within aviation in Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world. Although all focus has been on navigation issues, the bottom line remains the same: if GPS signals are jammed or spoofed, so can timing signals be.
Resilience Is the New Accuracy
While accuracy has always been the main priority in the past several decades, nowadays, it starts being accompanied by resilience. Even the best timing solution in the world means nothing when it proves unreliable in case of any disruptions.
As a result, today’s operators of critical infrastructure are changing their approach to timing, no longer focusing solely on accuracy. The target is to maintain reliable timing under any circumstances, including the presence of adversarial attacks or other forms of interference.
Such an approach affects the design of the timing architecture itself, which in the future will likely become more complex and rely on multiple timing sources. GNSS systems will remain integral, while other elements, such as atomic clocks or resilient PNT technologies, will complement them.
In other words, the future is no longer entirely about redundancy but about reliability.
The Rise of Assured Timing
Assured PNT is a term that has received considerable attention in recent years, especially among companies working in aviation, military, telecommunication, and energy fields. Its essence is clear and straightforward: companies should not depend completely on one source of time signal.
On the contrary, robust systems need to continuously verify received data, identify irregularities, and continue functioning without the presence of any reliable time references. In other words, the system is intelligent enough to distinguish between correct and incorrect information.
The matter is crucial given the current trend toward automation in different industries.
Automation implies autonomous vehicles, sophisticated air traffic management systems, digital communications infrastructure, and energy distribution networks, all depending on precise timekeeping. Automation, however, doesn’t tolerate uncertainties.
In high-speed decision-making processes, synchronization becomes highly important. Otherwise, the notion of autonomy remains just a fiction.
Building the Next Generation of Resilient Infrastructure
The silver lining in this is the fact that the industry has responded to this challenge.
Investments in robust timing solutions are increasing across the aerospace and critical infrastructure industry. Firms working on developing navigation, timing, and inertial system solutions are now developing technology-based solutions that are capable of ensuring accuracy irrespective of whether the GNSS solution is available or not.
These include solutions around advanced atomic clocks, robust PNT solutions, and signal authentication and monitoring solutions that are capable of detecting any form of interference even before it affects the process.
Organizations such as Safran have played an active role in this journey by backing the development of technology that enables infrastructure operators to maintain accurate PNT capability.
The objective is not to replace GNSS. Rather, it is to ensure that critical systems remain operational when GNSS alone is no longer enough.
The Strategic Importance of Time
The importance of timing will only increase in the years ahead.
5G and future communications networks require tighter synchronization. Autonomous transportation systems depend on coordinated decision-making. Smart grids must balance increasingly dynamic energy flows. Aviation continues its journey toward more connected and digitally integrated operations.
Every one of these developments places greater value on resilient timing. For decades, timing has quietly powered the systems behind modern life. It has been so reliable that many organizations have treated it as a given. That assumption is beginning to change.
The future of critical infrastructure will not be defined solely by how accurately systems can determine their position. It will be defined by how effectively they maintain trust when their primary sources of information are challenged.
Because in a world built on synchronization, timing is more than a technical requirement. It is a strategic asset. And when it is lost, the consequences can be felt far beyond the systems that depend on it.
SyncIoT, a division of SyncWise Inc., has introduced its G1 and G5 families of GNSS receiver modules for applications in the Internet of Things (IoT), defense and critical infrastructure sectors.
According to the company, the modules are designed and manufactured outside China and contain no Chinese hardware or software components. The products are intended for organizations seeking secure supply chains and compliance with U.S. procurement requirements, including those related to the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The G1 family is designed for applications requiring a balance of positioning performance, power consumption and cost. The L1 receivers support concurrent tracking of up to four GNSS constellations, enabling access to more satellites and improving positioning availability in challenging environments. A low-power version, the G1LP, is aimed at battery-powered applications.
The G5 module supports both L1 and L5 GNSS signals and is designed for higher-precision positioning applications. SyncIoT said the module can provide sub-meter accuracy while tracking up to four satellite constellations simultaneously. The use of L5 signals can help mitigate multipath effects, which can degrade positioning accuracy in urban and other signal-challenged environments.
Additional features of the G5 include raw carrier-phase measurements, a one-pulse-per-second (1PPS) timing output, anti-jamming and anti-spoofing capabilities, inertial measurement unit (IMU) data pass-through and an integrated surface acoustic wave (SAW) filter and low-noise amplifier (LNA).
“The release of the G1 and G5 families was initiated at the request of our top customers, who require U.S.-based solutions and greater security across their supply chains,” said Mark Murray, Head of IoT Modules at SyncWise. “The G1 and G5 families are only the beginning. Stay tuned for announcements regarding future products and partnerships.”
Samples and development kits for both product families are currently available here.
Focal Point Positioning, a U.K.-based developer of GNSS-enhancing software, has launched Precise+, a technology designed to deliver reliable high-precision positioning in environments where conventional carrier-phase tracking struggles. The company unveiled the technology at the 2026 European Navigation Conference in Vienna, Austria.
Precise+ extends the capabilities of the company’s patented Supercorrelation platform into the carrier-phase domain, targeting the cycle slips that can cause real-time kinematic (RTK) and precise point positioning (PPP) systems to lose lock in difficult environments.
Continuous carrier-phase lock is required for centimeter-level positioning. In dense urban areas, under tree cover and in multipath-heavy environments, interruptions can trigger cycle slips and force systems to reinitialize. According to the company, these disruptions remain a major obstacle for advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS), automated driving and robotics applications.
Focal Point said Precise+ improves GNSS performance in challenging conditions, delivering sub-meter accuracy in scenarios where commercial receivers using live corrections typically produce multi-meter errors.
The company tested its software-defined Precise+ receiver in Thetford Forest, a common benchmark environment for GNSS testing under dense foliage. According to Focal Point, the system achieved 80 cm accuracy at the 99th percentile, meaning positioning error remained below 80 cm for 99% of measurements collected in the most difficult sections of the route. The company said competing state-of-the-art receivers produced errors greater than 3 m under the same conditions.
Focal Point noted the results were achieved using only receiver-level performance, without inertial sensors, dead reckoning or sensor fusion. The company said the improvements can be combined with additional technologies such as sensor fusion, RTK or PPP corrections.
“RTK and PPP deliver centimeter accuracy in open sky but degrade sharply where signals are disrupted by tree cover, buildings or multipath,” said Scott Pomerantz, CEO of Focal Point Positioning. “This limits deployment to a narrow slice of the road network, not the environments people actually drive in.”
“Meanwhile, correction services carry high recurring per-vehicle costs yet cannot fix what happens at the receiver when the signal environment degrades,” Pomerantz added. “This means OEMs pay for precise positioning that doesn’t function where it matters most.”
According to the company, Precise+ is designed for automotive applications including ADAS, automated driving and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) systems, as well as other applications requiring sustained high-precision GNSS performance outside open-sky conditions.
As GNSS interference becomes more common and sophisticated across defense and mission-critical operations, resilient systems are now a core design priority.
At Jammertest in Andøya, Norway, industry participants evaluated how GNSS technologies perform under realistic interference conditions designed to replicate operational challenges faced in the field. Among them was Septentrio, which used the event to assess resilience strategies, explore emerging threat scenarios and showcase its latest advancements in anti-jamming and anti-spoofing technology.
GPS World spoke with Septentrio product manager, Yasmine Hunter, about Jammertest, the growing complexity of GNSS-denied environments and the company’s newly introduced mosaic-G5 P8 receiver designed for SWaP-sensitive, mission-critical applications operating in contested environments.
Jammertest and Real-World Scenarios
How realistic are the Jammertest scenarios, and how closely do they reflect real-world GNSS interference challenges?
I would say quite realistic. One of the strengths of Jammertest is that participants can actively propose scenarios based on what we have encountered in the field, and organizers are often able to adapt to those. For us, this means providing feedback on settings/scenarios that we have seen with our customers.
In addition, it offers participants the opportunity to test the equipment under real environmental conditions. Propagation conditions, terrain, platform dynamics, and antenna behavior (including multipath) all play major roles. These factors significantly influence GNSS performance and are very difficult to fully replicate in a laboratory, so testing them in an operational environment adds a lot of value.
To what extent do these scenarios mirror conditions in conflict zones (e.g., the Middle East or Ukraine)?
In my view, it’s very difficult to fully replicate a conflict‑zone environment, even in a remote location like Andøya. Conflict zones involve a unique combination of sustained, coordinated interference, evolving tactics, and operational pressure that is hard to mirror exactly.
Jammertest allows us to explore individual elements of those environments in a controlled and repeatable way and bridges lab and real‑world deployment by exposing systems to realistic threat profiles without the unpredictability and risk of an active conflict zone.
What are the biggest takeaways from Jammertest?
One clear takeaway is that jamming and spoofing scenarios are becoming more complex and sophisticated every year. It’s increasingly challenging as GNSS manufacturers to address these threats in isolation and still ensure robust operation across real-world use-cases.
Which brings me to the second point; resilience is not only about maintaining position availability. Situational awareness – understanding what the receiver is experiencing and why – becomes increasingly critical. Knowing when GNSS can be trusted, and when it cannot, is just as important as maintaining a solution.
What does Septentrio do differently from competitors when it comes to mitigating jamming and spoofing?
Septentrio has been working on jamming and spoofing mitigation for a long time, and that experience is built on extensive real‑world use cases rather than purely theoretical approaches.
This means that our receivers have been designed to be resilient, not just at the signal processing level, but also in how they disseminate this information to users. From my application‑engineering background, I’ve seen that these two aspects are equally important: strong mitigation technologies and clear insight into what is happening so users can make informed decisions.
The mosaic-G5 P8 offers trustworthy positioning and seamless switching to alternative sensors during GNSS disruptions. (Photo: Septentrio)
What are some of the most significant engineering or design challenges in developing resilient GNSS solutions?
A key challenge is balancing performance, robustness, and usability. Advanced mitigation techniques often come with trade‑offs in complexity, power consumption, or cost. As we are targeting increasingly SWaP‑sensitive applications with our latest modules, this balance becomes especially critical and requires careful design decisions from the outset.
From a usability perspective, it’s not just about rejecting interference or spoofing, but also doing so in a way that preserves continuity and transparency (or trust) in the solution that we provide.
How is your approach evolving as interference becomes more sophisticated?
We increasingly accept that GNSS will rarely operate alone in challenging environments. The focus is shifting toward deeper integration with complementary sensors and systems.
From our side, that means ensuring the GNSS receiver provides reliable, high‑quality information — not just position — but also integrity metrics and interference indicators (like our jamming and spoofing flags) that other systems can use effectively. Understanding how GNSS fits into a broader navigation or mission architecture is becoming essential.
Upcoming Product Releases in the Defense Market
Can you provide an overview of the new product and the specific problem it is designed to solve?
The mosaic-G5 P8 introduces what we call “ultimate resilience”. It is targeted to mission-critical applications where optimizing not only availability, but also the integrity of the solution is the main goal.
The product directly addresses environments where GNSS interference is not occasional but expected — and where incorrect positioning data can be more dangerous than no data at all.
What are the key technical specifications or innovations that set this product apart?
It has the highest level of jamming rejection and combined with more advanced spoofing mitigation capabilities. In addition, the mosaic-G5 P8 provides access to synchronized baseband samples and jamming-power indicators. These outputs enable advanced use cases such as jammer detection and localization.
How does this solution improve performance in contested or denied environments?
It improves both availability and integrity. The receiver is designed to maintain a usable solution for as long as possible, while also clearly indicating when conditions degrade. This allows operators or higher‑level systems to react appropriately.
What types of platforms or use cases is this product best suited for (e.g., UAVs, ground vehicles, naval, etc.)?
We are primarily targeting SWaP‑sensitive, mission‑critical platforms. So far, we’ve seen strong adoption (of our other products) in highly mobile applications such as UAVs and USVs, but we see clear potential across a broader range of platforms, including ground and (other) maritime systems.
How does it integrate with existing systems or architectures?
The receiver is designed to integrate seamlessly into existing architectures through standard interfaces, while also offering advanced outputs for customers who want deeper system‑level integration. This flexibility allows it to serve both as a drop‑in GNSS solution and as an active sensor within a larger resilience framework.
How does this launch reflect broader trends or priorities in the defense GNSS market?
It reflects a clear shift toward resilience, integrity, and transparency rather than pure accuracy. Defense users increasingly recognize that GNSS denial is not an edge case, but a baseline assumption. Solutions must therefore be designed to operate, inform, and adapt under persistent interference and spoofing.
Looking Ahead
What should defense and industry stakeholders be preparing for now?
They should be preparing for a reality in which GNSS interference is persistent, adaptive, and increasingly deliberate—not an exception, but an operating condition.
This is also an aspect we are actively considering with solutions like the mosaic‑G5 P8. Rather than treating resilience as a theoretical requirement or a nice add-on, we’re designing for operational use cases where integrity, interference awareness, and transparent behavior under stress are essential.
For stakeholders, this means thinking beyond standalone receivers and focusing on system‑level architectures: how GNSS integrates with other sensors, how integrity information is consumed, and how platforms respond when GNSS performance degrades.
The UAV Navigation–Grupo Oesía flight control system, as a subcontractor to SATNUS, proved key to the success of the demonstration.
In March, the Spanish consortium SATNUS successfully completed the fourth flight demonstration campaign under Pillar 3 of the Next Generation Weapon System / Future Combat Air System (NGWS/FCAS) program, held at the INTA‑CEDEA facilities. The campaign comprised a total of nine flights aimed at verifying the flight control software dedicated to collaborative manned‑unmanned teaming (MUT) operations, led by SATNUS and developed in cooperation with international partners Airbus GmbH and MBDA, and integrated into the Next Generation Autonomy Computer (NGAC). During these tests, the remote carriers were represented by both real and simulated platforms of the manned‑unmanned teaming & common systems demonstrator (MCSD).
During the campaign, key MUT functionalities were demonstrated, including formation flight, evasive maneuvers, collaborative navigation, mission replanning and formation breakup, among other capabilities. Flights involved up to three real Remote Carriers operating simultaneously, supported by UAV Navigation–Grupo Oesía’s technological contribution in guidance, navigation and control (GNC) systems, which acted as a key enabler for the safe execution of the flight maneuvers carried out within the objectives defined by SATNUS under Pillar 3 of the NGWS/FCAS program.
The campaign concluded with the execution of flights 29, 30, and 31, in the presence of the Combined Project Team (CPT) and representatives from the National Program Offices of the three participating nations: Spain, France and Germany.
Engineering teams from all SATNUS partner companies, including members from UAV Navigation–Grupo Oesía, carried out highly specialized work to achieve this milestone, successfully meeting all established objectives. In this context, UAV Navigation–Grupo Oesía’s contribution supported the proper execution of operations and helped validate the capabilities demonstrated throughout the campaign.
SATNUS has expressed its appreciation for the support and trust of the Spanish Armed Forces and the Spanish Ministry of Defence throughout the entire process and will continue advancing the development of capabilities within other NGWS/FCAS-related programs.
As noted in my previous newsletter, NC RFWG agencies are proactively conducting self-assessments of their needs and processes to identify challenges and opportunities early, enabling a smooth transition and sustained operational efficiency. The working group meets monthly to review progress on activities.
One key task of the working group was to develop a short online questionnaire. The goal was to open a dialogue with geospatial professionals and better understand their readiness for the upcoming modernization of the National Spatial Reference System (NSRS).
The questionnaire was designed to address the following key questions:
Are you prepared to implement the new NSRS once the National Geodetic Survey (NGS) officially adopts it?
Do you have the necessary tools and resources in place to ensure a smooth transition?
Has your organization established a timeline for transitioning to the modernized NSRS?
What concerns do you have regarding the transition to the new NSRS?
The section titled “Introduction of North Carolina Questionnaire” explains the purpose and background of the survey, while the section titled “North Carolina Online Questions” presents the list of questions included in the questionnaire.
Introduction of the North Carolina Questionnaire
This questionnaire seeks stakeholder input on the upcoming modernization of the National Spatial Reference System (NSRS). Your feedback is welcome on the proposed questions, as well as any concerns about the datum transition, tools (such as updated NCAT, OPUS, and SPCS2022), data transformation strategies, workflow impacts, and preparation needs.
The National Geodetic Survey (NGS) is replacing the North American Datum of 1983 and the North American Vertical Datum of 1988 with new plate-fixed terrestrial reference frames (NATRF2022, PATRF2022, CATRF2022, and MATRF2022) tied to the International Terrestrial Reference Frame 2020, along with the new vertical datum, the North American-Pacific Geopotential Datum of 2022.
In spring 2027, new horizontal and vertical datums will be implemented:
Horizontal
North American Terrestrial Reference Frame (NATRF2022)
Replaces the North American Datum of 1983 (2011)
Vertical
North American-Pacific Geopotential Datum of 2022 (NAPGD2022)
Replaces North American Vertical Datum of 1988
Units
14B NCAC 03 .0602 REQUIRED FOOT CONVERSION
North Carolina Online Questions
The section titled “Results of North Carolina Online Questionnaire” summarizes the survey responses collected as of April 27, 2026.
[Note: NCPMA refers to the North Carolina Property Mappers Association, and LGUC refers to the North Carolina Local Government Committee.]
Results of the North Carolina Online Questionnaire
(April 27, 2026)
This questionnaire solicited input from the North Carolina Property Mappers Association (NC PMA), the North Carolina Geographic Information Coordinating Council (GICC), and the North Carolina Local Government Committee (LGC). Although focused on North Carolina, the results may benefit other working groups. The NC working group is reviewing all feedback—especially regarding the Spring 2027 datum change—and will develop materials to address it.
In addition to the questionnaire, the working group prepared a short guidance document on the new reference frames for local governments and state agencies. It outlines how to prepare for the 2027 datum change and covers:
Preliminary steps for transitioning when NGS and North Carolina officially adopt the new datums in 2027.
Actions users can take now to ready NSRS‑referenced data for the modernized NSRS and the shift from U.S. Survey Foot/International Foot.
Estimated coordinate changes with the 2027 adoption of:
North American Terrestrial Reference Frame (NATRF2022)
North American-Pacific Geopotential Datum of 2022 (NAPGD2022)
New national geoid model (Geoid2022)
North Carolina State Plane Coordinate System of 2022 (SPCS2022)
Current NC statewide digital orthoimagery acquisition cycle and statewide lidar collection schedule.
How the NC CORS and Real-Time Network (RTN) will support the modernized NSRS.
Web links to more detailed resources.
The working group is developing a case study on preparing a FEMA Elevation Certificate using the modernized NSRS (NATRF2022 and NAPGD2022). It will be featured in upcoming newsletters. The North Carolina Geodetic Survey will host the materials on its website, and I’ll share the public link once it’s available.
ICAO Secretary-General Juan Carlos Salazar told delegates at the 2026 World Overflight Risk Conference in Vallarta, Malta, that emerging military technologies — including long-range weapons systems, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), GNSS radio frequency interference, and advanced air defense systems — pose growing risks to civil aviation.
“We must now reach beyond the boundaries of aviation as we have known it,” Salazar said, adding that increasingly sophisticated weaponry is creating conditions in which civilian aircraft face a heightened risk of being targeted or caught in crossfire.
While praising the aviation industry’s ability to reroute flights and maintain operations during the recent Middle East crisis, Salazar said operational flexibility alone cannot address the underlying security threats posed by weapons systems.
He commended states and airspace users for measures taken to mitigate safety and security risks during the escalation in the Middle East, noting that more than 10 states partially or fully closed their airspace, significantly disrupting international air transport.
“This commitment to resilience, adaptation, safety and security is the foundation of our industry,” he said, calling for concrete steps to prevent civil aviation facilities, airports and aircraft from being targeted.
Salazar cited ICAO Assembly Resolution A42-4 and Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention — which prohibit the use of weapons against civilian aircraft — as the legal basis for stronger protections. He said, however, that international law alone has proven insufficient as regional conflicts intensify.
Following ICAO guidance, Salazar urged states to take three immediate actions: rapidly share threat intelligence when activities pose risks to civilian aircraft; strengthen risk assessment and timely decision-making; and improve coordination between military and civilian authorities to prevent misidentification of civilian aircraft as military targets.
ICAO is finalizing a Global Crisis Management Framework to coordinate responses when civil aviation faces threats. Salazar said the reactive framework must be paired with proactive measures to prevent attacks.
The organization is also updating its Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities and its Risk Assessment Manual for Civil Aircraft Operations Over or Near Conflict Zones, with a focus on improving how authorities, airlines and air navigation service providers assess threats from malicious activity.
Recent disruptions during the Middle East crisis demonstrated both the industry’s adaptability and the economic impact of operating in an increasingly militarized airspace environment. ICAO regional contingency frameworks have supported rerouting when airspace becomes unsafe, but officials said such measures are costly and temporary, not solutions to underlying security risks.
The two-day Malta conference, which opened April 21, brought together aviation officials and security experts from multiple regions to discuss implementation of safety protocols and information-sharing mechanisms. The Safer Skies initiative also serves as a framework for those discussions.
Salazar’s remarks mark one of ICAO’s most direct acknowledgments of growing risks to civil aviation arising from conflict zones, reflecting the organization’s core mission to maintain safe and secure international air travel amid rising geopolitical tensions.
Following the conference, Salazar met with Myriam Spiteri Debono to discuss global and regional developments affecting aviation, with a focus on the role of multilateral cooperation in addressing emerging challenges, including conflict-zone risks. He also commended Malta’s aviation sector.
Salazar was accompanied by Nicolas Rallo, director of ICAO’s European and North Atlantic Regional Office.
BAE Systems has entered production and started initial deliveries of its NavGuide GPS receiver, a portable, field-installable device designed to provide secure positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) for vehicle, handheld and sensor applications.
NavGuide serves as a drop-in M-code upgrade to the company’s Defense Advanced GPS Receiver (DAGR), which has concluded production after more than 20 years in service. The new receiver is backward-compatible with existing DAGR installations and is designed for rapid integration into current mounts and accessories without interrupting operations. It is available to U.S. armed forces and allied partners through foreign military sales.
“NavGuide is more than just a replacement for DAGR,” said Luke Bishop, director of navigation and sensor systems at BAE Systems. “Built on the same trusted foundation for easy installation and transition, it delivers a more resilient, user-friendly M-code GPS solution.”
NavGuide uses the military’s M-code GPS signal to enhance protection against jamming and spoofing while delivering reliable PNT in challenging environments. The compact receiver features a full-color user interface with waypoint navigation and a moving map display.
More than 650,000 DAGR units have been deployed worldwide since 2004. NavGuide maintains the same form, fit and function, while adding enhanced security and performance. BAE Systems said it has integrated NavGuide on more than 30 vehicle platforms, with installation averaging less than two minutes and requiring no changes to existing cables, mounts or vehicle software.
The company will continue to support legacy DAGR units.
BAE Systems has delivered selective availability anti-spoofing modules to more than 45 countries and has begun fielding M-code GPS receivers in multiple form factors for U.S. and allied forces.
Development and production of the company’s military GPS products take place at its engineering and manufacturing facility in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
We asked our Editorial Advisory Board (EAB) which emerging sectors are driving the most demand for advanced positioning and timing solutions right now?
“The defense sector needs an off-the-shelf GNSS module that is small, light and low power, yet also highly resilient — such as a military-grade location system — to satisfy the insatiable growth in drones. While this segment is about a tenth of the total commercial vehicle market, it is significant compared to the emerging autonomous driving segment, where the need for resilience is still trying to figure out the cost-benefit of mitigating intentional interference.”
“If I had to pick newly emergent sectors with the highest need for precise and continuous PNT, I would say the autonomous system operations sector and portion of the artificial intelligence (AI) sector. AI cannot provide spatially or temporally ‘intelligent’ support if it does not have access to precise positioning and timing information from outside itself. PNT sources do not depend on AI, but ‘autonomous’ AI must have reliable PNT.
“The primary driver is the broad adoption of autonomy and automation across industries such as construction, logistics, agriculture, infrastructure, defense, or even entertainment. Amplifying this demand is the proliferation of smaller and lighter UAVs, drones and robots. Where a single manned platform once required one navigation system, a drone swarm may require hundreds or thousands of units. It is the combination of these two forces, adopting autonomy and automation and multiplying platforms, that is driving demand growth.”
For many, the meaning of advanced positioning and timing solutions equates to solutions that provide higher accuracy and precision. For me, achieving an advanced PNT solution must require equal focus on the other PNT metrics — availability, integrity, continuity and coverage. Given the tumultuous state of the world these days, there is an emerging demand for solutions that enable resilient PNT in the defense sector, the commercial aviation and maritime sectors, in telecommunications and in power
The U.S. Space Force and Lockheed Martin launched the GPS III Space Vehicle 10 (SV10) on April 21, marking the final satellite in the GPS III series and bringing the GPS constellation to its largest size to date.
Signal acquisition was achieved shortly after launch. The spacecraft is being managed at Lockheed Martin’s Denver-based launch and checkout operations center while it undergoes initial testing before integration into the operational network.
SV10 includes enhancements designed to improve the accuracy and resiliency of the constellation. Among its payloads is an optical crosslink demonstration designed to test direct satellite-to-satellite communication in orbit, a capability intended to strengthen system robustness.
The launch represents the fourth consecutive GPS mission conducted on an accelerated schedule.
GPS III satellites provide improved performance over earlier generations, including increased positioning accuracy, stronger resistance to jamming, and the addition of secure M-code signals for military users. The constellation supports positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services for military, civil and commercial applications worldwide.
SV10 also carries a demonstration digital rubidium atomic frequency standard, an advanced clock designed to improve onboard timekeeping precision.
The deployment of SV10 concludes the GPS III series and precedes the next-generation GPS IIIF satellites. The upcoming series is expected to introduce additional capabilities, including enhanced anti-jamming features such as Regional Military Protection.
More than 30 GPS satellites are currently in orbit, providing global PNT services to billions of users across defense, infrastructure and commercial sectors.
In my February GPS World newsletter, I highlighted that the National Geodetic Survey (NGS) staff participated in GeoWeek 2026 in Denver. They engaged with geospatial product and service users and provided the latest updates on the status of the modernization. On March 25, 2026, as President of American Association for Geodetic Surveying (AAGS), I participated in a GeoWeek webinar titled “NSRS Modernization is Here: What Surveyors Need to Know Now.”
The webinar was based on presentations by NGS and others at GeoWeek 2026. The webinar provided the status of NGS’s new modernized NSRS and the professional societies (AAGS, ASCE, ASPRS, and NSPS) addressed how they are helping others to prepare for the change. It is available to everyone under the “On-Demand Webinars” section of Geo Week News here: https://www.geoweeknews.com/webinars.
First, at the end of February’s newsletter, I shared my main thoughts and concerns that I believe NGS and the broader community should carefully consider before NGS adopts the new modernized NSRS.
I encourage you to watch the GeoWeek Webinar mentioned above for the latest update from NGS on the modernized NSRS.
I have already shared my concerns directly with NGS, but it’s important that they also hear from the user community. You can provide feedback via [email protected], user forums, or upcoming webinars and Q&A sessions.
Although I covered these points in my last newsletter, I believe they remain important, so here’s a shorter version of my key thoughts and concerns:
Timeline uncertainty: Clearer, more frequent milestone updates (beyond the Track Our Progress page) would help manage expectations.
OPUS and processing continuity: NGS should commit to a longer grace period — or ideally a defined parallel support window — for legacy OPUS tools (particularly OPUS-Projects 5) after the official adoption of the modernized NSRS.
Data access and usability in the new DDS: The new web-based system needs to provide robust APIs or export options that are comparable to those in current datasheets/legacy tools.
Transformation tools and legacy data handling:Users need confidence that transformations minimize errors, especially in deformation-prone areas.
Communication and outreach: Case studies, training resources, and FAQs that describe real-world practical examples, tailored to common workflows, need to be developed and documented.
Again, I encourage anyone reading this (including NGS staff) to test the beta products actively, submit detailed feedback, and participate in forums/Q&As. The community input will make or break the success of this once-in-a-generation update
Regarding the 2026 Society of Land Surveyors of Iowa (SLSI) Annual Meeting, I was grateful to receive the invitation and truly enjoyed attending. As always, I came away from this gathering of surveyors with valuable insights.
The conference was exceptionally well organized, with plenty of time for meaningful interactions among attendees, exhibitors, and speakers. In total, 285 people attended.
As expected, I presented on the new modernized NSRS. The topics I covered are listed in the box titled “Topics Addressed During my ½ Day Session on the New NSRS.”
I was fortunate to have Ben Sullivan, Seiler Geospatial, set the stage for my presentation by providing a short introduction to the new modernized NSRS. He provided an overview that addressed: (1) what the new national datum is, (2) how it will affect the geospatial community, and (3) how users can prepare for it once officially released by the NGS.
Topics Addressed During My Half-Day Session on the New NSRS
What to expect between NAD 83 (2011) and NATRF2022 in Iowa?
Why is NGS modernizing the NSRS and what are the expected coordinate changes in Iowa?
How are reference frames and datums defined?
What are the differences in CORS coordinates between the Multi-year CORS Solution 2 (MYCS2) and Multi-year CORS Solution 3 (MYCS 3) in Iowa?
What does NGS mean by time-dependent coordinates and why is it necessary for the new, modernized NSRS?
How will plate tectonics be handled in the new, modernized NSRS?
What’s the difference between NAD 83 (2011) epoch 2010.0 and NATRF2022 epoch 2020.0 in Iowa?
What are the differences between Reference Epoch Coordinates (REC) and Survey Epoch Coordinates (SEC)?
What’s the difference between ITRF2020 and NATRF2022 in Iowa?
How do you use NCAT to convert between reference frames and compute State Plane Coordinates?
Why is it important to have the appropriate metadata of your old projects for the implementation of the new, modernized NSRS?
What to expect between NAVD 88 and NAPGD2022 in Iowa?
How will orthometric heights be determined in the new, modernized NSRS; that is, how will NAPGD2022 orthometric heights be determined in the new NSRS?
Review of Computing GNSS-Derived Heights
What’s the estimated difference between NAVD 88 and NAPGD2022 epoch 2020.0 in Iowa?
How will NAPGD2022 Orthometric heights be determined using GEOID2022?
What are the differences between GEOID2022 models and Hybrid Geoid Model GEOID18 in Iowa?
How will NAPGD2022 affect the National Flood Insurance Program and the Elevation Certificate?
Updates from the National Geodetic Survey at GeoWeek 2026
Many of the topics covered in my session have been addressed in previous newsletters. For example:
My June 2020 newsletter explained how NAPGD2022 orthometric heights will be determined using GEOID2022, and why NGS will require GNSS occupations on primary marks when submitting leveling projects.
Whenever I attend conferences, I visit exhibitors to ask about the modernized NSRS. Many had heard of it, but only a few could explain the differences or how their company will adapt products and services to the new reference frames. Several said their company is aware of the change but couldn’t specify how or when they’ll respond. I encourage all users to contact their equipment and software providers and request a detailed plan for addressing the new NSRS.
I want to highlight two sessions I found both very interesting and important for surveyors. They were presented by Todd Horton, PE, PLS of Meridian Geospatial.
Meridian Geospatial Consulting Todd Horton, PE, PLS, is the owner of Meridian Geospatial Consulting, LLC. Todd has provided technician training and continuing education seminars for the land surveying industry since 2005. Todd served in the US Air Force and with the Illinois Department of Transportation in planning, design, construction, surveying and maintenance of civil engineering projects including commercial structures, airfields, utility systems and highways. He joined the full-time faculty at Parkland College in Champaign, IL, where he taught land surveying and construction management courses for 25 years. Todd founded the land surveying associate degree program at Parkland College in 2001. Having retired from full-time teaching, Todd has joined Farnsworth Group Inc. as a part-time senior project land surveyor. You can reach him at [email protected]. (From https://www.meridiangeospatial.com/)
One of Horton’s presentations was titled “Professional Ethics.” In it, he highlighted how new technology is reducing the size of surveying crews and improving overall efficiency. However, this comes at the cost of reduced opportunities for mentoring the next generation of survey technicians and surveyors.
I’ve recreated his diagram below to illustrate the issue.
Crew Size vs. Mentorship
Crew vs Mentorship. (Recreated from Todd Horton’s presentation)
As shown in Horton’s diagram, while new technology increases efficiency and allows for smaller survey crews, it also reduces the time available for surveyors to mentor technicians and the next generation of professionals.
Training and mentoring are extremely important for the continued growth and development of individuals in the surveying and mapping community.
He explained that the world consists of two types of individuals: specialists, who have a narrow skill set and limited opportunities, and generalists, who possess broader knowledge and skills, think multi-faceted, and are forward-looking.
He emphasized that a professional surveyor typically needs 3 to 5 surveying technicians to successfully complete a project. While professional surveyors regularly attend training sessions (as evidenced by many participants at this conference), technicians often have little or no access to formal training.
He advocated that technicians should be trained as generalists. This means equipping them not only with better tools and equipment, but also with a strong foundational knowledge and skill set — especially understanding the “why” behind the “how.” This deeper knowledge enables them to prevent problems before they occur and effectively troubleshoot issues when they arise.
I addressed this same concern in my November 2022 newsletter, where I warned that the industry is creating a growing number of “buttonologists” — technicians who rely heavily on pushing buttons without deeper understanding.
This trend concerned me then, and it still does today. That’s why I was especially pleased to hear Todd directly address the issue and offer a clear path forward for improving training and development for both technicians and surveyors.
A participant at one of my workshops stated that “GPS has made geodesists out of all of us.” In my opinion, the advancements in GNSS equipment and processing software provided some users with a “false sense of knowledge or security” that they understood what was happening within the “black box.” One of my colleagues at NGS said that the new equipment and software programs were creating a field force of “buttonologists.”
He highlighted that the surveying community needs more technicians than licensed professionals. As a result, we should prioritize training and development for technicians. This is a constant need and would help reduce turnover rates.
He also emphasized the importance of growing future professionals from within the technical ranks. Doing so would increase technicians’ motivation and desire for advancement, making them more eager to take on greater responsibility and pursue professional growth.
He provided the following training approaches:
On-the-job training
Self-guided study
Continuing education resources
Online content
College courses
Live skill training
He noted that these investments in training will yield the following advantages in professional and organizational development:
Enhanced employee skills
Opportunities for career advancement
Stronger organizational performance
Sustained competitiveness via continuous learning
Increased productivity
Higher employee retention
A thriving culture of innovation
Horton also discussed a training program he’s involved in that not only trains technicians but also includes training for the trainers. This “train-the-trainer” approach helps accelerate the program’s growth and impact.
For more information, I encourage you to reach out to Horton directly for additional details about his programs and his ideas on improving technician training.
Horton also gave a very good session on a very difficult subject, that is ALTA/NSPS “Relative Positional Precision (RPP).”
As a side note: see the box titled “Top 5 Key Changes in the 2026 ALTA/NSPS Standards” for the key changes in the 2026 ALTA/NSPS standards. Detailed information on the ALTA/NSPS 2026 document can be downloaded at the following NSPS weblink: https://nsps.us.com/page/2026ALTA.
Precision (RPP): The clarification of RPP is a core technical change. While it does not alter how surveys are performed, it improves consistency and understanding of measurement quality expectations across the profession.
Shift from “on the ground” to “practices generally recognized as acceptable” (Sections 5 & 6): This is one of the most significant forward-looking changes. It explicitly accommodates modern technologies such as drones, lidar and future tools (including AI), without locking the standards to specific methods.
Expanded guidance on sourcing title evidence when a recent title commitment is unavailable: This change directly affects research responsibilities and risk management, especially on projects where title information is incomplete, delayed, or unconventional.
Requirement to note evidence of possession or occupation along the entire perimeter: This materially broadens what must be considered and documented in the field, regardless of how close that evidence is to the boundary line – an important title-risk issue.
Clarification that verbal (“parol”) statements must be noted when made: This adds explicit documentation requirements tied to conversations with landowners or occupants, which can be critical in dispute resolution and liability defense.
Todd started his presentation by providing RPP as defined by ALTA/NSPS (2026):
Relative Positional Precision (RPP) is the acceptable indicator of measurement quality on an ALTA.NSPS Land Title Survey.
It is defined as the length of the semi-major axis, expressed in meters or feet, of the error ellipse of the line connecting the monuments or witnesses marking adjacent boundary corners of the surveyed property at the 95 percent confidence level.
His session was organized into nine sections labeled RPP Keys for Success:
Choose one equipment and a measurement method based on the accuracy needs of the project.
Use well-adjusted instruments and procedures to eliminate systematic errors in measures.
Make internal checks to detect blunders in measurements.
Make redundant measurements to have a large degree of freedom.
Access the quality of control that will be used.
Avoid weak network geometry.
Organize all field measurements for software input.
Establish standard errors for all observation conditions.
Adjust and analyze results.
In these sessions, he covered fundamentals including:
precision vs. accuracy,
systematic vs. random errors, and
absolute vs. relative accuracy.
Horton emphasized that systematic errors follow mathematical or physical laws and can usually be modeled or reduced with proper procedures, while random errors persist after blunders and systematic errors are addressed. By using improved equipment and proper procedures to detect, reduce, or remove errors, users lower the uncertainty in their results — reducing uncertainty should be a goal for any product or service.
Many people are familiar with the classic bow-and-arrow (or target) diagram that illustrates the difference between precision and accuracy.
I recreated Horton’s diagram on this topic because it effectively highlights that our ultimate goal in surveying is to reduce uncertainty in our results.
As the diagram shows, simply repeating observations can give the appearance of good precision, but it does not guarantee accuracy. The result can be high precision with low accuracy — and therefore a large remaining uncertainty.
Precision vs. Accuracy
Recreated from Todd Horton presentation
Todd noted that most RPP values are derived from a properly weighted least-squares adjustment. Many manufacturers’ software packages now use least squares to estimate RPP, making it essential to provide accurate error estimates so the data are correctly weighted in the adjustment.
To illustrate this point, he provided clear examples of the following concepts:
Determining the appropriate error estimates for data,
Measuring errors,
Degrees of freedom and redundancy,
Significance and confidence intervals,
Appropriate weights of measurements,
Propagation of errors, and
Statistical tests for analysis of data and results.
He explained how to compute the allowable RPP and offered practical advice on selecting the appropriate equipment and measurement methods, tailored to the accuracy requirements of the project.
In my opinion, this topic can be challenging to grasp without a strong mathematical background. Todd did an excellent job explaining the concepts clearly while avoiding excessive mathematical detail.
To illustrate the RPP, Todd presented two real-world examples of combined networks using GNSS and traverse data. The first example combined GNSS with an open traverse using EDM, horizontal, and zenith angles. The second example incorporated RTK GNSS vectors with a closed traverse using classical survey data.
This was an excellent session. I highly recommend reaching out to Todd for more details about his programs and insights.
I want to thank the organizing committee of the 2026 SLSI Annual Meeting for the kind invitation to participate in their conference. I truly enjoyed the experience and came away with many valuable insights from this excellent gathering of surveyors.
As GPS World readers know, the growing prevalence of GPS/GNSS jamming and spoofing outside of conflict zones interrupts vital aviation safety technologies and presents challenges to maritime commerce and the global economy. An alarming example is playing out along the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, prompting 13 coastal European nations and Iceland to highlight in January 2026 “growing GNSS interference” and collectively reinforce requirements to comply with existing regulations and international law designed to ensure the safety of all maritime vessels engaged in shipping.
As commercial aircraft report navigation anomalies and maritime operators experience false position data in congested waterways, global authorities are sounding alarms that GNSS interference will continue to rise without immediate action. In March 2025, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and International Maritime Organization (IMO) issued a joint warning expressing “grave concern” that disruptions from GNSS jamming and spoofing constitute an urgent threat to public safety, telecommunications networks and international commerce.
Compounding harmful interference incidents led the GPS Innovation Alliance (GPSIA) to act. Defeating illegal and harmful interference outside of combat zones requires a coordinated, whole-of-government strategy that focuses on stopping bad actors through deterrence and enforcement, and directing resources toward preventing and sanctioning those violating international commitments and laws prohibiting jamming and spoofing. Investing in GPS modernization and integrating innovative signals from complementary PNT satellite systems into devices and receivers will deliver PNT that surpasses today’s technologies to the global community.
Roadmap for Action
In September 2025, GPSIA led a coalition of leading industry groups in sending a letter to the Departments of Defense and Transportation that called for urgent action to address GPS jamming and spoofing. We noted the United States has the technology and expertise to solve this issue, and the administration has the power to act. GPSIA followed the letter with a whole-of-government strategy providing a clear roadmap for the administration. While some recommendations have been implemented, other opportunities remain.
Focus on the Real Culprits
The culprits in each of these scenarios are bad actors putting public safety and global commerce at risk with harmful interference outside conflict zones. The global community relies on several unique technologies that can be impacted by harmful interference, such as cellular and Wi-Fi signals, radars and automated information systems. The misplaced focus on faint GNSS signals or dependencies on GNSS derail collective efforts to immediately regain interference-free global commerce and bolster public safety.
Governments and international organizations mandate certain industries integrate safety-of-life technologies into their operations — and they do, at great cost. Officials should in turn be given the political support and resources to stop bad actors from intentionally interfering with them.
What to Do Next
Public and continued diplomatic engagement are critical. By amplifying European counterparts, condemnations from senior U.S. officials can raise the reputational costs for bad actors and reaffirm international norms that protect GNSS signals and other technologies from harmful interference.
Engaging with the ICAO is important. The U.S. should reinforce its commitment to providing modern civil GPS signals that support navigation in international airspace and encourage ICAO to prioritize the enforcement of global GNSS protections.
GPSIA also recommends Executive agencies establish an interagency task force that rapidly identifies and disseminates information about interference events with civil operators, including sanitized intelligence information on intentional jamming and spoofing of commercial aircraft and ships.
Civil operators also should be invited to participate in interference coordination calls and reporting. Sharing radio-frequency interference data, incident reports and threat assessments among military and civil agencies and operators is essential to preserving public safety. The Performance-based Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee’s recommendations for continuity of operations during GPS disruption events should continue to be implemented with urgency.
The GPS III satellite has additional anti-interference features. (Image: Lockheed Martin)
Deterrence and information sharing must be coupled with sustained enforcement. Federal agencies have taken welcome action to interdict illegal jamming equipment, reporting an 830% increase in seizures since 2021. We applaud the U.S. government for prioritizing resources to stop the illegal import and sale of these devices.
GPSIA commends the Kingdom of Norway’s annual Jammertest, which allows receiver and device manufacturers to test interference detection and counter jamming and spoofing. These realistic test scenarios, together with strengthened enforcement and prioritized intelligence collection and analysis, will enhance public safety.
Modernize GPS
While GPS satellites continue operating with an extraordinary 99.99% availability and no outages on record, the health of the constellation and jamming and spoofing incidents affecting receivers and devices, demand action. The final GPS III satellite is scheduled to launch this spring. Next-generation GPS IIIF satellites are being built. Their launches should be prioritized to reduce the number of satellites on orbit that are one system or subsystem away from failure. GPSIA welcomed the passage of the FY2026 Defense Appropriations Bill, which bolstered national and economic security by investing needed funding for modernized GPS IIIF satellites and long-term PNT leadership.
Notably, the current GPS program plan does not include counter-spoofing technologies. Implementing counter-spoofing authentication capabilities for Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) signals would further strengthen aviation resilience.
Ground infrastructure modernization is equally important. The GPS ground station must be able to command and monitor GPS III and IIIF satellites and the modern L5 aviation signal.
Streamline Regulatory Activities
Regulatory modernization represents another area of progress. In September 2025, the State Department removed jam-and spoof-resistant Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), fulfilling one recommendation from GPSIA’s strategy.
Certification processes also must evolve, and integration of CRPAs into aircraft should be accelerated. The modern L5 signal and counter spoofing signal authentication signals must be incorporated into FAA-certified and other receivers as soon as possible.
Recommendations for the FCC
President Trump’s December 2025 Executive Order (EO), “Ensuring American Space Superiority,” directs U.S. departments and agencies to detect and counter threats to U.S. space infrastructure. It also states that his administration will enable industry to develop and deploy advanced space capabilities, including terrestrial and cislunar PNT applications. This EO should serve as a “North Star” for the FCC, resulting in increased enforcement resources to address illegal jamming and spoofing, and a regulatory environment prioritizing innovative, advanced commercial satellite PNT systems that complement GPS. Demonstrating American leadership in space demands that we step forward, not backwards, in our PNT capabilities.
The FCC is evaluating the record developed in its Notice of Inquiry, Promoting the Development of PNT Technologies and Solutions, and is reportedly considering future rulemaking. The FCC’s task is not to replace GPS, but to ensure that the regulatory environment protects its spectrum, increases enforcement actions against those perpetuating harmful interference and enables innovation that complements this foundational system. This balanced approach will fulfill President Trump’s mandate, preserving public safety and economic security, and ensure continued American leadership in PNT.
Global Safety and Commerce
Baltic and North Sea shipping lanes have become a flashpoint for GPS jamming and spoofing, prompting 13 European nations and Iceland to issue a joint warning in January 2026 over interference threatening maritime safety and global commerce. (Photo: Dmitri Toms / iStock / Getty Images Plus / Getty Images)
The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry uncovered dozens of PNT technologies, ranging from those in the marketing stage, to hyper-localized solutions, to proposals to exploit “signals of opportunity.” Creativity and ingenuity abound in the commission’s record, but the docket’s many filings lacked technical details to evaluate whether the systems advance the nation’s PNT leadership.
The hallmarks of GPS are its worldwide coverage, and the continuity, availability, integrity and accuracy of its signals. Our modern global community deserves complementary PNT systems and signals that meet or exceed GPS capabilities. A few satellite-based solutions stood out as holding promise to do so.
Systems operating in low-Earth orbit (LEO) can transmit stronger signal power due to their proximity to Earth, improving performance in urban environments and contested spectrum conditions. Systems operating in different frequency bands, such as TrustPoint’s C-band system, add spectral diversity, making it far more difficult for an adversary to disrupt all PNT services simultaneously. When combined with modernized GPS signals and authentication capabilities, this layered approach can deliver robust services while complementing the foundational role of GPS.
Terrestrial systems cannot replicate global coverage of satellite constellations. They are also vulnerable to wildfires, hurricanes and other disasters.Building parallel terrestrial networks would require significant investment while delivering a fraction of modernized satellite systems’ capabilities. Nor do terrestrial signals provide the continuity, availability, integrity and accuracy of satellite systems.
The Progress is Real
GPSIA is pleased to report that progress is being made in several areas outlined in its “whole-of-government” strategy. It’s time to accelerate that progress. In May 2026, GPSIA members will convene to evaluate this strategy and outline what more the PNT industry can do to play a part in defeating harmful interference. Our members also will meet with government officials to underpin that government-led enforcement and solutions to jamming and spoofing can further illustrate the importance of PNT to U.S. leadership in space, and national security, public safety and the global economy.
